Thieriot v. Laggner: Application of New York’s Brettler Rule on Anti‑Assignment Clauses, “Consummation” of Share Sales, and Joinder of Contracting Parties

I. Introduction

In Thieriot v. Laggner, No. 24‑2500‑cv (2d Cir. Nov. 26, 2025) (summary order), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff-appellee Juan Pablo Thieriot on a breach-of-contract claim arising from a settlement agreement governed by New York law.

The dispute centers on:

• Whether Halsey Minor validly assigned to Thieriot his contractual right to receive a share of proceeds from the sale of certain shares held by defendant-appellant William Laggner, notwithstanding an anti‑assignment clause in the settlement agreement.
• Whether a sale of 40,000 shares of Uphold Ltd. from Laggner to a third party, Yuan Yuan, was “consummated” within the meaning of the settlement agreement (and under New York law), thereby triggering the payment obligation.
• Whether certain nonparties – including the buyer Yuan, as well as other parties to the settlement agreement (Minor, David Bechtel, and Outpost Capital Management) – were “indispensable parties” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19.
• Whether the district court correctly determined that Thieriot, as the prevailing party, is contractually entitled to attorney’s fees.

Although the court’s disposition is a “summary order” without precedential effect (see Fed. R. App. P. 32.1; 2d Cir. Local Rule 32.1.1), it provides a useful and concrete application of several significant doctrinal points under New York and federal law:

• How Brettler v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 40 N.Y.3d 450 (2023) governs the enforceability of assignments in the face of anti‑assignment clauses.
• How New York courts interpret the term “consummation” in contract provisions tied to the completion of a sale, including cross-border share transfers.
• How Rule 19’s “necessary” (or “required”) party analysis works in contract disputes, and why not all contracting parties are automatically indispensable.
• The handling of attorney’s fee entitlement on appeal when the amount of fees is determined in a later, separate proceeding.

Note: This commentary analyzes the court’s reasoning as reflected in the text you’ve provided. It is not legal advice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Circuit, reviewing the grant of summary judgment de novo (Ashley v. City of New York, 992 F.3d 128, 136 (2d Cir. 2021)), affirmed in all respects the district court’s August 19, 2024 judgment in favor of Thieriot. The key holdings are:

1. Validity of the Assignment:
   • Under New York law, and applying Brettler, the settlement agreement’s anti‑assignment clause – which merely barred assignment without consent – did not render Minor’s assignment to Thieriot void or unenforceable against Laggner, because the clause did not use the “clear language” required to make unauthorized assignments void.
   • The clause is properly construed as a personal covenant by the parties not to assign, enforceable (if at all) by a damages action against the assignor, but not as a bar to the assignee’s right to enforce the assigned claim.
   • A separate provision restricting Minor’s ability to “transfer, assign, sell, or encumber” the shares did not prevent the assignment of his distinct contractual right to proceeds.
2. Consummation of the Sale:
   • The settlement agreement’s term “consummation of a sale of the Laggner Shares” is governed by New York law under the agreement’s choice-of-law clause (Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)).
   • Under New York law, “to consummate” means to complete or bring to completion (citing Schulman v. City of New York, 291 N.Y. 520, 522 (1943); Wm. A. White & Sons v. La Touraine-Bickford’s Foods, Inc., 375 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1st Dep’t 1975)).
   • On the undisputed record, the sale of 40,000 shares from Laggner to Yuan was fully completed: there was a written agreement, full payment of $280,000, issuance of a digital share certificate to Yuan, update of Uphold’s corporate records, and retention of the proceeds by Laggner. The sale was thereby “consummated,” triggering the payment obligation.
   • Even if Cayman Islands law requires a particular share transfer document, under New York’s prevention doctrine a party cannot rely on a condition precedent whose nonperformance is caused by that party’s own conduct (A.H.A. Gen. Constr., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 20, 31 (1998)). Thus, Laggner could not avoid his contractual obligation by citing his own failure to deliver such a document.
   • The mere fact that a Cayman Islands winding-up petition is pending, under which the sale might hypothetically be voided in the future, does not mean the sale was not consummated for purposes of the settlement agreement, particularly where Laggner has actually received and retained the sale proceeds.
3. Indispensable Parties Under Rule 19:
   • Relying on CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 553 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2009), and MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 471 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir. 2006), the court rejected any bright-line rule that all parties to a contract are indispensable.
   • Under Rule 19(a)(1), joinder is required only if (i) complete relief cannot be afforded among existing parties, or (ii) the absent persons’ ability to protect their interests would be impaired or they would face substantial risk of multiple or inconsistent obligations.
   • Here, complete relief between Thieriot and Laggner is possible without joining Yuan, Minor, Bechtel, or Outpost Capital Management; none of those parties claim entitlement to the funds at issue, and no impairment of their interests was shown. They are therefore not “required” parties, and there was no error in proceeding without them.
4. Attorney’s Fees:
   • The district court ruled in its August 19, 2024 judgment that under the settlement agreement’s fee-shifting clause, the prevailing party – here, Thieriot – is entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.
   • Although the amount of fees was not fixed until a separate judgment in March 2025, the Second Circuit affirmed the entitlement determination “substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court.”
   • A separate appeal (No. 25‑865) challenging, among other things, the amount of the fee award is pending before another panel; the court in this appeal expressly declined to address those later issues.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Validity of the Assignment and the Anti‑Assignment Clause

