Strickland Prejudice, “Federalized” Claims, and Trial Strategy in Arkansas Rule 37 Practice: Commentary on Clarence Turnbo v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 106

I. Introduction

The Arkansas Supreme Court’s decision in Clarence Turnbo v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 106, is a significant reaffirmation of the stringent standards that govern ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims in Arkansas postconviction practice under Rule 37.1. Although the case does not announce a dramatic new doctrinal shift, it crystallizes several important principles:

The high burden a petitioner faces under Strickland v. Washington to show both deficient performance and prejudice.
The broad deference granted to trial counsel’s strategic decisions (whether to object, call witnesses, obtain experts, or put the defendant on the stand).
The limits on re-litigating issues already decided on direct appeal, especially rape-shield rulings.
The rule that failing to “federalize” an argument (i.e., frame it in federal constitutional terms to preserve it for federal habeas) does not itself satisfy the Strickland prejudice requirement.
The circumstances under which a Rule 37 petition may be denied without an evidentiary hearing.

The appellant, Clarence Turnbo, was previously convicted of rape in Pulaski County. His conviction was affirmed on direct appeal in Turnbo v. State, 2021 Ark. 166, 629 S.W.3d 797. He then filed a pro se petition under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel on multiple fronts. The circuit court denied his petition without an evidentiary hearing, and the Arkansas Supreme Court, in this opinion authored by Associate Justice Cody Hiland, affirmed.

This commentary provides a structured overview of the case and a detailed analysis of its reasoning, precedential foundations, and implications for Arkansas postconviction and criminal-defense practice.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The Arkansas Supreme Court affirms the circuit court’s denial of Turnbo’s Rule 37.1 petition for ineffective assistance of counsel and upholds the decision to do so without an evidentiary hearing.

The Court:

Applies the “clearly erroneous” standard of review for Rule 37.1 rulings.
Reaffirms the controlling Strickland v. Washington two-prong test (deficient performance and prejudice).
Declines to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, including a purported Brady v. Maryland violation and certain impeachment issues related to a video recording.
Rejects claims that trial counsel was ineffective for:
- Not further impeaching a detective regarding access to a video recording.
- Failing to obtain or present additional DNA or forensic expert testimony.
- Failing to present an expert, or the ex-wife, regarding Turnbo’s sexual proclivities to contest penetration.
- Not objecting to the prosecutor’s opening statement describing the victim as having been raped.
- Failing to put Turnbo on the witness stand despite his desire to testify.
- Not adequately investigating or presenting the victim’s prior sexual history (rape-shield issues).
- Failing to “federalize” arguments for purposes of federal habeas review.
Holds that the circuit court correctly denied an evidentiary hearing because the files and record conclusively showed that Turnbo was not entitled to relief, and the court made adequate written findings under Rule 37.3.

Overall, the Court concludes that none of Turnbo’s allegations meet the demanding Strickland standard; many are either conclusory, purely strategic, previously litigated, or procedurally barred.

III. Standard of Review and Core Legal Framework

A. Rule 37.1 and “Clearly Erroneous” Review

Turnbo’s petition arose under Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1, which provides a mechanism for challenging a conviction or sentence on postconviction grounds, including ineffective assistance of counsel.

The Court reiterates that it will not reverse a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 37.1 petition unless it is “clearly erroneous,” citing:

Price v. State, 2023 Ark. 36, 660 S.W.3d 316.
Lane v. State, 2019 Ark. 5, 564 S.W.3d 524.

A finding is clearly erroneous when, despite evidence supporting it, the appellate court has the firm conviction that a mistake has been made. This is a deferential standard and makes it more difficult for petitioners to overturn Rule 37 rulings on appeal.

B. The Strickland Standard for Ineffective Assistance

The Court again applies the well-established test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as adopted in Arkansas and reaffirmed in Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 S.W.3d 120.

Under Strickland, a petitioner must prove both:

Deficient performance – that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms; and
Prejudice – that there is a “reasonable probability” that, but for counsel’s errors, the outcome would have been different (i.e., the fact-finder would have had a reasonable doubt about guilt).

A “reasonable probability” is one “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial.” Importantly, unless the petitioner makes both showings, no relief is warranted.

