Knowledge, Necessity, and Objective Reasonableness in Fair Housing Act Accommodation and Retaliation Claims: Commentary on Carlos Alonso Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC (11th Cir.)

Knowledge, Necessity, and Objective Reasonableness in Fair Housing Act Accommodation and Retaliation Claims: Commentary on Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC (11th Cir.)

Disclaimer: This commentary is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute legal advice.

I. Introduction

This unpublished Eleventh Circuit decision, Carlos A. Alonso Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC; CFH Group, LLC, consolidates two appeals from a long-running Fair Housing Act (“FHA”) dispute between a tenant family and the owner/manager of their apartment complex. The case offers a dense cluster of rulings on:

  • Discovery sanctions and the responsibility of parties (including represented ones) to comply with discovery orders;
  • The strict consequences of failing to object to a magistrate judge’s non-dispositive order under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a);
  • The elements and evidentiary demands of FHA failure-to-accommodate and retaliation claims, including the “necessity,” “knowledge,” and “objective reasonableness” components;
  • How express lease terms can limit or effectively waive a claim for breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; and
  • The jurisdictional bar, under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine, to using federal appellate review as a vehicle to overturn state-court judgments.

The plaintiffs–appellants are:

  • Carlos Alonso Cano (Cano),
  • his wife Fe Morejon Fernandez, and
  • their daughter Jany Alonso Morejon,

collectively challenging a series of federal district court rulings in their FHA case against landlords 245 C&C, LLC and CFH Group, LLC. The family’s underlying theory was that the landlords discriminated and retaliated against them because of their disabled child (“Angie”) and otherwise interfered with their housing rights and quiet enjoyment.

The Eleventh Circuit (per curiam, LUCK, LAGOA & WILSON, JJ.) affirms most of the district court’s rulings and dismisses the rest for lack of jurisdiction or abandonment. While designated “Not for publication,” the opinion is a useful and fairly comprehensive application of FHA doctrines and federal procedural rules that will likely be cited persuasively in future litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Issues on Appeal

The appellants challenged:
  1. Discovery Sanction – a $3,000 sanction against Cano for discovery delay;
  2. Pretrial Magistrate Orders – an order striking their jury demand and an order denying leave to amend the second amended complaint;
  3. Partial Summary Judgment – in favor of the landlords on several FHA discrimination/retaliation counts and a state-law quiet enjoyment claim;
  4. Bench Trial Rulings – on remaining FHA claims (parking and bathroom modification), including a statute of limitations ruling and substantive findings; and
  5. Request to Vacate a Florida Appellate Decision – asking the Eleventh Circuit to overturn an adverse Florida state appellate ruling.

B. Holdings (High-Level)

  • Discovery sanctions: Affirmed. Rule 37 authorized sanctioning Cano himself; no abuse of discretion was shown, and appellants failed to provide key hearing transcripts.
  • Magistrate judge orders (jury strike & amendment): Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Appellants did not timely object to the magistrate’s non-dispositive orders under Rule 72(a); thus there was no district court ruling for the court of appeals to review.
  • Summary judgment:
    • Counts 4 & 10 (certain FHA claims) – deemed abandoned on appeal for failure to argue them.
    • Count 5 (noise accommodation) – affirmed for lack of evidence that the requested accommodation was “necessary” or that landlords knew it was necessary.
    • Counts 9, 11, 12 (FHA retaliation theories) – affirmed; appellants lacked an objectively reasonable, good faith belief that defendants’ actions were unlawful and failed to prove “but-for” causation.
    • Count 14 (quiet enjoyment) – affirmed; express lease covenants and addenda defeated the claim, and the remaining allegation (laundry noise) was unsupported.
  • Bifurcation & bench trial outcomes:
    • Challenge to bifurcation – abandoned (no developed argument on appeal).
    • Count 1 (reserved handicap parking) – barred by FHA’s two-year statute of limitations. The only proven request occurred in 2012/2013, well outside the limitations period.
    • Count 3 (bathroom modification) – meritless; the landlord approved the requested modification promptly, so there was no “refusal” to accommodate.
  • Attempt to vacate a Florida appellate decision: Dismissed under the Rooker–Feldman doctrine. The Eleventh Circuit lacks jurisdiction to overturn state court judgments.
  • Challenge to cost award: deemed abandoned for being raised only in the reply brief.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Discovery Sanctions and the Appellate Record

1. Legal Standards Applied

The court reviews discovery sanctions for abuse of discretion (Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp.) and will reverse only if it has a “definite and firm conviction” of clear error in judgment (Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs).

