“Involving a Minor” Encompasses Fictitious Minors Under § 2260A: A Comprehensive Commentary on Charles W. Christopher v. United States, 23-2976 (7th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

Charles W. Christopher, already a registered sex offender, pleaded guilty in the Central District of Illinois to two counts: (1) attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and (2) commission of a felony “involving a minor” while under a sex-offender reporting requirement, contrary to 18 U.S.C. § 2260A. The factual backdrop was a classic sting operation—Christopher exchanged sexually explicit messages with an undercover agent posing as a 15-year-old, arranged a meeting, and arrived with alcohol.

After receiving a 264-month aggregate sentence (144 months on § 2422(b), a mandatory consecutive 120 months on § 2260A), Christopher filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 alleging ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC). He argued his lawyer should have attacked the § 2260A count on the theory that “involving a minor” requires an actual minor victim, not a fictitious one. The district court denied relief, and the Seventh Circuit granted a certificate of appealability limited to that single issue.

Judge Lee, writing for a unanimous panel (Hamilton, Lee, Maldonado, JJ.), affirmed. Crucially, the court held that a § 2422(b) attempt conviction—where the “minor” is an undercover agent—does trigger § 2260A. Because the underlying statutory argument lacked merit, counsel’s failure to raise it caused no Strickland prejudice.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Issue Certified: Was counsel constitutionally ineffective for failing to argue that § 2260A applies only when the predicate felony actually involved a real minor?
• Holding: No. Even assuming counsel’s performance was deficient, Christopher suffered no prejudice because § 2260A encompasses conduct aimed at fictitious minors. Therefore, the § 2255 motion was properly denied.
• Key Statutory Interpretation: The phrase “involving a minor” in § 2260A is broad enough to cover felony attempts that are directed at minors, whether real or fictitious.
• Precedential Effect: The Seventh Circuit aligns with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, rejecting the Eastern District of Pennsylvania’s contrary view (United States v. Dahl, 2015). The decision cements an emerging majority rule among federal appellate courts.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The panel weaves together two distinct lines of authority:

1. Ineffective Assistance (Strickland line):
   • Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) – Two-prong test (deficiency and prejudice).
   • Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500 (2003) – IAC claims may be raised on collateral review.
   • Seventh Circuit IAC decisions – Bridges (2021), Coleman (2023), Lickers (2024) explored lawyers’ duty to research evolving doctrines. These cases informed the panel’s cautious assumption (without deciding) that counsel may have been deficient.
2. Scope of § 2260A:
   • United States v. Slaughter, 708 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2013) – Held that fictitious minor suffices.
   • United States v. Fortner, 943 F.3d 1007 (6th Cir. 2019) – Same conclusion, emphasizing textual and structural cues.
   • United States v. Dahl, 81 F. Supp. 3d 405 (E.D. Pa. 2015) – Lone published opinion adopting the “actual minor” view, ultimately rejected by the Seventh Circuit.
   • Related attempt-crime precedents – United States v. Sanchez, 615 F.3d 836 (7th Cir. 2010) on “substantial step”.

