Physical Neglect, Poverty, and Court Authority to Order Mental-Health Evaluations in CHINS Reunification Cases: Commentary on In re J.D. & C.D., Juveniles

Case: In re J.D. and C.D., Juveniles (S.D., Mother), 25-AP-217
Court: Vermont Supreme Court (three-justice panel)
Date: December Term, 2025 (Entry Order)
Trial Court: Superior Court, Bennington Unit, Family Division (Nos. 24-JV-01601 & 24-JV-01602)

Note: The opinion itself states that decisions of a three-justice panel “are not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal.” Nonetheless, the entry order illustrates how Vermont courts are currently applying CHINS statutes and disposition powers in practice, and so it has real-world persuasive value and instructional importance.

I. Introduction

This case arises from a Vermont child-protection proceeding in which the family division adjudicated two minor children, J.D. (born July 2021) and C.D. (born March 2017), as children in need of care or supervision (CHINS) and, in the subsequent disposition order, required the mother to obtain a psychological (mental-health) evaluation.

The mother appealed on two primary grounds:

She claimed the CHINS merits decision was effectively based on “abandonment”—a statutory ground not pleaded by the State—and that the evidence of neglect (dirty car, poor hygiene, poverty) was insufficient to meet the CHINS standard.
She argued the family court lacked a sufficient basis to require a mental-health evaluation as a condition of reunification.

The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed both the CHINS adjudication and the disposition order. The Court concluded that:

The family division had properly adjudicated the children CHINS under 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(B) (lack of proper parental care), not abandonment under § 5102(3)(A), and the evidence of physical neglect and unsafe, unsanitary living conditions was sufficient.
The court had a sound evidentiary and statutory basis to require a psychological evaluation as a condition of a conditional custody order returning the children to the mother.

At its core, the entry order highlights two important themes in Vermont juvenile law:

How courts distinguish between poverty and legally cognizable “neglect” in CHINS cases.
How far courts may go in imposing mental-health related conditions on parents at the disposition stage, particularly where the goal remains reunification rather than termination of parental rights.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. The CHINS Merits Determination

The Department for Children and Families (DCF) took emergency custody of the children in December 2024 after the mother was arrested at a McDonald’s restaurant for alleged exploitation of a vulnerable adult. At that time, the children and mother had long lacked stable housing and were living out of a dirty, cluttered car owned by the vulnerable adult, with a dog and several kittens (one deceased) in the vehicle.

Key facts included:

Longstanding housing instability since 2021, involving motels and short-term rentals, often paid for by friends.
On the incident date, C.D. was alone in the car, ill, sleeping on a pile of dirty clothes; the car contained garbage, food, and personal items; a deceased kitten was in the trunk.
J.D. was in very dirty clothes with a saggy, wet diaper; his clothing was soaked in urine and he had scratches all over his arms and legs from kittens.

The family division concluded that these conditions constituted physical neglect that affected the children’s safety and well-being, and therefore the children were CHINS under 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3)(B) (children “without proper parental care or subsistence, education, medical, or other care necessary for [their] well-being”).

On appeal, the Supreme Court held:

The trial court did not base its decision on abandonment, and thus did not violate the requirement that CHINS grounds be limited to those pleaded.
The facts, including unsafe and unsanitary living conditions and the children’s physical state, supported a finding of physical neglect and risk of harm, satisfying the CHINS standard.

B. The Disposition Order and Mental-Health Evaluation

At disposition, the family division recognized that mother had made significant progress:

She obtained safe and stable housing.
She secured reliable transportation.
She completed a parenting program.
She had ceased contact with the vulnerable adult involved in the initial incident.

The court also found that the children loved their mother, she loved them, she was attentive to their medical and educational needs, and that their best interests favored returning them to her care. It therefore granted a conditional custody order (CCO) returning the children to the mother, subject to conditions.

