Trial Courts, Not the Division, Decide “Work‑Relatedness” When the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive‑Remedy Defense Is Raised Outside the Benefits Process

Trial Courts, Not the Division, Decide “Work‑Relatedness” When the Workers’ Compensation Exclusive‑Remedy Defense Is Raised Outside the Benefits Process

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Rita Oteka, Supreme Court of Texas (June 13, 2025)

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court of Texas’s decision in The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka answers a recurring and practically important question in Texas workers’ compensation and tort practice: who decides whether an injury is “work‑related” when the issue arises only as a defense to a civil damages claim, and the employee has not sought workers’ compensation benefits?

The Court holds that the Division of Workers’ Compensation (the “Division”) does not have exclusive jurisdiction in that scenario. Instead, district courts retain subject‑matter jurisdiction to decide whether an injury occurred in the “course and scope of employment” when:

  • the issue is raised only through the employer’s workers’ compensation exclusive‑remedy defense, and
  • the employee’s lawsuit does not depend on any entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

In doing so, the Court resolves a split among the courts of appeals, disapproving a line of cases that had required employees to go through the administrative system to obtain a course‑and‑scope ruling even when they had not claimed benefits. The opinion clarifies the reach of the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction and re‑emphasizes the constitutional and statutory presumption that Texas district courts remain the default fora for adjudicating private disputes.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Incident

  • Parties:
    • Plaintiff/Respondent: Rita Oteka, a faculty member (clinical track) at The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley (UTRGV).
    • Defendant/Petitioner: The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, a component institution of the University of Texas System and a self‑insured employer under the Texas Workers’ Compensation Act as modified by Labor Code Chapter 503.
  • Event: Oteka voluntarily attended a commencement ceremony to support former students. While walking to her car after the ceremony at a leased convention center, she was struck and injured by a vehicle driven by a UTRGV police officer.

B. The Initial Workers’ Compensation Handling

  • UTRGV, as a self‑insured employer, reported the injury to its third‑party claims administrator.
  • When asked about workers’ compensation, Oteka stated she would use personal insurance.
  • The claims administrator then sent a letter to both Oteka and the Division stating that benefits were denied because:
    • she was seeking treatment under her own insurance and not pursuing benefits;
    • no supporting medical evidence had been presented; and
    • based on its investigation, the injury did not arise out of and in the course and scope of her employment.
  • Crucially, Oteka did not contest this denial and never filed a workers’ compensation claim with the Division. She alleges she did not file because the carrier had confirmed what she believed: her injury was not work‑related.

C. The Tort Suit and the Exclusive‑Remedy Defense

  • More than a year later, Oteka filed a negligence suit:
    • initially against the individual police officer;
    • UTRGV was later substituted in as the defendant under a Rule 11 agreement, consistent with the governmental‑unit substitution rules in the Texas Tort Claims Act (TTCA), Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 101.021, 101.025, 101.106(f).
  • UTRGV raised the workers’ compensation exclusive‑remedy defense (Labor Code § 408.001(a)), arguing that:
    • Oteka was a covered employee;
    • her injuries were sustained in the course and scope of her employment; and
    • therefore, recovery of workers’ compensation benefits was her exclusive remedy, barring the tort action.
  • Course‑and‑scope dispute:
    • Oteka’s position: The injury was not work‑related because attendance was voluntary, and she had already left the ceremony when she was struck.
    • UTRGV’s position: Clinical‑track faculty are expected to attend at least one ceremony per year as part of the required 10% “service” component of their duties, and the injury occurred in the parking lot serving the event, thus within the course and scope of employment.
  • The parties filed cross‑motions for summary judgment on the exclusive‑remedy defense. This was the first time the course‑and‑scope / work‑relatedness issue was formally disputed.

D. The Carrier’s Reversal and the Plea to the Jurisdiction

  • Thirty‑one months after the incident, and about a year after UTRGV had first asserted the exclusive‑remedy defense, the claims administrator sent a new letter to Oteka stating her injury was now being:
    • “accepted as compensable,” and
    • benefits would be paid.
    This reopening of compensability proceeded under Labor Code § 409.021(d), which allows reopening on newly discovered evidence.
  • The next day, UTRGV filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing:
    • The Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury is in the course and scope of employment (i.e., compensability); and
    • Because Oteka never filed a compensation claim, she failed to exhaust administrative remedies, so her suit must be dismissed for lack of subject‑matter jurisdiction.
  • The trial court denied the plea to the jurisdiction.

