Reaffirming the Admissibility of Prior Failure‑to‑Register Convictions and Intrinsic Flight Evidence in SORNA Prosecutions:
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Fuertes (11th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025)

I. Introduction

United States v. Fuertes, No. 24‑12839 (11th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025) (not for publication), is an Eleventh Circuit decision affirming a sex‑offender’s SORNA conviction and a 60‑month sentence for failure to register and update required information. Although unpublished and therefore non‑precedential, the opinion is a useful and detailed illustration of:

How the Eleventh Circuit treats inadequately briefed constitutional challenges to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (“SORNA”);
How prior state failure‑to‑register convictions can be admitted under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) to prove the “knowledge” element of 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a);
How evidence of flight, concealment, and resistance to arrest is analyzed as “intrinsic” to the charged crime and weighed under Rule 403; and
When isolated prejudicial remarks at trial do—and do not—justify a mistrial.

The case arises from a defendant, already convicted of a federal sex offense, who failed to update his sex‑offender registration after leaving Florida for Georgia, and who also failed to report new electronic identifiers (email accounts and a Facebook profile) as required by Florida law and by SORNA’s implementation in that jurisdiction. A jury convicted him on four counts of failing to register; the district court imposed a 60‑month sentence.

On appeal, Fuertes advanced: (1) constitutional attacks on SORNA; (2) evidentiary challenges to three categories of “uncharged conduct”; and (3) objections to the district court’s denial of two motions for mistrial. The Eleventh Circuit rejected each argument and affirmed.

II. Case Background and Procedural Posture

A. Factual Background

In 2010, Fuertes was sentenced in federal court for a sex offense. At sentencing, he received explicit notice of his duty to comply with SORNA. Under Florida’s sex‑offender registration scheme (which implements SORNA requirements for in‑state offenders), Fuertes was required to:

Register in person every six months;
Report, within 48 hours, any new electronic mail address or “internet identifier” (which includes social media accounts);
Report in person within 48 hours if he established a permanent, temporary, or transient residence in any other state—and he was warned that failure to register after crossing state lines could violate state and federal law.

In early 2023, the Palm Beach County Sheriff’s Office (“PBSO”) discovered that Fuertes had created an email account four months earlier and had not reported it. After repeated attempts to contact him and advise him of his duty to register that email, PBSO told him on May 30, 2023, that felony charges would be filed for non‑compliance.

Within days, Fuertes:

Booked a one‑way flight from Florida to Atlanta, Georgia, and, according to cell‑phone data, never returned to Florida;
Left a voicemail with PBSO saying he was away for a “family emergency” but did not say where he was;
Eight days later, left another voicemail saying he was thinking about staying in Atlanta.

A PBSO detective explicitly informed Fuertes that if he did not intend to return to Florida immediately, he was required to register with the local sheriff’s office in Georgia. He never did so.

By mid‑July, PBSO told Fuertes that if he did not return to Florida, a warrant would issue. On October 24, U.S. Marshals arrested him at a residence in Tucker, Georgia. A search of his phone revealed:

A Facebook profile he had created on May 24, 2023; and
An additional email address created on May 22, 2023.

Neither of these identifiers had been reported as required.

B. Charges and Trial

Fuertes was charged under SORNA with four counts of “Failure of a Sex Offender to Properly Register,” all under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a):

One count for failing to register and update his registration after terminating his residence in the Southern District of Florida and commencing residence in another jurisdiction (Georgia);
Three counts for failing to register electronic identifiers: one count for each of the two undisclosed email addresses and one count for the Facebook profile.

At trial, Fuertes stipulated that he was a sex offender and was required to register under SORNA; the dispute centered on whether he “knowingly” failed to register and on his asserted affirmative defense that “uncontrollable circumstances” prevented his compliance. The jury convicted him on all four counts.

The district court sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Fuertes initially also challenged two sentencing enhancements, but he affirmatively abandoned that issue in his reply brief, so the Eleventh Circuit did not reach it.

III. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

The Eleventh Circuit (Judges Abudu, Tjoflat, and Anderson, per curiam) held:

Constitutional challenges to SORNA were abandoned on appeal. Fuertes merely “re‑argued and incorporated by reference” his district‑court motion to dismiss without actually developing those arguments in his appellate brief. Under United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942 (11th Cir. 2015), that is insufficient; the court therefore declined to address his non‑delegation, First Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment challenges.
No abuse of discretion in admitting evidence of “uncharged conduct.” The court upheld three evidentiary rulings:
- Admission of prior Florida convictions for failing to register as a sex offender under Rule 404(b), as probative of knowledge and intent;
- Admission, as intrinsic evidence, of a fake lease and other evidence that Fuertes was squatting in the Georgia residence;
- Admission, also as intrinsic evidence, that Fuertes resisted arrest and created “traps” (soap and knives) to impede law enforcement.
In each instance, the court found that the probative value was not substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice under Rule 403, particularly in light of limiting instructions.
No abuse of discretion in denying mistrial motions. Two isolated remarks—a detective’s statement that he was concerned Fuertes would “hurt” his girlfriend, and a prosecutor’s suggestion that there was “a lot [of Fuertes information] that was never reported”—did not require a mistrial. With curative instructions given, and in light of the overall strength of the government’s case, the comments were not so prejudicial as to create a reasonable probability of a different verdict.

Accordingly, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the conviction.

IV. Detailed Analysis

A. Abandonment of Constitutional Challenges to SORNA

1. The constitutional claims Fuertes attempted to raise

Fuertes argued that SORNA is unconstitutional on three grounds:

Non‑delegation doctrine: Congress allegedly impermissibly delegated too much authority to the Attorney General to determine SORNA’s applicability or details;
Fourteenth Amendment: The statute purportedly lacked a mens rea requirement, allegedly offending due process principles; and
First Amendment: The registration requirements regarding email addresses and internet identifiers allegedly imposed an undue burden on speech.

Those challenges were raised in a motion to dismiss in the district court. On appeal, however, Fuertes did not re‑brief them substantively. Instead, his opening brief simply “re‑argue[d] and incorporate[d] by reference” the arguments made below.

2. The Eleventh Circuit’s application of the abandonment doctrine (Moran)

The Eleventh Circuit relied on United States v. Moran, 778 F.3d 942, 985 (11th Cir. 2015), which holds that a party cannot preserve an issue merely by referencing arguments made in the district court. Appellants must:

Identify the specific issues they seek to challenge on appeal;
Explain why the district court erred; and
Develop those contentions with citation and argument in the appellate brief.

Simply “incorporating by reference” lower‑court filings leaves the appellate court without focused, developed argumentation and is therefore treated as abandonment.

The Fuertes panel applied that rule straightforwardly: because Fuertes “without elaborating” just adopted his district‑court filings, he failed to present any actual appellate argument on the constitutional issues. The court therefore deemed those challenges abandoned and did “not address [them]” at all.

3. Practical implications for SORNA litigants

The opinion underscores three important points for future litigants:

Constitutional challenges must be fully briefed at each stage. Parties wishing to contest SORNA under the non‑delegation doctrine, the First Amendment, or Due Process cannot rely on prior filings; they must dedicate meaningful argument and analysis in their appellate briefs.
Abandonment doctrine is strictly applied. The Eleventh Circuit will not comb the record or district‑court filings to construct arguments for the appellant.
Substantive issues can be avoided entirely through procedural default. Without reaching the merits, the panel sidestepped potentially weighty constitutional questions—showing again how procedural rules shape substantive outcomes.

Somewhat ironically, then, the Fuertes opinion provides more guidance on appellate procedure than on the underlying constitutional issues. Nonetheless, it effectively warns defense counsel in SORNA cases: if you want constitutional claims heard, you must do the hard work of full appellate briefing.

