Implied Online Violence as a “True Threat” and Social‑Media “Monitoring” under Vermont’s Civil Stalking Statute: Commentary on Brian Tomlinson v. Kathleen Lovell

I. Introduction

This commentary analyzes the Vermont Supreme Court’s entry order in Brian Tomlinson v. Kathleen Lovell, Case No. 25‑AP‑207 (Dec. 5, 2025), a civil anti‑stalking appeal arising from a series of hostile social‑media posts directed at a local police officer and his family. Although issued by a three‑justice panel and expressly “not to be considered as precedent before any tribunal,” the opinion contains important clarifications about:

When violent “hopes” or wishes expressed online can qualify as “true threats” for purposes of Vermont’s civil stalking statute; and
What constitutes “monitoring” under 12 V.S.A. §§ 5131–5133 in the context of social‑media activity.

The plaintiff, Brian Tomlinson, is a Morristown police officer who sought a civil order against stalking after defendant Kathleen (a/k/a “Kei”) Lovell repeatedly posted vitriolic Facebook messages targeting him, his wife, and his children over at least a nine‑month period. The trial court denied relief, holding that the posts did not contain “true threats” and that the evidence was insufficient to show that defendant had “monitored” plaintiff. On appeal, the Vermont Supreme Court reversed, holding that:

Viewed in context, the May 4, 2025 post contained a true threat of violence; and
The trial court interpreted “monitoring” too narrowly under the civil stalking statute.

The Court remanded the matter for further proceedings because the trial court had dismissed the complaint before defendant had an opportunity to present evidence. The opinion thus blends substantive clarification of stalking law with a quiet reminder about procedural fairness in abuse‑prevention proceedings.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

The controversy traces back to an April 2023 incident involving defendant’s son, which resulted in criminal charges against him. Plaintiff, as a Morristown police officer, responded to that incident. Beginning in September 2024 and continuing through May 2025, defendant (using a Facebook account under the name “Kei Lovell”) posted a series of messages about plaintiff that:

Repeatedly used plaintiff’s name and photograph;
Accused him of lying about being shot and trying to kill a “developmentally disabled kid”; and
Referred to plaintiff’s wife, children, and family life, and to his prior work as a chef.

The posts escalated in hostility. Of particular importance was a May 4, 2025 post stating:

Brian Tomlinson tried so hard to kill my son. Brian, I hope someday, that someone fires eight 40 caliber bullets into your wife or kids. I hope someday a thug commits extreme violence against your wife and her possessions. The way you did to me and my son, you absolute psycho.

The trial court conducted an evidentiary hearing. Plaintiff and the Morristown police chief testified. Defendant had not yet testified when the court recessed, then returned and announced from the bench that the evidence did not support a finding of stalking and denied the request for an order.

B. Trial Court’s Ruling

The trial court held:

The May 2025 post did not constitute a “true threat” because it was phrased as a “hope” that someone else would cause harm, rather than an expressed intent by defendant.
The remaining posts did not contain threatening language at all (i.e., were insults, accusations, or harassment but not threats of violence).
The evidence did not show that defendant had “followed or monitored” plaintiff, in part because there was no explanation of how defendant obtained information about his family and personal history.

On this basis, the court concluded that plaintiff had not proved the statutory elements of stalking and denied relief under 12 V.S.A. § 5133.

C. Supreme Court’s Disposition

The Vermont Supreme Court:

Reversed the trial court’s determination that the May 2025 post did not constitute a true threat;
Rejected the trial court’s narrow construction of “monitoring” under the stalking statute; and
Remanded the case so that defendant could present evidence, emphasizing that the trial court had decided the merits without hearing defendant’s side.

III. Legal Framework and Standards of Review

A. Vermont’s Civil Stalking Statute

The relevant statutory provisions are in 12 V.S.A. §§ 5131–5133:

Definition of “stalking” – 12 V.S.A. § 5131(6):
Stalking is to
“engage purposefully in a course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for his or her safety or to suffer substantial emotional distress.”
“Course of conduct” – 12 V.S.A. § 5131(1)(A)(i):
A “course of conduct” is:
“two or more acts over a period of time, however short, in which a person follows, monitors, surveils, threatens, or makes threats about another person, or interferes with another person's property.”
Burden of proof and issuance of order – 12 V.S.A. § 5133(d):
The court may issue an order only if the plaintiff proves stalking by a preponderance of the evidence.

