Suspicion Is Not Enough: The Seventh Circuit’s Strict Application of Employer Expectations, Comparator Evidence, and Retaliation Causation in Rabenhorst v. Noem

I. Introduction

This commentary examines the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Karl Rabenhorst v. Kristi L. Noem, No. 24‑1297 (7th Cir. Dec. 22, 2025), an appeal from the Northern District of Illinois affirming summary judgment for the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in a federal-sector employment discrimination case.

The plaintiff, Karl Rabenhorst, a longtime Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) employee and Navy veteran, alleged:

• Sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑2(a)(1);
• Age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 623(a);
• Hostile work environment under both statutes; and
• Retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e‑3(a), based on his pursuit of an internal EEO complaint.

His claims focused on two principal adverse events:

• His removal “for cause” from the Puerto Rico air operations branch during the Hurricane Maria disaster response; and
• A subsequent 13‑day suspension without pay ordered by his supervisor, Sean O’Leary.

Judge Rovner, writing for a unanimous panel (Chief Judge Brennan and Judge St. Eve joining), affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment. The opinion is doctrinally conservative but clarifies, and emphatically applies, several important principles:

• The “meeting legitimate expectations” and “similarly situated comparator” requirements under the McDonnell Douglas framework;
• The insufficiency of “suspicious timing” alone to sustain a retaliation claim;
• The strict enforcement of local summary-judgment rules and evidentiary foundations; and
• The boundary between legitimate discipline and actionable hostile work environment.

II. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Plaintiff’s Role at FEMA and Prior Discipline

After a 28‑year Navy and Naval Reserve career, Rabenhorst joined FEMA in 2009 as a technical hazards specialist focused on radiological emergency preparedness. Initially, he worked directly with state officials in Wisconsin, Michigan, and Ohio, developing and reviewing emergency preparedness plans.

Before the main events in dispute, he had already been formally reprimanded twice:

1. April 2016 – Michigan incident:
   • Without supervisory approval, he emailed a Michigan Assistant Attorney General challenging the state’s interpretation of federal vs. state law.
   • The reprimand cited a failure to follow the chain of command and noted prior counseling on sending “aggressive or argumentative” emails.
2. June 2017 – Ohio incident:
   • During a contentious exchange with Ohio officials, he asked rhetorically whether any of them “spoke English” and then remarked, “This is bullshit.”
   • Ohio requested that he not be assigned to future Ohio matters; he was reprimanded for inappropriate behavior.

In both events, he was warned that further incidents could lead to more serious discipline, up to and including discharge.

B. Change in Assignment and August 2017 Incidents

In 2017, FEMA reassigned him away from direct state interaction. Sean O’Leary, chief of the Technological Hazards Branch, became his supervisor.

During an August 2017 disaster preparedness exercise:

• He was overheard telling a contractor that O’Leary “had his head up his ass.”
• O’Leary instructed him not to discuss the exercise with contractors and to route complaints through the chain of command.
• Despite this, the next day he again spoke “at length” with a contractor about the exercise.

O’Leary began preparing discipline for insubordination and interference with contractors, but before formal action was taken, FEMA deployed Rabenhorst to Puerto Rico in October 2017.

C. Puerto Rico Deployment and Removal “for Cause”

Drawing on his military aviation background, FEMA assigned him to help oversee Puerto Rico air operations for Hurricane Maria relief, involving:

• Airlift of emergency supplies; and
• Medical evacuations.

He worked with younger FEMA employees—“female FEMA employees in their twenties”—whom he considered inexperienced and unqualified in air operations. According to the record:

• He used profanity in staff meetings;
• He treated female coworkers and supervisors disrespectfully;
• He referred to one or more of them as “sorority girls;” and
• He remarked that he had “paddled the butts of daughters who were older than her,” directed at one young colleague.

These interactions made several women uncomfortable. After about a month, the FEMA Chief of Staff for the Puerto Rico response, Josie Arcurio, removed him from the operation “for cause” and had him escorted out of the air operations branch in view of other employees.

