United States v. Cabrera & Pacheco (6th Cir. 2025): Clarifying the “Business of Laundering” Enhancement and Safe-Harbor Parameters for Supplemental Jury Instructions

Introduction

In July 2025 the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit delivered a published-but-non-precedential opinion resolving a consolidated appeal brought by Ruvi Beaney Pacheco and Claudio Everardo Cabrera, Jr., romantic partners convicted in the Eastern District of Kentucky for (i) conspiracy to commit money laundering and (ii) promotional money laundering. Each received a 110-month term of imprisonment derived from Guideline calculations under USSG §2S1.1 (laundering) and §2B1.1 (loss table).

The appellants raised four issues:

Whether the trial judge erred in answering a factual question from deliberating jurors about canine-alert testimony.
Whether the district court overstated the loss amount attributable to each defendant.
Whether the four-level enhancement for being “in the business of laundering funds” was misapplied.
(Cabrera only) Whether he qualified for a two-level mitigating-role reduction as a minor participant.

The Sixth Circuit (Boggs, J.) rejected each contention, offering notable doctrinal refinement on two fronts: (1) how far a trial court may go in answering jurors’ fact-bound questions without invading the jury function and (2) how broadly the “in the business of laundering funds” enhancement may sweep, especially when the defendants function as roving cash couriers without an obviously formal “laundering enterprise.”

Summary of the Judgment

Supplemental Instruction: No abuse of discretion occurred when the district judge confirmed, in a short written note, that officer testimony established the use of a drug-sniffing dog—so long as the judge simultaneously reminded jurors to consider the evidence as a whole.
Loss Calculation: The court correctly attributed (a) $80k delivered to Pacheco’s brother, (b) $100k delivered to Cabrera, and (c) $196,870 seized at the airport, using the “jointly undertaken criminal activity/relevant conduct” doctrine of §1B1.3.
Business-of-Laundering Enhancement (§2S1.1(b)(2)(C)): The enhancement does not require proof that defendants were “professional fences” or derived “substantial revenue.” Regular and extended engagement in multiple pickups across the country suffices.
Minor Role Reduction: Cabrera forfeited the argument by mentioning it only in a headnote.
Outcome: Convictions and 110-month sentences AFFIRMED.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Harvey, 653 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2011)
Established that rereading (or summarising) limited testimony to address jurors’ questions, with cautionary instructions, falls within the trial court’s discretion. Cabrera extends Harvey by approving even a single-sentence confirmation of undisputed testimony, so long as the court:
- consults counsel,
- confines itself to an objectively undisputed fact, and
- re-orients the jury to the totality of the evidence.
United States v. Giacalone, 588 F.2d 1158 (6th Cir. 1978) & United States v. Valentine, 553 F. App’x 591 (6th Cir. 2014)
Provide framework for appellate review of supplemental instructions. Cabrera re-affirms the abuse-of-discretion standard.
United States v. Donadeo, 910 F.3d 886 (6th Cir. 2018)
A seminal §1B1.3 case detailing how to decide if co-conspirator conduct is within the scope, in furtherance, and reasonably foreseeable. The panel imported Donadeo’s six-factor “single scheme / modus operandi / coordination” test and applied it to attribute the December 7 pickup accomplished by Pacheco’s brother.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Supplemental Jury Instruction

The court stressed two “inherent dangers” in replaying evidence: undue emphasis and loss of context. It held that dangers were minimized because (i) the jurors’ question was narrow and fact-specific; (ii) parties agreed the testimony was undisputed; (iii) the judge framed the answer as “testimony was presented …” rather than vouching; and (iv) a cautionary instruction directed the jury to its collective memory.

2. Attributing Loss Amounts

Applying §1B1.3(a)(1)(B), the panel performed a two-step inquiry:

Scope Determination: The defendants’ agreement encompassed coordinated pickups using identical logistics (same hotel, same false “visiting family” explanation, consecutive flights, etc.). Thus, the brother’s and Nemetz’s transactions fell within the shared plan.
In-Furtherance & Foreseeability: Deliveries of bulk currency in Lexington furthered the laundering objective and were reasonably foreseeable given the identical modus operandi and evidence of text contact between Cabrera and Pacheco’s brother.