1. The Contractual Setting

The settlement agreement imposed on William Laggner a duty to pay Halsey Minor “half of the first $750,000 in proceeds” from the sale of certain shares of stock (the “Laggner Shares”). At some point, Minor assigned his right to that share of proceeds to plaintiff Juan Pablo Thieriot.

Two contractual provisions are central:

• Section 10 – Anti‑Assignment Clause:

  “No Party shall assign, delegate or transfer to any person or entity its rights or responsibilities under this Settlement Agreement without the prior written consent of all other Parties.” (App’x 228)

• Section 2(g) – Restriction on Share Transfers by Minor:

  “Minor agrees not to seek to transfer, assign, sell, or encumber said Shares, or any interests therein.” (App’x 223)

Laggner contended that these provisions rendered Minor’s assignment to Thieriot invalid, or at least unenforceable against him, because:

• The assignment allegedly violated the general anti‑assignment clause (no prior written consent was shown); and/or
• The assignment allegedly transferred an “interest” in the shares, contrary to Section 2(g).

The court rejected both theories.

2. Application of Brettler v. Allianz: Personal Covenant vs. Disabling Clause

The panel’s central doctrinal move relies on Brettler v. Allianz Life Ins. Co. of N. Am., 40 N.Y.3d 450 (2023), a New York Court of Appeals decision that clarified how anti‑assignment clauses are to be construed.

Under New York law, as summarized by the panel:

“Assignments are generally enforceable notwithstanding an anti‑assignment clause, unless the clause expressly specifies that such assignments are void. … Parties who intend to prohibit assignments must use ‘clear language and the plainest words stating that an assignment made in contravention of the original contract is void.’” (quoting Brettler, 40 N.Y.3d at 454)

Brettler draws a sharp distinction between:

• Personal covenants not to assign (e.g., “no assignment without consent”), which may make the assignor liable to the other contracting party if the covenant is broken, but which do not generally destroy the validity of the assignment as between assignor and assignee or as against the obligor; and
• Disabling clauses (or “voiding provisions”) that expressly say an unauthorized assignment is “void,” “invalid,” “of no effect,” or that the obligor will not be “bound” by such assignments. These can render an assignment ineffective to pass enforceable rights against the obligor.

The settlement agreement in Thieriot was of the first type. Section 10 said simply:

“No Party shall assign, delegate or transfer … without the prior written consent of all other Parties.”

Crucially, it did not add language such as:

• “and any assignment in violation of this clause shall be void,” or
• “and no such assignment shall be binding on the Parties,” or
• “and we shall not recognize or be obligated under any such assignment.”