D. EEO Activity, Proposed Suspension, and Second Internal Complaint

Between October and December 2017, following his removal:

• He contacted DHS’s Office of Equal Rights;
• Participated in EEO counseling; and
• On December 6, 2017, filed an internal EEO complaint alleging age and sex discrimination in his removal from the Puerto Rico relief effort.

FEMA never responded to that EEO complaint, and DHS did not dispute that point.

Meanwhile, in November 2017, after receiving reports from Arcurio about his conduct in Puerto Rico, O’Leary decided to move forward with discipline encompassing:

• His pre‑Puerto Rico misconduct (August 2017 exercise); and
• His conduct during the Puerto Rico deployment.

In June 2018, O’Leary issued a notice proposing a 14‑day suspension for:

• “Conduct unbecoming a federal employee;”
• Failure to follow instructions (August 2017 incident); and
• “Disruptive conduct” in Puerto Rico.

The notice invited an oral or written response; he submitted a 200‑page written defense. Multiple meetings to discuss the proposal were set and rescheduled; they never occurred because of O’Leary’s medical leave. On October 1, 2018, after reviewing the record, including the 200‑page response, O’Leary finalized a 13‑day unpaid suspension.

Separately, in August 2018:

• O’Leary cancelled his participation in two FEMA exercises; and
• He filed a second internal complaint alleging:
  • Age and sex discrimination; and
  • Retaliation for his prior EEO complaint, based on:
    • The proposed suspension; and
    • His exclusion from the two exercises.

FEMA issued a final agency decision in April 2021 denying relief on this second complaint. In June 2021, he filed suit in federal court. (His later removal from federal service in May 2023 was explicitly outside the scope of this litigation.)

E. District Court Decision

Judge Shah granted summary judgment for DHS on all claims, applying the McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework (for both Title VII and ADEA claims) and finding no triable issues on:

• Age discrimination;
• Sex discrimination;
• Hostile work environment; or
• Retaliation under Title VII.

He also:

• Strictly enforced N.D. Ill. Local Rule 56.1, disregarding some of plaintiff’s proposed facts and portions of his declaration for lack of proper foundation or citation; and
• Rejected plaintiff’s comparator evidence and pretext theory.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

III. Summary of the Seventh Circuit’s Opinion

A. Standard of Review

The court reviewed the summary judgment ruling de novo, drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the non‑moving party (Rabenhorst), consistent with Culp v. Caudill, 140 F.4th 938, 942 (7th Cir. 2025).

B. Enforcement of Local Rule 56.1 and Evidentiary Rules

The panel upheld the district court’s:

• Disregard of plaintiff’s extra factual assertions that:
  • Did not properly admit or deny the Secretary’s statements as required by Local Rule 56.1(e)(2); or
  • Were unsupported by the cited record evidence, contrary to Local Rule 56.1(d)(2).
• Striking of portions of his declaration that lacked a foundation of personal knowledge, consistent with Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4) and Packer v. Trustees of Indiana University School of Medicine, 800 F.3d 843, 850 (7th Cir. 2015).

The court characterized strict enforcement of such rules as well within a district court’s discretion, citing:

• Upchurch v. Indiana, 146 F.4th 579, 586 (7th Cir. 2025);
• Taylor v. Schwarzhuber, 132 F.4th 480, 491–92 (7th Cir. 2025);
• Patterson v. Indiana Newspapers, Inc., 589 F.3d 357, 359 (7th Cir. 2009);
• Bordelon v. Chicago School Reform Board of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 527–28 (7th Cir. 2000);
• Brasic v. Heinemann’s Inc. Bakeries, 121 F.3d 281, 283–84 (7th Cir. 1997); and
• Midwest Imports, Ltd. v. Coval, 71 F.3d 1311, 1313 (7th Cir. 1995).

C. Age and Sex Discrimination Claims (Title VII & ADEA)

Applying McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), the court held that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case because:

1. Protected class membership – Undisputed:
   • Over 40 (ADEA protected class);
   • Male (Title VII protected class).
2. Meeting employer’s legitimate expectations – Not satisfied:
   • He was repeatedly “insubordinate and abusive” to supervisors and co‑workers.
   • His misconduct included crude comments about his supervisor to contractors, disobeying instructions, and demeaning and sexualized remarks toward younger female colleagues.
3. Adverse employment actions – Satisfied:
   • The 13‑day unpaid suspension; and
   • Removal from the Puerto Rico relief operation, which negatively affected hours, compensation, and career prospects.
4. Similarly situated comparators treated more favorably – Not established:
   • No evidence that younger or female co‑workers engaged in comparable misconduct (insubordination, abusive language, contractor interference) and escaped discipline.