However, the family division was concerned about:

Mother’s “extreme difficulty” in working with service providers.
Her refusal to cooperate with Family Time Coaching and Easterseals.
Her behavior that led a supervising agency to stop providing visitation services, effectively suspending parent-child contact.
Her frequent, adversarial contact with the DCF caseworker and complaints about nearly every professional involved (children’s attorney, guardian ad litem, foster parents, visit supervisors, and DCF staff).

The DCF worker expressed concern about possible unaddressed mental-health needs. Although mother had completed a mental-health assessment, it was based entirely on self-report and concluded she had no mental-health needs.

The family division therefore ordered mother to obtain a psychological evaluation to identify any untreated mental-health needs that might be impeding effective collaboration with service providers. The Supreme Court held this was permissible under 33 V.S.A. §§ 5317(c) (preponderance of the evidence standard at disposition) and 5318(a), (a)(1) (allowing conditions in disposition orders in the child’s best interests).

According to the Court, this condition:

Was supported by evidence of mother’s oppositional and disruptive behavior.
Was reasonably aimed at improving cooperation between mother and DCF/service providers.
Served the children’s best interests by supporting the reunification goal.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Factual and Procedural Context

The case follows the standard sequence in Vermont juvenile proceedings:

Emergency Removal & Temporary Custody – Following the December 2024 incident, DCF obtained an emergency care order placing the children in DCF custody.
CHINS Petition & Merits Hearing – The State petitioned to have the children adjudicated CHINS under § 5102(3)(B), asserting lack of proper parental care. After an evidentiary hearing, the family division entered the CHINS merits adjudication.
Disposition & Case Plan – DCF proposed a disposition (case) plan with reunification as the goal. Mother contested the plan, particularly the requirements related to mental health and cooperation with services.
Disposition Order & Conditional Custody – The court issued a disposition order returning legal custody to mother under a CCO, subject to conditions including a psychological evaluation.
Appeal – Mother appealed both the CHINS adjudication and the mental-health evaluation requirement.

The Supreme Court’s review is accordingly bifurcated:

For the CHINS merits: Did the evidence support the statutory ground alleged, and did the court rely on an unalleged ground (abandonment)?
For disposition: Was the requirement of a mental-health evaluation supported by a preponderance of the evidence and consistent with the children’s best interests under the statute?

B. The CHINS Adjudication: Poverty vs. Physical Neglect

1. Statutory framework

The CHINS statute, 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3), provides several alternative bases for adjudicating a child as in need of care or supervision.

Relevant here are:

§ 5102(3)(A): Abandonment – Where a child has been abandoned or left without proper parental care and no responsible person can be found.
§ 5102(3)(B): Lack of proper parental care – Where a child is “without proper parental care or subsistence, education, medical, or other care necessary for his or her well-being.”

The State here explicitly proceeded under § 5102(3)(B); it did not allege abandonment under § 5102(3)(A).

Under 33 V.S.A. § 5315(a), the State must prove CHINS by a preponderance of the evidence. This is a civil standard: it means it is more likely than not that the child meets the CHINS definition.

2. The “abandonment” argument and the In re J.N. precedent

Mother’s first argument on appeal was essentially a notice-and-variance argument: she contended that because the trial court mentioned her arrest and temporary inability to care for the children, the court had in substance found CHINS on the basis of abandonment—an entirely different statutory ground not alleged by the State. This, she argued, violated the principle that a court cannot adjudicate CHINS on a basis that was never pleaded.

She relied on In re J.N., 2023 VT 34, 218 Vt. 137, where:

The State had not alleged a CHINS ground based on abuse or a particular physical discipline incident.
The trial court nevertheless found CHINS based on a single incident of physical discipline.
The Supreme Court criticized this because there were no findings regarding failure to provide necessary care or support under the pleaded ground.

The Supreme Court in J.D. & C.D. distinguished J.N. on a crucial factual and legal point:

In J.N., the court essentially switched theories to find CHINS based on a factual ground (a single incident of discipline) that corresponded to an unpleaded statutory category, without findings that fit the pleaded category.
In J.D. & C.D., by contrast, the family division’s findings fit squarely within the pleaded ground—lack of proper parental care under § 5102(3)(B). The judge’s reference to mother’s arrest and temporary unavailability was incidental, not the legal basis for the CHINS finding.