B. Appellate Standards

The Court reiterates standard Vermont appellate principles in abuse‑prevention and civil‑protection cases:

Findings of fact are reviewed for clear error. The Court will affirm unless “there is no evidence to support” them. (Benson v. Muscari, 172 Vt. 1, 5 (2001).)
The Court views findings “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below, disregarding the effect of any modifying evidence.” (Coates v. Coates, 171 Vt. 519, 520 (2000) (mem.).)
Constitutional issues and legal characterizations of speech (e.g., whether speech is a “true threat,” akin to the “fighting words” issue in State v. Tracy, 2015 VT 111) are reviewed de novo.
Statutory interpretation questions (such as the meaning of “monitoring”) are also reviewed without deference. (Morton v. Young, 2023 VT 29, ¶ 10, 218 Vt. 96.)

IV. Precedents Cited and Their Role in the Decision

A. Benson v. Muscari (2001) & Coates v. Coates (2000)

Benson and Coates are standard citations for the clear‑error review of factual findings and the practice of reading those findings in the light most favorable to the prevailing party. Their role in this decision is largely methodological:

They underscore that the Supreme Court did not lightly overturn the trial court’s factual conclusions, but rather intervened because its disagreement centered on legal characterizations of undisputed facts (the content of the posts) and statutory interpretation.
They also frame the appellate posture: the Court respects the trial court’s vantage point on live testimony, but reserves to itself the final word on what counts as a “true threat” or “monitoring” as a matter of law.

B. State v. Tracy (2015)

Tracy concerned whether certain speech constituted “fighting words” and thus fell outside First Amendment protection. The citation here serves two purposes:

It anchors the Court’s statement that determinations involving the constitutional status of speech (e.g., fighting words, true threats) are reviewed de novo.
It reinforces the framework that Vermont courts treat the categorization of speech (protected vs. unprotected) as a question of law, not simply a question of fact.

This matters because the trial court appears to have treated the question “Is this a true threat?” as if it were organized around its own subjective assessment of the posts’ tone. The Supreme Court instead assumes responsibility for independently assessing that issue.

C. Hinkson v. Stevens (2020 VT 69)

Hinkson is the Court’s key prior decision interpreting “threatening” and “monitoring” under the same civil stalking statute. It provides crucial doctrinal building blocks:

The statute defines “threatening” to include non‑express or non‑overt threats, but “does not include constitutionally protected activity.” (12 V.S.A. § 5131(1); Hinkson, ¶ 41.)
This wording is read as incorporating the First Amendment “true threat” doctrine: the statute only reaches speech that is a “true threat” as defined by U.S. Supreme Court and Vermont case law. (Hinkson, ¶ 44.)
For “monitoring,” Hinkson defines it as:
“tracking or collecting some form of information about the person being monitored or their activities.”
(Hinkson, ¶ 38.)

In Tomlinson, the Court invokes Hinkson in two ways:

To reaffirm that the civil stalking statute is limited to true threats and does not criminalize (or civilly sanction) mere harsh criticism; and
To remind trial courts that “monitoring” can be proven by demonstration that the defendant has collected personal information about the plaintiff, not necessarily by direct surveillance or by proof of how that information was acquired.

D. State v. Noll (2018 VT 106)

Noll is a cornerstone Vermont case on true threats. It holds that:

True threats are not protected by the First Amendment.
A “true threat” consists of
“statements where the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.”
(Noll, ¶ 22 (quotation omitted).)
Whether speech amounts to a true threat turns on an objective, reasonable person standard: would an ordinary reasonable person, familiar with the context, interpret the statement as a threat of injury? (Noll, ¶¶ 36–37.)
In assessing “monitoring,” Noll observed that an offender’s detailed recitation of private information about a complainant in a self‑published book showed that he kept “close tabs” on her and “wanted complainant to feel as if he was watching her.” (Noll, ¶ 42.)

