Heins v. Public Storage: Exclusive Special‑Proceeding Remedy for Challenging Self‑Storage Liens Under New York Lien Law § 182

I. Introduction

Heins v. Public Stor., 2025 NY Slip Op 06605 (2d Dept Nov. 26, 2025), is a decision of first impression in New York appellate jurisprudence on the remedial scheme of Lien Law § 182, which governs self‑storage facilities. The Appellate Division, Second Department, squarely held that:

A self‑storage occupant may not maintain a plenary damages action under Lien Law § 182 based on an allegedly wrongful sale of stored goods arising from a disputed lien; and
Where an occupant “disputes the validity of the lien, or the amount claimed”, the exclusive statutory remedy is a special proceeding commenced within the 10‑day period specified in Lien Law § 182(7)(a), with the limited relief described in § 182(9).

The plaintiff, Robert Heins, lost the contents of his storage unit after the defendant, Public Storage, conducted a lien sale premised on alleged rent arrears. Although the sale was later rescinded after discovery of payment misallocations, Heins claimed that some items were missing and sought damages. Among several causes of action, his fifth cause alleged a statutory violation of Lien Law § 182, framed largely as a “wrongful sale” based on the contention that there was, in fact, no valid lien.

The core legal issue, never before addressed by a New York appellate court, was whether Lien Law § 182 authorizes a private damages action for an allegedly wrongful sale of self‑storage contents, or whether the statute confines such challenges to the special‑proceeding mechanism with its strict 10‑day deadline and limited forms of relief.

The Second Department answered that question in the negative: no independent damages cause of action for “wrongful sale” exists under § 182. Instead, the statute:

Confers a narrow private right of action for unlawful detention and for other technical violations of § 182; and
Separately and exclusively channels challenges to the existence or amount of the lien into a special proceeding, which must be commenced within 10 days and affords only cancellation or reduction of the lien and, if cancelled, a directive entitling the occupant to possession.

This commentary examines the factual background, the statutory framework, the court’s interpretation and reasoning, the precedents invoked, and the broader implications of Heins for New York’s self‑storage industry and for lien‑related litigation strategy.

II. Background of the Case

A. The Occupancy Agreement and Contractual Limitation of Value

On August 16, 2004, plaintiff Robert Heins entered into a written rental/occupancy agreement with Public Storage for a self‑storage space in Patchogue, New York. Key contractual terms included:

Monthly rent of $76 due on the first of each month;
A contractual representation that the total value of all personal property stored was “less than $5,000”; and
A limitation clause stating that Public Storage’s “total responsibility for any liability, expense, personal property damage and personal injury will not exceed [that sum].”

The agreement further provided that if the plaintiff fell behind in rental payments, Public Storage could, among other remedies, remove and sell the stored property pursuant to the New York Lien Law.

B. Alleged Delinquency and the Auction Sale

On March 5, 2007, Public Storage mailed notice to Heins at the address in the agreement, advising that his rent was delinquent and demanding $226 in delinquent rent and related charges. The notice stated that the contents of his storage space would be sold at auction on March 30, 2007, unless the full amount was paid within 15 days.

On March 30, 2007, Public Storage held the auction, at which the contents of Heins’s space were sold to a purchaser, Anthony Stoisich.

C. Discovery of Misapplied Payments and Attempted “Undoing” of the Sale

After the sale, Public Storage determined that Linda Cox, with whom Heins was in a relationship and who rented a separate storage space at the same facility, had made payments intended to cover Heins’s rent for January and February 2007, but those payments had been misapplied to Cox’s unit.

Upon discovering the mistake, Public Storage:

Rescinded the sale;
Waived late fees for Heins;
Returned the auction purchase money to Stoisich; and
Advised Stoisich to return the property bought from Heins’s unit.

When Heins later accessed his unit, he claimed that certain items were missing. This formed the factual predicate for his damage claims.

D. The Litigation and the Fifth Cause of Action Under Lien Law § 182

Heins commenced an action against:

Public Storage, a Maryland real estate investment trust and successor to Public Storage, Inc., and
PS Orangeco, Inc., as Public Storage’s agent.

