State v. Long: Cross‑Jurisdictional Other‑Act Evidence and Psychological Coercion in Familial Rape and Abuse Prosecutions

I. Introduction

In State v. Long, 2025 S.D. 69, the Supreme Court of South Dakota affirmed multiple convictions arising from a sustained pattern of physical, sexual, and emotional abuse that Lance Lowell Long inflicted upon his stepchildren. The case sits at the intersection of evidence law and substantive criminal law, and it is legally significant in at least two respects:

It squarely rejects any geographic limitation on the admissibility of “other act” evidence under SDCL 19‑19‑404(b), holding that acts committed in other South Dakota counties and in other states may be admissible to prove a common plan, modus operandi, or the nature of a familial relationship.
It re‑affirms that “force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm” in second-degree rape (SDCL 22‑22‑1(2)) can be satisfied by a combination of physical overpowering and psychological coercion within a powerful, abusive family dynamic.

Long was convicted in Corson County of:

Three counts of rape (including second-degree rape under SDCL 22‑22‑1(2));
Three counts of aggravated assault;
Five counts of abuse of or cruelty to a minor.

The victims were his stepchildren, referred to in the opinion as A.A., E.D., A.D., I.A., and J.A. The factual record described a years‑long course of extreme physical discipline (including shocks with a cattle prod, shock collars, and a taser), provision of methamphetamine and marijuana to minors, and repeated sexual assaults on A.A.

On appeal, Long principally argued:

That the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting “other act” evidence of abuse and drug distribution occurring outside Corson County—specifically in other South Dakota counties and in other states.
That the court erred in denying his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second‑degree rape count, claiming insufficient evidence of “force, coercion, or threats.”

The Supreme Court rejected both arguments and affirmed.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Holdings

Other‑act evidence across jurisdictions is admissible under SDCL 19‑19‑404(b).
The Court held that SDCL 19‑19‑404(b) (the South Dakota counterpart to Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)) contains no requirement that “other acts” occur in the same county or even the same state as the charged offenses. The circuit court properly admitted evidence of Long’s similar conduct in Oklahoma, Dewey County, and Minnehaha County to:
- Show the nature of his relationship with the victims, and
- Demonstrate a common plan, modus operandi, and pattern of abusive behavior within the family unit.
Remoteness does not bar evidence where there is a continuous and strikingly similar pattern of abuse.
The abusive conduct spanned approximately five years. The Court held that the continuing nature and striking similarity of the conduct eliminated concerns about temporal remoteness under Rule 404(b).
Sufficient evidence supported second-degree rape by force, coercion, or threats.
The Court concluded that A.A.’s testimony—describing Long on top of her, ignoring her verbal resistance, causing her pain and bleeding, and threatening to kill her if she told anyone—combined with the larger context of his dominance and abuse in the household, provided sufficient evidence of “force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm” under SDCL 22‑22‑1(2).

B. Result

The Supreme Court affirmed all of Long’s Corson County convictions. It found no abuse of discretion in the admission of other‑act evidence and no error in the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal on the second‑degree rape count.

III. Analysis of the Evidence Issues (SDCL 19‑19‑404(b))

A. Framework: What SDCL 19‑19‑404(b) Allows and Forbids

SDCL 19‑19‑404(b)(1) provides (in substance) that evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts:

May not be used to prove a person has a bad character and therefore acted in conformity with that character on the charged occasion.
May be used for other, non‑character purposes, such as “motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

Key points from the Court’s prior interpretations, many of which the Long court draws upon:

Non‑exclusive list of purposes. In State v. Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 14, 593 N.W.2d 792, 798, the Court emphasized that the list in Rule 404(b) is non‑exhaustive:
“Because the possible uses for other act evidence are limitless, Rule 404(b) only suggests a nonexclusive list of purposes.”
Only character propensity proof is forbidden. In State v. Carter, 2023 S.D. 67, ¶ 27, 1 N.W.3d 674, 686, the Court reiterated:
“All that is prohibited under § 404(b) is that similar act evidence not be admitted solely to prove character.”
Two‑step analysis. As restated in State v. Rudloff, 2024 S.D. 73, ¶ 47, 15 N.W.3d 468, 485–86, and State v. Evans, 2021 S.D. 12, ¶ 25, 956 N.W.2d 68, 79, before admitting other‑act evidence, courts must:
1. Determine whether the evidence is relevant to a material issue other than character, and
2. Decide whether its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice (Rule 403 balancing).