E. Court of Appeals and Conflicting Authority

  • The Thirteenth Court of Appeals (Corpus Christi–Edinburg) affirmed, relying on its own earlier decision in Berry Contracting, L.P. v. Mann, 549 S.W.3d 314 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2018, pet. denied).
  • The court held that:
    • the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction “does not extend to all cases that touch on workers’ compensation issues,” and
    • trial courts routinely determine whether the exclusive‑remedy defense applies.
  • It acknowledged contrary precedent from other courts of appeals—most notably:
    • In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding);
    • Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018, no pet.);
    • In re Hellas Construction, Inc., No. 03‑21‑00182‑CV, 2022 WL 2975702 (Tex. App.—Austin July 28, 2022, orig. proceeding [mand. denied]); and
    • later cases such as In re Prentis, 702 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding).
  • Those decisions had held or strongly suggested that the Division has exclusive jurisdiction over whether an injury occurred in the course and scope of employment.
  • Because of this split, the Texas Supreme Court granted review to resolve the conflict.

III. Summary of the Court’s Holding

The Supreme Court (Justice Devine, writing for the Court) held:

The Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether an injury was work‑related in a dispute arising outside of the compensability context when the employee’s requested relief does not depend on entitlement to benefits.

More concretely:

  • The Workers’ Compensation Act gives the Division exclusive jurisdiction to determine entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits and to adjudicate disputes about compensability and claims‑handling.
  • But the Act does not divest district courts of jurisdiction to determine:
    • whether an injury was in the course and scope of employment,
    • when that question arises only as part of a defense (the exclusive‑remedy bar) to a tort suit, and
    • no benefits claim has been filed and the employee’s requested relief does not rest on an entitlement to benefits.
  • The plea to the jurisdiction was therefore properly denied, and the district court may determine whether the injury is “work‑related” for purposes of the exclusive‑remedy defense.
  • The Court expressly disapproves of the contrary holdings of several courts of appeals, including: Tyler Asphalt, Berrelez, Hellas, In re Prentis, and In re Texas Mutual Insurance Co. (San Antonio 2025).

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

IV. Legal Framework and Precedents

A. Constitutional and Statutory Baseline: District‑Court Jurisdiction

The Court starts from first principles:

  • Texas district courts have constitutional jurisdiction over “all actions, proceedings, and remedies” except where jurisdiction is expressly or by necessary implication given exclusively to some other court or administrative body. (Tex. Const. art. V, § 8; Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 24.007(a), 24.008.)
  • Administrative agencies, by contrast, have only those powers “expressly conferred” by statute and those “necessary to accomplish [their] duties.” (In re CenterPoint Energy Houston Electric, LLC, 629 S.W.3d 149, 156 (Tex. 2021).)
  • There is no presumption that an agency’s jurisdiction is concurrent or exclusive; the party invoking agency exclusivity has the burden to show that the Legislature clearly divested the courts of jurisdiction. (Pape Partners, Ltd. v. DRR Family Properties LP, 645 S.W.3d 267, 271–72 (Tex. 2022).)
  • The Court describes this as requiring a “compelling showing” and presumes that district‑court jurisdiction “remains undisturbed” unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise. (S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d 428, 436 (Tex. 2022).)

Thus, the central statutory question is whether the Workers’ Compensation Act either:

  • expressly grants the Division exclusive original jurisdiction over the course‑and‑scope issue in this defensive posture, or
  • creates a pervasive regulatory scheme so comprehensive that it implies the administrative process is the exclusive means of resolving that issue, even outside the compensability/benefits context. (In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 322 (Tex. 2004).)