Two key doctrines framed this part of the opinion:

  • Rule 37(a)(5)(A) – When a motion to compel is granted, the court must (after giving an opportunity to be heard) require the noncomplying “party or attorney advising that conduct, or both” to pay reasonable expenses and attorney’s fees, unless certain exceptions apply.
  • Record-completeness rule (Fed. R. App. P. 10(b)(2)) – If an appellant argues that findings are unsupported by the evidence, they must include “a transcript of all evidence relevant to that finding.” If they do not, the appellate court must assume the missing portions support the district court’s decisions (Loren v. Sasser).

The court also reiterated that pro se filings are liberally construed (Timson v. Sampson), but pro se appellants are still bound by procedural rules.

2. Party vs. Attorney Sanctions

Cano argued that if there was to be any sanction, it should have been imposed on his lawyer under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (which targets attorneys or others admitted to practice who “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiply proceedings). The Eleventh Circuit rejects this framing:

  • Section 1927 governs sanctions against attorneys or similarly situated representatives;
  • But Rule 37 independently authorizes sanctions directly against a party, the attorney, or both.

Here, the magistrate judge relied on Rule 37, not § 1927, and the district judge upheld that sanction. The appellate court sees no legal error in sanctioning Cano personally for discovery delay, given Rule 37’s explicit language.

3. Failure to Provide Discovery Hearing Transcripts

Critically, the appellants did not provide the transcripts of the relevant discovery hearings to either the district court or the court of appeals. Under Loren and Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 10(b)(2), that omission is fatal:

Because appellants failed to ensure the record was complete, the Eleventh Circuit had to presume that the missing transcripts supported the district court’s decision to uphold the magistrate judge’s sanction.

This reinforces a recurring theme: the appellant bears the burden of assembling a complete record; if they fail, the default result is affirmance.

4. Takeaway

  • District courts have “wide discretion” in sanctioning discovery violations;
  • Rule 37 explicitly allows sanctions against parties, not just their lawyers;
  • On appeal, incomplete transcripts nearly guarantee affirmance of such orders.

B. Magistrate Judge Orders, Rule 72(a), and Appellate Jurisdiction

1. The Orders at Issue

The magistrate judge had issued non-dispositive orders that:
  • Struck the plaintiffs’ jury demand; and
  • Denied their motion to further amend their second amended complaint.
The appellants sought to challenge those orders in the Eleventh Circuit.

2. Rule 72(a) and Section 636(b)(1)(A)

Rule 72(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) jointly govern the review of non-dispositive pretrial orders entered by magistrate judges:

  • A magistrate judge may decide non-dispositive pretrial matters;
  • Objections to such orders must be filed within 14 days;
  • A party “may not assign as error a defect in the order not timely objected to”; and
  • Appeals from magistrate orders go first to the district court, not directly to the court of appeals (United States v. Renfro).

The Eleventh Circuit has applied this structure to hold that where a party fails to object to a magistrate’s non-dispositive order, the appellate court lacks jurisdiction to review that order later, even after final judgment (United States v. Schultz).

3. Application to This Case

The appellants did not file timely objections under Rule 72(a) to the magistrate judge’s orders striking the jury demand and denying leave to amend. Because of that:

  • The district court never reviewed (or “adopted”) those orders; and
  • The Eleventh Circuit had no jurisdiction to review them directly.

The court therefore dismissed this portion of the appeal. This is more than mere “waiver”; it is treated as a jurisdictional bar.