The standard of review is “abuse of discretion,” defined in State v. Geist, 2025 S.D. 32, ¶ 17, 24 N.W.3d 101, 105 (citing State v. Belt, 2024 S.D. 82, ¶ 20, 15 N.W.3d 732, 737, and State v. Krueger, 2020 S.D. 57, ¶ 29, 950 N.W.2d 664, 672), as:

a “fundamental error of judgment, a choice outside the range of permissible choices, a decision, which on full consideration, is arbitrary or unreasonable.”

Even if error exists, reversal requires a showing of prejudice: a reasonable probability that, but for the error, the result would have been different. See Carter, 2023 S.D. 67, ¶ 26, 1 N.W.3d at 686.

B. The Unique Familial Context: Relationship Evidence and Pattern of Abuse

Long’s case fits squarely within a line of South Dakota decisions allowing prior abuse evidence in closely related or familial contexts. The Court drew expressly on this body of law:

State v. Solis, 2019 S.D. 36, ¶ 23, 931 N.W.2d 253, 259 (quoting State v. Laible, 1999 S.D. 58, ¶ 21, 594 N.W.2d 328, 335):
“When an accused had a close relationship with the victim, prior aggression, threats[,] or abusive treatment of the same victim by the same perpetrator are admissible when offered on relevant issues under Rule 404(b).”
State v. Phillips, 2018 S.D. 2, ¶ 16, 906 N.W.2d 411, 415:
“Prior instances of domestic abuse against the same victim are often relevant in the familial context because they show the nature of the relationship[.]” (emphasis added).
State v. Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 19, 593 N.W.2d at 800, where other acts of excessive punishment were admitted to:
“establish that the defendant had a plan or design to inflict excessive punishment in a similar manner and ferocity regardless of his children's transgression. All that is required to show a common plan is that the charged and uncharged events ‘have sufficient points in common.’”
State v. Fisher, 2010 S.D. 44, ¶ 21, 783 N.W.2d 664, 671:
Other‑act evidence can show “an uninterrupted chain or series of closely connected events between defendant and [the victim], allowing the jury to realistically evaluate the charged events in light of the entire history” of abuse.

Building on this jurisprudence, the Court in Long held that where the accused is a stepfather/head of household, evidence of his ongoing abuse of the same children—even in different locations and times—helps the jury understand:

The power dynamics within the family;
The pattern of escalating violence and control;
How conduct in Corson County is part of a “common plan or scheme” rather than isolated incidents.

The circuit court explicitly admitted the other acts “to show the alleged relationship between Defendant and his alleged MO, mode of operandi, and a unique pattern of behavior occurring with children in this family setting” ([¶14], [¶21]). The Supreme Court endorsed this approach.

C. The Geographic Argument: No County‑ or State‑Based Limitation

Long’s central evidentiary argument was that because:

the charged crimes occurred in Corson County;
the other acts occurred in Dewey County, Minnehaha County, and Oklahoma;

the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting the latter as Rule 404(b) evidence.

The Supreme Court’s response was categorical:

“Long's argument that the other act evidence was inadmissible because it occurred in different counties in South Dakota and in different states has no legal basis. The text of SDCL 19‑19‑404(b) contains no such requirement, and Long advances no alternative source for such a requirement.” ([¶19])

In other words:

Rule 404(b) looks to purpose and relevance, not geography.
So long as the other acts are relevant to a permissible non‑character purpose and survive Rule 403 balancing, their venue or state of occurrence is immaterial.

This is an important clarification for South Dakota practice:

Prosecutors may use conduct charged or occurring in other counties or states as 404(b) evidence in a South Dakota trial, provided they meet the usual relevancy and prejudice tests.
Defendants cannot obtain exclusion merely by pointing out that the acts occurred outside the forum county or outside the state.

The Long opinion thus settles a question that defendants may have tried to raise implicitly: whether Rule 404(b) has an unstated jurisdictional limitation. It does not.

D. Pattern and Common Plan: How the Other Acts Fit the Corson County Charges

The other acts described in the State’s notice fell into several categories:

Use of a cattle prod and shock collar on the children in Oklahoma;
Shocking E.D. with a “hot shot” in Isabel (Dewey County);
Continued shocks with a hotshot and taser, as well as physical beatings, after the family moved to Sioux Falls (Minnehaha County);
Provision of methamphetamine, marijuana, and alcohol to the children between roughly 2017–2020;
Sexual abuse of A.A. in Philip (Haakon County);
Evidence from searches (devices matching children’s descriptions).

The Court concluded the acts “depicted the nature of Long’s relationship with the children and how Long perpetrated his abuse of these children over a prolonged period and in a manner remarkably similar to the crimes charged in the Corson County indictments” ([¶24]).