B. The Workers’ Compensation Act: Core Provisions

Key statutory components discussed by the Court include:

  • Basic coverage and eligibility:
    • Employees subject to the Act who suffer a “compensable injury” are entitled to benefits “without regard to fault or negligence.” (Tex. Lab. Code §§ 406.031(a), 406.032, 401.011(10) (defining “compensable injury”).)
    • “Course and scope of employment” is a defined concept in § 401.011(12).
  • Exclusive remedy (substantive immunity):
    “Recovery of workers’ compensation benefits is the exclusive remedy of an employee covered by workers’ compensation insurance coverage … against the employer … for a work‑related injury.” (Tex. Lab. Code § 408.001(a).)
  • Administration and adjudication:
    • The Division administers the system and adjudicates disputes over benefits through a four‑tier process: (1) benefit review conference; (2) contested‑case hearing; (3) appeals panel; (4) judicial review. (Tex. Lab. Code ch. 410.)
    • Judicial review of compensability/benefits determinations is under a modified de novo standard with a jury right (Labor Code §§ 410.301, 410.304), while “other issues” are reviewed under substantial‑evidence standards (Labor Code § 410.255(b); Gov’t Code § 2001.175(e)).
  • Claim prerequisites:
    • Only an “employee or a person acting on the employee’s behalf” may file a compensation claim. (§ 409.003.)
    • A “compensation claim” is, by definition, a claim for payment of benefits based on an injury that arises in the course and scope of employment and “for which compensation is payable.” (§ 401.011(5), (10), (11).)
    • The claim must be filed within one year of the injury, absent “good cause” or certain other statutory exceptions. (§§ 409.003, 409.004.)
  • Exclusive jurisdiction precedent:
    • American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801 (Tex. 2001): The Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine entitlement to benefits. A court cannot award damages for denial or delay of benefits without the Division first deciding that the benefits were due.
    • Ruttiger and Accident Fund: the Act provides the exclusive process and remedies for claims arising out of an insurer’s investigation, handling, or settlement of a workers’ compensation claim. (In re Accident Fund General Insurance Co., 543 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. 2017).)

From these provisions and precedents, the Court re‑affirms that the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction covers:

  • disputes about whether benefits are owed (compensability), and
  • claims that arise out of the handling, denial, or delay of those benefits.

The question is whether that exclusive jurisdiction extends further, to any civil dispute in which “course and scope” or “work‑relatedness” is at issue—even when no one is asking for benefits.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. No Express Grant of Exclusive Jurisdiction Over Defensive Course‑and‑Scope Issues

First, the Court notes UTRGV concedes that:

  • the Workers’ Compensation Act does not expressly grant the Division exclusive jurisdiction to decide the exclusive‑remedy defense itself; and
  • the Division likewise does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide:
    • the existence or breadth of an employer’s workers’ compensation insurance coverage.

Yet UTRGV argued that any “course and scope” question must go first to the Division. The Court rejects that proposition as incompatible with both:

  • the text of the Act; and
  • the constitutional presumption in favor of district‑court jurisdiction.

B. The Structural Problem: No Standing Mechanism for a Stand‑Alone Course‑and‑Scope Determination

The Court’s most concrete and practical reason for rejecting exclusive Division jurisdiction in this setting is structural:

  • The Division’s dispute‑resolution machinery—benefit review conferences, contested‑case hearings, appeals—exists to resolve disputed workers’ compensation claims.
  • To trigger that machinery, there must be a compensation claim—a claim for the payment of benefits—filed by the employee or someone acting for the employee.
  • There is no independent procedural vehicle in the Act for either party to ask the Division: “Was this injury work‑related?” if no one is actually claiming benefits.

In other words:

The Act lacks a procedural mechanism for the employee or employer to obtain a course‑and‑scope finding from the Division without the employee first filing a compensation claim.

The Court emphasizes that the Legislature defined a “claim” as seeking benefits for an injury “arising out of and in the course and scope of employment.” So the employee, to get a ruling that her injury was not in the course and scope, would have to:

  • file a claim asserting she was entitled to benefits (because the injury was in the course and scope),
  • while simultaneously arguing against that position before the Division,
  • in a setting where the employer/carrier—having raised an exclusive‑remedy defense in the civil case—would likely not contest her entitlement to benefits.

The Court accurately labels this a “somewhat unusual” and fundamentally awkward posture, citing Douglas v. Moody Gardens, Inc., 2007 WL 4442617 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, no pet.), where a worker tried to argue her injury was not compensable in order to avoid the exclusivity bar.