In his third amended complaint, the fifth cause of action asserted a statutory claim under Lien Law § 182. That cause alleged, among other things:

A “wrongful sale” of his property on the ground that
“there was no unpaid obligation, lien or other right of enforcement.”
That defendants had “failed and refused to return plaintiff’s goods and property to him, thereby committing acts of wrongful detention”; and
That the statutory notice of the pending sale was inadequate.

Thus, the fifth cause of action combined three theories under § 182:

A wrongful sale based on the absence of any valid lien or unpaid obligation;
Wrongful detention / refusal to return goods;
Defective statutory notice of sale.

E. Pre‑Trial Motions

1. April 28, 2020 Order (Rebolini, J.)

Heins moved for summary judgment on liability on his statutory “wrongful sale” theory under § 182. Defendants cross‑moved, inter alia, to limit damages to $5,000 based on the contractual limitation of value.

The Supreme Court:

Denied plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on his § 182 wrongful sale theory; and
Granted defendants’ motion to limit any damages to $5,000, holding Heins to the agreed contractual valuation cap.

In explaining the denial of summary judgment to Heins, the court commented that plaintiff had not demonstrated how a wrongful sale “states a basis for an independent cause of action alleging violation of Lien Law § 182.” As the Appellate Division later explains, that observation was dicta, not an actual dismissal of any part of the claim at that stage.

2. June 7, 2020 Order (Whelan, J.)

Defendants later moved, among other relief, in effect for summary judgment dismissing the portion of the fifth cause of action that alleged a statutory violation based on wrongful sale.

In the June 7, 2020 order, the Supreme Court:

In effect granted summary judgment dismissing the portion of the fifth cause of action alleging a violation of § 182 based on wrongful sale;
But held that plaintiff could proceed under § 182 on a theory of wrongful detention of his property.

Thus, by the time of trial, only:

Unlawful detention, and
Any “other violation” of § 182 (such as defective notice)

remained as potential statutory bases for the fifth cause of action.

F. Trial and CPLR 4401 Motion

The matter proceeded to a jury trial. At the close of the plaintiff’s case, defendants moved under CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law, seeking dismissal of the fifth cause of action.

In a June 23, 2021 order, the Supreme Court granted that branch of the 4401 application, effectively concluding that plaintiff had failed to produce evidence supporting any viable § 182 theory.

A judgment dated June 2, 2022 was then entered in favor of defendants, dismissing the fifth cause of action, among other relief. Heins appealed from:

The June 23, 2021 order (CPLR 4401 ruling); and
The June 2, 2022 judgment (as it incorporated prior orders, including limiting damages to $5,000).

III. Summary of the Opinion

The Second Department, per Justice Wooten, issued a detailed opinion addressing several points:

Law of the Case: The April 28, 2020 order (denying plaintiff’s summary judgment motion on wrongful sale) did not, under the law‑of‑the‑case doctrine, bar plaintiff from advancing a wrongful sale theory at trial. That order did not grant summary judgment to defendants on that theory, and any language questioning the viability of the theory was dicta.
Statutory Interpretation / Viability of Wrongful Sale Claim: The June 7, 2020 order did, in effect, grant summary judgment to defendants on the wrongful sale aspect of the § 182 claim. On appeal, the Court affirmed that determination, holding that:
- Lien Law § 182(7) and (9) create a specific, time‑limited procedure for challenging the validity of a self‑storage lien or the amount claimed, which must be done within 10 days of service of the notice of sale by way of a special proceeding;
- The remedy in such a proceeding is limited to cancellation or reduction of the lien, and, if cancelled, a directive that the occupant is entitled to possession of the property;
- The private right of action for damages under § 182(4)(a) for “unlawful detention of goods or any other violation of this section” does not extend to disputes over the validity of the lien or the amount claimed; and
- A “wrongful sale” claim based on the assertion that “there was no unpaid obligation, lien or other right of enforcement” is, in substance, a direct challenge to the validity of the lien and thus must be pursued exclusively by timely special proceeding, not by plenary damages action.
Scope of “Unlawful Detention” and “Any Other Violation”:
- “Unlawful detention” is narrowly defined in § 182(3) as an owner’s refusal to surrender goods upon payment by the occupant of the occupancy fees permitted by the section.
- A “wrongful sale” is not encompassed by “unlawful detention” because the statutory definition makes no mention of sales.
- The phrase “any other violation of this section” in § 182(4)(a) is interpreted as covering other forms of statutory non‑compliance (e.g., failure to provide a proper written occupancy agreement; failure to give the required statutory notice of sale; improper mailing or content of notice), but not disputes over whether a lien exists or the amount of the lien.
Application of CPLR 4401 Standard: At trial, plaintiff:
- Admitted he was never refused access to his storage space or his goods by defendants; and
- Offered no evidence of any violation of the statutory notice requirements or other specific provisions of § 182.
Accordingly, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Heins, there was no rational basis upon which a jury could find for him on a § 182 claim. Judgment as a matter of law under CPLR 4401 was therefore properly granted.
Appeal from June 23, 2021 Order: The appeal from the 4401 order was dismissed because the order was subsumed in the final judgment under Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241.