B. Rule 404(b) and Prior State Failure‑to‑Register Convictions

1. Elements of § 2250(a) and the centrality of “knowledge”

To convict someone under 18 U.S.C. § 2250(a), the government must prove:

The defendant was required to register under SORNA;
The defendant was a sex offender as defined by SORNA; and
The defendant knowingly failed to register or update a registration as required.

Fuertes stipulated to the first two elements. The government could then easily show his non‑registration through registry records. That meant the only real live issue—regardless of how Fuertes tried to frame his defense—was the knowledge element: did he know of his registration obligations and still fail to comply?

By entering a not‑guilty plea, Fuertes put “knowledge” at issue. The government therefore sought to admit his prior Florida convictions for failing to register as a sex offender to show that he was thoroughly familiar with the registration requirements and could not have failed to register accidentally or through mistake.

2. The Rule 404(b) framework (Edouard and Beechum)

Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)(1) bars evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” when offered to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with that character (i.e., propensity reasoning).

But Rule 404(b)(2) explicitly permits such evidence for other purposes, such as: “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”

The Eleventh Circuit applies a three‑part test for 404(b) admissibility, articulated in United States v. Edouard, 485 F.3d 1324, 1344 (11th Cir. 2007):

The extrinsic act must be relevant to an issue other than the defendant’s character;
There must be sufficient proof so that a jury could find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant committed the extrinsic act;
The probative value of the evidence cannot be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice under Rule 403.

The court also cited United States v. Beechum, 582 F.2d 898 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc), which remains binding in the Eleventh Circuit through Bonner v. City of Prichard. Beechum is important because it explains that:

The more similar an extrinsic act is to the charged offense, the greater its probative value and the greater its potential for prejudice; and
Whether that balance favors admission is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge.

3. Application to Fuertes’s prior convictions

Fuertes had three prior state convictions for registration‑related offenses:

Two offenses in a single judgment: (1) failure to register his address with the driver’s license office; and (2) failure to comply with the six‑month sex‑offender re‑registration requirement;
A separate conviction for failure to register his address with the driver’s license office.

The district court admitted these prior convictions under Rule 404(b), finding that:

They were relevant to Fuertes’s knowledge and intent;
There was obviously sufficient proof that he had committed them (they were convictions);
Their probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, especially in light of limiting instructions and the manner of presentation (through one witness only).

The Eleventh Circuit agreed. Because knowledge was the only truly contested element of § 2250(a), evidence that Fuertes had previously been convicted—twice—of essentially the same sort of registration violations strongly supported the inference that he knew of his obligations this time as well. This fit squarely within Rule 404(b)(2)’s allowance for evidence used to show knowledge and absence of mistake.

Furthermore, the district court gave a limiting instruction, telling the jury it could consider the prior convictions only for non‑propensity purposes. Under Edouard, such instructions are a recognized way of mitigating any unfair prejudice.

4. Addressing the defense’s Beechum similarity argument

Fuertes argued that admitting prior state failure‑to‑register convictions in a federal failure‑to‑register trial was especially prejudicial, because the state and federal offenses were “largely identical.” He relied on Beechum’s observation that the more similar the extrinsic act and the charged offense, the more prejudicial the evidence is likely to be.

The panel responded in two ways:

Similarity also increases probative value. Beechum itself notes that the probative value of an extrinsic offense “correlates positively” with its likeness to the charged offense. The same factor that increases prejudice also increases probativeness; it does not automatically bar admission.
The decision is entrusted to the trial judge’s discretion. Beechum emphasizes that whether an extrinsic offense is “sufficiently similar” so that its probative value is not substantially outweighed by prejudice is a matter for the trial court’s judgment. Here, the Eleventh Circuit found no “clear error of judgment” or application of an incorrect legal standard, which is the definition of abuse of discretion under United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir. 2004).