The court further held that even if a prima facie case existed, plaintiff offered no evidence that:

• DHS’s articulated reasons were pretextual; or
• O’Leary or Arcurio harbored discriminatory animus based on age or sex.

Relying on Gaines v. Dart, 158 F.4th 829, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2025) and Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016), the court emphasized that, looking at the evidence as a whole, nothing would permit a reasonable jury to infer that age or sex “played an animating role” in his removal or suspension.

For the ADEA claim, the court reiterated, via Gaines and O’Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 313 (1996), that age comparators need not be under 40, only “not insignificantly younger,” but found plaintiff still had no adequate comparators.

D. Hostile Work Environment

The court found the hostile environment claim failed for multiple reasons:

• The only arguably “harsh” incident was his humiliating, escorted removal from the Puerto Rico office; and
• Even that happened as part of what the record showed to be a legitimate disciplinary decision.

More fundamentally:

• There was no evidence of “severe or pervasive” unwelcome conduct; and
• No evidence any alleged hostility was “based on” age or sex, as required by cases like Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc., 142 F.4th 460, 476 (7th Cir. 2025).

E. Retaliation (Title VII)

The court limited its retaliation analysis to conduct protected by Title VII—namely, his EEO activity between October and December 2017 concerning alleged sex and age discrimination.

His earlier:

• Whistleblower complaint (to the DHS Office of Inspector General) about regulatory issues; and
• Internal grievances about regulatory violations and prior reprimands

were not Title VII-protected activity because they did not allege discrimination based on a protected characteristic, consistent with Alley v. Penguin Random House, 62 F.4th 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2023).

The retaliation claim failed because:

• Adverse action: The 13‑day suspension was sufficiently adverse (it might dissuade a reasonable worker from engaging in protected activity).
• Protected activity: His late‑2017 EEO complaint was protected.
• Causation: No evidence beyond “suspicious timing” linked the complaint to the suspension.

Although the timing was close—O’Leary moved forward with discipline in November 2017, around the time the EEO complaint was filed—the record showed:

• O’Leary had already intended to discipline him before Puerto Rico; and
• O’Leary’s decision was triggered and reinforced by misconduct reported by Arcurio from the Puerto Rico deployment.

Even assuming O’Leary knew about the EEO complaint, plaintiff provided no evidence that the complaint factored into the decision. Nor was there evidence:

• That similarly situated employees who had not filed complaints were treated more leniently; or
• That the reasons given for the suspension were pretextual.

The court also rejected plaintiff’s effort to cast Arcurio as the true decisionmaker, noting:

• No evidence she knew about the EEO complaint; and
• No evidence she participated in the discipline decision beyond reporting his misconduct.

Plaintiff did not pursue a “cat’s paw” theory (where a biased subordinate manipulates an otherwise neutral decisionmaker), and the record would not support it in any event.

IV. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Precedents and Their Role in the Opinion

1. McDonnell Douglas and Its Seventh Circuit Refinements

The court’s discrimination analysis follows the well‑established McDonnell Douglas burden‑shifting framework:

1. The plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case by showing:
   • (1) Protected class membership;
   • (2) Meeting legitimate job expectations;
   • (3) A materially adverse employment action; and
   • (4) More favorable treatment of similarly situated non‑protected employees.
2. The burden then shifts to the employer to assert a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason for the adverse action.
3. The burden returns to the plaintiff to demonstrate that the stated reason is a pretext—a lie or cover for discrimination.

The court relied on:

• Gaines v. Dart, 158 F.4th 829, 837–38 (7th Cir. 2025), for the elements of the prima facie case;
• Cunningham v. Austin, 125 F.4th 783, 788 (7th Cir. 2025), and Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan University, 36 F.4th 755, 760 (7th Cir. 2022), for the articulation of the employer’s burden and the pretext analysis; and
• Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760, 765 (7th Cir. 2016), emphasizing the need to view all evidence together rather than pigeonholing it into rigid tests.