By harmonizing these lines, the court concluded the underlying statutory argument was, at best, a long-shot, so Christopher could not show a “reasonable probability” of a different result.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Step One – Assume Deficiency, Bypass the Debate: Rather than definitively decide whether counsel was deficient, the court “assumed without deciding” that deficiency existed. This is a classic Strickland shortcut: if the prejudice prong fails, no need to rule on deficiency.
2. Step Two – Statutory Construction of § 2260A:
   • Textual focus: “Whoever … commits a felony offense involving a minor under [enumerated sections, including § 2422] … shall be sentenced to 10 years.”
   • Dictionary cross-check: Competing dictionary definitions of “involve”—“require as a necessary accompaniment” (narrow) vs. “relate closely” (broad). The court selected the broader reading.
   • Congressional pattern: Where Congress intends actual minor, it says so (e.g., § 2252A speaks of “actual minor”). The absence of the modifier is presumed deliberate.
   • Attempt principle: Attempt liability under § 2422(b) is complete when the defendant believes the target is a minor and takes a substantial step. Because Congress explicitly listed § 2422 among the predicates, it presumably incorporated the attempt doctrine.
   • Surplusage argument refuted: “Involving a minor” still performs meaningful work by filtering out adult-victim predicates such as certain § 1201 kidnappings.
3. Step Three – Rule of Lenity Rejected: After a “hard look” at text, structure, and history, no “grievous ambiguity” remained; therefore, the rule of lenity was inappropriate.
4. Step Four – Prejudice Analysis: Because the statutory attack was foredoomed, Christopher could not establish a reasonable probability that:
   • (a) he would have gone to trial rather than plead, and
   • (b) the district judge would have dismissed the § 2260A count or imposed a lower sentence.
   Hence, the § 2255 motion failed.

3.3 Potential Impact

The decision carries notable implications:

• Uniformity Among Circuits: The Seventh Circuit’s alignment with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits deepens the appellate consensus, leaving only outlier district-level authority. A certiorari petition could nevertheless invite the Supreme Court to settle the issue definitively.
• Law-Enforcement Tactics Endorsed: Undercover sting operations remain legally sufficient to trigger the harsh 10-year consecutive penalty in § 2260A. Agencies can continue “fictitious minor” investigations with confidence that § 2260A will apply.
• Plea-Bargaining Dynamics: Defense counsel now have clearer notice that challenging § 2260A on “actual minor” grounds is unlikely to succeed in the Seventh Circuit, which may streamline plea negotiations and discourage meritless collateral attacks.
• Professional Responsibility: Although the panel assumed deficiency arguendo, the opinion signals that counsel’s failure to foresee every untested statutory nuance is not automatically ineffective—important for evaluating defense lawyers’ performance post-Strickland.
• Sentencing Policy: The ruling reinforces Congress’s intent to impose additional punishment on recidivist sex offenders even when the “victim” is a decoy, underscoring a preventive rather than solely retributive rationale.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Attempt Liability

A crime of attempt is complete when (1) the defendant intends to commit the underlying offense and (2) takes a “substantial step” toward completion. No actual victim or consummation is necessary.

18 U.S.C. § 2422(b)

Criminalizes the use of interstate communication to entice, coerce, or persuade a minor to engage in unlawful sexual activity. Includes attempts.

18 U.S.C. § 2260A

Imposes a mandatory consecutive 10-year sentence on registered sex offenders who commit specified felony offenses “involving a minor.” The controversy is whether the phrase requires a real minor.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel (IAC)

Under Strickland, a defendant must show (1) deficient performance—representation falling below objective reasonableness—and (2) prejudice—a reasonable probability of a different result but for counsel’s errors.

Rule of Lenity

A tie-breaker canon: if, after exhausting traditional tools of statutory interpretation, the court finds grievous ambiguity, it must construe the statute in the defendant’s favor.

5. Conclusion

Christopher v. United States crystallizes the Seventh Circuit’s stance that § 2260A’s phrase “involving a minor” comfortably includes sting operations where no real child exists. By tying the analysis to the statute’s structure and surrounding provisions, the court foreclosed the “actual minor” defense and, in the process, denied Christopher’s Strickland claim for lack of prejudice.

The decision enhances doctrinal clarity in two significant ways: it narrows the field of plausible IAC theories in sex-offense cases and solidifies a cross-circuit majority on § 2260A’s scope. Practitioners should now treat the fictitious-minor scenario as settled law within the Seventh Circuit and should calibrate litigation strategies, plea advice, and sentencing expectations accordingly.

Going forward, any judicial reconsideration will likely have to emanate from either an en banc circuit split or the Supreme Court. Until then, Christopher stands as an authoritative statement that the law’s protective reach is triggered by the offender’s intent, not the victim’s actual existence.