Fuertes also tried to argue that because his defense focused on an affirmative defense (uncontrollable circumstances) rather than on disputing the elements of the offense, the probative value of the prior convictions was lower. The panel rejected this reasoning:

The government always bears the burden of proving each element (including knowledge) beyond a reasonable doubt, regardless of the defense’s theory;
Thus, evidence bearing directly on the knowledge element remains highly probative, no matter how the defense frames its strategy.

5. Significance for future sex‑offender registration prosecutions

Fuertes reinforces several evidentiary propositions, especially important in sex‑offender and SORNA prosecutions:

Prior failure‑to‑register convictions are powerful evidence of knowledge. Where a defendant claims ignorance, mistake, or impossibility, prior similar registration offenses are likely to be admitted under Rule 404(b) in the Eleventh Circuit.
Similarity cuts both ways but tends to favor admissibility. Though similar prior acts raise prejudice concerns, they also have strong probative value on knowledge and absence of mistake. Trial courts have broad discretion to conclude that the probative value predominates, especially if limiting instructions are used.
Affirmative‑defense strategies do not diminish the government’s entitlement to prove elements robustly. Defendants cannot avoid damaging 404(b) evidence simply by shifting the focus of their defense away from the elements of the offense.

While unpublished, Fuertes serves as a functional roadmap for prosecutors considering 404(b) use of prior registration‑related convictions and for defense counsel assessing the likelihood of excluding such evidence.

C. Intrinsic Evidence: Fake Lease, Squatting, and “Traps” for Police

1. Intrinsic vs. extrinsic evidence (Cenephat and Ford)

The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes between:

Extrinsic evidence of “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” governed by Rule 404(b);
Intrinsic evidence, which is part of the charged offense itself and therefore not subject to Rule 404(b), though still subject to Rule 403.

In United States v. Cenephat, 115 F.4th 1359, 1365 (11th Cir. 2024), the court stated that evidence is “intrinsic” if it:

Arises out of the same transaction or series of transactions as the charged offense;
Is necessary to complete the story of the crime; or
Is inextricably intertwined with the evidence regarding the charged offense.

Even intrinsic evidence must pass Rule 403’s balancing test, as emphasized in United States v. Ford, 784 F.3d 1386, 1393 (11th Cir. 2015): the probative value must not be substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice.

2. Fake lease and squatting as intrinsic evidence

The government introduced evidence that Fuertes:

Was living in a Georgia residence as a squatter; and
Had created a false rental agreement and other documents to make it appear that he was lawfully renting the property.

The district court admitted this evidence as intrinsic, reasoning that it was “inextricably intertwined” with the charged offense. On appeal, Fuertes argued primarily that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial, painting him as a dishonest squatter and hinting at other criminal conduct.

The Eleventh Circuit held:

The evidence was highly probative. It showed that Fuertes:
- Knew law enforcement was pursuing him and that a warrant would issue if he did not return to Florida;
- Took active steps to conceal his identity and location, consistent with consciousness of guilt;
- Intentionally remained in Georgia rather than returning promptly to Florida, which was critical to establishing that he “commenced residence” in another jurisdiction without registering there.
The risk of unfair prejudice did not “substantially outweigh” its probative value. While it certainly portrayed Fuertes in a negative light, the court emphasized that the defense did not show that this evidence was more unfairly prejudicial than “any other piece of evidence” the government might have offered to prove guilt.
The district court gave limiting instructions, telling the jury how to use (and not use) the evidence, which mitigated prejudice.

Notably, the panel also observed that Fuertes effectively abandoned any argument that the lease and squatting evidence was not intrinsic, because he failed to develop that claim in his brief. Citing United States v. Jernigan, 341 F.3d 1273, 1283 n.8 (11th Cir. 2003), the court reiterated that appellants must devote a “discrete, substantial portion” of their brief to any issue they wish to preserve.