In Tomlinson, the Court leans heavily on this objective test:

It explicitly asks whether a reasonable person, “viewed in context,” would perceive defendant’s May 2025 post as a threat of injury.
It applies Noll’s monitoring analysis by analogizing the Facebook posts, rich with personal details about plaintiff and his family, to the obsessive tracking shown in Noll.

E. Morton v. Young (2023 VT 29)

Morton confirms that interpretation of the civil stalking statute is a question of law reviewed without deference. The citation is used to justify the Court’s independent reading of “monitoring” and to correct the trial court’s overly narrow approach.

F. Nichols v. Lafayette, No. 24‑AP‑288 (Vt. Mar. 14, 2025) (unpub. mem.)

Although unpublished and formally non‑precedential, Nichols is significant and closely analogous:

In Nichols, the Court affirmed that a parent’s statement at a school board meeting that he hoped the superintendent “got hit by a bus” could be treated as a true threat.
Tomlinson cites Nichols to demonstrate that language framed as a “hope” that someone suffers violence can cross the line into a true threat, particularly in context.

This makes Nichols an important doctrinal stepping stone: expressing a desire that violence happen to someone—when made in a hostile, targeted, emotionally charged context— can be viewed objectively as threatening, even if not phrased “I will do X.”

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Determining Whether the May 2025 Post Was a “True Threat”

1. The Content of the Post

The Court’s analysis hinges on the May 4, 2025 Facebook post:

Brian, I hope someday, that someone fires eight 40 caliber bullets into your wife or kids. I hope someday a thug commits extreme violence against your wife and her possessions.

Key features of the content:

Explicit, graphic violence: The post references “eight 40 caliber bullets” and “extreme violence.”
Specific targets: Plaintiff’s “wife or kids” are named as potential victims.
Retaliatory motive: The text ties the hoped‑for violence to plaintiff’s perceived wrongdoing (“The way you did to me and my son”).

These features, taken together, go beyond generic abuse or rhetorical flourish. They suggest a focused, retaliatory wish for catastrophic harm against specific, identifiable persons.

2. Context: Repetition, Fixation, and Public Attacks

The Court emphasizes that the May post cannot be read in isolation:

Defendant repeatedly posted plaintiff’s picture alongside insults and accusations over at least nine months.
The posts did not merely criticize government policy; they targeted plaintiff personally as “Killer Cop Brian,” “unhinged,” “psycho,” and a “total freak,” emphasizing his family and children (“try not to shoot anyone at your kids’ soccer games”).
The pattern shows an escalating, obsessive fixation with plaintiff and his family.

This pattern matters under the objective “reasonable person” standard: an ordinary person, seeing this long‑term online campaign and then reading the May 4 post, would reasonably perceive a serious risk of violence or incitement to violence.

3. The “Hope” Formulation Does Not Neutralize the Threat

The trial court appears to have relied heavily on the fact that defendant used the language “I hope someone…” rather than “I will…”. The Supreme Court directly rejects the idea that this phrasing takes the statement outside the realm of “threat”:

A threat need not be an explicit promise of personal action. It can be implied, indirect, or phrased as a wish.
The key is whether the speaker means to communicate a serious expression of intent that unlawful violence occur, and whether a reasonable person interprets it as such.
The Court notes that the specificity of the violence (“eight 40 caliber bullets”), the identified targets, and the broader context “suggests a premeditated plan” and “can reasonably be construed as an implied threat to harm plaintiff or his family.”
Citing Nichols, the Court reiterates that statements like “I hope X happens to you” can be treated as true threats if a reasonable hearer would perceive them as serious and menacing.

In other words, the doctrinal message is clear: couching violent intent as a “hope” that someone else will act is not a safe harbor under the First Amendment when the context shows a serious, targeted, and menacing expression.

4. Objective Standard, Not Speaker’s Subjective Intention to Act

Following Noll, the Court again emphasizes that:

A statement may be a true threat “even if the speaker does not intend to carry out the threat.”
The only relevant question is whether an ordinary, reasonable person, aware of the context, would see the statement as a threat of injury.