Consistent with Brettler, the Second Circuit treated the clause as a personal non‑assignment covenant. The result:

“The assignment here is thus ‘valid, and the clause is read instead as a personal covenant not to assign that justifies only an award of damages against the assignor for breach.’” (quoting Brettler, 40 N.Y.3d at 454)

In other words, even assuming the assignment was made without the required consent (a factual question the court ultimately found unnecessary to reach), it was still valid and enforceable as against Laggner. If anyone has a complaint about the unauthorized assignment, it is the non-assigning parties against Minor (the assignor), not against the assignee Thieriot.

3. Distinguishing Fortunato v. Patten

Laggner relied on the older New York Court of Appeals case Fortunato v. Patten, 147 N.Y. 277 (1895), which had been reaffirmed in Brettler, to support the proposition that even if an assignment is valid between assignor and assignee, it might be unenforceable against a nonconsenting obligor.

The panel acknowledged Fortunato but found it materially distinguishable:

• The contracts in Brettler and Fortunato used additional language specifying that the obligor “will not be bound by unnoticed assignments.” Brettler, 40 N.Y.3d at 456.
• This “will not be bound” language is precisely the kind of explicit disabling language that converts a mere personal covenant into a clause that makes unauthorized assignments ineffective against the obligor.
• No such language appeared in the settlement agreement here; Section 10 did not say that unconsented-to assignments would not bind the parties.

As a result, the line of authority culminating in Fortunato and reaffirmed in Brettler did not help Laggner. Instead, it underscored the absence of the critical “non‑binding” or “void” language in Section 10.

4. Distinguishing Rights in Shares vs. Contractual Rights to Proceeds

Laggner also argued that Section 2(g) barred the assignment because it stated that “Minor agrees not to seek to transfer, assign, sell, or encumber said Shares, or any interests therein.”

The panel, echoing the district court, made a sharp conceptual distinction:

• The restriction in Section 2(g) concerns the shares themselves – ownership interests in the equity of Uphold Ltd. – and the associated “interests therein.”
• The right that Minor assigned to Thieriot was not an equity interest in the shares, but a contractual right to a portion of proceeds that would be realized if (and when) Laggner sold his shares.

That contractual payment right is a separate “chose in action,” distinct from any interest in the underlying securities. The court held that Section 2(g) governed only the latter (the shares) and did not bar assignment of the former (the proceeds right). Thus, Section 2(g) did not undermine the assignment.

5. Practical and Doctrinal Implications

Although this is a nonprecedential summary order, it reinforces – in a concrete fact pattern – several important points for New York contract law:

• For drafters: If the goal is to prevent assignment of rights and ensure that any attempted assignment will not bind the obligor, the contract must say so explicitly. Typical formulations include:
  • “Any assignment in violation of this section shall be void,” and/or
  • “No such assignment shall be binding upon [the obligor].”
• For litigators: New York courts will generally treat simple “no assignment without consent” clauses as personal covenants rather than disabling provisions. A defendant cannot defeat an assignee’s claim merely by invoking an anti‑assignment covenant that lacks the requisite “void” or “non-binding” language.
• On rights vs. property interests: A prohibition on transferring shares or “interests” in shares does not automatically prohibit assignment of a contractual right to cash proceeds contingent on a sale of those shares, absent clear contractual language to that effect.

B. Consummation of the Sale and Cross-Border Complications

1. The Contractual Trigger: “Consummation of a Sale”

The settlement agreement limited Minor’s (and thus Thieriot’s) right to proceeds:

“Minor … shall only be entitled to receive any proceeds upon the consummation of a sale of the Laggner Shares.” (App’x 222–23)

The core dispute: Did the transaction between Laggner and Yuan – a sale of 40,000 Uphold Ltd. shares for $280,000 – constitute “consummation of a sale” under this provision?

The agreement had an express New York choice-of-law clause, and both parties accepted that New York law governed its interpretation. The court therefore treated the meaning of “consummation” as a question of New York contract law (citing Krumme v. WestPoint Stevens Inc., 238 F.3d 133, 138 (2d Cir. 2000)).