Given:

  • the absence of a clean statutory path for a non‑benefits course‑and‑scope determination, and
  • the Court’s interpretive presumption that what the Legislature omitted was omitted purposefully,

the Court concludes the Legislature did not intend the Division’s process to be the exclusive means of determining course and scope when that issue arises only as a defensive matter in a civil suit.

C. Prior Supreme Court Treatment of the Exclusive‑Remedy Defense

The Court further supports its jurisdictional conclusion by pointing to its own prior decisions where it:

  • reached the merits of an exclusive‑remedy defense, including course‑and‑scope issues,
  • without requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies or suggesting the Division had exclusive jurisdiction.

Examples include:

  • Walls Regional Hospital v. Bomar, 9 S.W.3d 805 (Tex. 1999):
    • Nurses sued their hospital employer for negligently allowing a physician with staff privileges to sexually harass them.
    • The Court decided whether their injuries arose out of an act of a “third person” for personal reasons and thus were excluded under Labor Code § 406.032(1)(C).
    • It held the injuries occurred “in the course of their employment” and that the Act barred their negligence claims.
    • At no point did the Court suggest the trial court lacked jurisdiction or that the case needed to be abated for a Division ruling.
  • Waste Management of Texas, Inc. v. Stevenson, 622 S.W.3d 273 (Tex. 2021): discussed employee status and the exclusive‑remedy defense on the merits.
  • City of Bellaire v. Johnson, 400 S.W.3d 922 (Tex. 2013): addressed employee status in the exclusive‑remedy context.
  • Garza v. Exel Logistics, Inc., 161 S.W.3d 473 (Tex. 2005): considered employer status and coverage issues under the Act.
  • GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605 (Tex. 1999): analyzed whether mental‑anguish injuries from extreme workplace harassment were “injuries” within the Act (and, ultimately, held the Act did not bar certain intentional‑tort/mental‑anguish claims).

The Court acknowledges that a failure to raise jurisdiction in those cases does not create binding “precedent” on jurisdiction. But it does show that in exercising their duty to ensure subject‑matter jurisdiction is secure, neither the parties nor the Court saw any jurisdictional obstacle to adjudicating the exclusive‑remedy defense.

If the Division’s jurisdiction truly were exclusive over all course‑and‑scope determinations, the Court notes, every Texas court would be duty‑bound to dismiss cases sua sponte whenever course and scope was in dispute. (S.C. v. M.B., 650 S.W.3d at 449.)

D. Drawing the Line: When the Division’s Exclusive Jurisdiction Applies

The Court is careful to reaffirm the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction where it clearly applies:

  • The Division has exclusive jurisdiction to determine:
    • a claimant’s entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits (compensability), and
    • claims that “arise out of” the investigation, handling, or settlement of such claims.
    (Am. Motorists Ins. Co. v. Fodge, 63 S.W.3d 801; In re Accident Fund, 543 S.W.3d 750; In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920 (Tex. 2015).)
  • When an employee’s damages suit is predicated on entitlement to benefits (for example, seeking damages for wrongful denial or delay of benefits), she cannot “circumvent” the Division’s exclusive authority by going straight to court.
  • In such cases, exhaustion of administrative remedies is mandatory before a court may exercise jurisdiction.

But those principles do not extend to cases like this one, where:

  • the employee seeks traditional tort damages for an injury she alleges is not work‑related; and
  • she neither claims nor depends upon any right to workers’ compensation benefits in her lawsuit.

In that defensive context, the Act:

  • does not provide a clear administrative means to get a stand‑alone course‑and‑scope determination, and
  • does not clearly vest the Division with exclusive jurisdiction to decide the issue first.

Accordingly, the Court concludes the presumption in favor of district‑court jurisdiction is not overcome.