Due to:

The same victims (his stepchildren);
The same methods of discipline and intimidation (shocking, beating, drugging);
The same role (primary disciplinarian and father figure);
The continuous, escalating pattern of control and harm;

the Court held that:

“The consistency of the abuse established a common plan or scheme as envisioned in SDCL 19‑19‑404(b).” ([¶24])

This is classic “pattern of abuse” jurisprudence: the jury is permitted to see the Corson County charges as one chapter in a larger, continuing story of familial domination and maltreatment, not as isolated anomalies.

E. Remoteness in Time: The Similarity–Remoteness Balance

Long also argued that the other acts were too far removed in time. The Court responded by invoking its existing framework, summarizing Evans, 2021 S.D. 12, ¶ 34, 956 N.W.2d at 82, which in turn draws from Wright, Most, and Fisher:

There is no strict time cutoff: “we have steadfastly refused to adopt an inflexible rule on remoteness” (Wright, 1999 S.D. 50, ¶ 24, 593 N.W.2d at 802).
Remoteness must be evaluated together with similarity (Most, 2012 S.D. 46, ¶ 17, 815 N.W.2d 560, 565; Fisher, 2010 S.D. 44, ¶ 28, 783 N.W.2d 664, 673):
- Greater time gaps can be tolerated when the acts are strikingly similar to the charged conduct.
- Less similarity may suffice when the acts are temporally close.

Applying that framework, the Court noted that the children described “a course of continuing conduct which occurred over a five‑year period that exactly mirrored the conduct charged in the Corson County indictments” ([¶25]). Because:

The pattern was continuous, not episodic; and
The later and earlier acts were nearly identical in method and purpose;

“the striking similarity between the acts and the continuing nature of Long’s conduct eliminates any concern about remoteness” ([¶25]).

This reinforces that in long‑term abuse cases, courts will generally treat the acts as part of a continuous course of conduct rather than as “old” or “stale” offenses, especially where the same perpetrator and victims are involved and the modus operandi remains consistent.

F. Prejudice Analysis and Harmlessness

Because the Court found no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence ([¶26]), it did not reach the question of prejudice. Nonetheless, one can infer that:

The highly probative nature of the pattern—showing Long’s control, routine use of shocking devices, and distribution of drugs to minors—was seen as outweighing the risk of unfair prejudice.
The evidence was directed toward non‑character purposes: relationship, common plan, and explanatory context, rather than simply painting Long as a bad person.

IV. Analysis of the Second‑Degree Rape Issue

A. Standard of Review: Judgment of Acquittal and Sufficiency of Evidence

Long’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the second‑degree rape count challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The Court reminds us of the governing principles:

A motion for judgment of acquittal “attacks the sufficiency of the evidence” (State v. Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 12, 941 N.W.2d 216, 220).
Denial of such a motion is reviewed de novo (Belt, 2024 S.D. 82, ¶ 35, 15 N.W.3d at 740, citing State v. Brim, 2010 S.D. 74, ¶ 6, 789 N.W.2d 80, 83).
The ultimate question is “whether there is evidence in the record which, if believed by the fact finder, is sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt” (Belt, 2024 S.D. 82, ¶ 35, 15 N.W.3d at 740, quoting State v. Martin, 2015 S.D. 2, ¶ 13, 859 N.W.2d 600, 606).
The court must accept “the evidence and the most favorable inferences that can be fairly drawn from it that support the verdict” and does not:
- resolve conflicts in the evidence,
- assess witness credibility, or
- reweigh evidence.
See Wolf, 2020 S.D. 15, ¶ 13, 941 N.W.2d at 220.

B. Statutory Elements of Second‑Degree Rape and Key Definitions

Second-degree rape under SDCL 22‑22‑1(2) is defined as:

“an act of sexual penetration accomplished . . . [t]hrough the use of force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm against the victim or other persons within the victim's presence, accompanied by apparent power of execution[.]”

Two legal concepts are important here: force and coercion.

Force is statutorily defined in SDCL 22‑22‑1.5(2) as:
“the use of physical effort sufficient to overcome, restrain, injure, or prevent escape[.]”
Coercion has been defined in case law. State v. Townsend, 2021 S.D. 29, ¶ 22 n.1, 959 N.W.2d 605, 611 n.1 (quoting State v. Willis, 370 N.W.2d 193, 199 (S.D. 1985)):
“Coercion exists when ‘one is, by the unlawful conduct of another, induced to do or perform some act under circumstances which deprive her of the exercise of her free will; it may be either actual, where physical force is put on a woman to compel her to do an act against her will, or implied, where the relation of the parties is such that one is under subjection to the other.’”