3. Evidence of resisting arrest and “traps”

The government also presented evidence that:

Fuertes remained inside the house for about 90 minutes after officers ordered him to come out; and
When officers conducted a protective sweep, they found soap, water, and knives scattered along the entryway—construed by the government as an attempt to impede or injure law enforcement.

The district court again treated this as intrinsic evidence, and Fuertes did not challenge that characterization on appeal. Instead, he argued that the evidence was unfairly prejudicial because it suggested he was dangerous.

The Eleventh Circuit upheld its admission, reasoning that:

The evidence showed consciousness of guilt: evasive behavior, delay in surrendering, and steps to hinder arrest support an inference that the defendant knew he was in trouble for failing to register;
As with the other intrinsic evidence, the probative value was not substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, particularly given the trial court’s limiting instructions;
The district court applied the correct legal standard and made no clear error in judgment, so there was no abuse of discretion.

4. Rule 403 balancing and the role of limiting instructions

Across both categories of intrinsic evidence (fake lease/squatting and traps/resistance), the panel emphasized:

Relevancy and probative value: The evidence was not tangential; it was closely tied to proving that Fuertes knew about his obligations, knew the authorities were after him, and chose to evade both Florida and Georgia law enforcement.
Unfair prejudice threshold: Rule 403 requires exclusion only when unfair prejudice “substantially outweighs” probative value. The court repeatedly found that, in context, the prejudice here did not reach that threshold.
Limiting instructions as a central safeguard: As with the 404(b) evidence, the trial court instructed the jury about the proper use of this evidence. The Eleventh Circuit treated such instructions as an important factor mitigating prejudice.

For practitioners, Fuertes confirms that evidence of flight, concealment, false paperwork, and resistance to arrest is often going to be treated as intrinsic and admissible—especially when the defendant’s intent and state of mind are central issues.

D. Denial of Motions for Mistrial

1. Governing standards (Valois, Newsome, Delgado, Adams)

The Eleventh Circuit reviews the denial of a mistrial for abuse of discretion. The guiding principles, drawn from cases cited in the opinion, include:

United States v. Newsome, 475 F.3d 1221, 1227 (11th Cir. 2007): A mistrial is warranted when the defendant’s “substantial rights are prejudicially affected,” meaning there is a “reasonable probability that, but for the remarks, the outcome of the trial would have been different.”
United States v. Delgado, 321 F.3d 1338, 1347 (11th Cir. 2003): When the district court gives a curative instruction, reversal is appropriate “only if the evidence is so highly prejudicial as to be incurable by the trial court’s admonition.”
United States v. Adams, 74 F.3d 1093, 1097–98 (11th Cir. 1996): If there is sufficient independent evidence of guilt, any error may be harmless, weakening the case for mistrial.
United States v. Valois, 915 F.3d 717, 723 n.2 (11th Cir. 2019): Confirms the abuse‑of‑discretion standard for reviewing mistrial denials.

2. Detective’s comment about potential violence

During testimony, Detective Terry Wise stated that he was “concerned [Fuertes] was going to hurt the young lady,” referring to Fuertes’s girlfriend. This was potentially inflammatory: it played into a stereotype that sex offenders are violent and dangerous, and it implied a threat of harm not directly tied to the charged registration offenses.

Fuertes moved for a mistrial, arguing that this remark was highly prejudicial. The district court:

Denied the mistrial motion; but
Immediately and explicitly instructed the jury to disregard the statement.

On appeal, the panel noted that:

The remark was a single, brief statement in a six‑day trial;
The curative instruction was timely and clear; and
The jury had already heard other prejudicial but admissible evidence (prior failure‑to‑register convictions, evidence of traps, etc.), reducing the marginal impact of this single remark.

The court concluded that the statement was not so “highly prejudicial” as to be incurable and that there was no reasonable probability of a different verdict but for the statement.

3. Prosecutor’s “a lot that was never reported” remark

During cross‑examination on the fifth day of trial, the prosecutor, discussing Fuertes’s two unregistered email accounts, said:

“There’s a lot of Ramon Fuertes information flying around.”
Fuertes responded: “Is there?”
The prosecutor replied: “A lot that was never reported, when it should have been.”