In other words, the Supreme Court viewed the reference to the arrest as background context: mother “was unable to care for the children at that time,” which explained the emergency custody but did not transform the case into an abandonment CHINS under § 5102(3)(A).

The critical legal holding is that:

The Court will look at the actual findings and their alignment with the statutory ground pleaded. So long as the findings support the pleaded ground, incidental references to other circumstances (like arrest) will not be treated as a de facto switch to an unpleaded theory such as abandonment.

3. Evidence of physical neglect vs. “mere” poverty

Mother’s second challenge was that the evidence did not show neglect; rather, it showed only poverty and “less than optimal conditions,” which standing alone should not support a CHINS adjudication. She argued that:

Housing instability and homelessness are manifestations of poverty.
A dirty car and a soiled diaper, in isolation, should not be enough to constitute legal neglect.

The Supreme Court rejected this framing, emphasizing the totality of circumstances and the degree of risk.

The Court highlighted:

Chronic housing instability since 2021, culminating in living out of a car.
Living environment in the car: cluttered with trash, food, children’s clothing, a dog, multiple kittens, and one deceased kitten in the trunk.
Condition of the children:
- C.D. alone, sick, sleeping on a pile of dirty clothes in the car.
- J.D. in very dirty clothing and a saggy, wet diaper; clothing soaked in urine.
- J.D. covered in scratches from kittens, indicating poor supervision and unsafe conditions around animals in a confined space.
Car ownership & context: the car belonged to a man identified by law enforcement as a vulnerable adult, traveling with mother and the children—raising concerns about decision-making and safety.

The Supreme Court endorsed the family division’s characterization of this as physical neglect affecting the children’s safety and well-being, not merely “being poor.” The presence of a deceased animal in the trunk, unsanitary conditions, the children’s state of hygiene, and C.D.’s illness demonstrated a risk of harm beyond generalized hardship.

The Court reiterated several important CHINS principles drawn from its prior cases:

Focus on risk, not only actual harm – Citing In re J.C., 2016 VT 9, ¶ 7, 201 Vt. 192, the Court reaffirmed that “the State is not required to demonstrate that the child has suffered actual harm, but rather is subject to a risk of harm.”
Child welfare is paramount; the statute is to be liberally construed – Relying on In re B.R., 2014 VT 37, ¶¶ 13, 15, 196 Vt. 304, the Court emphasized that the focus of CHINS proceedings is the child’s welfare and that the statute should be “liberally construed” to effectuate its protective purpose.
Longstanding instability + failure to address problems = risk of harm – The Court analogized to In re L.M., 2014 VT 17, ¶ 29, 195 Vt. 637 (mem.), where CHINS was affirmed based on a father’s longstanding drug addiction, lack of housing, and failure to follow treatment recommendations, all of which created a risk of harm.

Taken together, these principles signal that:

Although poverty alone is not neglect, chronic instability combined with unsanitary, unsafe living conditions and clear indicators that the children’s basic needs (cleanliness, medical attention, safe supervision) are not being met can constitute “physical neglect” and justify a CHINS finding.

4. Standard of appellate review

The Court cited In re M.L., 2010 VT 5, ¶ 8, 187 Vt. 291, to restate the familiar standard of review:

Findings of fact are upheld unless “clearly erroneous,” meaning that there is no credible evidence in the record to support them.
Legal conclusions are upheld so long as they are supported by those findings.

In J.D. & C.D., the mother did not meaningfully challenge the factual findings themselves but argued their legal insufficiency. Given the evidentiary record summarized above, the Supreme Court had little difficulty concluding that the findings supported the CHINS conclusion under § 5102(3)(B).