4. Takeaway

  • Non-dispositive magistrate judge orders must be challenged timely via Rule 72(a) objections;
  • Failure to do so means the court of appeals has nothing to review—there is no district court ruling on that point;
  • This rule applies equally to pro se litigants (Albra v. Advan, Inc.).

C. Summary Judgment on FHA and Quiet Enjoyment Claims

1. Abandonment of Certain Counts (4 and 10)

Under Sapuppo v. Allstate Floridian Ins. Co. and Timson v. Sampson, an appellant abandons an issue by failing to “plainly and prominently” raise it in the opening brief. That means:

  • Passing references are not enough;
  • Arguments must be developed with at least some legal analysis and/or authority.

The Eleventh Circuit held that the appellants abandoned their challenges to summary judgment on Count 4 (bathtub painting accommodation) and Count 10 (harassment by OnCall Patrol) by not substantively arguing those rulings in their opening brief.

2. FHA Failure-to-Accommodate – Noise from Tree Trimming / Pressure Washing (Count 5)

a. FHA Standard
Citing Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n and Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC v. City of Fort Lauderdale, the court restated the elements of an FHA failure-to-accommodate claim:
  1. The plaintiff is disabled;
  2. The plaintiff requested a reasonable accommodation;
  3. The accommodation was necessary to afford an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and
  4. The defendant refused to make the accommodation.
Two further refinements are crucial:
  • Defendant’s knowledge: The landlord must know of both the disability and the necessity of the accommodation; they cannot be liable for refusing an accommodation whose necessity was not communicated (Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island).
  • Necessity: The accommodation must actually alleviate the effects of the disability and address the needs created by the disability (Sailboat Bend; Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County).
b. Evidence and Findings
The appellants complained about noise from tree trimming and pressure washing. Their disabled child, Angie, had documented hearing loss, with medical evidence showing no “startle response” to sounds as loud as 100 decibels. Key points:
  • Medical evidence suggested that Angie did not react to loud sounds; this undercut the theory that noise had disabling effects that required accommodation.
  • Video evidence submitted by appellants showed:
    • Minimal audible noise when their sliding door was closed;
  • Cano’s communications with management:
    • Referred to Angie as “disabled,”
      • medically necessary,
    • Described inconvenience or sleep disruption but did not link those experiences to a defined disability-based limitation.
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that there was no genuine dispute of material fact on two elements:
  • Necessity: The record did not show the requested accommodation would “alleviate the effects” of Angie’s particular disability (hearing loss without startle response).
  • Knowledge: The landlords were never put on proper notice that noise had some special, disability-related impact on Angie that necessitated specific accommodations.
The court also rejected any suggestion that the district judge ignored the appellants’ supplemental evidence (the “PSUSB”), noting that the district court cited and considered materials contained on that drive.
c. Impact
This part of the opinion emphasizes:
  • The functional link that must exist between the accommodation and the specific effects of the disability;
  • The importance of clear communication to the landlord about why a requested measure is medically/disability-related, not just a preference or general comfort measure;
  • That general complaints of annoyance or inconvenience, even involving a disabled person, do not automatically trigger FHA accommodation duties absent a clear disability nexus.

