Georgia Supreme Court Bars Use of Arrest Warrants and Indictments for Impeachment Under OCGA § 24-6-609; Ineffective-Assistance Claims Fail Absent Prejudice

Introduction

In Copney v. State, S25A0877 (Ga. Oct. 15, 2025), the Supreme Court of Georgia affirmed the malice murder and related convictions of Leroy Starr Copney, Jr., arising from a fatal shooting at a Chamblee gas station in December 2016. The appeal centered exclusively on claims of ineffective assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, challenging trial counsel’s failure to object to: (1) the admission and impeachment use of older convictions under Georgia’s Rule 609; (2) the State’s use of an out-of-state arrest warrant that erroneously suggested a prior murder conviction; (3) prosecutorial questioning alluding to violent prison conduct; and (4) the trial court’s pattern instruction on the Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act. A cumulative-error claim rounded out the appeal.

The Court’s most significant doctrinal contribution is a clear, categorical holding on Georgia’s impeachment rule: OCGA § 24‑6‑609 permits impeachment with convictions, not accusations. The Court expressly held that arrest warrants and indictments are not admissible for impeachment under Rule 609. Although the Court found trial counsel deficient for not objecting to an arrest warrant containing erroneous “prior murder” language, it concluded there was no Strickland prejudice given the strength of the State’s case, limiting instructions, sustained objections in closing, and other properly admitted impeachment evidence.

Summary of the Opinion

Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Land affirmed the convictions. The Court:

• Reiterated the demanding Strickland standard and the strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance.
• Held that counsel was not deficient for failing to object to certain older convictions where strategic reasons were plausible or the evidence was admitted for a non-Rule 609 purpose (proving felon-in-possession status).
• Announced an important evidence rule: arrest warrants and indictments are inadmissible for impeachment under OCGA § 24‑6‑609, and found counsel deficient for not objecting to such an exhibit; but found no prejudice.
• Concluded there was no prejudice from counsel’s failure to seek a rebuke/curative instruction under OCGA § 17‑8‑75 after the prosecutor’s improper question referencing a violent jail altercation, where objections were sustained and the defendant did not answer.
• Rejected the ineffective assistance challenge to the pattern jury instruction on gang activity, noting counsel need not anticipate changes to the law and that this Court had already upheld the instruction against a “mandatory presumption” attack.
• Found no cumulative prejudice.

Key Holdings at a Glance

• OCGA § 24‑6‑609 permits impeachment by convictions only; arrest warrants and indictments are not admissible to impeach any witness. This aligns Georgia practice with persuasive federal precedent interpreting FRE 609.
• Failure to object to an inadmissible arrest warrant used to impeach was deficient, but not prejudicial on this record.
• Strategic reasons can justify not objecting to older convictions under § 24‑6‑609(b), especially where the State has other, similar admissible convictions and the defense may choose controlled disclosure to bolster credibility.
• Pattern Street Gang Act instruction (including “sort of crime the gang does” language) did not render counsel ineffective for failing to object; counsel need not anticipate doctrinal shifts. The Court has granted certiorari in another case (Lee v. State) to consider that phrasing further but has already rejected arguments that it creates a mandatory presumption (Jackson v. State, 2025).
• No cumulative error where the evidence of guilt was overwhelming.

Factual and Procedural Background

The State’s evidence showed a brief confrontation inside a gas station between appellant and the victim, Andrew Spencer. After both parties left the store, appellant confronted Spencer and his companion, Quintin Heard, used aggressive language, and then maneuvered to intercept them as they walked to their car. Surveillance footage captured appellant circling a pump, drawing a handgun, and firing six shots. Spencer died from a single chest wound. Five .45 caliber casings were recovered; the bullet in Spencer’s body matched that caliber, and the casings were consistent with a single weapon. Appellant fled to South Carolina after the incident. A gang expert linked appellant to the Bloods and testified that perceived disrespect can trigger violent responses and increase status.

