Idaho Supreme Court Abandons Statute-of-Limitations Bar for Easements by Necessity and Expands Discretion to Revisit “Law-of-the-Case”: Easterling v. Clark (“Easterling II”)

Idaho Supreme Court Abandons Statute-of-Limitations Bar for Easements by Necessity and Expands Discretion to Revisit “Law-of-the-Case” Doctrine: Detailed Commentary on Easterling v. Clark (2025)

1. Introduction

Parties & posture. Edward and Janice Easterling own three contiguous but landlocked parcels in Ammon, Idaho. Jeremiah and Amanda Clark (successors to HAL Pacific Properties, LP) own the only parcel that borders a public road (Sunnyside Road) south of the Easterlings. The dispute concerns the Easterlings’ attempt to judicially confirm an easement by necessity across the Clark/HAL parcel.

Procedural saga. In Easterling I (2023) a divided Supreme Court unexpectedly held—over a vigorous dissent—that the catch-all four-year statute of limitations in Idaho Code § 5-224 applies to common-law easement-by-necessity claims and remanded for factual findings on accrual. After remand the district court fixed an accrual date of 2004 and entered summary judgment for the Clarks, extinguishing the easement claim.

Current appeal (“Easterling II”). The second appeal presented three issues: (1) waiver of the limitations defense under I.R.C.P. 8(c); (2) propriety of summary judgment; and (3) whether the Court should overrule Easterling I. A re-configured Court (with one new Justice) not only vacated the district court’s judgment but expressly overruled Easterling I, restored the Easterlings’ easement, and remanded only for determination of its location.

2. Summary of the Judgment

  • The Court holds for the first time that § 5-224 does not apply to easement-by-necessity actions; such easements “exist as long as the necessity persists,” so limitations cannot extinguish them.
  • Affirmative defenses omitted from an answer are not waived if raised before trial in summary-judgment briefing and the opponent has a fair chance to respond (Rule 8(c) reaffirmed).
  • Neither res judicata, collateral estoppel, nor traditional “law-of-the-case” principles prevented the Court from revisiting its own prior ruling in the same litigation; the doctrine is discretionary and subordinate to correcting manifest legal error before final judgment.
  • The original trial-court findings that the Easterlings satisfied all three elements of easement by necessity were supported by substantial evidence; width of 26 feet (to satisfy Ammon fire-code drive-aisle standard) is reasonable; however, location of the easement was determined without adequate notice and is remanded.
  • Costs were awarded to the Easterlings; attorney-fee request under I.C. § 12-121 was denied.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  1. Easterling I, 171 Idaho 500 (2023) – Majority had applied § 5-224; became focal point for reconsideration.
  2. Hall v. Blackman (1904) – Classic Idaho statement of law-of-the-case; Majority distinguishes it and labels doctrine discretionary.
  3. Messenger v. Anderson, 225 U.S. 436 (1912) & Arizona v. California, 460 U.S. 605 (1983) – U.S. Supreme Court language that law-of-the-case “directs discretion.”
  4. Christianson v. Colt, 486 U.S. 800 (1988) – Courts may revisit prior rulings if “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest injustice.”
  5. Idaho cases clarifying Rule 8(c) waiver, e.g., Patterson v. IDHW, 151 Idaho 310 (2011); Fuhriman, Gibson.
  6. Sister-state cases rejecting limitations on easement-by-necessity: Hinrichs v. Melton (Cal.); Canali v. Satre (Ill.); Attaway v. Davis (Ark.), etc.
  7. Restatement (Third) of Property: Servitudes § 2.15 – No time limit on claiming a way of necessity.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

a) Rule 8(c) waiver. Although HAL neglected to plead limitations in its answer, Idaho precedent permits first assertion in a summary-judgment motion as long as the opponent has notice and opportunity to respond. Thus the defense was not waived.

b) Ability to revisit precedent. The majority re-characterises law-of-the-case as a flexible policy, not an inflexible command, particularly where (i) no final judgment on the merits exists, and (ii) failure to correct a manifest error would perpetuate an erroneous rule affecting numerous landowners. It stresses that unlike Hall II, the present case was still at the summary-judgment stage and no jury verdict would be disturbed.

c) Statute of limitations inapplicable.

  • An easement by necessity is implied at the moment of severance; the right lies “dormant” until needed. A cause of action therefore is not to create a right but to declare an existing one.
  • Public-policy rationale—prevent land from being rendered useless—prevails over stale-claim policy underpinning limitations statutes.
  • Applying § 5-224 would generate uncertainty, disrupt long-standing implied easements statewide, and conflict with the trend in other jurisdictions and the Restatement.

d) Width expansion. The Court adopts the majority rule that once the easement is established its scope may adapt to “reasonable and necessary” present needs, provided the burden on the servient estate is not unreasonable. Fire-code compliance justified increasing width from historic 10-12 feet to 26 feet.

e) Location issue. Because the location question was first raised in a reply brief on reconsideration, HAL lacked adequate notice. The issue is remanded, signalling that both parties should cooperate to minimize further litigation.

3.3 Likely Impact

  • Statewide property law. Landlocked parcels—common in Idaho’s rural subdivisions—no longer face a limitations bar when owners seek judicial confirmation of access, regardless of the parcel’s age.
  • Transactional practice. Title companies and real-estate lawyers must adjust risk assessments; dormant implied easements cannot be “cleared” by passage of time alone.
  • Litigation strategy. Parties cannot rely on a limitations defense against easement-by-necessity claims; focus will shift to contesting the three substantive elements and the scope/location of the easement.
  • Appellate procedure. The Court’s broad statement on discretionary departure from law-of-the-case may embolden litigants to re-argue previously decided points before final judgment, at least where a manifest legal error is alleged.
  • Municipal regulation. Decision affirms that current safety codes (e.g., fire access) can influence the required dimensions of implied easements, affecting land-development approvals.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Easement by Necessity
An automatic right of access that arises when a landowner splits a parcel and one piece becomes landlocked. It is implied (not written) and lasts as long as the property would otherwise be unusable.
Statute of Limitations
A law that sets deadlines for filing lawsuits. If the deadline passes, the claim is barred. Easterling II rules that no deadline applies to claims merely declaring an already-existing implied easement.
Law-of-the-Case
A doctrine that normally prevents higher-court rulings in a given case from being re-examined in later phases of the same case. The Court now says it can disregard the doctrine before final judgment to fix “manifest error.”
Unity of Title / Severance
“Unity” means the dominant and servient parcels were once under common ownership. “Severance” is the conveyance that split them, triggering easement-by-necessity doctrine.
Dominant vs. Servient Estate
The dominant parcel benefits from the easement; the servient parcel bears the burden (i.e., must allow the access).

5. Conclusion

Easterling II reshapes Idaho property law and appellate practice in two sweeping moves. First, it declares that easement-by-necessity claims are timeless: no statute of limitations can extinguish them so long as the underlying necessity persists. Second, it signals that the Idaho Supreme Court will, in rare circumstances, jettison its own prior rulings within the same litigation when convinced they are “manifestly wrong,” notwithstanding traditional law-of-the-case constraints.

The decision protects landlocked owners and realigns Idaho with the majority rule nationwide, but it simultaneously injects new flexibility—and potential unpredictability—into appellate finality doctrines. Practitioners must adjust both transactional due-diligence practices and litigation strategies in light of these clarified principles.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Supreme Court of Idaho

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