This keeps the focus on the protection of the victim’s sense of safety, not on parsing the internal psychology of the speaker.

B. Re‑Defining the Scope of “Monitoring” in the Stalking Context

1. The Trial Court’s Narrow View

The trial court had held there was insufficient evidence of “monitoring” because it was not clear how defendant learned about plaintiff’s:

Wife and children;
Presence at his children’s soccer games; or
Past employment as a chef.

The court effectively required proof of the provenance of the information—where it came from, when, and how.

2. Supreme Court’s Correction

Invoking Hinkson, the Supreme Court holds that:

For purposes of the civil stalking statute, “monitoring” only requires showing that the defendant engaged in “tracking or collecting some form of information about the person being monitored or their activities.”
There is no requirement that the plaintiff prove where or how defendant obtained this information.
The repeated posts referencing plaintiff’s family, children, soccer games, and work history demonstrate defendant’s detailed knowledge of plaintiff’s personal life and activities. This can “rise to the level of monitoring.”
The Court analogizes to Noll, where the defendant’s recitation of personal facts in a self‑published book demonstrated that he was “keeping close tabs” on the complainant and wanted her to feel watched.

The practical effect is to recognize that social‑media‑based stalking can involve information‑gathering that is not easily traceable but still deeply invasive and frightening. The focus is on the existence and pattern of personal knowledge and its use, not on a forensic reconstruction of how it was acquired.

C. The Procedural Posture and Remand

After correcting the trial court’s legal errors, the Supreme Court stops short of directing entry of a stalking order. Instead, it:

Observes that the evidence presented could support such an order, given the true threat and possible monitoring; but
Emphasizes that the trial court reached its decision “without ever hearing defendant's side of the story.”
Concludes that remand is necessary so that defendant can “present evidence.”

This signals an important procedural principle: even in the context of emergency or protective proceedings, courts must respect basic fairness and the adversarial process. A court should not resolve the ultimate merits—especially where constitutional speech protections are implicated—without giving the accused stalker an opportunity to testify and present their own evidence.

VI. Impact and Significance

A. Clarifying “True Threats” in the Social‑Media Era

Although three‑justice panel entry orders are formally non‑precedential in Vermont, Tomlinson is likely to be cited informally and used by trial judges as persuasive authority on several points:

Violent “hopes” or wishes can be true threats. Expressions like “I hope someone shoots your wife and kids” or “I hope a thug commits extreme violence against you” may be actionable true threats when:
- Directed at a specific individual or their family;
- Accompanied by other aggressive and targeted conduct; and
- Reasonably interpreted as a serious expression of intent that unlawful violence occur.
Context—and especially pattern—matters. A single isolated statement might be ambiguous; a series of escalating posts featuring photos, name‑calling, and detailed personal knowledge makes the threat more objectively menacing.
Law enforcement officers are not excluded from stalking protection. The case shows that officers, even though public figures in some sense, are entitled to protection from threats and stalking directed at them and their families. Robust criticism of police conduct is protected, but targeted, violent threats are not.

B. Lowering the Evidentiary Barrier for “Monitoring”

By explicitly rejecting the trial court’s requirement that plaintiffs show how the defendant obtained their personal information, the Court makes clear that:

Stalking can be established based on the content of public posts alone, if those posts demonstrate that the defendant knows—and publicizes—details of the plaintiff’s private life and movements.
Online information gathering qualifies as “monitoring,” even if the defendant merely combed public records or social media. The fear and distress arises from the sense of being watched and targeted, not exclusively from the method of information acquisition.

This clarification is particularly significant in an era where much personal information is available online. Victims may have no way to show exactly how a stalker learned about their children’s activities, workplaces, or routines. Under Tomlinson (and Hinkson), it is enough to show that the defendant demonstrably has and uses that information in a pattern of conduct directed at the victim.

C. Guidance for Trial Courts in Abuse‑Prevention and Stalking Cases

Practically, the opinion encourages trial courts to:

Take explicit, graphic online statements about violence very seriously, even if the speaker claims they were merely “venting” or “hoping.”
Analyze patterns of conduct rather than dissecting each post in isolation. Together, repeated posts, pictures, and escalating rhetoric can form a “course of conduct” that meets the statutory definition.
Ensure full participation of both parties before making final merit determinations. Rulings made after only one side’s evidence—especially dismissals—create a risk of reversible error, as this case demonstrates.