E. Disapproval of Contrary Court of Appeals Decisions

The Court expressly disapproves of the holdings (to the extent inconsistent with this opinion) in:

  • In re Texas Mutual Insurance Co., No. 04‑24‑00386‑CV, 2025 WL 610877 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 26, 2025, orig. proceeding)
  • In re Prentis, 702 S.W.3d 762 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2024, orig. proceeding)
  • In re Hellas Construction, Inc., 2022 WL 2975702 (Tex. App.—Austin)
  • Berrelez v. Mesquite Logistics USA, Inc., 562 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2018)
  • In re Tyler Asphalt & Gravel Co., 107 S.W.3d 832 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, orig. proceeding)

Those decisions broadly read the Division’s “compensability” jurisdiction to encompass all course‑and‑scope questions, even when raised only as a defense in a civil suit with no benefits claim at stake. The Supreme Court narrows that reading, confining the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction to disputes over entitlement to benefits and related claims‑handling issues.

VI. Policy Concerns and Safeguards

A. The Exclusive‑Remedy Provision Remains Central

The Court reiterates the importance of the exclusive‑remedy provision to the legislative compromise underlying the Workers’ Compensation Act:

  • Employees get relatively swift and certain benefits without having to prove fault.
  • In exchange, employers obtain limited liability for work‑related injuries and immunity from most tort claims (“exclusive remedy”).
  • If employers had to both provide workers’ compensation and defend/pay for accidental injuries in tort, their ability to spread risk through manageable insurance premiums would be undermined, disturbing the “balance of advantage and detriment.” (Mo‑Vac Service Co. v. Escobedo, 603 S.W.3d 119, 125 (Tex. 2020), quoting Reed Tool Co. v. Copelin, 689 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. 1985).)

The Court’s holding is jurisdictional only:

  • It does not alter the substantive scope of the exclusive‑remedy defense.
  • If the district court finds Oteka’s injury was work‑related and she was covered, the exclusive‑remedy bar will apply, and her tort claim will fail, regardless of who decides course and scope.

B. Concern: Employees “Forum Shopping” for Tort Damages First

UTRGV and amicus Texas Mutual Insurance Co. argued that if the Division does not have exclusive jurisdiction, injured workers will be tempted to:

  • skip the administrative system entirely,
  • file civil suits first to try for higher tort damages, and
  • only later, if the tort claim fails, seek workers’ compensation benefits.

The Court takes this concern seriously but identifies existing statutory and procedural safeguards that constrain such behavior.

C. Safeguard 1: One‑Year Claim Deadline and “Good Cause” Standard

  • An employee must file a compensation claim with the Division within one year of the injury. (§ 409.003.)
  • If the employee does not, the employer and carrier are relieved of liability unless:
    • the claim is uncontested, or
    • “good cause” exists for the late filing. (§ 409.004.)
  • “Good cause” requires the claimant to prosecute the claim with the diligence of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circumstances, and that good cause persist up to the date the claim is actually filed. (Lee v. Houston Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 530 S.W.2d 294, 296 (Tex. 1975); Hawkins v. Safety Casualty Co., 207 S.W.2d 370 (Tex. 1948).)
  • The Court notes that merely wanting to “take a shot” at a larger tort recovery before turning to benefits would not qualify as good cause.
  • As a practical matter, the one‑year deadline makes it unlikely a civil suit (including appeals) could fully run its course before the claim‑filing deadline expires. Thus, an employee who wants to preserve both avenues must file a Division claim within that year, even while a tort suit is pending.

The Court also notes that employer communications can be relevant to good cause. For example, an employer’s explicit statement that an injury is not work‑related may, under some circumstances, support good cause for a late‑filed claim. (Lee, 530 S.W.2d at 297.)

D. Safeguard 2: Abatement and Prudential Case Management

The Court then addresses the problem of parallel proceedings: what if:

  • the employee has a civil suit pending, and
  • a workers’ compensation claim concerning the same injury and course‑and‑scope issue is also pending before the Division?

In such cases, the Court suggests that trial courts may (and sometimes should) rely on traditional abatement and prudential doctrines to avoid:

  • duplicative litigation,
  • conflicting rulings, and
  • unnecessary expense and confusion.

The Court cites:

  • Dolenz v. Continental National Bank of Fort Worth, 620 S.W.2d 572, 575 (Tex. 1981): courts may abate actions for comity, convenience, and orderly procedure.
  • In re Luby’s Cafeterias, Inc., 979 S.W.2d 813, 816 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, orig. proceeding): a personal‑injury suit was abated while a related workers’ compensation claim was pending.
  • In re Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 226 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. 2007): courts may refer certain issues to an agency and abate litigation under primary‑jurisdiction principles.