2. New York’s Definition of “Consummation”

The panel noted that New York case law gives “consummate” its ordinary meaning:

• Schulman v. City of New York, 291 N.Y. 520, 522 (1943) – “to consummate” means to complete, or bring to completion.
• Wm. A. White & Sons v. La Touraine-Bickford’s Foods, Inc., 375 N.Y.S.2d 351, 352 (1st Dep’t 1975) – same general understanding.

There is no suggestion in the settlement agreement that “consummation” carries some technical meaning tied to any foreign jurisdiction’s corporate law. Accordingly, the court applied the ordinary New York-law definition.

3. The Facts of the Share Sale

The record showed, without genuine dispute, that:

• Laggner entered into a written agreement with Yuan for the sale of 40,000 shares.
• Yuan paid the full purchase price of $280,000.
• Uphold Ltd. issued a digital share certificate to Yuan, certifying her ownership.
• Uphold’s official corporate records reflected the transfer: Laggner’s holdings decreased by 40,000 shares, and Yuan was listed as owner of 40,000 shares.
• Laggner retained the $280,000 and never returned or attempted to return the funds.

On these facts, the sale was plainly “completed” in any ordinary sense. The panel therefore held that the sale was “consummated” for purposes of the settlement agreement, triggering the obligation to pay half the proceeds to Minor’s assignee, Thieriot.

4. The Cayman Islands Law Argument and the Prevention Doctrine

Despite agreeing that New York law governs the settlement agreement, Laggner attempted to inject Cayman Islands law on two fronts:

1. He argued that because he had not delivered a formal share transfer instrument allegedly required by Cayman law, the sale was not “consummated.”
2. He argued that his pending winding-up petition in the Grand Court of the Cayman Islands meant that the share transfer was not truly final, because it might be voided if he prevails.

The panel addressed both contentions.

a. Failure to Deliver a Share Transfer Instrument

Even “assuming that Cayman Islands law requires such an instrument of transfer,” the court invoked New York’s prevention doctrine:

“[U]nder New York law ‘a party cannot insist upon a condition precedent, when its non-performance has been caused by himself.’” (A.H.A. Gen. Constr., Inc. v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth., 92 N.Y.2d 20, 31 (1998))

Applied here, the reasoning is:

• If the delivery of a formal transfer document is a condition of “consummation” of the sale under foreign law, that condition’s non-fulfillment was caused by Laggner himself (he is the one who did not deliver the instrument).
• A party cannot rely on his own failure to perform a step in the transaction to avoid the occurrence of a condition (“consummation”) that would trigger his obligation to pay.
• This is especially so where the party has retained the benefits of the transaction (the $280,000 purchase price).

Thus, any reliance on missing Cayman-law formalities fails under New York’s prevention doctrine.

b. Pending Winding-Up Proceedings

The court also rejected the argument that a pending Cayman winding-up petition prevented the transaction from qualifying as a consummated sale:

• The petition is still pending; no court has yet voided the sale.
• As of now, the company’s records, share certificate, and payment all reflect a completed transaction.
• Meanwhile, Laggner has had the benefit of the proceeds.

Under these circumstances, the sale is consummated under the settlement agreement as interpreted by New York law. Any future unwinding of the transaction by a Cayman court, if it occurs, would pose a different set of issues, but it does not retroactively erase the completion of the transaction upon which the settlement agreement’s payment obligation was conditioned.

5. Implications

This part of the opinion underscores several points:

• Choice-of-law clauses matter: Where a contract explicitly selects New York law, New York courts will use New York rules of interpretation, including ordinary-language meanings, even if the subject-matter (e.g., share transfers) involves a foreign corporation.
• Foreign-law formalities vs. domestic contractual obligations: A party that takes money and updates corporate records cannot rely on its own failure to complete additional formalities under foreign law to deny that a sale was consummated for purposes of a domestic contract.
• Uncertain future events: The hypothetical possibility that a transaction might later be set aside in foreign proceedings does not generally prevent it from counting as “completed” at the time it closed, especially where the party seeks to retain the benefits while avoiding bargained-for obligations.
• Digital share evidence and consummation: The court comfortably treated digital share certificates and corporate record changes as strong evidence that a share sale was completed.