The Court also referred to State v. Klaudt, 2009 S.D. 71, ¶ 46, 772 N.W.2d 117, 131–32, where “psychological coercion” was found based on:

the victim’s “history, age, vulnerability, and trust and respect” for the defendant; and
the defendant’s “authoritative position as a foster parent and state legislator.”

Klaudt stands for the principle that coercion in rape can be psychological and relational, not just physical. Authority and vulnerability can substitute for overt violence.

C. The Facts of the St. Patrick’s Day Rape

A.A., then fourteen, recounted the first rape:

She and Long were watching a movie.
He began touching her within her underwear line and made her touch him.
He then “put his penis inside of [her] and it hurt.”
She told him to stop; he refused; she was unable to make him stop.
He was positioned on top of her, and she bled immediately afterward.
Afterward he threatened to kill her and hide her body so no one would ever find her if she told anyone ([¶7], [¶31]).

This episode occurred against the backdrop of Long’s progressively severe physical abuse, his role as the primary disciplinarian, and his manipulation and threats toward the children more broadly.

D. Applying “Force, Coercion, or Threats” to These Facts

Long’s appellate argument was narrowly framed: he claimed A.A. did not testify to “coercion or threats” at the time of the act and that there was no use of force beyond that inherent in sexual penetration itself ([¶27]).

The Court’s reasoning, when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, was:

Physical force. A.A. testified that:
- Long was on top of her;
- She told him to stop;
- He did not stop; and
- She could not make him stop, and “it hurt.”
This fits the statutory definition of “force” as “physical effort sufficient to overcome, restrain, injure, or prevent escape.”
Psychological coercion and threats. The Court placed the encounter within the broader pattern of Long’s:
- Authoritative role as stepfather and primary disciplinarian,
- Use of extreme punishments (shocking, beating),
- Use of threats, including specific death threats to A.A. if she disclosed the rape.
Drawing on Klaudt, the Court said:
“[T]he jury could have determined that the sexual encounter between Long and A.A. was the result of both physical and ‘psychological coercion’ as identified in Klaudt because of the authoritative and manipulative environment Long created after moving to the ranch, and assuming the role of primary disciplinarian and father figure.” ([¶32])
“Threats of immediate and great bodily harm.” Though the explicit death threat followed the act, it confirmed the existing coercive dynamic and the realistic fear of serious harm if A.A. resisted or disclosed. Combined with Long’s pattern of meting out painful punishments for defiance, the jury could reasonably infer a contemporaneous threat environment.

Taken together, the facts and reasonable inferences provided a sufficient evidentiary basis for the jury to find that the sexual penetration was accomplished through force, coercion, or threats, with Long possessing the “apparent power of execution” of those threats.

V. Clarifying Complex Legal Concepts

A. “Other Act” Evidence vs. Character Evidence

It is easy to conflate “other bad things the defendant did” with impermissible propensity evidence. The key distinction:

Not allowed: “He did bad things before, therefore he is a bad person, therefore he probably did this bad thing.”
Allowed: “He did these other (similar) things to the same victims in the same way, which helps show his plan, intent, relationship, or the context in which the charged acts occurred.”

In Long, the abuse in other locations was not introduced simply to say “Long is an abusive man,” but to:

Explain the family context and Long’s control over the children;
Show a common plan of using shocking devices and drugs as tools of discipline, intimidation, and control;
Help the jury interpret the Corson County conduct in light of a continuous pattern.

B. “Common Plan or Scheme” and “Modus Operandi”

A “common plan or scheme” under Rule 404(b) means that the uncharged and charged acts share enough distinctive points in common that they are best understood as parts of a unified course of conduct. “Modus operandi” refers to a signature method of committing a crime.

In Long:

He consistently used tools (cattle prod, shock collar, taser) to cause pain and fear;
He coupled physical abuse with drug provision and sexual abuse, all within his role as the family’s authority figure;
The same methods and victims appeared across time and geography.

This repetition made it credible to view the Corson County acts as part of a common plan rather than one‑off, unrelated events.

C. “Remoteness” vs. “Similarity”

Remoteness addresses how long ago other acts occurred relative to the charged offense. Courts balance:

Temporal distance (how old the prior act is), and
Similarity and continuity (how closely the acts resemble the charged crime and whether they form a continuous chain).

In child abuse or domestic abuse cases, abuse is often:

Long‑term;
Repetitive;
Escalating; and
Committed in private.

The Court recognizes that what might seem “remote” in a one‑time stranger assault may be part of an unbroken pattern in an intrafamilial context. Long endorses this flexible approach.