C. The Mental-Health Evaluation as a Disposition Condition

1. Statutory authority at disposition

Once the court finds a child CHINS, it proceeds to the disposition stage. Two statutes are central:

33 V.S.A. § 5317(c) – Sets the standard of proof at disposition: preponderance of the evidence, where termination of parental rights is not being sought.
33 V.S.A. § 5318(a), (a)(1) – Requires that the disposition order be in the “best interests of the child” and expressly authorizes the court to impose conditions when returning custody to a parent, often via a conditional custody order.

Disposition is not a punitive phase; it is a planning and protective phase where the court designs conditions to ensure the child’s safety and well-being while moving toward the chosen permanency goal (here, reunification).

2. Evidence justifying the mental-health evaluation

The Supreme Court carefully recounted the behavioral evidence that led the family division to require a mental-health evaluation:

Mother had “extreme difficulty” working with community service providers.
She refused or resisted structured support through Family Time Coaching and Easterseals for visitation.
An agency supervising parent-child contact ceased working with her because of unreasonable demands, effectively suspending her parenting time.
Mother repeatedly contacted the DCF caseworker at all hours and appeared in person without appointments.
She lodged complaints against nearly every involved professional: the children’s attorney, the guardian ad litem, foster parents, visit supervisor, and DCF staff.
The trial court found mother’s complaints were “unfounded” and that her oppositional behavior delayed reunification.
The DCF worker, based on this pattern, expressed concern about untreated mental-health needs.

Mother had, on paper, “completed a mental-health assessment,” but the Supreme Court emphasized that:

It was based solely on self-reporting by mother.
In light of the extensive evidence of dysregulated, oppositional behavior, the court was entitled to view that self-report assessment as insufficient.

3. The court’s reasoning and the “best interests” test

Despite these concerns, the trial court found there were no immediate safety risks to the children at the time of disposition and that returning them to mother under conditions was in their best interests.

The mental-health evaluation served a specific, child-centered purpose:

It was designed to identify any untreated mental-health conditions that might explain or contribute to mother’s inability to work productively with DCF and service providers.
By promoting a better working relationship, the evaluation (and any resulting treatment) was aimed at supporting reunification, not undermining it.
Improved collaboration with service providers would allow those providers to better support the family, thereby serving the children’s best interests.

The Supreme Court expressly characterized this as a legitimate concern based on mother’s past behavior and concluded that a mental-health evaluation condition:

was reasonably calculated to promote the children’s best interests by reducing conflict with service providers and supporting the reunification goal.

Under § 5317(c), the question is not whether the mother’s mental-health challenges are proven beyond a reasonable doubt, but whether, by a preponderance of the evidence, the condition is warranted to safeguard the children’s welfare. On this record, the Court had no difficulty answering yes.

D. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

The opinion draws on and clarifies several earlier Vermont decisions:

1. In re J.N., 2023 VT 34, 218 Vt. 137

As noted above, J.N. serves as a cautionary precedent: the State must clearly allege the statutory CHINS ground, and the court may not decide the case on a different, unpleaded basis. J.D. & C.D. uses J.N. as a foil to show what did not happen here:

The family division did not find CHINS based on a theory of abandonment.
Its findings were tied to the pleaded ground of lack of proper parental care.

The case clarifies that when analyzing a CHINS merits decision, one must examine:

The statutory ground alleged in the petition, and
The court’s actual findings and legal conclusion to see if they match that ground.

2. In re M.L., 2010 VT 5, 187 Vt. 291

This case is cited for the standard of review. It reinforces the strong deference appellate courts give to the factfinding of the family division in CHINS cases. That deference is significant in cases like this, where much turns on the interpretation of real-world living conditions and parental conduct.

3. In re B.R., 2014 VT 37, 196 Vt. 304

B.R. confirmed that:

The “focus of a CHINS proceeding is the welfare of the child.”
The juvenile statutes should be liberally construed to achieve their protective purpose.

These principles underwrite the Court’s rejection of a narrow, technical view of neglect in J.D. & C.D.. The Court leans heavily on the liberal-construction directive to treat the combination of chronic homelessness, unsanitary and dangerous living conditions, and clear physical indicators (illness, filthy clothing, urine-soaked diaper, scratches) as sufficiently serious to warrant state intervention.