For age discrimination, the court cited Gaines again, referencing O’Connor for the rule that a plaintiff need not show comparators outside the ADEA’s 40+ class, only people “not insignificantly younger.”

2. Local Rule 56.1 and Summary Judgment Practice

The Seventh Circuit’s repeated citations to Upchurch, Taylor, Patterson, Bordelon, Brasic, and Midwest Imports signal continued endorsement of strict compliance with local summary-judgment rules. Local Rule 56.1 is not a mere technicality; it shapes what the court considers the record on summary judgment to be.

Practically, this means:

• Plaintiffs cannot evade undisputed facts by labeling them “misleading” and then offering a narrative instead of a proper admission/denial with record support;
• Additional facts must be tethered to specific pages of the record; and
• Declarations must be grounded in admissible personal knowledge under Rule 56(c)(4), as reinforced by Packer.

3. Retaliation and What Counts as Protected Activity

In narrowing the retaliation claim to conduct protected by Title VII, the court relied on Alley v. Penguin Random House, 62 F.4th 358, 362 (7th Cir. 2023), which distinguishes:

• Participation in Title VII processes or opposition to discriminatory practices (protected); from
• Complaints about regulatory noncompliance or general unfairness (not protected, unless explicitly tied to discrimination on a protected ground).

This boundary is crucial: an employee can be a “whistleblower” in the everyday sense yet not be engaged in “protected activity” for Title VII purposes.

4. Hostile Work Environment and “Based On” Requirement

Arnold v. United Airlines, Inc. confirms that hostile work environment claims require:

• Objectively and subjectively unwelcome conduct that is severe or pervasive; and
• A causal link to the plaintiff’s protected class (age, sex, etc.).

The Seventh Circuit here makes explicit that disciplinary actions—even humiliating ones—do not become “harassment” absent evidence that they happened because of the plaintiff’s sex or age.

B. Legal Reasoning by Claim Type

1. Age and Sex Discrimination

a. Employer’s Legitimate Expectations: Civility and Chain of Command

One of the most significant aspects of the opinion is its treatment of the “meeting expectations” element. Plaintiff’s core narrative was: he was technically superior, his colleagues and supervisors were incompetent or non‑compliant with FEMA rules, and he was disciplined for “doing his job correctly” and speaking uncomfortable truths.

The court rejects that framing. For purposes of discrimination law, “legitimate expectations” are the employer’s articulated expectations, which reasonably may include:

• Respect for the supervisory chain of command;
• Avoidance of combative or demeaning language toward co‑workers and external partners;
• Compliance with directions (e.g., do not discuss certain matters with contractors); and
• Basic workplace civility.

The court explicitly notes that even if plaintiff’s criticisms of his colleagues’ competence were accurate, what mattered was the manner in which he voiced them—insubordination, profanity, personal insults, and sexually charged or paternalistic comments. That conduct, uncontroverted in the record, meant he was not meeting FEMA’s legitimate expectations.

This reinforces a key principle: technical competence does not excuse disrespectful or insubordinate conduct, and failure to meet conduct‑based expectations defeats the prima facie case.

b. Adverse Action: Temporary Removal from a Special Operation

The court treats:

• The 13‑day unpaid suspension; and
• Removal from the Puerto Rico detail that affected work hours, pay, and career prospects

as “adverse employment actions.” This is consistent with prior precedent, but it usefully confirms that:

• Temporary suspensions without pay are clearly adverse; and
• Removal from a high‑profile operational assignment can be adverse when it materially affects compensation and career advancement opportunities.

For future cases involving deployments, details, or special assignments (especially in the federal sector), this recognition of materiality to “career prospects” is potentially important.

c. Comparator Evidence: Misconduct Must Be Comparable

The court is strict about comparator analysis. Plaintiff argued that his younger female co‑workers in Puerto Rico were not disciplined despite being unqualified, while he was disciplined despite his expertise. The court responds:

• He was not disciplined for lack of knowledge or skills; he was disciplined for insubordination and abusive behavior.
• The record contains no indication that those female co‑workers engaged in similar misconduct (profanity, demeaning comments, insubordination toward supervisors).