Defense counsel objected; the objection was sustained, and the jury was instructed to disregard the prosecutor’s last statement. Fuertes then moved for a mistrial, arguing that the prosecutor had implied the existence of additional, undisclosed misconduct beyond the specific charges.

The district court denied the mistrial motion, finding that:

The remark was brief and ambiguous, in context;
Any prejudice was immediately addressed by sustaining the objection and instructing the jury to disregard; and
The level of prejudice did not approach that necessary to require a mistrial.

The Eleventh Circuit agreed, applying the Newsome standard: there was no reasonable probability that this single, corrected remark changed the outcome of the trial.

4. Why the Eleventh Circuit found no abuse of discretion

Synthesizing both incidents, the panel emphasized:

Isolated nature of the comments: Two isolated remarks in a multi‑day trial, neither of which was repeated or underscored in argument;
Effective curative instructions: In both instances, the district court promptly instructed the jury to disregard the problematic statements;
Strength of the evidence: Independent evidence of guilt (travel from Florida to Georgia while under warning, failure to register in Georgia, multiple unreported email accounts and a Facebook profile, prior convictions, etc.) was ample—so there was little likelihood that these comments shifted the verdict;
Deference to the trial judge: Under abuse‑of‑discretion review, the appellate court gave deference to the trial judge’s assessment of the impact of the remarks on the jury.

Fuertes thus reinforces that mistrials are extraordinary remedies: even in emotionally charged contexts such as sex‑offender cases, a defendant must show that improper comments were both seriously prejudicial and incurable by standard judicial instructions.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. SORNA and § 2250(a)

The Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA) is a federal law requiring sex offenders to register and keep their registrations current. Section 2250(a) makes it a federal crime for a person who:

Is required to register under SORNA;
Travels in interstate commerce; and
Then knowingly fails to register or update registration as required by SORNA.

In practice, SORNA piggybacks on state registration systems (like Florida’s).

2. “Mens rea” and “knowingly”

“Mens rea” is Latin for “guilty mind.” Most crimes require proof not only that the defendant did a prohibited act, but that they did so with a particular state of mind (e.g., intentionally, knowingly, recklessly).

Here, § 2250(a) requires that the defendant knowingly failed to register or update his information. That means:

He understood that registration was required; and
He consciously chose not to comply.

Evidence of prior registration violations can strongly suggest that he knew the requirements and was not simply confused or forgetful.

3. Rule 404(b): “other acts” evidence

Rule 404(b) generally bars the government from using “other crimes, wrongs, or acts” solely to prove that the defendant is a bad person who probably did the charged crime. But it allows such evidence for non‑character purposes, such as:

Proving knowledge, intent, or absence of mistake;
Establishing motive or plan;
Identifying the defendant.

The court must still apply Rule 403 and ensure that unfair prejudice does not substantially outweigh the probative value of the evidence.

4. Intrinsic evidence and being “inextricably intertwined”

Not all bad‑act evidence is “other acts” governed by Rule 404(b). Some evidence is considered part of the story of the charged crime—“intrinsic” evidence. This includes:

Acts that happen as part of the same series of events;
Facts needed to explain how the crime unfolded;
Conduct so connected to the charged offense that it would distort the story to omit it.

In such cases, even if the evidence reflects poorly on the defendant, it can be admitted without going through the 404(b) analysis, though Rule 403 still applies.

5. Mistrials and curative instructions

A mistrial stops the trial and usually requires starting over with a new jury. It is granted only when something happens that makes a fair trial impossible.

Often, when an improper remark or piece of evidence comes in, the judge will instead issue a curative instruction telling the jury to ignore it. Appellate courts assume jurors follow such instructions unless the prejudice is so extreme that it cannot realistically be cured by telling jurors to disregard it.

