Introduction

The case of Riccy Mabel Enriquez-Perdomo v. Ricardo A. Newman, et al. (54 F.4th 855) adjudicated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on July 22, 2021, addresses pivotal questions concerning the scope of federal court jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g) amidst the existence of Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA). This commentary delves into the case's background, the key legal issues at stake, the court's reasoning, and its broader implications for immigration law and constitutional claims against federal officials.

Summary of the Judgment

Ricardo Mabel Enriquez-Perdomo, a DACA recipient, filed a lawsuit against several ICE officers alleging violations of her First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights during her arrest and detention. The district court dismissed her claims, citing a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g). Upon appeal, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of her First Amendment claim but vacated the judgment concerning her other claims, remanding the case for further proceedings. The appellate court held that § 1252(g) did not preclude jurisdiction because Enriquez-Perdomo's DACA status rendered her removal order non-executable at the time of her detention.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

The judgment extensively references several key precedents that shape the interpretation of § 1252(g) and the availability of Bivens remedies:

• Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents (403 U.S. 388): Established an implied cause of action for constitutional violations by federal officers.
• Regents of the University of California v. Department of Homeland Security (Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.), 140 S.Ct. 1891 (2020): Clarified that DACA grants affirmative relief from removal but does not equate to lawful status.
• AADC v. Reno (525 U.S. 471), 119 S.Ct. 936 (1999): Interpreted § 1252(g) narrowly, limiting its scope to specific executive actions related to removal proceedings.
• Egbert v. Boule, 142 S.Ct. 1793 (2022): Outlined the two-step inquiry for determining the availability of a Bivens remedy.
• Silva v. United States, 866 F.3d 938 (8th Cir. 2017): Held that § 1252(g) barred jurisdiction for claims arising from the execution of removal orders.
• Arce v. United States, 899 F.3d 796 (9th Cir. 2018): Contrasted Silva by allowing jurisdiction where claims arose from violations of a court-ordered stay, not directly from removal orders.

These cases collectively inform the Sixth Circuit's nuanced approach to applying § 1252(g) in scenarios where removal orders interact with discretionary protections like DACA.

Legal Reasoning

The court's analysis centered on interpreting whether Enriquez-Perdomo's claims were barred by § 1252(g), which generally restricts federal courts from hearing cases arising from the execution of removal orders. The critical aspect was determining if the removal order was "executable" at the time of her detention.

The court employed a textual analysis, adhering to the principle that statutes should be interpreted based on their ordinary meaning in context. It concluded that § 1252(g) references "executables" removal orders—those actively subject to enforcement. Since Enriquez-Perdomo held DACA status, which provided affirmative relief from removal, her removal order was not executable during her detention. Therefore, her claims did not arise directly from the execution of a removal order, positioning her case outside the statutory bar.

Furthermore, the court considered Congress's purpose in enacting § 1252(g), emphasizing the intent to shield discretionary executive actions from judicial review. However, the court noted that DACA, by rendering a removal order non-executable, created an exception where the underlying removal action was effectively nullified. This interpretation aligns with the principle that when an executive decision does not result in the execution of a removal order, it does not fall within the jurisdictional bar.

On the issue of Bivens claims, the court affirmed the dismissal of the First Amendment retaliation claim based on established precedents that limit Bivens applicability. However, it vacated the judgment on Fourth and Fifth Amendment claims, citing the complexity of Bivens expansion and the need for further analysis on remand.

Impact

This judgment has significant implications for both immigration law and constitutional litigation against federal officials:

• Jurisdictional Clarity: By distinguishing between executable and non-executable removal orders, the Sixth Circuit provides a framework for evaluating the applicability of § 1252(g) in cases involving discretionary relief measures like DACA.
• Constitutional Claims Against Federal Officers: The decision underscores the limitations of pursuing constitutional remedies under Bivens, especially in the context of immigration enforcement where statutory bars are prominent.
• Deferred Action Policies: The ruling recognizes the protective scope of DACA, potentially encouraging other discretionary relief programs by affirming that they can shield individuals from certain executive removal actions.
• Guidance for Lower Courts: This decision offers lower courts a precedent when grappling with similar jurisdictional challenges, particularly in balancing executive discretion with individual constitutional protections.

Future cases will likely reference this judgment when addressing the boundaries of § 1252(g) and the viability of Bivens claims in immigration-related disputes.

Complex Concepts Simplified

8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)

A federal statute that restricts courts from hearing cases filed by or on behalf of non-citizens (aliens) arising from certain executive actions related to removal proceedings, specifically the commencement, adjudication, or execution of removal orders.

Bivens Remedy

A legal principle allowing individuals to seek monetary damages from federal officials alleged to have violated their constitutional rights, established in Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents. However, its applicability is limited and often disfavored unless explicitly recognized by the Supreme Court.

Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA)

An immigration policy enacted in 2012 that allows certain individuals who entered the United States as minors and meet specific criteria to request deferred action from deportation and obtain work authorization for renewable periods. DACA does not grant lawful status but provides temporary relief from removal.

Executable vs. Non-Executable Removal Orders

An executable removal order is one that the government can actively enforce, leading to the detention and deportation of the individual. A non-executable removal order is effectively inactive, often due to discretionary protections like DACA, meaning the individual cannot be currently detained or deported under that order.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit's decision in Enriquez-Perdomo v. Newman marks a nuanced interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g), particularly in the evolving landscape of immigration policies like DACA. By distinguishing between executable and non-executable removal orders, the court carved out a jurisdictional exception that acknowledges the protective scope of deferred action programs. This ruling not only provides a pathway for individuals under similar circumstances to seek constitutional redress but also delineates the boundaries of executive discretion in immigration enforcement. As immigration laws and policies continue to develop, this judgment will serve as a critical reference point for balancing individual rights against the executive branch's authority to enforce removal orders.