D. “Coercion” and “Psychological Coercion”

“Coercion” in rape law does not require overt physical violence. As defined in Willis and reiterated in Townsend, it encompasses:

Actual coercion: physical force compelling an act against the victim’s will; and
Implied coercion: where the relationship is such that the victim is “under subjection” to the other person.

“Psychological coercion,” as recognized in Klaudt and applied here, refers to the use of:

Authority (e.g., parent, foster parent, teacher, legislator);
Control (e.g., financial, physical, emotional);
Vulnerability (e.g., youth, dependence, history of abuse);

to effectively override a victim’s free will even without a beating or weapon at the moment of the sexual act. The victim may reasonably believe that resistance will result in serious consequences, given the perpetrator’s established pattern of behavior.

E. “Abuse of Discretion” vs. “De Novo” Review

Two different standards of review appear prominently:

Abuse of discretion (for evidentiary rulings): The appellate court will affirm the trial court’s choice among reasonable options unless it is “arbitrary or unreasonable” and outside the range of permissible choices. This gives significant leeway to the trial judge.
De novo (for sufficiency of the evidence / judgment of acquittal): The appellate court independently assesses whether, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a rational jury could have convicted. No deference is given to the trial court’s decision on the motion, but the appellate court still defers to the jury’s role as fact finder.

VI. Impact and Implications

A. For Evidence Law and Criminal Practice

No geographic safe harbor from 404(b) evidence.
Defendants cannot exclude damaging prior conduct simply because it occurred in another county or another state. If there is sufficient similarity and relevance to a non‑character purpose, and the court properly balances probative value against prejudice, such evidence can be admitted in South Dakota courts.
Use of out‑of‑county/out‑of‑state convictions or conduct as context.
Prosecutors may:
- Rely on abuse episodes from other jurisdictions to show a common plan and the nature of a relationship;
- Use prior prosecutions (e.g., Long’s Minnehaha County convictions) as Rule 404(b) evidence in later prosecutions, provided double‑jeopardy concerns are not implicated in the charged conduct itself.
Strengthening the “whole story” approach in intrafamilial abuse cases.
The opinion confirms that juries may hear a comprehensive narrative of the abusive relationship, even if some episodes are temporally distant or geographically dispersed, as long as they form part of a coherent pattern.

B. For Child Abuse and Sexual Assault Prosecutions

Recognition of psychological and relational coercion.
Long reinforces that in prosecutions involving authority figures and minors:
- Overt physical violence is not necessary for “force” or “coercion.”
- A pattern of authoritarian control, threats, and punishment can supply the coercive element, particularly when combined with the victim’s youth and dependence.
Role of prior abuse in proving elements of sexual offenses.
Evidence of earlier physical and emotional abuse can help prove:
- Why the victim did not physically resist or immediately disclose;
- Why the victim reasonably feared immediate and great bodily harm;
- The defendant’s capacity and willingness to carry out threats (apparent power of execution).

C. For Defense Strategy

Defense counsel should note:

Challenging other‑act evidence on the basis of location is no longer viable.
Objections must focus on:
- Lack of genuine similarity or connection to a non‑character issue;
- Rule 403 undue prejudice, especially if the evidence risks turning the trial into a series of “mini‑trials” on collateral incidents.
Where psychological coercion is alleged, challenging the adequacy of the pattern evidence and the specific link between that pattern and the charged incident may be more effective than insisting on the absence of immediate physical violence.

VII. Conclusion

State v. Long is a significant decision in South Dakota’s evidence and criminal law jurisprudence. It clarifies that:

SDCL 19‑19‑404(b) imposes no geographic limitation on other‑act evidence. Courts may consider prior or subsequent conduct occurring in different counties and states, provided it is probative of legitimate, non‑character issues such as common plan, modus operandi, and the nature of a familial relationship.
Concerns about temporal remoteness yield to evidence of a continuous, strikingly similar pattern of conduct, especially in long‑term intrafamilial abuse settings.
Second‑degree rape by “force, coercion, or threats of immediate and great bodily harm” can be proved through a combination of:
- Physical overpowering at the time of the act, and
- A broader environment of psychological and relational coercion grounded in the perpetrator’s position of authority and history of violent and controlling behavior.

By affirming the use of cross‑jurisdictional other‑act evidence and recognizing the realities of psychological coercion in familial abuse, the Court has equipped trial courts and juries to evaluate such cases in a way that reflects the full context of the abusive relationship rather than isolated snapshots. The decision will likely be cited frequently in future cases involving patterned child abuse, domestic violence, and sexual assault within family structures.