6. “Abuse of discretion” standard of review

Many trial‑management decisions—evidentiary rulings and mistrial decisions among them—are reviewed on appeal for “abuse of discretion.” That means the appellate court will reverse only if the trial judge:

Applied the wrong legal rule; or
Made a decision so unreasonable that no fair judge would have made it.

It is a deferential standard; even if the appellate judges might have ruled differently themselves, they will not reverse unless the trial court clearly misused its discretion.

VI. Broader Impact and Observations

Although designated “Not for Publication” and thus non‑precedential in the Eleventh Circuit, United States v. Fuertes is still citable for its persuasive value and is a useful indicator of how panels are likely to approach similar issues in future SORNA prosecutions.

1. Reinforcement of procedural rigor in constitutional litigation

The panel’s rejection of Fuertes’s constitutional arguments on abandonment grounds reinforces that:

Appellate courts will not address even serious constitutional claims unless they are properly and fully briefed;
Defendants seeking to attack SORNA’s constitutionality must commit significant resources to appellate briefing, not just raise the issues perfunctorily.

This may make it less likely that novel constitutional theories about SORNA will be developed in published Eleventh Circuit decisions unless counsel are meticulous in preserving and briefing them.

2. Evidentiary trends in SORNA prosecutions

Fuertes signals a continued willingness in the Eleventh Circuit to:

Admit prior registration‑related convictions under Rule 404(b) where knowledge is contested;
Treat concealment, squatting, false documents, and resistance to arrest as intrinsic evidence that “completes the story” of the charged offense;
Resolve close Rule 403 questions in favor of admission when the government’s need for evidence of knowledge and intent is strong.

Defense counsel should therefore expect aggressive use of prior registration offenses and post‑offense conduct evidence, and should be prepared with targeted Rule 403 arguments and carefully crafted limiting instruction requests.

3. The role of limiting instructions

Across all three evidentiary issues and the mistrial rulings, limiting instructions played a central role in the Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning. The panel repeatedly:

Noted that the trial court gave such instructions; and
Treated them as effective cures for potential prejudice, consistent with longstanding doctrine.

Practically, this suggests that, in the Eleventh Circuit, once a limiting instruction is given and the evidence is materially probative on a key issue, it is very difficult to secure reversal based on evidentiary prejudice or denial of mistrial.

4. Subtle tightening of the “uncontrollable circumstances” defense

While the opinion does not squarely analyze the statutory affirmative defense of “uncontrollable circumstances” (recognized in § 2250), the evidentiary rulings indirectly undermine such defenses. By:

Introducing prior failure‑to‑register convictions (showing knowledge of obligations); and
Admitting evidence of deliberate concealment and evasion (fake lease, squatting, traps),

the government can strongly counter any claim that the defendant was unable, rather than unwilling, to comply. Fuertes illustrates how vigorously the government can frame non‑compliance as a matter of choice rather than uncontrollable circumstance.

VII. Conclusion

United States v. Fuertes does not announce new binding doctrine, but it provides a clear, concrete example of how the Eleventh Circuit approaches:

Appellate abandonment of constitutional claims that are not properly briefed;
Admission of prior failure‑to‑register convictions under Rule 404(b) to prove knowledge and absence of mistake in SORNA cases;
Classification and admission of “intrinsic” evidence involving concealment, squatting, and resistance to arrest;
The high threshold for granting mistrials where curative instructions are promptly given.

The opinion’s through‑line is deference: deference to trial judges on evidentiary and mistrial decisions, and insistence on rigorous briefing by appellants who seek to challenge their convictions on constitutional grounds. For practitioners in the Eleventh Circuit handling SORNA or other registration cases, Fuertes is a valuable guidepost for anticipating how similar issues will likely be resolved.

Reaffirming the Admissibility of Prior Failure‑to‑Register Convictions and Intrinsic Flight Evidence in SORNA Prosecutions: A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Fuertes (11th Cir. Nov. 24, 2025)