The judgment was affirmed insofar as appealed from, and costs were awarded to the defendants.

IV. Statutory Framework: Lien Law § 182 Explained

Understanding the court’s reasoning requires a careful look at the structure of Lien Law § 182 as the opinion lays it out.

A. The Self‑Storage Lien

Under Lien Law § 182(6), the owner of a “self‑storage facility” (defined in § 182(1)(b)) has a lien on all personal property stored there for:

Occupancy fees (rent) and other charges, present or future;
Expenses necessary to preserve the property; and
Expenses reasonably incurred in its sale or other lawful disposition, and other charges under the occupancy agreement.

This provision creates the basic legal device that allows a storage facility to enforce payment by holding and, if necessary, selling the occupant’s goods.

B. Enforcement of the Lien by Sale

Section 182(7)(a) governs enforcement of the lien through sale. It provides that an owner’s lien:

“may be enforced by public or private sale of the . . . goods . . . that remain in the self-storage facility, in block, or in parcel, at any time or place and on any terms which are commercially reasonable after notice to all persons known to claim an interest in the goods.”

The required notice of sale must include (among other things):

An itemized statement of the amount due;
A description of the property subject to the lien;
The nature of the proposed sale;
A demand for payment within a specified time (at least 30 days from mailing);
A conspicuous statement that the goods will be advertised and sold if payment is not made; and
The time and place of the proposed public or private sale.

Critically, the notice must also state that:

“any person claiming an interest in the goods is entitled to bring a proceeding hereunder within ten days of the service of the notice if he [or she] disputes the validity of the lien, or the amount claimed” (emphasis added).

C. The Special Proceeding and Its Limited Remedies

Section 182(9) describes this special proceeding. It may be brought in any court that would have jurisdiction over a claim in the amount of the lien. If the claimant shows that:

The owner is not entitled to claim a lien; or
All or part of the amount claimed is improper or exceeds the fair and reasonable value of services;

then:

“the court shall direct the entry of judgment cancelling the lien or reducing the amount claimed thereunder accordingly,” and, if the lien is cancelled, “the person shall be entitled to possession of the property.”

Note: Section 182(9) does not mention damages. Its focus is on the status and amount of the lien and the right to possession of goods, not on monetary compensation for an already completed sale.

D. Private Right of Action for Unlawful Detention and “Any Other Violation”

Section 182(4)(a) creates a separate “private right of action”:

“Any occupant damaged by an unlawful detention of his [or her] goods or any other violation of this section may bring an action for recovery of damages and the return of his [or her] goods.”

The term “unlawful detention of goods” is defined in § 182(3):

“It shall constitute an unlawful detention of goods for an owner to refuse to surrender goods stored by him [or her] for an occupant upon payment by the occupant of the occupancy fees permitted by this section.”

Thus:

Unlawful detention: A very specific scenario—occupant has paid the amounts properly due, but the owner refuses to surrender the goods.
“Any other violation of this section”: A residuary category covering violations of other requirements of § 182 (e.g., written agreement contents, notice procedures), but, as the court holds, not disputes over lien validity or amount, which the statute addresses elsewhere with a separate procedure and remedy.

V. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning

A. Law of the Case and Dicta

Before addressing the merits, the Second Department considered defendants’ argument that the April 28, 2020 order had settled, as “law of the case,” that a wrongful sale theory was not viable under § 182.

The court rejected that argument, drawing on established law‑of‑the‑case principles:

Vehifax Corp. v Georgilis, 205 AD3d 973, 975; Kaygreen Realty Co., LLC v IG Second Generation Partners, L.P., 116 AD3d 667, 669: law of the case bars relitigation of issues necessarily decided on the merits by a court of coordinate jurisdiction, absent new evidence or change in law.
Matter of Koegel, 184 AD3d 764, 766, affd sub nom. Anderson v Anderson, 37 NY3d 444; Ramanathan v Aharon, 109 AD3d 529, 530: the doctrine applies only to legal determinations actually resolved and to the same question in the same case.
37 E. 50th St. Corp. v Restaurant Group Mgt. Servs., LLC, 195 AD3d 535, 535: an order denying summary judgment does not establish law of the case in favor of the non‑moving party.
Matter of B.Z. Chiropractic, P.C. v Allstate Ins. Co., 197 AD3d 144: dicta in a prior decision has no law‑of‑the‑case effect.

Applying these principles:

The April 28, 2020 order did not grant summary judgment dismissing any portion of the fifth cause of action; it merely denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.
The statement that plaintiff had not shown how wrongful sale states a basis for an independent § 182 cause of action was, therefore, a commentary not necessary to the disposition—i.e., dicta.
Consequently, plaintiff was not precluded from pursuing a wrongful sale theory until the June 7, 2020 order actually dismissed that aspect of the claim.

This set the stage for appellate review of the June 7, 2020 determination on the merits of the wrongful sale theory.

B. Central Holding: No Damages Action Under § 182 for “Wrongful Sale” Based on Lien Invalidity

The heart of the opinion is a straight textual and structural interpretation of Lien Law § 182. The court approaches the statute using standard principles of statutory construction:

Matter of D.L. v S.B., 39 NY3d 81, 87; Majewski v Broadalbin-Perth Cent. School Dist., 91 NY2d 577, 583: courts must seek to effectuate legislative intent, primarily from the statutory text, giving effect to the plain meaning of words.
Kuzmich v 50 Murray St. Acquisition LLC, 34 NY3d 84, 91: absent ambiguity, courts may not resort to interpretive rules to alter a statute’s scope.
Feinman v County of Nassau, 154 AD3d 739, 742; Matter of Universal Metal & Ore, Inc. v Westchester County Solid Waste Commn., 145 AD3d 46, 56: courts must avoid rendering statutory words superfluous; related provisions must be harmonized.

Applying those interpretive tools, the court reasons as follows:

1. The Statute’s Express Scheme for Disputes Over Lien Validity or Amount

Section 182(7)(a) explicitly addresses the scenario where a person claiming an interest in the goods “disputes the validity of the lien, or the amount claimed”. It directs such a person to:

“bring a proceeding hereunder within ten days of the service of the notice.”

Section 182(9) in turn specifies the available relief in that proceeding:

Cancellation of the lien; or
Reduction of the amount claimed under the lien; and
If the lien is cancelled, a directive that the person is entitled to possession of the property.

Notably, this remedial scheme:

Imposes a strict 10‑day time limit for initiating the special proceeding; and
Provides no express right to monetary damages, even if the lien is found invalid or excessive.

2. The Private Right of Action Under § 182(4)(a)

The plaintiff sought to characterize his “wrongful sale” complaint as falling within the private right of action in § 182(4)(a), which allows actions for:

“unlawful detention” of goods; or
“any other violation of this section.”

Plaintiff advanced two lines of argument:

A wrongful sale was akin to, or encompassed by, “unlawful detention”; and/or
It was covered by the catch‑all phrase “any other violation of this section.”

3. Rejection of “Wrongful Sale” as Unlawful Detention

The court quickly disposes of the first argument:

“Unlawful detention” is expressly and narrowly defined in § 182(3) as refusal to surrender goods to an occupant after payment of the occupancy fees permitted by § 182.
That definition does not mention sales and does not include disputes over the existence of a lien.
Therefore, “unlawful detention” cannot be stretched to cover a claim that there was “no unpaid obligation, lien or other right of enforcement.”