C. Indispensable Parties Under Rule 19

1. The Rule 19 Framework

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 19 provides a two-step analysis:

1. Step 1 – “Required” (formerly “necessary”) parties – Rule 19(a)(1): A person must be joined if:
   • 19(a)(1)(A): In their absence, the court cannot accord complete relief among existing parties; or
   • 19(a)(1)(B): The absent person claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is so situated that proceeding without them may (i) impair or impede the person’s ability to protect that interest, or (ii) leave an existing party subject to a substantial risk of incurring multiple or inconsistent obligations.
2. Step 2 – “Indispensable” parties – Rule 19(b): If a person is required under Rule 19(a) but cannot be joined (e.g., joinder destroys jurisdiction), the court decides whether “in equity and good conscience” the action should proceed or be dismissed.

Importantly, as the Second Circuit reaffirmed in CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 553 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2009), and as repeated here, there is no automatic rule that every party to a contract is indispensable in every contract-related lawsuit.

2. The Parties Laggner Sought to Add

Laggner argued that the following were indispensable:

• Yuan Yuan – the purchaser of the shares;
• Halsey Minor – the original holder of the proceeds right and assignor;
• David Bechtel – another party to the settlement agreement; and
• Outpost Capital Management – also party to the settlement agreement.

His theory was that, as parties to the contract or as directly involved in the share sale, they were necessary to fully and fairly resolve the dispute.

3. Application of CP Solutions and MasterCard

The panel relied on two key Second Circuit precedents:

• CP Solutions PTE, Ltd. v. General Electric Co., 553 F.3d 156, 159 (2d Cir. 2009): The court there rejected a bright-line rule that all parties to a contract are necessary or indispensable in an action relating to that contract.
• MasterCard Int’l Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, Inc., 471 F.3d 377, 385 (2d Cir. 2006): This case discussed the circumstances under Rule 19 in which nonparties’ interests may be sufficiently implicated to require joinder.

Applying Rule 19(a)(1), the court held:

• Complete relief among existing parties: The disputed issue is straightforward: whether Thieriot, as Minor’s assignee, is entitled to half of the proceeds of the sale that Laggner has already received. The court can grant full relief (by ordering payment or not) between Thieriot and Laggner without joining anyone else.
• Interests and impairment: None of the absent persons – Yuan, Minor, Bechtel, or Outpost – claims any entitlement to the proceeds at issue. Nor did Laggner show how their legal interests would be impaired if the action went forward in their absence.
• Multiple or inconsistent obligations: There was no credible risk identified that Laggner would face conflicting judgments or multiple liability as a result of these absent parties not being joined.

Because the absent parties were not “required” under Rule 19(a), the court did not need to reach the “indispensability” balancing under Rule 19(b). The district court was correct to proceed without them.

4. Implications for Contract Litigation

• No automatic joinder of all contract parties: A party cannot force dismissal or derail a suit simply by pointing out that not everyone who signed the contract is currently in the case.
• Narrow scope of the dispute matters: Where the claim involves a discrete payment obligation between two parties, and no one else is asserting an interest in that payment, Rule 19 will rarely require joinder of additional parties.
• Strategic defense arguments limited: Attempts to invoke Rule 19 as a defensive tactic to complicate litigation or to create jurisdictional problems are likely to fail unless the absent parties truly have protectable interests that will be impaired or a serious risk of inconsistent obligations can be shown.

D. Attorney’s Fees and Appellate Procedure

1. Fee-Shifting Under the Settlement Agreement

The settlement agreement evidently contained a fee-shifting clause entitling the “prevailing party” to recover reasonable attorney’s fees incurred in litigation arising out of the agreement. The district court, in the August 19, 2024 judgment, held that:

• Thieriot was the prevailing party, having obtained summary judgment on his breach-of-contract claim; and
• Under the agreement, he was entitled to reasonable attorney’s fees.

