Clarifying the Boundary Between Professional Judgment and Deliberate Indifference & the Standard for Appointing Counsel to Pro Se Prisoners: Commentary on Joshua Scolman v. Daniel LaVoie, 7th Cir. No. 24-2635 (2025)

I. Introduction

In Joshua Scolman v. Daniel LaVoie, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit confronted two recurrent problems in prison-conditions litigation:

• When does a prison medical professional’s refusal to prescribe a particular medication constitute deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment?
• Under what circumstances should a district court recruit counsel for an indigent, mentally-ill, but demonstrably competent pro se prisoner?

Although issued as a nonprecedential disposition, the panel’s decision—authored per curiam by Chief Judge Diane S. Sykes, Judge Michael Y. Scudder, and Judge Doris L. Pryor—offers a compact restatement of controlling standards that will inevitably inform future litigation. The court affirmed summary judgment for several Wisconsin Department of Corrections (“WDOC”) medical personnel and administrators, and it upheld the district judge’s refusal to appoint counsel for the prisoner-plaintiff.

II. Summary of the Judgment

The Seventh Circuit held:

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Scolman’s motion for recruitment of counsel because his filings demonstrated sufficient legal aptitude under Pruitt v. Mote.
2. None of the defendants—administrators or treating clinicians—acted with deliberate indifference. Their medication decisions represented reasoned, professional judgments influenced by Scolman’s history of diverting controlled substances.
3. Because all federal claims failed, the district court rightly relinquished supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law negligence counts.

Accordingly, the panel affirmed the grant of summary judgment to all defendants.

III. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Pruitt v. Mote, 503 F.3d 647 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc) – Sets the two-part test for appointing counsel: (1) has the plaintiff made reasonable efforts to obtain counsel; and (2) does the case’s difficulty exceed the plaintiff’s demonstrated ability. The panel reiterated that even serious mental illness does not mandate counsel where the prisoner’s filings are “significantly more sophisticated than the average pro se prisoner.”
• Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1994) – Articulates the subjective and objective prongs of deliberate indifference. The panel applied Farmer to determine that mere disagreement over medications, without reckless disregard of a substantial risk, is not unconstitutional.
• Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016 (7th Cir. 2019) – Cited for the rule that persisting with an “easier and less efficacious treatment” can violate the Eighth Amendment. The panel distinguished Lockett because defendants here tried multiple alternatives and ultimately reinstated pregabalin when contract conditions were met.
• Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768 (7th Cir. 2015) – Clarifies supervisory liability under § 1983; administrators may be liable only if they “turn a blind eye.” The panel relied on Perez to exonerate Utter and Haseleu, who reasonably deferred to clinicians.
• Burton v. Downey, 805 F.3d 776 (7th Cir. 2015) – Permits clinicians to choose less addictive treatments over a specialist’s recommendation. This case directly supported the reasonableness of nurses Wachholz’s and Simmons’s choices.

B. Legal Reasoning

1. Appointment of Counsel: The court meticulously applied the Pruitt factors. It underscored that high-quality pro se filings can outweigh mental-health concerns, particularly at early stages. The panel also endorsed the district judge’s pragmatic approach of “wait-and-see” regarding later recruitment of counsel.

2. Deliberate Indifference Analysis:

• Objective Prong: All parties accepted that degenerative disc disease constituted a serious medical need.
• Subjective Prong: The panel dissected each defendant’s state of mind:
  • Administrators (LaVoie, Utter, Haseleu) – No evidence they ignored obvious risks; they either facilitated care (LaVoie approved MRI & medication) or lacked authority to override clinicians.
  • Clinicians (Wachholz, Simmons) – Exercised professional judgment to withhold pregabalin due to diversion risk, experimented with other therapies, and responded promptly to side effects. Their conduct did not “depart radically from accepted standards.”

3. Medication-Contract Legality: The court treated the requirement to sign a non-diversion agreement as a legitimate penological measure, analogizing to Overton v. Bazzetta’s deference to prison safety concerns.

4. Summary-Judgment Methodology: Applying Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, the panel emphasized that conclusory allegations and disagreement over treatment do not create genuine disputes of material fact.

C. Potential Impact

Though the disposition is formally non-precedential, its reasoning portends practical effects:

• Medication Diversion: Prison healthcare providers may rely on this opinion to justify contractual safeguards and to refuse controlled substances when lab results suggest diversion.
• Appointment of Counsel: District courts within the Seventh Circuit gain reassurance that they may deny counsel—even to mentally-ill inmates—if the record shows capable self-representation, at least until complexity escalates.
• Specialist vs. Facility Clinician: The case bolsters the view that facility medical staff can diverge from outside specialists’ recommendations when justified by addiction-control considerations.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Deliberate Indifference: Not mere negligence; officials must know of a substantial risk and consciously disregard it. Think of it as “criminal recklessness,” not “ordinary carelessness.”
• Medication Diversion: The practice of hoarding or trading prescribed pills. In prison settings, diversion signals potential misuse and security threats.
• Non-Formulary Drugs: Medications not on the prison’s standard list; prescribing them often triggers heightened oversight.
• Pregabalin vs. Gabapentin: Both are “gabapentinoids.” They treat nerve pain but possess abuse potential, leading facilities to impose strict monitoring.
• Summary Judgment: A procedural device allowing courts to dispose of cases lacking factual disputes warranting trial. Evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party.
• Supplemental Jurisdiction (§ 1367): Federal courts may hear state claims related to federal ones, but can relinquish when federal claims disappear.

V. Conclusion

Scolman v. LaVoie re-asserts two crucial propositions:

1. Professional Judgment Shield: So long as prison clinicians make reasoned, documented choices—especially in response to diversion risks—courts will not brand those choices as deliberate indifference, even where the prisoner disagrees or a specialist recommends otherwise.
2. Measured Approach to Counsel Recruitment: The Pruitt framework remains robust. Pro se prisoners capable of coherent legal advocacy will not automatically receive counsel, and courts may revisit the issue if litigation becomes more complex.

Practitioners should view this decision as a practical guide: maintain careful records of treatment decisions, articulate security-based medication policies, and evaluate counsel requests with attention to the litigant’s demonstrated capacities. While non-precedential, the opinion is poised to influence district-court rulings and litigation strategies across the Seventh Circuit’s correctional-health docket.