IV. Detailed Analysis of Each Claim

A. The Video Recording and Alleged Brady Violation

Turnbo argued that Detective Julie Eckert falsely testified about attempts to obtain access to a video recording and that counsel failed to impeach her using existing evidence. He also alleged a Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), violation for failure to comply with an order to produce DVR photographs.

The Court does not reach the merits of these claims because they were not properly raised below. Relying on Price v. State, it reiterates the rule:

This court will not address new or different arguments raised for the first time on appeal.

Conceptually, this reinforces a critical procedural point: a Rule 37 petitioner must present specific claims and factual bases to the trial court. They cannot be articulated for the first time in appellate briefing. For postconviction practitioners, this opinion underscores the need to carefully develop all theories and supporting facts in the Rule 37 petition itself.

B. DNA Evidence and the Role of Strategic Decisions

Turnbo asserted that, had a forensic DNA expert reviewed the victim’s sexual-assault examination, he would have been acquitted. He did not contest that his DNA was present; instead, he argued counsel should have better emphasized that there was no evidence of “penetration with ejaculation.”

The trial court had found—and the Supreme Court agreed—that:

Trial counsel did challenge the DNA evidence at trial.
The State’s testing showed a DNA match to Turnbo on the victim’s vaginal swabs.
Turnbo failed to show any prejudice from counsel’s decision not to pursue additional DNA testing or expert review.

The Court explicitly notes that counsel’s choice not to seek additional DNA testing in the face of a State match is “a strategic decision that normally would not support an ineffective-assistance claim.” This is a textbook application of deference to counsel’s professional judgment.

The Court further criticizes the claim as consisting of “conclusory allegations” and “self-serving conjectures,” invoking Gordon v. State, 2018 Ark. 73, 539 S.W.3d 586:

Neither conclusory statements nor allegations without factual substantiation are sufficient to overcome the presumption that counsel was effective.

Additionally, the Court underscores a crucial point for rape cases: even if some forensic evidence could be attacked, the victim’s testimony alone can sustain a conviction. Citing:

Clarks v. State, 2011 Ark. 296 (per curiam).
Doucoure v. State, 2024 Ark. 162, 698 S.W.3d 643.

The Court emphasizes that “a victim’s testimony alone provides sufficient evidence to support a rape conviction.” Thus, even more favorable DNA testimony could not eliminate the victim’s narrative evidence.

The net effect is a strong reminder that:

Counsel’s tactical decisions about whether to pursue additional scientific testing are heavily shielded from critique on collateral review.
To establish prejudice in a rape case, a petitioner must contend with the reality that a credible victim’s testimony—standing alone—is enough to support the verdict.

C. Failure to Call Expert or Ex-Wife on Sexual History

Turnbo argued that counsel was ineffective for not calling a medical expert or his ex-wife to testify that he lacked the sexual proclivities consistent with the victim’s description, or to testify that no penetration occurred.

The Court characterizes this as a classic strategic issue. Citing Arnold v. State, 2022 Ark. 191, 653 S.W.3d 781, it reiterates:

With respect to a claim of ineffective assistance regarding trial counsel's decision whether to call a witness, such matters are generally trial strategy and outside the purview of Rule 37.1.

Even if a witness could theoretically “offer testimony beneficial to the defense,” that fact alone does not demonstrate ineffectiveness. The Court defers to counsel’s professional judgment regarding which witnesses to call and notes that such decisions are “largely a matter of professional judgment that experienced advocates could endlessly debate.”

From a practical standpoint:

Petitioners must do more than speculate that a witness might have helped.
They must provide specific facts showing what the witness would have said and how it would likely have altered the verdict.
Even then, courts are extremely reluctant to second-guess witness-selection strategy under Rule 37.

D. Failure to Object to Prosecutor’s Opening Statement

Turnbo next claimed that counsel should have objected when the prosecutor stated during opening that the victim had been raped by Turnbo. He contended this was prejudicial.

The Court notes that “experienced advocates might differ about when, or if, objections are called for” during opening statements or closing arguments. Citing Gay v. State, 2022 Ark. 23, the Court stresses:

Because a lawyer may refrain from objecting during opening statement and closing argument, absent egregious misstatements, the failure to object during closing argument and opening statement is within the wide range of permissible professional legal conduct.