3. FHA Retaliation Claims (Counts 9, 11, and 12)

a. General Retaliation Framework
Under 42 U.S.C. § 3617 and Eleventh Circuit precedent (e.g., Frazier-White v. Gee), to establish a prima facie case of FHA retaliation, a plaintiff must show:
  1. They engaged in a protected activity (e.g., requesting a reasonable accommodation, filing a HUD complaint);
  2. They suffered an adverse action (e.g., nonrenewal, eviction proceedings, threats); and
  3. A causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action, under a “but-for” causation standard.
Additionally, borrowing from employment discrimination concepts (Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp.; Dixon v. The Hallmark Co.), the plaintiff must demonstrate that:
  • They had a good faith, objectively reasonable belief that the conduct they opposed or complained about was unlawful under the FHA.
b. Count 9 – Tape Removal, Notice to Cure, and Nonrenewal
The facts:
  • Appellants left tape on their apartment windows contrary to management rules;
  • The landlords:
    • Threatened a $150 fine;
    • Served a seven-day notice to cure;
    • Later issued a notice of lease termination.
The core problem for appellants was the “objectively reasonable belief” requirement:
  • They asserted that these actions constituted unlawful retaliation under the FHA.
  • The court could find no statute or case law suggesting that:
    • Requiring tenants to remove tape from windows;
    • Issuing a cure notice; or
    • Nonrenewing a lease for such noncompliance
    was, by itself, an FHA violation or protected-activity-triggering conduct.
Therefore, the appellants’ belief that these actions were unlawful was not objectively reasonable. Without an objectively reasonable belief of illegality, their reaction to those actions is not protected by § 3617, and no prima facie retaliation claim exists.
c. Count 11 – Alleged Retaliatory Eviction After Second HUD Complaint
Timeline:
  • Appellees served a nonrenewal notice of the lease;
  • One day later, appellants filed their second HUD complaint;
  • Appellants then refused to vacate after nonrenewal;
  • Only then did the landlords file eviction proceedings;
  • After learning of the HUD complaint, landlords agreed to extend the move-out date by five months to accommodate HUD’s investigation.
Key legal points:
  • Causation requires knowledge: The landlord must know about the protected activity when taking the adverse action for it possibly to be retaliatory (Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp.).
  • Here, the Eleventh Circuit found no evidence that the landlords had knowledge of the second HUD complaint when they initiated eviction proceedings;
  • Thus, the HUD complaint could not have been the “but-for” cause of the eviction.
d. Count 12 – Allegedly Retaliatory State-Court Appeal

Appellants argued that the landlords’ decision to appeal an adverse ruling in Florida state eviction proceedings was itself retaliatory.

The court rejected this, finding:

  • Record evidence showed the landlords appealed because they had a reasonable belief that the law entitled them to judgment in their favor;
  • This is a classic legitimate litigation motive, not evidence of coercion, threats, or retaliation under § 3617;
  • The appellants thus failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to retaliatory motive.
e. Takeaway on FHA Retaliation
This opinion strongly underscores that:
  • FHA retaliation claims are not triggered by every adverse landlord action involving a tenant who has complained or made accommodation requests;
  • The plaintiff must have a legally reasonable belief that the underlying action violated the FHA;
  • Enforcement of neutral lease rules (tape removal, cure notices, appeals) without more is likely legitimate business conduct, not retaliation.

4. Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment (Count 14)

a. Legal Framework

Under Florida law (as applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante, P.A. v. Brickell Building 1 Holding Co.), where lease provisions expressly address matters that overlap with the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, courts may give effect to both the express and implied covenants. However, express terms can narrow or define what constitutes a breach.

b. Lease Terms vs. Tenant Complaints
The appellants claimed violations of quiet enjoyment based on:
  • Maintenance workers and fumigators entering their apartment without prior notice;
  • Noisy neighbors;
  • Water shut-offs (sometimes without prior notice); and
  • Noise from laundry equipment.
The lease and addenda, however, contained specific provisions:
  • Entry for maintenance/pest control: The lease permitted entry “at any reasonable time, without notice for inspection” by maintenance and pest control.
  • Noise complaints: In a “good conduct addendum,” appellants agreed to notify management of noise issues and allow staff to handle them.
  • Water shut-offs: The addendum acknowledged that water could be turned off temporarily without notice during emergencies; and when the shutdowns were not emergencies, the landlord provided notice.
On this record:
  • Complaints about entry, neighbor noise, and water shut-offs were largely foreclosed by the express lease terms previously agreed to by appellants;
  • As to laundry equipment noise, the evidence showed it was not audible in appellants’ unit, negating any genuine factual dispute.
c. Takeaway

The court’s analysis illustrates that:

  • The implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is not an open-ended guarantee of absolute tranquility;
  • Express lease provisions granting entry rights, anticipating temporary service interruptions, or prescribing procedures for noise issues can significantly constrain a tenant’s quiet enjoyment claims;
  • Tenants who have signed such provisions are often found to have effectively accepted those conditions, reducing the scope of what constitutes a breach.