On the December 20 $100k estimate, Agent Morris’s surveillance/video plus pattern evidence satisfied §2B1.1 cmt. 3(C)’s “reasonable estimate” standard.

3. “In the Business of Laundering Funds” (§2S1.1(b)(2)(C))

The panel rejected the defense effort to turn the commentary’s six factors into a cumulative or heightened threshold (e.g., requiring proof of “substantial profits”). Instead, it treated the factors as alternatives feeding a holistic, totality-of-circumstances test. Evidence satisfied at least three factors:

Regular engagement (multiple pickups across a ten-month span),
Extended period of activity, and
Funds from multiple brokers/sources.

Because the list is non-exhaustive, the regimented travel/hotel pattern further signaled a commercial-like laundering enterprise. The opinion therefore lowers any perceived bar that only professional third-party launderers (e.g., currency-exchange storefronts) trigger the 4-level bump.

4. Minor-Participant Reduction

Cabrera’s perfunctory briefing doomed the claim; the court reiterated the rule that undeveloped or conclusory statements constitute forfeiture.

C. Impact of the Decision

Sentencing: Prosecutors and probation officers in the Sixth Circuit now possess clearer authority to recommend the §2S1.1(b)(2)(C) enhancement where defendants act as itinerant couriers, even absent seized business ledgers or profit evidence. Defense counsel must marshal concrete rebuttal on the six commentary factors.
Trial Management: Trial judges gain comfort that narrowly tailored factual answers to jury notes are permissible if: (i) parties are consulted; (ii) the fact is undisputed; (iii) the answer is succinct; and (iv) an immediate context-restoring instruction is given.
Conspiracy Doctrine: The opinion underlines the breadth of “jointly undertaken activity.” Physical separation or lack of direct communication does not insulate a defendant from co-conspirator loss amounts when the logistics are cookie-cutter.
Appellate Practice: The court’s forfeiture holding reinforces the need for full argumentation in appellate briefs.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Abuse of Discretion: A deferential review standard. The appellate court asks whether the trial judge made a decision that was unreasonable or irrational, not whether it would have decided differently.
Relevant Conduct (§1B1.3): In federal sentencing, a defendant can be punished for additional acts by co-conspirators if those acts were part of the jointly undertaken plan and were reasonably foreseeable.
“Business of Laundering”: A 4-level Guideline enhancement triggered when laundering resembles an ongoing venture—regular, extended, multi-source—even if it is not a formal company.
Clear Error: A factual finding is clearly erroneous only when the appellate court, after reviewing all the evidence, is firmly convinced a mistake was made.
Supplemental Jury Instruction: Additional guidance a judge gives to a deliberating jury to clarify law or evidence. Allowed, but must avoid tipping the scale.

Conclusion

United States v. Cabrera & Pacheco carries dual precedential value within the Sixth Circuit. First, it delineates a pragmatic safe-harbor for trial judges responding to juror fact questions, endorsing efficient, pinpoint confirmations when coupled with a cautionary reminder. Second, it lowers any artificial barrier to the “business of laundering funds” enhancement, signaling that serial cash couriers who operate with flight-and-hotel precision are fair game for the 4-level increase even without traditional trappings of a laundering storefront or profit ledger.

Practitioners should read the opinion as a call to:

Document every coordinated act that reflects a shared modus operandi when litigating relevant-conduct disputes; and
Prepare robust Guideline objections (or concessions) grounded in the §2S1.1 commentary factors.

In the broader landscape of money-laundering jurisprudence, Cabrera underscores the judiciary’s willingness to treat recurrent courier activity as a business, reinforcing deterrence in an era of increasingly itinerant laundering networks.