Here, the prosecutor’s statement was essentially a description of the charge and theory of the case, not an “egregious misstatement.” The Court also cites Lowe v. State, 2012 Ark. 185, 423 S.W.3d 6, for the principle that a petitioner cannot establish prejudice for failing to object unless he shows the objection would have been meritorious.

Because Turnbo could not demonstrate that:

the prosecutor’s statement was improper, or
an objection would have been sustained, or
the verdict would likely have been different if counsel had objected,

this ineffective-assistance claim fails both prongs of Strickland.

E. Right to Testify and Counsel’s Advice

Turnbo argued two related points:

He felt compelled to testify due to the prosecutor’s opening statement, but
Counsel was ineffective for not calling him as a witness, despite his desire to testify to his own credibility.

The Court notes that Turnbo acknowledged on the record that he understood his right to testify and chose not to exercise it. The trial court found—and the Supreme Court agreed—that:

He understood the right was his to exercise.
He did not provide a specific showing of prejudice resulting from his failure to testify.

The opinion cites:

Dansby v. State, 347 Ark. 674, 66 S.W.3d 585 (2002) – whether a defendant actually testifies is not, by itself, a ground for Rule 37 relief.
Wertz v. State, 2014 Ark. 240, 434 S.W.3d 895 – the right to testify belongs to the defendant, although counsel may advise; the decision is part of trial strategy.
Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899 – a petitioner must show specifically what he would have said and how it might have changed the result; counsel is not bound to present every client-proposed argument.

The Court notes that Turnbo did not identify the specific, material testimony he would have offered or how it would have changed the verdict. General assertions that he wanted to appear more credible than the victim do not suffice.

Therefore, under Strickland, there was neither a showing of deficient performance (since the decision was strategic and acknowledged) nor of prejudice (no specific omitted testimony or plausible effect on the jury).

F. Rape-Shield Evidence and Prior Sexual History

Turnbo argued that counsel was ineffective for failing to present evidence of the victim’s prior sexual history.

The Court notes that this issue had already been litigated. Before trial, a hearing was held on the admissibility of such evidence, and it was excluded under Arkansas’s rape-shield statute, Arkansas Rule of Evidence 411. On direct appeal in Turnbo v. State, 2021 Ark. 166, the Supreme Court affirmed the exclusion, holding that the evidence fell squarely within Rule 411 because Turnbo sought to introduce prior sexual-allegation evidence merely to attack the victim’s credibility.

The Court invokes Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694, which bars using a Rule 37 proceeding to reargue issues already decided on direct appeal:

A proceeding under Rule 37.1 does not allow a petitioner the opportunity to reargue points that were decided on direct appeal.

Thus, this claim is procedurally foreclosed in postconviction proceedings. As a practical matter:

If an evidentiary ruling (most notably, rape-shield exclusions) has been addressed and affirmed on direct appeal, it cannot be repackaged as ineffective assistance unless new, distinct grounds are alleged (such as a different theory of admissibility or new facts about counsel’s performance), which were not present here.

G. Failure to “Federalize” Claims

One of the more doctrinally significant aspects of the opinion is the Court’s treatment of Turnbo’s argument that counsel was ineffective for failing to “federalize” his rape-shield objections—i.e., for not explicitly grounding them in the federal Constitution so as to preserve them for possible federal habeas corpus review.

The Court rejects this as a basis for ineffective assistance, citing Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004). It clarifies that the kind of prejudice required by Strickland is:

a reasonable probability that the outcome at trial or, in this case, on appeal, would have been different.

By contrast, the mere failure to preserve an issue for possible federal habeas corpus review does not satisfy that standard. In other words:

Strickland prejudice focuses on the reliability of the state-court result (verdict or direct appeal), not on a lost future opportunity to present the claim in federal court.
A petitioner cannot show prejudice merely by saying, “Had counsel raised the federal constitutional angle, I might now qualify for habeas review.”

This portion of the opinion effectively reinforces and restates a critical boundary line for ineffective-assistance claims in Arkansas: counsel’s performance is judged by its effect on the state proceeding’s outcome, not by its impact on hypothetical collateral federal litigation.