D. Bifurcation and Bench Trial on Remaining FHA Claims (Counts 1 and 3)

1. Bifurcation of Trial

The district court bifurcated the trial for reasons of convenience and efficiency under Rule 42(b). On appeal, appellants nominally challenged the bifurcation, but:

  • They failed to develop any substantive argument or cite authority showing an abuse of discretion;
  • Under Timson and Sapuppo, the issue was deemed abandoned.

2. Count 1 – Parking Accommodation and the FHA Statute of Limitations

a. Legal Standard
  • FHA civil actions must be brought within two years of the “occurrence or the termination” of the alleged discriminatory practice. 42 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1)(A).
  • The FHA failure-to-accommodate claim also requires proof that a request was actually made and refused (Schwarz).
  • After a bench trial, factual findings are reviewed for clear error and credibility findings receive “great deference” (Sidman, OHI Asset (VA) Martinsville SNF, LLC v. Wagner).
b. Evidence and Credibility
Facts:
  • Both sides agreed that appellants requested a reserved handicap parking space in late 2012 or early 2013.
  • Appellants (through Cano) claimed they also made similar requests in 2013, 2015, 2016, and 2017.
  • The suit was filed on May 6, 2019, so only a 2017 request, if proven, might fall within the two-year window.
The district court, as factfinder:
  • Did not find Cano’s testimony about later requests credible, based on:
    • Observations of his demeanor during trial;
    • Lack of corroborating documentation or witness testimony;
    • Contradiction by other evidence.
  • Found that only one request had been made, in 2012/2013.
The Eleventh Circuit deferred to these credibility findings and held that substantial evidence supported them. Therefore:
  • The only actionable discriminatory act (the denial of a reserved handicap space) occurred in 2012/2013;
  • It fell outside the FHA’s two-year statute of limitations by the time the suit was filed in 2019.
c. Takeaway
  • FHA limitations periods are strictly applied; courts will not infer later “continuing” acts without concrete evidence;
  • At trial, credibility determinations about when accommodation requests were made are central and rarely overturned on appeal;
  • Repeated assertions of additional requests, unsupported by documents or witnesses, may be insufficient to avoid a limitations bar.

3. Count 3 – Bathroom Modification Request

a. Legal Requirement

To prevail on an FHA modification/accommodation claim, a plaintiff must prove the defendant refused the requested change. A claim fails if the landlord actually grants the request.

b. Record Evidence

The undisputed evidence showed:

  • On August 26, 2018, appellants made an official request to modify Angie’s bathroom;
  • The landlords approved the request the next day and then confirmed that approval a few days later.
c. Court’s Conclusion

Because the request was granted, not refused, the essential “refusal” element of an FHA failure-to-accommodate claim was missing. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding that Count 3 was meritless.

d. Practical Point

This illustrates that once a landlord timely grants a reasonable modification or accommodation request, a plaintiff cannot maintain a failure-to-accommodate claim based solely on the fact that it was sought and processed. The focus is on whether there was a denial or constructive refusal, not merely some disagreement or delay.

E. Attempt to Vacate a Florida Appellate Decision and Rooker–Feldman

1. Jurisdictional Framework

  • The Eleventh Circuit’s appellate jurisdiction generally extends only to “final decisions of the district courts of the United States” (28 U.S.C. § 1291) and certain enumerated interlocutory orders (28 U.S.C. § 1292).
  • The Rooker–Feldman doctrine (from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co. and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman) bars federal district courts—and, by extension, federal circuit courts reviewing district court judgments—from effectively reviewing and overturning state-court decisions.
  • The doctrine is limited but applies when a federal case is “essentially an appeal by a state court loser seeking to relitigate a claim that has already been decided in a state court” (Target Media Partners v. Specialty Marketing Corp.).