4. Interpretation of “Any Other Violation of This Section”

The more substantial question is whether “any other violation of this section” in § 182(4)(a) can be read to cover a “wrongful sale” premised on absence of a valid lien. The court holds it cannot, for several reasons.

(a) Plain Meaning and Examples

The court gives illustrative examples of what “any other violation” reasonably covers:

Failure to provide a written occupancy agreement containing the elements required by § 182(2) (actual monthly charge, itemization of other fees, statement of any limitation of damages, etc.);
Failure to give notice to all persons known to claim an interest in the goods, or failure to properly mail or email the notice as required by § 182(7)(a), (b);
Omission of required notice contents—itemized amount due, description of property, nature of proposed sale, demand for payment within at least 30 days, conspicuous warning of sale, and the time and place of sale.

These examples all involve violations of specific procedural or informational requirements in § 182 that do not depend on contesting whether a lien exists in the first place.

(b) Structural Incompatibility With § 182(7) and (9)

The critical analytical step is harmonizing § 182(4)(a) with § 182(7) and (9). If “any other violation of this section” were interpreted to allow a damages action whenever an occupant claims there was no valid lien (e.g., because there was “no unpaid obligation”), then:

The explicit 10‑day limit for challenging lien validity or amount in § 182(7)(a) would become effectively optional; and
The remedial limitation in § 182(9) (cancellation/reduction of lien plus possession) would be circumvented by suing for damages under § 182(4)(a) at any time.

This would render the specific procedural and remedial provisions of § 182(7) and (9) “meaningless or superfluous,” a result forbidden by interpretive canons, as illustrated by:

Matter of Westchester Joint Water Works v Assessor of the City of Rye, 27 NY3d 566, 575;
JJM Sunrise Auto., LLC v Volkswagen Group of Am., Inc., 149 AD3d 1051, 1053;
Matter of Ebanks v Skyline NYC, LLC, 70 AD3d 943, 945.

(c) Legislative Intent and Expressio Unius

The court further reasons:

The Legislature expressly created a private right of action for damages for an “unlawful detention of goods” and for any “other violation” of § 182, but treated disputes about lien validity and amount separately in § 182(7) and (9), with a different procedure and limited non‑monetary relief.
If the Legislature had intended to authorize a damages cause of action for wrongful sale based on lien invalidity, without any time limit, it “would have said so in the statute”, quoting Colon v Martin, 35 NY3d 75, 82, and Cruz v TD Bank, N.A., 22 NY3d 61, 72.
By expressly providing a damages action in § 182(4)(a) for certain violations, while omitting such a remedy from § 182(7)/(9), the Legislature signaled that lien validity disputes were to be addressed differently.

(d) Application to Heins’s Theory

Heins’s statutory “wrongful sale” theory rested on the allegation that:

“there was no unpaid obligation, lien or other right of enforcement.”

The court characterizes this as a dispute over “the validity of the lien”, squarely within the scope of § 182(7)(a). Because:

Heins did not commence a special proceeding within 10 days of the notice of sale; and
He attempted instead to obtain damages via a plenary action under § 182(4)(a);

the court holds that his statutory wrongful sale theory was not cognizable under § 182, and summary judgment dismissing that aspect of the fifth cause of action was proper.

C. Trial‑Stage Dismissal Under CPLR 4401

Having confirmed that wrongful sale is not a recognized statutory claim under § 182, the court turns to the propriety of the trial‑stage dismissal of the remainder of the fifth cause of action under CPLR 4401.

The standard is drawn from:

Whitehall v Andrade, 231 AD3d 1094, 1095; Stewart v Heralall, 116 AD3d 760, 760: a defendant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law at the close of plaintiff’s case when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, there is no rational basis for a jury to find for plaintiff.
Feteha v Scheinman, 169 AD3d 871, 872: on such a motion, plaintiff’s evidence must be taken as true and accorded every reasonable inference.