D. Free Speech vs. Protection from Harassment and Violence

The case continues Vermont’s trend of carefully balancing First Amendment protections with the need to protect individuals from stalking:

The Court reaffirms that constitutionally protected activity is excluded from the stalking statute’s reach. Mere insults, criticism, or harsh public commentary about a police officer’s actions are generally protected.
The line is crossed when the speech becomes:
- Directed specifically at an identifiable person or their close family; and
- Communicates a serious intent that unlawful violence occur.
By anchoring its analysis in the “true threat” doctrine and the reasonable person standard, the Court both safeguards free speech and recognizes that victims should not have to wait for overt promises of personal action before obtaining protection.

VII. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “True Threat”

A “true threat” is a statement that:

Communicates a serious expression of intent that someone will suffer unlawful violence; and
Would be understood that way by a reasonable person given all the surrounding circumstances.

Important points:

The speaker does not need to say “I will do this.” It can be implied or expressed as a wish.
The law looks at how a reasonable listener or reader would take it, not just at what the speaker later claims they meant.
True threats are not protected free speech; they can justify criminal or civil sanctions (like stalking orders).

B. “Monitoring” in Stalking Law

“Monitoring” means tracking or collecting information about someone or their activities. It is a form of stalking conduct that can occur without physical following or contact.

Examples that may count as monitoring:

Regularly checking a person’s social‑media accounts to learn their schedule or family details, then commenting on them;
Posting online about where they live, where they work, and where their children attend school;
Publishing or repeatedly sharing their private or semi‑private information in a way that shows close observation.

In Tomlinson, defendant’s references to plaintiff’s wife, children, kids’ soccer games, and past employment as a chef are evidence of monitoring: they show that defendant has been paying close attention to plaintiff’s life and activities.

C. “Course of Conduct”

A “course of conduct” is simply two or more acts over a period of time—any period, even a short one— where the defendant has:

Followed the person;
Monitored or surveilled them;
Threatened them or made threats about them; or
Interfered with their property.

In online stalking cases, this can be a repeated pattern of posts, messages, tags, or comments about the victim.

D. “Preponderance of the Evidence”

This is the civil standard of proof. It means the plaintiff must show that it is more likely than not that stalking occurred. It is a lower bar than “beyond a reasonable doubt” in criminal cases.

E. “Clearly Erroneous” vs. “De Novo” Review

Clearly erroneous: The Supreme Court will uphold factual findings unless there is no supporting evidence. It gives trial courts deference on questions of “what actually happened.”
De novo: The Supreme Court does not defer to the trial court on legal questions such as:
- Does this set of words, on these facts, amount to a “true threat”?
- Is this conduct “monitoring” under the statute?
The Court answers those questions for itself.

VIII. Conclusion

Brian Tomlinson v. Kathleen Lovell provides a detailed and timely clarification of Vermont’s civil stalking law in the age of social media, even though it is issued as a non‑precedential entry order. The decision:

Affirms that violent wishes or “hopes” expressed online—especially when graphically specific and directed at a person’s spouse and children— can constitute true threats unprotected by the First Amendment.
Reasserts that the “true threat” analysis is an objective one, grounded in how a reasonable person would perceive the statements in context.
Expands and clarifies “monitoring” to include the collection and public display of personal information via social media, without requiring proof of where or how that information was obtained.
Underscores the importance of procedural fairness in abuse‑prevention proceedings: trial courts should not make final merit determinations without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard.

Taken together, these points significantly shape how Vermont courts, lawyers, and litigants should approach online harassment and stalking claims. The opinion highlights that while robust, even harsh criticism of public officials is protected speech, targeted, graphic expressions of violent intent toward those officials and their families are not. It also recognizes that stalking in the digital age often manifests through patterns of online speech and information‑gathering, and that legal tools must adapt to provide meaningful protection in that environment.