2. Application

The appellants explicitly asked the Eleventh Circuit to vacate a Florida appellate court decision that had gone against them in their landlord–tenant dispute. That request fell squarely within what Rooker–Feldman prohibits:

  • They were state-court losers;
  • They sought federal appellate relief from a state appellate judgment;
  • The Eleventh Circuit has no authority to act as a super-appellate court over state judiciaries.

Accordingly, the court dismissed this portion of the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

IV. Precedents and Doctrinal Themes

A. Precedents on Procedure and Sanctions

  • Chudasama v. Mazda Motor Corp. – Establishes abuse-of-discretion review for discovery orders.
  • Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau v. Brown – Reaffirms broad discretion in sanctioning, emphasizing trial courts’ firsthand observation.
  • Josendis v. Wall to Wall Residence Repairs – Articulates the “definite and firm conviction” language for clear error in discretionary rulings.
  • Loren v. Sasser – Imposes on appellants the burden of providing a complete record; appellate courts presume missing transcripts support the district court.
  • Link v. Wabash R.R. Co. – Parties are bound by their counsel’s acts and omissions; they cannot avoid consequences by blaming their lawyers.

B. Magistrate Judge Authority and Appellate Review

  • Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) – Requires timely objections to non-dispositive magistrate orders; unobjected-to defects cannot later be assigned as error.
  • 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A) – Appeals from magistrate rulings must go to the district court, not directly to the court of appeals.
  • United States v. Renfro (binding Fifth Circuit precedent adopted in Bonner) – No direct appeals from federal magistrates.
  • United States v. Schultz – Applies Renfro’s rule in circumstances where magistrate rulings are not objected to but later challenged on appeal from the final judgment.

C. FHA Accommodation and Retaliation Precedents

  • Bhogaita v. Altamonte Heights Condo. Ass'n – Articulates the four-part FHA accommodation test and stresses landlord knowledge and interactive dialogue when skeptical.
  • Schwarz v. City of Treasure Island – Clarifies that landlords cannot be liable for denying accommodations whose necessity they did not know.
  • Schaw v. Habitat for Humanity of Citrus County and Sailboat Bend Sober Living, LLC – Elaborate on the “necessity” requirement, focusing on whether the accommodation alleviates the effects of the handicap.
  • Frazier-White v. Gee – Establishes FHA retaliation elements, borrowing Title VII analytical frameworks.
  • Weeks v. Harden Mfg. Corp. and Dixon v. The Hallmark Co. – Demand that the plaintiff’s belief in the unlawfulness of challenged conduct be both subjective (good faith) and objective (reasonable in law and fact).
  • Kidd v. Mando Am. Corp. – Emphasizes that causation requires employer (or landlord) awareness of the protected conduct and a linkage between that conduct and the adverse action.

D. Quiet Enjoyment and Lease Interpretation

  • Stinson, Lyons, Gerlin & Bustamante v. Brickell Building 1 Holding Co. – Recognizes that express lease covenants can coexist with the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and can shape or limit what counts as a breach.

E. Rooker–Feldman and State Court Judgments

  • Behr v. Campbell and Target Media Partners v. Specialty Mktg. Corp. – Describe Rooker–Feldman as a doctrine of limited scope whose essential role is to prevent federal district courts from acting as de facto appellate courts over state judgments.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. “Reasonable Accommodation” under the FHA

A “reasonable accommodation” is a change in rules, policies, practices, or services that is:

  • Linked to a disability (physical or mental impairment that substantially limits major life activities);
  • Necessary to allow the disabled person equal use and enjoyment of their housing; and
  • Not an undue burden on the landlord or a fundamental alteration of services.

It is not enough to say “I am disabled” and “I prefer X.” The tenant must explain why this specific change is needed to cope with their disability.

2. “Necessary” in Accommodation Law

“Necessary” does not mean “nice to have” or “convenient.” Courts ask:

  • Does the requested change actually ease or remove a barrier created by the person’s disability?
  • Is there a direct link between the disability’s effects and the proposed accommodation?

