Intervening Cause Defense in Colorado’s Fentanyl-Death Enhancement Statute

Introduction

In Re The People of the State of Colorado v. Patrick L. Beverly, II (2025 CO 18) presents the first opportunity for Colorado’s highest court to interpret the proximate-cause requirement in the newly enacted fentanyl-death enhancement statute (§ 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A), C.R.S. 2024). Against the backdrop of a national and state surge in fentanyl-related fatalities, the 2022 General Assembly enacted H.B. 22-1326 to impose substantially harsher penalties on distributors whose unlawful sales proximately cause a buyer’s death. Here, defendant Beverly sold pills containing fentanyl to Matthew Bowen, who texted a “goodbye” message to his girlfriend and ingested a massive dose of fentanyl with lethal intent. After a district court refused to suppress evidence of Bowen’s suicidal intent, the State petitioned for an extraordinary writ under C.A.R. 21. The Colorado Supreme Court granted review to resolve whether suicidal intent may ever sever the causal link between distribution and death, thus precluding the sentencing enhancement.

Summary of the Judgment

The Colorado Supreme Court unanimously held that—

The term “proximate cause” in § 18-18-405(2)(a)(III)(A) carries its established legal meaning, requiring that the defendant’s conduct not be superseded by an unforeseeable, independent intervening cause.
A buyer’s suicide by intentional fentanyl overdose can constitute an intervening cause if it was unforeseeable, interrupting the natural causal sequence of distribution → death.
Evidence of suicidal intent—including text messages and coroner testimony—may therefore be relevant under CRE 402 and is not unduly prejudicial under CRE 403. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting that evidence.

The Court discharged the People’s writ and affirmed that the question of proximate cause—whether suicide severed Beverly’s liability for enhanced sentencing—properly goes to the jury.

Analysis

Precedents Cited

People v. Rockwell (125 P.3d 410 (Colo. 2005)): “proximate cause” invokes established criminal-law definition.
People v. Stewart (55 P.3d 107 (Colo. 2002)): conduct is not a proximate cause if an unforeseeable intervening event instead causes the harm.
People v. Saavedra-Rodriguez (971 P.2d 223 (Colo. 1998)): lays out the three-part test for intervening causes (nonparticipation, unforeseeability, but-for causation).
Burrage v. United States (571 U.S. 204 (2014)): distinguishes actual (but-for) and legal (proximate) cause in drug deaths.
People v. Subjack (2021 CO 10): exercise of C.A.R. 21 original jurisdiction is narrow but warranted for issues of first impression and significant public importance.
People v. Elmarr (2015 CO 53): abuse-of-discretion review of evidentiary rulings under CRE 402/403.
Federal and out-of-state analogues:
- United States v. Camacho (D. Haw. 2024): similar federal sentencing statute.
- United States v. Jeffries (6th Cir. 2020): § 841(b)(1) requires only but-for cause, but recognized death from fentanyl is foreseeable.
- Baker v. State (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2021): rejected suicide as interrupting cause.
- Yeary v. State (Ind. Ct. App. 2022) & McCrorey (N.C. Ct. App. 2023): purchaser’s misuse not unforeseeable.

Legal Reasoning

1. Statutory Interpretation: The General Assembly chose the phrase “proximate cause” rather than “results in” or “caused,” invoking Colorado’s long-standing doctrine that an intervening cause can break the causal chain. Had lawmakers intended to enhance sentences for any fentanyl-related death, they could have used broader language, as Congress did in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1).

2. Intervening-Cause Doctrine: To qualify, an event must (a) occur without the defendant’s participation, (b) be unforeseeable, and (c) be a but-for cause of the harm. A suicide undertaken by ingesting a massive dose of fentanyl may satisfy all three elements in the right case.

3. Relevance and Prejudice Balancing: Under CRE 402/403, evidence of suicidal intent has substantial probative value in showing an unforeseeable intervening cause and is unlikely to mislead or inflame the jury when accompanied by appropriate limiting instructions.

Impact

Prosecutors must anticipate defense evidence on buyers’ mental states when seeking the fentanyl-death enhancement.
Trial courts will weigh foreseeability fact-by-fact; not every suicide will rise to the level of an unforeseeable intervening cause.
The decision preserves the jury’s role in assessing proximate cause and will shape defense strategies in drug-distribution prosecutions statewide.
Broadly, the ruling underscores the continuing importance of traditional causation doctrines even in modern statutory schemes addressing public-health crises.

Complex Concepts Simplified

But-for Cause: “Had the defendant not distributed the pills, Bowen would not have died from that ingestion.”
Proximate (Legal) Cause: The defendant’s conduct must be closely linked to the result in a “natural and probable sequence” without an unforeseeable interruption.
Intervening Cause: An independent event—here, a buyer’s suicide—that breaks the chain of legal responsibility if it was unforeseeable and solely responsible for the death.
CRE 402: All relevant evidence is admissible; evidence is relevant if it makes any fact more or less probable.
CRE 403: Even relevant evidence may be excluded if its prejudice substantially outweighs its probative value.
C.A.R. 21: An extraordinary original writ in Colorado when no adequate remedy exists and public importance warrants immediate review.

Conclusion

The Colorado Supreme Court’s ruling in People v. Beverly confirms that Colorado’s fentanyl-death enhancement statute is not a blanket prohibition on defenses arising from a buyer’s mental state. By preserving the common-law doctrine of proximate cause and intervening cause, the Court ensures that sentences are enhanced only when defendants’ distributions directly and foreseeably lead to fatal overdoses. The decision upholds the jury’s traditional fact-finding role and strikes a constitutional and pragmatic balance between legislative intent to curb fentanyl deaths and fundamental principles of criminal causation.