1. Introduction

Jesus Zambrano v. City of Joliet & Patrick Schumacher, No. 24-1277 (7th Cir. June 23 2025), stems from a wrongful-conviction civil rights suit filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. After being acquitted in his second murder trial, Zambrano alleged Detective Patrick Schumacher falsified portions of an investigative report, thereby denying him due process. The Northern District of Illinois granted summary judgment for the defendants; the Seventh Circuit has now affirmed. The panel (Rovner, J., writing; Sykes, C.J.; Rovner; St. Eve, JJ.) clarifies the stringent evidentiary burden a plaintiff must meet to survive summary judgment on a fabricated-evidence due-process claim.

Key issues framed on appeal:

• Whether Zambrano produced evidence from which a reasonable jury could find (i) Detective Schumacher knowingly and in bad faith recorded false statements, and (ii) the allegedly false statements were material to Zambrano’s prosecution.
• Whether summary judgment was proper on Zambrano’s parallel indemnification claim against the City of Joliet, which rose or fell with the federal constitutional claim.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment, holding:

1. Zambrano failed to produce evidence that Detective Schumacher knowingly entered false information or did so in bad faith.
2. The contested portions of the report—names of two friends and the location of an apartment—were immaterial to the murder prosecution and therefore could not have deprived Zambrano of due process even if false.
3. Because the underlying due-process claim fails, the derivative indemnification claim against the City of Joliet likewise fails.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Patrick v. City of Chicago, 974 F.3d 824 (7th Cir. 2020)
  – Articulates four-factor test for fabricated-evidence due-process claims (deliberate falsification; use at trial; materiality; damages).
• Petty v. City of Chicago, 754 F.3d 416 (7th Cir. 2014)
  – Distinguishes fabricated evidence (known falsity) from coerced or mistaken testimony.
• Fields v. Wharrie, 740 F.3d 1107 (7th Cir. 2014)
  – Reiterates that liability hinges on the fabricator’s knowledge that the evidence is false.
• Coleman v. City of Peoria, 925 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2019)
  – Clarifies that inadvertent misstatements do not meet the fabrication standard.
• United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976)
  – Defines materiality: evidence is material when there is a reasonable likelihood it affected the jury’s judgment.

The court synthesizes these authorities to emphasize two pillars: bad-faith knowledge and materiality. Lacking either, a § 1983 due-process claim must fail.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Bad Faith / Knowledge Requirement
   • Zambrano offered only his own assertion that he never gave the names or address.
   • Multiple contemporaneous witnesses corroborated the information recorded.
   • The report was drafted at 2:30 a.m., expressly “in essence and not verbatim.” In these circumstances, a reasonable jury could not infer deliberate falsification as opposed to innocent mistake or conflation.
2. Materiality Requirement
   • The disputed statements concerned events the afternoon before the murder; trial evidence focused on Zambrano’s movements immediately before and after the 12:47 a.m. shooting.
   • The statements were neither contested nor outcome-determinative; both trials heard the same evidence, yet only the second ended in acquittal—an empirical sign the statements played no decisive role.
3. Use at Trial
   • Although Detective Schumacher testified, the report itself was never admitted. Even assuming testimony mirrored the report, its content was immaterial and cumulative.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Heightened Evidentiary Threshold: Plaintiffs in the Seventh Circuit must marshal concrete proof—beyond their own memory—showing an officer knew a statement was false at the moment he made it. Conjecture or innocent error will not survive summary judgment.
• Materiality as Gatekeeper: Courts will scrutinize whether the alleged fabrication had any realistic potential to change the verdict. Immaterial errors, even if knowingly made, may not ground a due-process claim.
• Distinction from Fourth-Amendment Claims: Zambrano reaffirms the separate analytical tracks for (i) false arrest / detention (Fourth Amendment) and (ii) trial-use fabrication (Fifth/Fourteenth Due Process). Plaintiffs must plead and prove the correct constitutional theory.
• Practical Guidance for Law Enforcement: Reports may be drafted summarily and late at night, but officers should clearly label summaries as such. Consistency among witnesses will help defeat later fabrication allegations.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Fabricated Evidence: Not merely incorrect information. It is information the officer knows is false and intentionally inserts to influence prosecution.
• Materiality: Think of “Could it change the result?” If the jury would reach the same verdict even without the statement, it is immaterial.
• Bad Faith: More than negligence. Requires purposeful misconduct or a reckless disregard for the truth.
• Summary Judgment: A procedural device letting a court decide a case without trial when no genuine factual dispute exists on essential elements.

5. Conclusion

Zambrano cements an exacting standard in the Seventh Circuit for fabricated-evidence due-process suits: plaintiffs must present evidence that an officer knowingly created false material used at trial. Inadvertent misstatements or immaterial details—even if technically inaccurate—do not implicate constitutional protections. The ruling thus narrows the pathway for civil rights plaintiffs while providing clearer guidance to law enforcement and trial courts on where honest mistake ends and actionable fabrication begins.