By insisting on functional equivalence in misconduct, the court underscores a recurring theme in Seventh Circuit comparator law:

• Comparators must be similarly situated “in all material respects,” including having engaged in comparable rule violations, to support an inference of discrimination.
• Difference in skills or performance issues that are not the basis for discipline cannot be used to show differential treatment in discipline.

In the age discrimination context, the court also reiterates—via Gaines and O’Connor—that comparators need only be “not insignificantly younger,” but that broader age band does not relax the requirement of comparable misconduct.

d. Pretext and Animus: No Evidence Beyond Plaintiff’s Narrative

Even assuming a prima facie case, plaintiff failed to show that DHS’s reasons were pretextual—that is, dishonest. The court notes:

• The disciplinary reasons (insubordination, profanity, disrespect, misbehavior with contractors) were firmly documented;
• He did not meaningfully dispute the underlying factual incidents; and
• He produced no evidence of age‑ or sex‑biased comments or differential discipline of similarly situated employees.

Under Ortiz, the court then considers all the evidence in aggregate and finds no basis for inferring discriminatory motivation:

• The record supports a straightforward explanation: he was repeatedly warned about his conduct and ultimately disciplined when his behavior continued.
• His own belief that his professionalism and candor motivated his supervisors’ hostility does not equate to evidence of illegal animus.

2. Hostile Work Environment

The court’s hostile environment analysis is concise but instructive:

• It hints at possible waiver because plaintiff did not meaningfully respond to summary-judgment arguments on this claim, but still reaches the merits.
• It identifies only one arguably humiliating incident: the escorted removal in Puerto Rico.
• It finds:
  • No pattern of severe or pervasive harassment; and
  • No evidence linking any harsh treatment to his sex or age.

The decision reiterates an important doctrinal constraint: legitimate discipline, even if embarrassing, is not harassment unless it is carried out because of a protected trait. Without evidence that the decision to remove him or the manner of removal was motivated by his age or sex, there is no Title VII or ADEA harassment claim.

3. Retaliation

a. Defining Protected Activity: Title VII vs. Whistleblower Complaints

The court carefully distinguishes:

• His Title VII-protected activity: the EEO complaint in late 2017 alleging sex and age discrimination in his removal from Puerto Rico; from
• His non‑protected activity:
  • 2016 whistleblower complaints about O’Leary allegedly waiving disaster‑preparedness criteria; and
  • Internal grievances about regulatory violations and earlier reprimands.

Relying on Alley, the court confirms that:

• To be protected, the complaint must oppose an unlawful employment practice under Title VII or involve participation in Title VII proceedings.
• Complaints purely about regulatory or policy violations are not protected unless they explicitly allege discrimination on a protected ground.

This reinforces a critical practical lesson: employees and counsel should clearly link complaints to protected categories if they want Title VII’s anti‑retaliation provision to apply.

b. Causation and the Limits of Suspicious Timing

The court accepts that:

• The 13‑day unpaid suspension was materially adverse; and
• The timing was “suspicious” (the discipline process moved forward shortly after the EEO complaint period).

However, it holds that suspicious timing, standing alone, is insufficient. The record shows:

• O’Leary intended to discipline him before the Puerto Rico deployment;
• O’Leary’s decision was catalyzed by new misconduct reports from Puerto Rico;
• These are non‑retaliatory reasons for the timing and existence of discipline; and
• There is no evidence—emails, comments, inconsistent explanations—suggesting the EEO complaint affected the suspension decision.

The court also treats as non‑dispositive the factual dispute over whether O’Leary knew of the EEO complaint. Even assuming he knew, knowledge alone is insufficient without evidence that the protected activity influenced the decision.

c. Attempted “Substitute Decisionmaker” Theory and Cat’s Paw

Plaintiff tried to recast the decisionmaker as Arcurio, arguing she:

• Was aware of his EEO activity; and
• Was the real force behind the suspension.

The court rejects this:

• No evidence that she knew of his EEO complaint;
• No evidence she participated in the actual suspension decision; and
• Her role was limited to reporting misconduct.