The court then set a schedule to determine the amount of such fees, which was not decided until a later judgment on March 25, 2025.

2. Appeals on Entitlement vs. Amount

Laggner filed a timely notice of appeal from the August 19, 2024 judgment (this appeal, No. 24‑2500‑cv). His brief challenged both the merits judgment and the determination that Thieriot was entitled to fees. However, when that appeal was filed, the district court had not yet fixed the dollar amount of fees.

Subsequently, the district court entered a separate judgment on March 25, 2025, setting the amount of fees. Laggner appealed that judgment as well (No. 25‑865), which is pending before another panel.

In this appeal, the Second Circuit:

• Affirmed the entitlement to fees “substantially for the reasons stated by the District Court” in its August 19 opinion.
• Explicitly declined to express any view on issues adjudicated after August 19, 2024, including the fee amount, because they are the subject of the separate appeal.

This aligns with the general federal principle that unresolved issues of attorney’s fees (especially as to amount) are typically considered collateral to the merits and do not prevent a merits judgment from being “final” and appealable. Entitlement and amount can be reviewed separately.

3. Practical Notes

• For parties: Even where the fee amount is still being litigated, you may be able to appeal the underlying merits and fee entitlement determination without waiting for the final fee amount, subject to the specifics of the judgment and applicable jurisdictional rules.
• For drafters: Fee-shifting clauses can significantly influence the economics of litigation. Courts will enforce them according to their terms, including who qualifies as a “prevailing party.”

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

Assignment

An assignment is a transfer of a legal right from one person (the assignor) to another (the assignee). In contract law, it commonly refers to transferring the right to receive money or performance under a contract.

Anti‑Assignment Clause

A contract term that restricts or prohibits a party from assigning its rights or duties under the contract. Under New York law, per Brettler, such a clause:

• Is usually treated as a personal promise (“I won’t assign”) unless it explicitly says that any noncompliant assignment is “void,” “invalid,” or not binding.
• If it lacks such explicit language, the assignment remains valid, and the non-assigning party’s remedy, if any, is to sue the assignor for breach of that covenant.

Personal Covenant Not to Assign

A promise between the parties that one of them will not assign its rights without consent. It does not necessarily affect the validity of an assignment made in breach of the covenant as against the obligor, unless the contract clearly says so.

Disabling Clause / Voiding Provision

A stronger anti‑assignment clause that states unauthorized assignments are “void,” or that the obligor “will not be bound” by such assignments. Under New York law, such language can prevent the assignee from enforcing the contract against the obligor.

Chose in Action

A legal term for a personal right to receive or recover a debt or damages, enforceable by an action (lawsuit). Here, Minor’s right to a portion of sale proceeds is a chose in action, distinct from any ownership interest in the shares.

Consummation of a Sale

In ordinary legal usage, to “consummate” a sale means to complete it. This generally requires:

• Agreement on essential terms (e.g., price, quantity, subject matter),
• Performance by the buyer (paying the price), and
• Performance by the seller (transferring the asset or ownership).

Additional formalities may be needed under particular legal systems, but a party cannot rely on its own failure to complete those formalities to avoid obligations triggered by the completed sale.

Prevention Doctrine

A contract principle that a party may not insist on the failure of a condition precedent when that failure was caused by the party’s own conduct. Put simply, you cannot sabotage a step necessary for your obligation to arise and then argue that the condition did not occur.

Indispensable (Required) Party – Rule 19

A person whose joinder is mandated by Rule 19 because:

• The court cannot grant complete relief among existing parties without them, or
• They have an interest in the dispute that would be impaired if they are absent, or
• Their absence risks multiple or inconsistent obligations for existing parties.

Not all parties to a contract are automatically indispensable; courts look to the specific interests and practical consequences in the particular case.

