“Silence Is Not Consent” & the Objective Test for Attorney Conduct:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Marriage of Roadarmel (Sup. Ct. Mont. 2025)

I. Introduction

In Marriage of Roadarmel, the Montana Supreme Court (per Justice Shea) upheld Rule 11 sanctions against attorney Terry F. Schaplow and affirmed the District Court’s refusal to grant the lawyer relief under Rule 60(b)(6) despite the opposing party’s failure to file a responsive brief. Although the opinion was designated “non-citable” under the Court’s Internal Operating Rules, it offers valuable guidance on three recurring procedural points:

1. The discretionary nature of district-court action on unopposed motions under Uniform District Court Rule (MUDCR) 2;
2. The high threshold and “extraordinary circumstances” test for relief under M. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); and
3. The objective, reasonable-attorney standard that governs Rule 11(b) certifications, including sanctions for reckless or harassing allegations unsupported by fact or law.

The underlying dissolution involved Karli R. Roadarmel (now Thompson) and John “Mike” Roadarmel, but the appeal focused exclusively on Schaplow’s personal liability for $6,630.23 in attorney fees imposed as a Rule 11 sanction. The Supreme Court affirmed every challenged ruling, denied Karli’s motion to dismiss the appeal as frivolous, and declined further fees on appeal.

II. Summary of the Judgment

• Rule 60(b)(6) Denial. The District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Schaplow’s motion for relief from judgment. An unanswered motion is not automatically “well-taken,” and Rule 60(b)(6) cannot be used as a substitute for an appeal or as a vehicle to re-argue previously rejected contentions.
• Rule 11 Liability. De novo review confirmed that Schaplow’s written accusations—asserting that the Standing Master had “trafficked” children and that opposing counsel Caitlin Pabst had become the Standing Master’s “lawyer”—were:
  • Presented for an improper purpose (harassment);
  • Unsupported by existing law or any good-faith argument for changing the law; and
  • Lacking evidentiary support.
• Sanction Upheld. The fee award of $6,630.23, calculated under the Plath factors, was “appropriate” and within the District Court’s broad discretion.
• Appeal Not Frivolous. Although meritless, the appeal was not “entirely frivolous,” so no additional fees were awarded at the Supreme Court level.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion weaves together a line of Montana and persuasive federal cases:

1. In re Marriage of Remitz, 2018 MT 298 – Reaffirmed abuse-of-discretion review for Rule 60(b)(6) denials.
2. Estate of Boland, 2019 MT 236 – Provided the twin review standards for Rule 11 decisions: de novo for the violation, clear-error for underlying facts, abuse of discretion for sanction choice.
3. In re Marriage of Lundstrom, 2007 MT 304; State v. Loh, 275 Mont. 460 (1996) – Clarified that MUDCR 2’s “deemed admitted” clause is permissive, not mandatory.
4. Estate of Kinnaman v. Mountain West Bank, 2016 MT 25 – Described the “extraordinary circumstances” and “blameless movant” prerequisites for Rule 60(b)(6).
5. Jacildo v. McFadden, 253 Mont. 114 (1992) and D’Agostino v. Swanson, 240 Mont. 435 (1990) – Articulated the “objective reasonableness” test for Rule 11(b).
6. Christian v. Mattel, 286 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2002); In re Bees, 562 F.3d 284 (4th Cir. 2009) – Persuasive authority on the limited reach of Rule 11 to oral statements.
7. Eisenhart v. Puffer, 2008 MT 58; State v. Pizzola, 283 Mont. 522 (1997) – Mistaken reliance by appellant; both show that unanswered motions cannot transform legally defective requests into meritorious ones.

Together, these decisions furnished the doctrinal scaffolding for the Supreme Court’s holding: Rule 11 sanctions must be grounded in an objective test, and Rule 60(b)(6) relief is extraordinary, not routine.

B. Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 60(b)(6)
   • The Court examined whether “extraordinary circumstances” existed. None did; Schaplow merely re-argued assertions already litigated.
   • The non-response by Karli did not compel relief. Citing Lundstrom and Loh, the Court stressed that MUDCR 2 is permissive.
   • Reliance on Eisenhart was misplaced because there the court had no contrary record; here there was an extensive record negating the claims.
2. Rule 11(b) Violation
   • The Court asked whether a “reasonable attorney” after a “reasonable inquiry” could certify the challenged statements.
   • No Montana or foreign jurisdiction had ever used “child trafficking” as a metaphor for unequal parenting time. The allegations thus flunked Rule 11(b)(2) (legal basis) and 11(b)(3) (factual support).
   • The allegations against Pabst lacked any evidence; indeed they served an “improper purpose” under Rule 11(b)(1) – harassment.
3. Sanction Selection
   • Once a violation is found, Rule 11(c) states the court “shall impose” an appropriate sanction.
   • The fee award was tailored, tied directly to Karli’s costs in confronting the misconduct, and measured under the seven Plath factors.

C. Likely Impact on Montana Practice

1. Practical Reminder for Lawyers. Even though the opinion is “non-citable,” district courts will likely invoke its reasoning when practitioners invoke MUDCR 2 as a silver bullet or proffer inflammatory accusations without evidence.
2. Clarification of MUDCR 2. The decision reinforces that district-court discretion survives a party’s silence. Unopposed motions are not auto-wins.
3. Heightened Sensitivity to Harassing Pleadings. The Court’s willingness to uphold sanctions for “child-trafficking” rhetoric signals intolerance for hyperbole that impugns judicial integrity.
4. Rule 11 Self-Initiated Actions. The opinion demonstrates the procedural template for sua sponte Rule 11 action: notice, hearing, and written findings.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Rule 11(b) Certification. When a lawyer files a document, the rule assumes the lawyer has (a) a proper purpose, (b) a legal basis, and (c) evidentiary support. Violate any prong and sanctions may follow.
• “Objective Reasonableness.” The test is not what the attorney thought was true but what a hypothetical reasonable lawyer would conclude after a reasonable investigation.
• MUDCR 2 “Deemed Admission.” Failure to answer a motion lets the court grant it summarily, but the court is not compelled to do so and may deny it if the underlying request lacks merit.
• Rule 60(b)(6). A catch-all escape hatch from final judgments—but only for truly exceptional cases where the movant is blameless and equity demands relief. It is not a mulligan for losing arguments.
• “Non-Citable” Opinions. Under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules, some memorandum opinions may not be cited as precedent. They still illuminate how the Court applies settled law to new facts.

V. Conclusion

Marriage of Roadarmel reiterates core procedural truths: (1) silence from the opposing side does not guarantee victory, (2) Rule 60(b)(6) relief is extraordinary, and (3) Rule 11 imposes an objective duty of candor, punishing rhetoric that is untethered to law or fact. While labelled “non-precedential,” the opinion offers a cautionary tale to Montana practitioners: unchecked hyperbole can draw personal financial sanctions, and attempts to recycle rejected arguments through procedural side-doors will meet a firm judicial response. The case thus quietly fortifies Montana’s broader commitment to civility, evidentiary rigor, and judicial economy.