4. In re J.C., 2016 VT 9, 201 Vt. 192

In J.C., the Court made explicit that:

The State need not prove that a child has already been harmed; it is enough to show that the child is subject to a risk of harm.

In J.D. & C.D., this principle justifies acting before any catastrophic injury, illness, or developmental damage has occurred. It supports early intervention based on clear risk signals.

5. In re L.M., 2014 VT 17, 195 Vt. 637 (mem.)

L.M. involved a combination of factors—substance abuse, lack of housing, and failure to follow through on recommended treatment—that collectively created a risk of harm and justified a CHINS adjudication.

By invoking L.M., the Court in J.D. & C.D. underscores that:

CHINS determinations often rest on a pattern or constellation of risk factors rather than a single dramatic incident.
Longstanding instability, coupled with failure to take advantage of assistance, can justify a finding of risk of harm.

E. Broader Impact and Practical Implications

Even though this is a nonprecedential three-justice entry order, its reasoning has meaningful practical implications:

1. Clarifying the line between poverty and neglect

The Court implicitly acknowledges that poverty alone is not neglect.
However, when poverty is accompanied by dangerous and unsanitary living conditions—such as living in a cluttered car with animals, one deceased, and children in unhygienic and unhealthy conditions—the situation crosses into legally actionable physical neglect.
Practitioners should be prepared to distinguish:
- Cases where parents are poor but otherwise meet children’s basic needs, from
- Cases where poverty plus specific, documented conditions pose a substantial risk to the child’s health, hygiene, or safety.

2. Application of In re J.N.: No stealth theory-switching

The opinion reassures litigants that courts must adhere to the statutory grounds actually pleaded in the CHINS petition.
References to arrest or temporary unavailability will not, by themselves, transform a § 5102(3)(B) case into an unpleaded abandonment case under § 5102(3)(A).
Defense counsel, however, should remain vigilant to ensure that courts’ findings and conclusions genuinely track the pleaded theory.

3. Court authority to order mental-health evaluations in reunification cases

The decision strongly supports the view that family courts have wide discretion, at disposition, to require:
- Mental-health evaluations,
where a preponderance of the evidence suggests such services will protect the child and promote the case plan (e.g., reunification).
Even where there are “no immediate safety risks,” a psychological evaluation can be justified to address:
- Persistent conflict with service providers,
- Unfounded accusations against professionals,
- Behavior that obstructs visitation or case progress.
A prior “assessment” based solely on self-report will not necessarily preclude a court from ordering a more thorough, clinically informed evaluation.

4. Emphasis on cooperation and service engagement as reunification prerequisites

The opinion underscores that reunification is not only about securing housing and completing parenting classes; it also requires parents to:
- Cooperate with DCF,
- Engage productively with service providers, and
- Participate constructively in supervised visitation and case planning.
Adversarial, obstructive conduct toward providers can:
- Delay reunification, and
- Justify additional conditions (like mental-health evaluation) even when the child is returned under a CCO.

5. Practical lessons for litigants and counsel

For parents and their attorneys:
- Addressing material deficits (housing, transportation, parenting skills) is necessary but may not be sufficient; courts scrutinize how parents interact with service systems.
- Adopting a cooperative stance with DCF and providers may materially affect judicial perceptions of the parent’s readiness for full reunification.
- If a mental-health evaluation is ordered, counsel may wish to ensure the referral is appropriately scoped and connected to the case issues, and that confidentiality and use of information are understood.
For DCF and GALs:
- Develop a clear record of specific behaviors that suggest the need for mental-health or other clinical evaluation.
- Document how parental behavior has affected:
  - The ability to provide services,
  - Visitation and family time, and
  - Progress toward permanency.

IV. Complex Concepts and Key Terms Explained

1. CHINS – “Child in Need of Care or Supervision”

A “CHINS” adjudication is not a finding that a parent is “unfit” in a criminal sense. Rather, it is a civil determination that a child meets one of the statutory definitions in 33 V.S.A. § 5102(3), such as:

Abandonment,
Lack of proper parental care,
Abuse or neglect, or
Other specified grounds.