At trial, once the wrongful sale theory was already out on summary judgment, plaintiff had to prove:

An unlawful detention of goods as defined in § 182(3) (owner refused to surrender goods upon payment of occupancy fees); or
Some “other violation” of § 182, such as defective notice.

The court notes two key evidentiary gaps:

Plaintiff admitted that he never requested, nor was he refused, access to his storage space or goods by defendants. There was therefore no evidence of any refusal to surrender goods after payment, which is a necessary element of “unlawful detention.”
Plaintiff presented no evidence that defendants violated the content or service requirements of the statutory notice provisions, nor any other specific subsection of § 182.

Because plaintiff failed to produce evidence from which a rational jury could find an “unlawful detention” or “other violation” of § 182, the court held that defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law dismissing the fifth cause of action in its entirety.

D. Dismissal of Appeal From the June 23, 2021 Order

Finally, the court invokes Matter of Aho, 39 NY2d 241, to dismiss the appeal from the June 23, 2021 order:

Under Aho, an appeal from an intermediate order is generally rendered academic once a final judgment is entered, because the right to direct appeal from that interlocutory order terminates.
Any issues arising from that order are instead reviewed on the appeal from the final judgment.

Accordingly, the separate appeal from the June 23, 2021 order was dismissed, and the judgment was affirmed.

VI. Complex Legal Concepts Simplified

A. What Is a “Lien” in the Self‑Storage Context?

A lien is a legal right to hold and, if necessary, sell someone’s property as security for a debt. Under Lien Law § 182, a self‑storage facility automatically acquires a lien on the occupant’s stored property to secure unpaid rent and certain other lawful charges. If the tenant falls behind, the facility can enforce this lien by selling the stored goods, but only after following the detailed notice procedures in § 182.

B. “Special Proceeding” vs. Ordinary Lawsuit

A special proceeding in New York is a streamlined, often faster, court process (usually commenced by petition and order to show cause) designed for certain matters like administrative reviews, landlord‑tenant disputes, and, in this context, challenges to self‑storage liens.

Here, § 182(7) and (9) direct that if someone disputes the existence or amount of a lien, they must bring a special proceeding within 10 days of the notice of sale.
This is different from a regular civil action, which begins with a summons and complaint and can take longer to resolve.

C. “Law of the Case” and “Dicta”

Law of the case is a judicial policy that, in ongoing litigation, a court generally should not revisit legal determinations previously made in the case by a court of coordinate jurisdiction, absent new evidence or legal change. It promotes consistency and efficiency.

Dicta (or “obiter dictum”) is commentary in a judicial opinion that is not necessary to decide the case. Dicta does not have binding effect, even under law‑of‑the‑case principles.

The April 28, 2020 order’s remarks expressing doubt about a wrongful sale theory under § 182 were dicta because that order did not actually grant summary judgment on the claim; thus those remarks had no preclusive effect.

D. “Judgment as a Matter of Law” (CPLR 4401)

Under CPLR 4401, after the opposing party has presented its evidence at trial, a party can move for judgment as a matter of law. The judge must ask:

If we believe all of the opponent’s evidence and give them the benefit of every reasonable inference, could any rational jury find in their favor?

If the answer is “no,” the court can take the decision away from the jury and dismiss the claim. That is what happened here regarding the § 182 claim.

VII. Impact and Significance of the Decision

A. Clarification of Remedies Under Lien Law § 182

Heins v. Public Storage clarifies, as a matter of first‑impression appellate authority, the remedial scheme of § 182:

Disputes over lien validity or amount (“no unpaid obligation, lien or other right of enforcement”) must be asserted through the special proceeding authorized by § 182(7) and (9), within 10 days of notice, and are limited to cancellation/reduction of the lien and a directive on possession.
The private right of action for damages in § 182(4)(a) is limited to:
- Unlawful detention of goods (as narrowly defined); and
- Other statutory violations (e.g., defective written agreements, notice failures, etc.), but not lien validity challenges.
There is no statutory damages cause of action under § 182 for a “wrongful sale” premised on absence of a valid lien or correct amount.