H. Denial of an Evidentiary Hearing

Finally, Turnbo argued that the circuit court erred by not holding an evidentiary hearing on his Rule 37.1 petition and by denying his motion for reconsideration of that denial.

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.3 provides that an evidentiary hearing should be held unless the “files and record of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief.” The Court relies on:

Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646 – confirming this standard.

If the record conclusively shows no entitlement to relief, the trial court must make written findings to that effect. The Supreme Court holds that:

Here, the record and petition did conclusively show that Turnbo was not entitled to relief.
The circuit court made the necessary written findings under Rule 37.3(a).

As to the motion for reconsideration, the Court cites Rule 37.2(d), which states that no petition for rehearing shall be considered. The opinion also references Lowery v. State, 2021 Ark. 97, 621 S.W.3d 140, recognizing a narrow exception where a party asks the trial court to address an omitted issue. But in this case, Turnbo did not ask for a ruling on an omitted claim; he asked for reconsideration of the lack of a hearing, so Rule 37.2(d)’s bar on rehearing applied.

The Court’s stance confirms that:

Where all claims can be resolved as a matter of law or on the existing record, no evidentiary hearing is required.
Attempts to re-open the Rule 37 proceedings merely to reargue the same issues are prohibited.

V. Precedents Cited and Their Function

1. Ineffective Assistance and Postconviction Framework

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – foundational federal test requiring deficient performance and prejudice. Arkansas follows this structure for ineffective-assistance claims.
Reynolds v. State, 2020 Ark. 174, 599 S.W.3d 120 – reiterates Arkansas’s adherence to Strickland and the need to satisfy both prongs.
Gordon v. State, 2018 Ark. 73, 539 S.W.3d 586 – holds that conclusory allegations cannot overcome the presumption of effective assistance.
Arnold v. State, 2022 Ark. 191, 653 S.W.3d 781 – calling witnesses is a strategic choice, rarely a basis for ineffective-assistance relief.
Gay v. State, 2022 Ark. 23 – failure to object in opening or closing, absent egregious misstatements, is within permissible professional conduct.
Lowe v. State, 2012 Ark. 185, 423 S.W.3d 6 – petitioner must show that the unmade objection would have been sustainable to establish prejudice.
Dansby v. State, 347 Ark. 674, 66 S.W.3d 585 (2002) – whether the defendant ultimately testifies is generally not a basis for Rule 37 relief.
Wertz v. State, 2014 Ark. 240, 434 S.W.3d 895 – the right to testify belongs to the accused; counsel’s advice is strategic.
Decay v. State, 2014 Ark. 387, 441 S.W.3d 899 – petitioner must specify omitted testimony and show a likely impact; counsel is not bound by every client demand.
Johnson v. State, 356 Ark. 534, 157 S.W.3d 151 (2004) – failure to preserve an issue for federal habeas does not satisfy Strickland prejudice.

2. Procedural and Appellate Standards

Price v. State, 2023 Ark. 36, 660 S.W.3d 316 – establishes that new arguments cannot be raised for the first time on appeal in Rule 37 proceedings.
Lane v. State, 2019 Ark. 5, 564 S.W.3d 524 – articulates the “clearly erroneous” standard for reviewing Rule 37 rulings.
Dennis v. State, 2020 Ark. 28, 592 S.W.3d 646 – addresses the requirement and exception for evidentiary hearings under Rule 37.3.
Lowery v. State, 2021 Ark. 97, 621 S.W.3d 140 – distinguishes between impermissible rehearing and permissible requests to add rulings on omitted issues under Rule 37.2(d).
Sartin v. State, 2012 Ark. 155, 400 S.W.3d 694 – bars re-litigation of issues decided on direct appeal in Rule 37 proceedings.

3. Substantive Criminal Law and Evidence (Rape Cases)

Clarks v. State, 2011 Ark. 296 – confirms that a rape victim’s testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Doucoure v. State, 2024 Ark. 162, 698 S.W.3d 643 – more recent reaffirmation of the same principle.
Turnbo v. State, 2021 Ark. 166, 629 S.W.3d 797 – Turnbo’s prior direct appeal, particularly relevant for its treatment of rape-shield issues under Rule 411.