The court notes that plaintiff did not pursue a cat’s paw theory (where a biased subordinate manipulates a neutral decisionmaker). Even if he had, the record contains no evidence that:

• She harbored retaliatory (or discriminatory) animus; or
• She provided misleading or false information that O’Leary unwittingly adopted.

Thus, the retaliation claim fails for want of evidence that the EEO complaint caused or influenced the adverse action.

V. Impact and Significance of the Opinion

A. Reinforcing Employer Control Over Conduct-Based Expectations

Rabenhorst underscores that:

• “Legitimate expectations” include behavioral norms, not only technical performance;
• An employee’s view that he is technically correct or more competent does not entitle him to disregard the chain of command or use demeaning language;
• Persistent insubordination and disrespect can, by themselves, defeat a discrimination claim at the prima facie stage.

For employers, particularly in high‑stakes government operations like FEMA, the case affirms that:

• They may discipline even highly skilled employees for conduct that undermines workplace order and cohesion; and
• Such discipline can withstand judicial scrutiny if supported by clear, consistent documentation and applied even‑handedly.

B. Comparator Rigor and the Narrow Path for Pretext

The decision continues the Seventh Circuit’s trend toward demanding close comparability in comparator evidence:

• Differences in discipline must be tied to similar underlying misconduct;
• Employees cannot point to others who merely lack skills or experience to argue inequality in discipline for insubordination or abusive behavior.

On pretext, the case illustrates how:

• A well‑documented history of warnings and progressive discipline;
• Consistent justifications over time; and
• The plaintiff’s failure to seriously dispute the underlying incidents

make it very difficult to survive summary judgment. Plaintiffs must do more than disagree with managerial judgments; they must present specific evidence that the given reasons are dishonest or not actually relied upon.

C. Title VII Retaliation: Drawing Bright Lines Around Protected Activity

The opinion helps solidify for practitioners:

• Internal whistleblower or regulatory complaints are not, without more, Title VII‑protected activity;
• To gain the statute’s anti‑retaliation shield, complaints must explicitly oppose discrimination (or participate in a discrimination proceeding);
• “Suspicious timing” is rarely sufficient by itself; plaintiffs must couple it with evidence of:
  • Decisionmaker animus;
  • Shifting explanations;
  • Differential treatment; or
  • Other indicia of retaliatory motive.

For employers, the lesson is symmetrical:

• Document disciplinary considerations before and independent of any protected activity where possible;
• Show continuity between pre‑complaint concerns and post‑complaint discipline; and
• Ensure decisionmakers articulate and repeat legitimate reasons consistently.

D. Local Rule 56.1: Procedural Precision as Substantive Gatekeeper

The court’s endorsement of strict Local Rule 56.1 enforcement confirms that, especially in the Northern District of Illinois:

• Summary judgment is often won or lost in the rule 56.1 statements response;
• Counsel who respond with narratives instead of precise admissions/denials risk having their version of the facts disregarded;
• Poor record citation and insufficiently founded declarations can effectively erase favorable facts from the summary judgment record.

For litigants, Rabenhorst is a reminder that:

• Substantive rights can be lost through procedural missteps; and
• Skilled summary‑judgment practice is essential in employment litigation.

E. Hostile Work Environment Claims: Discipline Is Not Harassment

Though not groundbreaking, the opinion reaffirms:

• Not all unpleasant or humiliating conduct is actionable harassment;
• There must be:
  • Sufficient severity or pervasiveness; and
  • A clear tie between the conduct and the plaintiff’s protected class.
• Enforcement of rules—even in a strict or embarrassing way—does not become “harassment” absent discriminatory motive.

This guards against the tendency to recast ordinary disciplinary actions as hostile-environment claims when discrimination evidence is thin.

VI. Key Legal Concepts Explained in Plain Terms

A. McDonnell Douglas Framework

The McDonnell Douglas framework is a three‑step method courts use to evaluate discrimination claims when there is no “smoking gun” direct evidence:

1. The employee shows a basic case (prima facie) that suggests discrimination might have occurred.
2. The employer responds with a legitimate, non‑discriminatory reason for what it did (e.g., poor performance, rule violation).
3. The employee must then show that this reason is a pretext—a lie or cover story—by pointing to inconsistencies, implausibilities, or differential treatment.