3. FHA Retaliation and “Objectively Reasonable Belief”

To claim retaliation, a tenant must have:

  • A good faith belief that the landlord did something illegal; and
  • A belief that is objectively reasonable – a reasonable person, knowing the law and facts, would also think the landlord’s conduct violated the FHA.

If the landlord is simply enforcing neutral lease provisions or pursuing legitimate legal remedies (like an appeal), it is usually not reasonable to view that as unlawful discrimination or retaliation without additional evidence of discriminatory motive.

4. Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

This is a default rule in landlord–tenant law: landlords cannot substantially interfere with the tenant’s use and enjoyment of the premises. However:

  • Lease contracts can define, explain, or limit what counts as interference (for example, reserving a right to enter for maintenance or allowing temporary service interruptions);
  • When tenants sign leases with such clauses, courts often hold that these anticipated interferences do not breach quiet enjoyment.

5. Rooker–Feldman Doctrine

This doctrine says:

  • You cannot go to a federal district court (and then to a federal court of appeals) and ask it to overturn a state court judgment against you;
  • Only the U.S. Supreme Court can review final decisions of a state’s highest court, and only via a specific petition process.

VI. Impact and Broader Significance

1. For FHA Litigants

  • Clarity and documentation: Tenants must clearly articulate how a requested accommodation is tied to their disability and, where possible, provide supporting documentation.
  • Realistic expectations about noise and conditions: Claims based on general noise, maintenance activity, or routine building operations will be scrutinized for actual disability-related necessity, not mere discomfort.
  • Retaliation must be tied to unlawful conduct: Complaints or HUD filings do not transform all subsequent landlord actions into retaliation; the underlying belief in unlawfulness must be objectively reasonable.

2. For Landlords and Property Managers

  • Importance of neutral policies and documentation: Enforcing lease provisions consistently, and documenting reasons for nonrenewal or eviction, helps defeat retaliation claims.
  • Interactive process still important: While a landlord won here, cases like Bhogaita and Schwarz make clear that landlords are expected to engage constructively when an accommodation appears plausibly tied to a disability.
  • Lease drafting: Clear terms regarding entry, service interruptions, and complaint procedures can significantly reduce exposure to “quiet enjoyment” claims.

3. For Appellate Practice, Especially Pro Se

  • Rule 72(a) is unforgiving: Failure to object to a magistrate’s non-dispositive order within 14 days can permanently remove that issue from appellate review.
  • Record completeness: Missing transcripts, particularly of critical hearings, make reversals on appeal highly unlikely.
  • Issue preservation: Arguments must be raised in the opening brief, with some analysis and citation; arguments “saved” for the reply are typically lost.

4. Precedential Weight

The opinion is marked “Not for publication,” meaning under Eleventh Circuit rules it is not binding precedent. However, under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 32.1 and Eleventh Circuit practice, it may still be cited as persuasive authority, particularly on factual applications of FHA standards and on the consequences of procedural missteps like failure to object under Rule 72(a).

VII. Conclusion

Cano v. 245 C&C, LLC is not a groundbreaking opinion, but it is a dense and instructive one. It synthesizes several core strands of federal civil procedure and Fair Housing Act doctrine:

  • It reaffirms landlords’ liability for FHA accommodations only when they are adequately informed of both the disability and the necessity of the accommodation;
  • It narrows FHA retaliation claims by insisting on an objectively reasonable belief in underlying illegality and concrete proof of but-for causation;
  • It illustrates the practical effect of express lease covenants on the scope of quiet enjoyment claims;
  • It underscores procedural rigor, especially for pro se litigants: timely objections, complete records, and properly preserved appellate arguments are indispensable; and
  • It reiterates the strict jurisdictional boundary preventing federal appellate courts from reviewing state-court judgments under Rooker–Feldman.

In aggregate, the opinion sends a clear signal: FHA protections are robust but bounded by both substantive elements and procedural discipline. Tenants and landlords alike must navigate these boundaries with careful documentation, clear communication, and respect for the distinct roles of state and federal courts.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit

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