4. Constitutional Criminal Procedure

Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) – requires the prosecution to disclose exculpatory evidence; here, invoked by Turnbo but procedurally defaulted because it was not raised below.
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) – cited by Turnbo for the proposition that certain fundamental decisions (like testifying) rest with the accused; the Court notes the citation but finds no violation since Turnbo understood and personally waived his right to testify.

VI. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. What Is Rule 37.1 Postconviction Relief?

Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.1 allows a person convicted of a crime to challenge their conviction or sentence after the direct appeal is over. It is not a second appeal; rather, it focuses on fundamental problems like:

Ineffective assistance of counsel.
Jurisdictional defects.
Certain constitutional violations not apparent from the trial record.

Rule 37 is often the vehicle for raising claims that depend on facts outside the trial record (e.g., what counsel did or did not investigate).

B. The “Clearly Erroneous” Standard

On appeal from a Rule 37 decision, the Arkansas Supreme Court uses a “clearly erroneous” standard, which is highly deferential. The Court asks not whether it would have decided the issue differently, but whether it is firmly convinced that the trial court made a mistake, despite some evidence supporting its findings. This makes it difficult for petitioners to overturn Rule 37 denials, especially when the trial court has made written findings.

C. The Strickland Test in Plain Terms

Under Strickland:

Deficient performance = Counsel’s work fell below what a reasonably competent criminal-defense lawyer would do.
Prejudice = The error mattered: there is a real, not speculative, chance that the verdict (or sentence, or appeal) would have been different if counsel had performed adequately.

Courts are highly deferential and presume counsel acted reasonably; the burden rests with the petitioner to overcome that presumption with specific, fact-based allegations.

D. Trial Strategy vs. Ineffective Assistance

Many complaints about counsel amount to disagreements about strategy. Courts distinguish between:

Strategic or tactical decisions (e.g., which witnesses to call, whether to object, whether to pursue certain tests), which are almost always insulated from collateral attack; and
Objectively unreasonable failures (e.g., ignoring critical alibi evidence, misapplying basic law, failing to investigate obvious leads).

Arnold, Gay, and others in this opinion reaffirm that strategic choices belong to counsel’s professional judgment and rarely justify relief under Rule 37.

E. Rape-Shield Rule (Rule 411)

Arkansas Rule of Evidence 411—the rape-shield rule—generally blocks the admission of evidence about the victim’s prior sexual conduct, including previous allegations, when such evidence is offered solely to attack credibility or suggest promiscuity. There are narrow exceptions, but:

The defense must follow specific procedures to seek admission.
Courts evaluate whether the probative value outweighs unfair prejudice and whether the evidence fits within a recognized exception.

In Turnbo’s direct appeal, the Supreme Court already held that the evidence he wanted admitted fit squarely within Rule 411’s prohibition and was properly excluded. Postconviction attempts to revisit that decision are barred.

F. “Federalizing” Claims

To “federalize” an issue means to clearly state that a claim rests on federal constitutional grounds (e.g., “this exclusion of evidence violated my Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights”), so that if a defendant later seeks federal habeas relief, the issue will be treated as properly exhausted.

This opinion clarifies that:

Even if counsel fails to frame an argument in explicitly federal terms, that omission alone does not satisfy Strickland prejudice.
Prejudice is tied to the outcome of the state trial or direct appeal, not the lost opportunity to seek federal habeas review.

G. Evidentiary Hearings Under Rule 37.3

An evidentiary hearing is not automatic. Under Rule 37.3:

The trial court must hold a hearing unless the existing record and filings conclusively show the petitioner is not entitled to relief.
If no hearing is held, the court must enter written findings explaining why the petition fails as a matter of law or on the record.

In practice, many Rule 37 petitions are denied without a hearing when:

Claims are purely conclusory.
They are procedurally barred (e.g., new issues raised only on appeal, or issues previously decided on direct review).
They attack strategic decisions without specific factual allegations showing unreasonableness and prejudice.