If the employee cannot show pretext, the employer wins.

B. “Meeting Employer’s Legitimate Expectations”

This phrase refers to what the employer reasonably expects from an employee—not just technical skill but also:

• Obeying rules and orders;
• Treating co‑workers and partners respectfully;
• Communicating in a professional manner.

If the employer can show the employee consistently violated conduct rules, courts will find that the employee did not meet “legitimate expectations,” defeating many discrimination claims at the first step.

C. “Similarly Situated” Comparators

To prove discrimination, employees often compare themselves to co‑workers who:

• Have the same supervisor;
• Have similar job duties; and
• Engage in similar misconduct.

If comparators are treated better (lighter discipline or no discipline) for the same kind of behavior, it can suggest discrimination. But if the comparators’ conduct is different in nature or seriousness, the comparison fails.

D. Hostile Work Environment

A hostile work environment exists when:

• The workplace is filled with unwelcome conduct (insults, slurs, ridicule, threats);
• The conduct is severe (very serious) or pervasive (happens a lot); and
• The conduct happens because of the person’s protected characteristic (e.g., sex or age).

One unpleasant event or justified discipline—without evidence of discriminatory motive—usually does not meet this standard.

E. Retaliation and Protected Activity

Retaliation under Title VII requires:

1. Protected activity: complaining about discrimination based on protected traits, or participating in an investigation or lawsuit about such discrimination.
2. Adverse action: something that could reasonably deter a person from complaining in the future (e.g., suspension, demotion, termination).
3. Causation: a link between the protected complaint and the adverse action.

General complaints about unfairness or rule violations, without connecting them to race, sex, age, etc., are not protected by Title VII’s anti‑retaliation provision.

F. Cat’s Paw Theory (Briefly)

Under the “cat’s paw” theory, an employer can be liable if:

• A biased subordinate (who hates the employee for discriminatory or retaliatory reasons);
• Manipulates an unwitting decisionmaker (who has no bias);
• By providing tainted information that leads to the adverse action.

In Rabenhorst, plaintiff did not fully pursue this theory, and the record lacked evidence of subordinate bias or manipulation.

G. Local Rule 56.1

Local Rule 56.1 in the Northern District of Illinois governs how parties present facts at summary judgment:

• The moving party sets out numbered paragraphs of “undisputed” facts with citations.
• The opponent must respond to each paragraph by:
  • Admitting it; or
  • Denying it with a specific citation to the record.
• The opponent can also add new, properly supported facts.

If a party does not follow these rules, the court can treat the moving party’s facts as admitted and ignore unsupported assertions.

VII. Conclusion

Rabenhorst v. Noem does not announce novel doctrine, but it crystallizes and reinforces several important strands of Seventh Circuit employment law:

• Employees who are technically proficient may still fail the “meeting legitimate expectations” element when they persistently violate conduct rules, show insubordination, or engage in abusive speech;
• Comparator evidence must be tightly matched on material aspects of misconduct, not just job title or perceived competence;
• Title VII’s retaliation provision applies only to complaints tied to protected classes, not to generic whistleblowing or regulatory disputes;
• Suspicious timing can raise questions but is not enough, alone, to survive summary judgment on retaliation without corroborating evidence of motive or pretext;
• Hostile environment claims require both severity/pervasiveness and a clear connection to the plaintiff’s protected status; legitimate discipline, even if humiliating, is not harassment by itself; and
• Strict compliance with local summary‑judgment rules and evidentiary foundations can determine which facts are even considered at the dispositive stage.

For federal and private employers alike, the case underscores the value of:

• Clear, documented behavioral expectations;
• Consistent, progressive discipline backed by contemporaneous records; and
• Careful separation of disciplinary decisions from any involvement in EEO processes.

For employees and their counsel, the decision is a cautionary tale about the limits of subjective narratives of unfairness in the absence of concrete, admissible evidence of discriminatory or retaliatory motive, and about the need for meticulous compliance with procedural rules at summary judgment.