Summary Judgment

A procedural device where the court decides a case (or an issue) without a full trial because there is no genuine dispute over any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Summary Order (Second Circuit)

A nonprecedential disposition used by the Second Circuit. Under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and Local Rule 32.1.1, such orders:

• Can be cited (with the notation “SUMMARY ORDER”),
• Are not binding precedent, but
• May be considered persuasive authority by other courts.

V. Impact and Broader Significance

While Thieriot v. Laggner is a summary order and thus nonprecedential, it may exert persuasive influence in several areas of contract and commercial litigation, particularly within the Second Circuit and under New York law.

1. Anti‑Assignment Clauses Under New York Law

• The decision reinforces Brettler’s clear rule: absent explicit “void” or “non-binding” language, anti‑assignment clauses do not invalidate assignments as against obligors.
• Parties who truly intend to disable assignments must use “the plainest words” to say that violating assignments are “void” or will not bind the obligor; otherwise, courts are likely to treat the clause as a personal covenant.
• For existing contracts that use generic no‑assignment language, this case underscores that assignees may still have enforceable rights, even if the assignment breached the contract.

2. Distinguishing Share Ownership from Payment Rights

• The court’s separation of:
  • Restrictions on transferring “shares” and “interests therein,” and
  • Assignments of contractual rights to future sale proceeds
  clarifies that the latter can be treated as distinct, freely assignable contract rights, absent clear contractual language to the contrary.
• This is particularly important in private equity, venture capital, and similar arrangements where party A’s future cash interest in party B’s equity holdings is frequently transferred or used as collateral.

3. Cross-Border Share Sales and Contractual Triggers

• The court emphasized New York’s control over interpretation of the term “consummation” in a New York-governed contract, even where the underlying asset is equity in a company governed by foreign law (here, presumably Cayman law).
• Parties who want “consummation” to depend on satisfaction of particular foreign-law formalities (e.g., filing specific forms, board approvals, or court approvals) need to say so explicitly in the contract.
• The use of digital share certificates and updated corporate records as sufficient to show completion of a sale may influence how courts assess completion in transactions involving dematerialized or blockchain-based securities.

4. Rule 19 Strategy in Contract Cases

• Thieriot adds another data point to a consistent pattern: the Second Circuit is skeptical of attempts to characterize every contracting party as indispensable.
• Defendants cannot easily compel dismissal on nonjoinder grounds by pointing to other signatories when the dispute is confined to a single payment obligation and the absent parties are not asserting competing claims.
• This will likely discourage overbroad Rule 19 motions aimed at complicating or delaying straightforward contract disputes.

5. Attorney’s Fees and Appeals

• The court’s handling of fee entitlement in one appeal and fee amount in another illustrates the practical bifurcation of fee issues on appeal.
• Parties should be aware that:
  • They may need to file separate notices of appeal for the merits/entitlement judgment and for the later fee-amount judgment.
  • An appellate court can affirm entitlement to fees while leaving challenges to amount (or to later fee-related issues) to a separate appeal.

VI. Conclusion

Thieriot v. Laggner offers a well-structured application of several important doctrines in New York contract law and federal civil procedure:

• It applies Brettler to hold that a simple anti‑assignment clause requiring consent, without express voiding language, does not invalidate an assignment or bar an assignee from enforcing the assigned right against the obligor.
• It clarifies that restrictions on transferring shares do not necessarily encompass assignments of distinct contractual rights to proceeds from a sale of those shares.
• It interprets “consummation of a sale” under New York law as completion of the sale in an ordinary sense, and it refuses to let a contracting party evade its obligations by relying on its own failure to complete foreign-law formalities or on the mere possibility of future unwinding in foreign proceedings.
• It reinforces that not all parties to a contract are indispensable under Rule 19; only those whose absence would prevent complete relief or jeopardize important interests must be joined.
• It confirms that contractual fee-shifting clauses will be enforced according to their terms, and that entitlement to fees can be resolved on appeal separate from the ultimate determination of the fee amount.

Although nonprecedential, the order is likely to be persuasive in similar disputes involving anti‑assignment clauses, cross-border securities transactions, and Rule 19 joinder issues in the Second Circuit and beyond.