VII. Impact and Broader Significance

A. Reinforcing the High Bar for Ineffective-Assistance Claims

Turnbo continues a line of Arkansas decisions that set a very high bar for postconviction relief based on ineffective assistance. The Court emphasizes:

The presumption of counsel’s competence.
The need for specific, non-conclusory factual allegations.
The requirement that alleged errors must realistically have affected the outcome.

For defense practitioners, the opinion is a reminder to:

Create a clear record of strategic decisions (including the defendant’s waiver of the right to testify).
Anticipate that nearly all tactical choices will be defended as within the “wide range of professional conduct.”

B. Clarifying the Role of Federal Habeas Preservation in Strickland Prejudice

One notable doctrinal point is the Court’s reiteration that loss of federal habeas review is not itself Strickland prejudice. This has several implications:

Counsel’s effectiveness is judged by state-trial and appeal outcomes, not by collateral review prospects.
Defendants cannot claim ineffective assistance merely because their trial or appellate counsel did not use explicit federal-constitutional language when objecting or preserving issues.
Federal habeas strategy, while important as a practical matter, does not independently ground a successful Rule 37 ineffective-assistance claim in Arkansas courts.

This principle may significantly limit attempts by state prisoners to leverage postconviction proceedings as a means of recreating or expanding the record with an eye primarily on federal habeas.

C. Sexual Assault Prosecutions and the Weight of Victim Testimony

The Court’s reliance on Clarks and Doucoure—holding that victim testimony alone is sufficient to sustain a rape conviction—continues to shape how postconviction courts view prejudice arguments in sexual-assault cases.

Even potentially exculpatory or mitigating forensic evidence (e.g., ambiguous DNA results, absence of injuries) will be evaluated against the backdrop of the victim’s testimony. Consequently:

Petitioners in rape cases face a particularly steep uphill battle in showing that any one evidentiary or strategic change would probably have altered the outcome.

D. Strategic Decisions and the Scope of Rule 37 Review

Across multiple claims—DNA testing, expert witnesses, whether to object to statements, whether to call the defendant—the Court emphasizes the centrality of “strategy.”

The opinion therefore:

Signals that Rule 37 is not a vehicle to second-guess tactical criminal-defense judgments.
Reinforces that even suboptimal outcomes do not convert strategic choices into constitutional violations.

For trial lawyers, this is both reassuring (in terms of protection from collateral attack) and cautionary (in terms of the need to make deliberate, well-documented strategic choices).

E. Procedural Discipline in Postconviction Litigation

Turnbo also serves as a reminder that:

All claims must be raised in the Rule 37 petition itself; new theories or expanded factual allegations added only on appeal will not be entertained.
Issues fully litigated on direct appeal—such as rape-shield rulings—cannot be re-labeled as ineffective assistance absent materially different grounds.
Requests for “reconsideration” under Rule 37.2(d) are tightly restricted.

This encourages precise pleading and tactical decision-making at the postconviction stage, especially when the petitioner is proceeding pro se, as Turnbo was.

VIII. Conclusion

Clarence Turnbo v. State of Arkansas, 2025 Ark. 106, is best understood as a comprehensive reaffirmation of established principles rather than a radical departure. Its main contributions to Arkansas law are:

Reaffirming the strict application of the Strickland standard and the deference to strategic decisions by defense counsel.
Clarifying that failure to “federalize” state-law objections does not constitute Strickland prejudice because prejudice is tied to the outcome of the state trial or appeal, not to federal habeas opportunities.
Emphasizing that victim testimony alone can sustain a rape conviction, thereby making prejudice arguments that focus narrowly on forensic or impeachment evidence especially difficult.
Confirming that Rule 37.1 is not a forum to reargue issues resolved on direct appeal nor to present new theories for the first time on appeal.
Illustrating when a Rule 37 petition may be denied without an evidentiary hearing under Rule 37.3, and how Rule 37.2(d) limits motions for reconsideration.

Taken together, the opinion reinforces a posture of strong deference—to trial counsel’s professional judgment, to prior appellate decisions, and to the trial court’s Rule 37 findings. For criminal defendants and their counsel, Turnbo underscores the importance of raising all plausible arguments at the earliest stage, building a robust trial and appellate record, and understanding that postconviction relief in Arkansas, especially on ineffective-assistance grounds, remains an extraordinary and difficult remedy to obtain.