The Court is explicit that, although these tools may be available, it does not decide how or when they would apply in this specific case because:

  • no workers’ compensation claim was pending before the Division; and
  • UTRGV sought only dismissal (until oral argument), not abatement.

Thus, this opinion is limited to the jurisdictional question; any doctrine of referral or abatement in similar cases is left for another day.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Exclusive Remedy” vs. “Exclusive Jurisdiction”

  • Exclusive remedy (Labor Code § 408.001(a)):
    • A substantive immunity rule.
    • If the injury is work‑related and the employee is covered, then workers’ compensation benefits are the employee’s only remedy against the employer—no negligence suit.
  • Exclusive jurisdiction:
    • A procedural and structural jurisdiction rule.
    • It determines who gets to decide certain issues first: a court or an administrative agency.
    • If an agency has exclusive jurisdiction, a court cannot decide those issues until the administrative process is exhausted.

This case is about exclusive jurisdiction, not exclusive remedy. The Court does not change when the exclusive‑remedy defense applies; it simply holds that, in a particular setting, the trial court—not the Division—has the power to decide whether the injury was work‑related for purposes of that defense.

B. “Course and Scope of Employment” and “Work‑Related Injury”

  • “Course and scope of employment” is a defined term (Labor Code § 401.011(12)) that generally means:
    • the employee is performing tasks or services for the employer,
    • within the furtherance of the employer’s business,
    • including activities related to or originating in work, during work hours or on the employer’s premises (with many case‑law nuances: travel, parking lots, special missions, “coming and going” rule, etc.).
  • A “work‑related injury” for purposes of § 408.001(a) (exclusive remedy) is close to, but not necessarily identical with, “course and scope” as defined in the Act.
  • The Court notes, citing Payne v. Galen Hospital Corp., 28 S.W.3d 15 (Tex. 2000), that whether “course and scope” for compensation purposes is always coextensive with “work‑related” for exclusivity purposes remains an open question. This opinion does not resolve that substantive question; it addresses only who decides.

C. “Compensability Context”

When the Court speaks of disputes arising “outside of the compensability context,” it means:

  • the case does not involve a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, and
  • no party is asking the Division (or the court on judicial review) to decide whether benefits are owed.

By contrast, in cases like Fodge and Ruttiger, the disputes directly concerned entitlement to benefits or claims‑handling, and thus were squarely within the compensability context where the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction applies.

D. “Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies”

  • “Exhaustion” means a party must complete the entire administrative process (e.g., benefit review conference, contested‑case hearing, appeals panel) before a court can hear the dispute.
  • In Texas workers’ compensation, this is required when the lawsuit depends on a determination of entitlements that the Act gives the Division exclusive authority to make.
  • In Oteka, exhaustion is not required because:
    • no benefits are being sought; and
    • the Act does not give the Division exclusive jurisdiction over defensive course‑and‑scope issues in a stand‑alone tort suit.

VIII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact: Clarifying the Division’s Domain

This decision significantly clarifies the contours of the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction:

  • Within the Division’s exclusive domain:
    • Whether a worker suffered a compensable injury for which benefits are payable;
    • Extent of disability and amount/type of benefits;
    • Disputes regarding claims‑handling, including delays, denials, and alleged bad faith (within the limits of the post‑1990 Act);
    • Other issues that the statute explicitly or by necessary implication assigns to the Division in connection with benefits adjudication.
  • Outside the Division’s exclusive domain (under this case):
    • Determining whether an injury is work‑related when:
      • the employee has not filed a compensation claim,
      • no benefits are sought or at issue, and
      • the issue arises solely as part of the employer’s exclusive‑remedy defense in a civil damages action.
    • Certain coverage and status questions (existence/breadth of coverage; employer or employee status) when raised in tort litigation rather than in a benefits claim.