B. Consequences for Occupants (Tenants) of Self‑Storage Units

For occupants, Heins has several practical implications:

Act Quickly: If an occupant receives a notice of sale and believes:
- They are not in arrears;
- The charges are inflated or improper; or
- No lien should exist;
they must file a special proceeding within 10 days. Waiting and later suing for damages under § 182 on a theory of “wrongful sale” is not an available statutory path.
Limited Statutory Damages: Even if an occupant can show the underlying lien was invalid, § 182 does not provide a statutory damages remedy for that issue itself. Statutory damages under § 182 are available only for:
- Unlawful detention after payment; and
- Other discrete statutory violations.
Other Theories May Still Exist (Outside § 182): While the opinion confines itself to § 182, occupants may, in appropriate circumstances, have common‑law claims (conversion, negligence, breach of contract, etc.) or claims under other statutes. But those are separate from the specific statutory remedies under § 182 and may be subject to contractual limitations (such as the $5,000 cap here).

C. Consequences for Self‑Storage Operators

For owners and operators of self‑storage facilities, the decision is significant:

It reduces exposure to open‑ended statutory damages claims under § 182 premised on alleged lien invalidity, especially when occupants have not utilized the 10‑day special‑proceeding mechanism.
At the same time, it underscores the need for strict compliance with the statute’s procedural and notice requirements, because failures there may give rise to valid damages actions under the “other violation” clause of § 182(4)(a).
It highlights the utility of well‑drafted limitation‑of‑liability and valuation clauses in occupancy agreements, which, as in this case, can cap damages (though the appellate opinion does not focus on that aspect as a point of law).

D. Doctrinal Significance Beyond Self‑Storage

The decision is also a model of how New York courts may approach statutes that embed both a private right of action and a distinct, time‑limited, special remedial scheme. The court’s refusal to let one remedy swallow the other may influence interpretation of other statutory frameworks with similar structures.

The key doctrinal message is that courts will respect the structural limits of statutory remedies and are reluctant to imply expansive damages rights where the Legislature has:

Carefully delineated a narrow, time‑sensitive procedure; and
Omitted damages language from that part of the statute.

E. Potential Legislative Response

The decision lays bare that, under current law, an occupant whose goods are sold pursuant to a lien later determined to be invalid may have no damages remedy under § 182 itself, so long as the owner complied with statutory procedures and the occupant failed to bring a timely special proceeding.

If the Legislature concludes that this result is unduly harsh or inequitable from a consumer‑protection perspective, it may consider amending § 182 to:

Extend or modify the 10‑day limitations period; and/or
Explicitly authorize a damages action for wrongful sale predicated on an invalid lien, with appropriate safeguards.

Until such amendments occur, however, Heins stands as binding precedent in the Second Department, and a persuasive authority elsewhere in New York, on the exclusive remedial path for challenging self‑storage liens.

VIII. Conclusion

Heins v. Public Storage is a significant appellate decision that brings much‑needed clarity to New York’s self‑storage lien regime. The Second Department holds that:

Lien Law § 182 does not create a damages cause of action for a “wrongful sale” predicated on the alleged absence of a valid lien;
Challenges to lien validity or amount must be pursued through the special proceeding authorized by § 182(7) and (9), within 10 days of the notice of sale, with remedies limited to cancellation or reduction of the lien and restoration of possession if the lien is cancelled; and
The separate private right of action in § 182(4)(a) is confined to unlawful detention (as narrowly defined) and other procedural or technical violations of the statute, not lien‑validity disputes.

The decision also reaffirms important procedural doctrines—law of the case, the limits of dicta, and the standards for judgment as a matter of law—and illustrates the judiciary’s adherence to textual and structural statutory interpretation.

For practitioners, Heins underscores the importance of:

Immediate action upon receipt of a lien‑sale notice;
Careful reading of the interplay between statutory remedies and private contractual limitations; and
Precise pleading that distinguishes between statutory claims under § 182 and separate common‑law or contractual causes of action.

In the broader legal context, the case exemplifies a judicial approach that respects legislative design and resists expanding statutory remedies beyond what the text and structure support. It will likely guide both self‑storage operators and occupants—and their counsel—in shaping their contractual practices, litigation strategies, and expectations about the scope of protection afforded by New York’s Lien Law § 182.