Once a child is adjudicated CHINS, the court gains authority to order protective interventions such as DCF custody, services, visitation structures, and conditions on parental conduct.

2. Merits vs. Disposition

Merits hearing – The phase in which the court decides whether the child is CHINS under § 5102(3). The focus is on past and present conditions and risk at the time of the petition.
Disposition hearing – Occurs after CHINS is found. The court determines:
- Where the child will live,
- What services will be provided,
- Whether custody should be with DCF or a parent, and
- What conditions or case-plan requirements are in the child’s best interests.

3. Conditional Custody Order (CCO)

A CCO returns legal custody to a parent but conditions that custody on compliance with certain requirements (e.g., cooperation with DCF, participation in services, maintaining safe housing, obtaining evaluations). If the parent substantially violates the conditions, the court may revisit custody.

4. Preponderance of the Evidence

This is the standard of proof in Vermont CHINS merits and disposition hearings (where termination is not sought). It requires the court to find that a fact is more likely true than not—often described as “greater than 50% likelihood.” It is substantially lower than the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used in criminal cases.

5. Physical Neglect

“Physical neglect” is not strictly defined in a single statute, but in practice it includes:

Failure to provide adequate food, shelter, clothing, or hygiene.
Maintaining children in environments that are unsanitary, unsafe, or dangerous (e.g., exposure to hazards, animals, filth, or conditions conducive to disease or injury).
Failure to attend to a child’s medical or health needs.

In this case, physical neglect was inferred from the combination of:

Living in a car full of trash and animals (including a deceased kitten),
Children’s soiled clothing and urine-soaked diaper,
Visible scratches from animals, and
C.D.’s illness while being left alone in the car.

6. “Vulnerable Adult”

The opinion notes that the man who owned the car was identified by law enforcement as a “vulnerable adult.” While the juvenile decision does not litigate that status in detail, a “vulnerable adult” generally refers to a person who, because of age, disability, or dependence, is susceptible to exploitation or abuse.

Mother was arrested for exploitation of a vulnerable adult, which underscored concerns about her judgment and choices of companions in caring for her children.

7. Mental-Health Assessment vs. Psychological Evaluation

The opinion draws a practical distinction:

A prior “mental-health assessment” based solely on self-report may be limited and may not fully capture issues evident from observed behavior.
A “psychological evaluation” ordered by the court is typically more in-depth and may involve standardized testing, clinical interviews, and review of collateral information—not just the parent’s own description of symptoms.

The court’s power to order the latter, in appropriate circumstances, reflects its duty to fully understand barriers to safe and stable parenting.

V. Conclusion

In re J.D. & C.D. illustrates how Vermont’s CHINS framework is applied in complex, real-world situations where poverty, unstable housing, and conflict with service systems intertwine.

Key takeaways include:

A CHINS adjudication based on lack of proper parental care can be sustained where chronic housing instability is coupled with dangerous and unsanitary living conditions—as evidenced here by living in a cluttered car with animals (one deceased) and children in visibly poor hygienic and physical condition.
Courts must adhere to the statutory grounds pleaded in the CHINS petition; incidental references to arrest or temporary unavailability will not transform a § 5102(3)(B) case into an abandonment case under § 5102(3)(A) without corresponding findings and notice.
At disposition, under §§ 5317 and 5318, courts have broad discretion to impose mental-health evaluation conditions when supported by a preponderance of the evidence and when those conditions promote the child’s best interests and the reunification goal—particularly where parental behavior evidences serious difficulties working with DCF and service providers.
The opinion underscores that cooperation with services—not merely housing stability or program completion—is a critical factor in assessing readiness for reunification and in structuring appropriate case-plan conditions.

Although nonprecedential, this entry order provides a clear, current example of the Vermont Supreme Court’s approach to differentiating poverty from neglect, applying CHINS risk-of-harm principles, and affirming the judiciary’s authority to order mental-health evaluations in the service of child safety and family reunification.