B. Practical Implications for Employees and Claimants

  • An employee injured in circumstances where work‑relatedness is disputed may:
    • file a civil suit alleging the injury is not work‑related; and
    • litigate the exclusive‑remedy defense—including course and scope—in the district court, without first seeking a Division ruling, provided no benefits are at issue.
  • But to avoid forfeiting workers’ compensation benefits entirely, an employee must:
    • file a compensation claim with the Division within one year of the injury, or
    • be prepared to show good cause for any late filing.
  • Employees cannot safely “wait and see” how the civil suit turns out before deciding whether to file for benefits; delaying past the one‑year mark risks losing all entitlement to benefits.

C. Practical Implications for Employers and Carriers

  • Employers (and their carriers) can no longer insist that the Division must decide all course‑and‑scope disputes first whenever they assert exclusive remedy. Trial courts will often decide that issue themselves.
  • Strategically, employers should:
    • raise the exclusive‑remedy defense early,
    • be consistent in their position on course and scope (statements denying work‑relatedness can later support an employee’s good‑cause argument for a late compensation claim), and
    • consider whether to encourage employees to file Division claims timely when work‑relatedness is genuinely uncertain.
  • If parallel proceedings arise (a tort suit and a Division claim), employers and carriers should consider seeking abatement or referral under primary‑jurisdiction principles to avoid duplicative litigation and conflicting rulings.

D. Practical Guidance for Courts

  • Trial courts faced with exclusive‑remedy defenses in cases where no compensation claim is pending should:
    • recognize they have subject‑matter jurisdiction to decide whether the injury was work‑related; and
    • avoid dismissing for failure to exhaust administrative remedies solely because course and scope is disputed.
  • If a workers’ compensation claim is or later becomes pending before the Division, courts should:
    • evaluate whether abatement or limited issue‑referral to the Division is appropriate to promote efficiency and consistency,
    • while respecting the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction over benefits entitlement.

E. Impact on Governmental Units and the Tort Claims Act

  • Governmental units like UTRGV enjoy the same workers’ compensation privileges and immunities as private employers if they have workers’ compensation coverage (or self‑insurance). (Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 101.028; Tex. Lab. Code ch. 503.)
  • When a governmental unit asserts both:
    • the TTCA motor‑vehicle waiver (as a basis for jurisdiction), and
    • the exclusive‑remedy bar (as a defense),
    the trial court must now be prepared to decide the course‑and‑scope / work‑relatedness question itself, absent a pending Division proceeding.
  • If the court finds the injury was work‑related and the worker was covered, the TTCA suit is barred by exclusive remedy, and the worker’s recourse is through the workers’ comp system (subject to claim‑filing rules).

IX. Conclusion: Key Takeaways and the Broader Significance

The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley v. Oteka is a significant clarification of Texas law at the intersection of workers’ compensation, civil tort claims, and administrative jurisdiction. Its central holding can be summarized as follows:

When an employee sues for a non‑work‑related injury and the employer responds with the workers’ compensation exclusive‑remedy defense, the Division of Workers’ Compensation does not have exclusive jurisdiction to decide whether the injury was work‑related, so long as the employee is not claiming or depending on entitlement to workers’ compensation benefits.

The decision:

  • reinforces the constitutional presumption that district courts retain broad jurisdiction unless the Legislature clearly says otherwise;
  • reaffirms the Division’s exclusive jurisdiction in the compensability/benefits context while cabining it from creeping into all disputes that merely “touch” on workers’ compensation concepts;
  • resolves a long‑standing split among the courts of appeals and disapproves a line of cases that had over‑extended the Division’s jurisdiction; and
  • provides pragmatic guidance and underscores existing safeguards—most notably the one‑year claim deadline and the availability of abatement—to maintain the balance and efficiency of the workers’ compensation system.

Going forward, Texas practitioners should understand that:

  • exclusive remedy (substantive immunity) and exclusive jurisdiction (procedural forum allocation) are distinct;
  • trial courts may—and often must—decide course‑and‑scope issues in tort suits when no benefits claim is at stake; and
  • timely use of the workers’ compensation system remains essential for preserving benefit rights, even when parallel or antecedent tort litigation is contemplated.

In striking this balance, the Court preserves the integrity of the workers’ compensation bargain while respecting the foundational role of the district courts as Texas’s courts of general jurisdiction.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Texas

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