Appellant testified, admitting the shooting but asserting self-defense; he claimed to have seen a gun on Heard (contradicted by contemporaneous video), and described an escalating threat. The jury convicted him of malice murder and related offenses, and the court imposed life without parole plus consecutive sentences on other counts. On appeal, appellant pursued ineffective assistance claims; the court affirmed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Strickland v. Washington (U.S. 1984): Two-prong test (deficient performance and prejudice); strong presumption of reasonable professional assistance; “reasonable probability” standard for prejudice.
• Harrington v. Richter (U.S. 2011): “Most deferential” standard; high bar for showing prejudice; avoid hindsight bias.
• Wells v. State (Ga. 2014); Pierce v. State (Ga. 2024): Counsel’s choices presumed strategic; ineffectiveness lies only where no competent attorney would so act.
• Vivian v. State (Ga. 2021); Rashad v. State (Ga. 2024): Absent evidence of non-strategic reasons, failures to object may be reasonable; not objecting to cumulative or passing bad-character evidence can be strategic.
• OCGA § 24‑6‑609(a)(1) and (b): Impeachment by conviction; 10-year time limit and heightened balancing/notice for stale convictions.
• Sinkfield v. State (Ga. 2024): Under Rule 609, only the fact, nature, and punishment of convictions are generally admissible; specific facts/circumstances generally are not.
• State v. Almanza (Ga. 2018): Georgia courts look to federal interpretations where Georgia’s Evidence Code mirrors federal rules.
• Persuasive federal authorities on FRE 609: United States v. Wilson (10th Cir. 2001); Medrano v. City of Los Angeles (9th Cir. 1992); American Environmental Enterprises v. Health Environmental Loss Prevention (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Eubanks (11th Cir. 1989); United States v. McBride (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hodnett (5th Cir. 1976) — all rejecting impeachment via arrests/indictments.
• OCGA § 17‑8‑75: Duty of the court to rebuke counsel and instruct the jury upon prejudicial statements not in evidence.
• Georgia Street Gang Terrorism and Prevention Act: OCGA § 16‑15‑4(a) and § 16‑15‑3; Rodriguez v. State (Ga. 2009) on the “nexus” requirement (“through”).
• Dixon v. State (Ga. 2020): Upheld the pattern gang instruction as a correct statement of law at that time.
• Jackson v. State (Ga. 2025): Pattern instruction’s “sort of crime” language does not create a mandatory presumption.
• Esprit v. State (Ga. 2019); Griffin v. State (Ga. 2020); Rhoden v. State (Ga. 2018): Counsel not required to anticipate changes in law or press novel legal theories.
• Jennings v. State (Ga. 2024); Troutman v. State (Ga. 2024): Strong evidence of guilt can defeat Strickland prejudice even where deficiencies are assumed.
• Schofield v. Holsey (Ga. 2007), as limited by State v. Lane (Ga. 2020): Cumulative-error analysis under Strickland.

Division-by-Division Reasoning

(a) Older convictions and Rule 609(b)

Appellant argued counsel should have objected to several pre-2000 convictions under OCGA § 24‑6‑609(b), which bars use of convictions older than 10 years (from conviction or release) unless their probative value, supported by specific facts and circumstances, substantially outweighs prejudice and advance notice is given. The Court held:

• A 2006 forgery conviction (State’s Ex. 99) was properly admitted during the State’s case-in-chief to prove an essential element of the felon-in-possession count, not for impeachment; Rule 609 did not apply.
• As to older New York convictions admitted during cross-examination, counsel’s failure to object was not shown to be deficient. Under Vivian and Pierce, absent testimony showing a non-strategic reason, counsel’s choices are presumed strategic. The Court posited reasonable strategies: allowing controlled disclosure to bolster appellant’s credibility by candidly admitting past crimes while denying the present charges; and avoiding highlighting older, similar convictions given the presence of newer, admissible convictions (Rashad).

Result: No deficiency established; no need to reach prejudice.

(b) Arrest warrant and indictment used as impeachment

During cross, the State introduced State’s Exhibit 104: a North Carolina arrest warrant (2010) and indictment (2011) for possession of a firearm by a felon. The warrant recited that appellant had previously been convicted of “MURDER: DEPRAVED INDIFFERENCE” in New York — a statement unsupported by the record and apparently conflating dates associated with appellant’s New York weapons offense. The State had appellant read the warrant aloud; appellant vehemently denied any murder conviction. The Court held:

• Clear evidentiary rule: “OCGA § 24‑6‑609(a)(1) does not permit the impeachment of witnesses, including a defendant, through evidence of arrest warrants or indictments.” The Court aligned Georgia’s rule with persuasive federal authority interpreting FRE 609.
• Counsel’s failure to object to Exhibit 104 as inadmissible for impeachment, and to the erroneous “prior murder” recitation, was “patently unreasonable” and therefore deficient under Strickland.
• No Strickland prejudice: The indictment within Exhibit 104 identified the prior felony as forgery (not murder), and Exhibit 105 showed the resulting conviction for felon-in-possession and aggravated assault — again without any murder. Appellant denied a prior murder conviction on the stand; defense counsel highlighted in closing that the State had no certified murder conviction; the trial court sustained defense objections when the State referenced a supposed prior murder in closing; and the jury received limiting instructions restricting prior-conviction use to credibility or the felon-in-possession element. The State’s case was independently strong: surveillance video contradicted the self-defense narrative; gang evidence supplied motive; appellant fled; and multiple properly admitted convictions undermined credibility.

Result: Deficiency shown; prejudice not shown.

(c) Prosecutorial misconduct and OCGA § 17‑8‑75

The prosecutor asked appellant about facial scars and whether he “slashed” correctional officers at Rikers with a razor blade. Defense objections were sustained before appellant answered. On appeal, appellant argued that counsel was ineffective for not invoking OCGA § 17‑8‑75 to seek a rebuke and curative instruction. The Court held:

• Even if counsel could have sought a rebuke/curative instruction, appellant failed to show prejudice. The objections were sustained; no answer was given; and the evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Under Jackson (2023) and Strickland, the absence of a rebuke or instruction does not undermine confidence in the outcome.

(d) Pattern gang instruction and the “sort of crime the gang does” language

The trial court gave the Georgia pattern charge for OCGA § 16‑15‑4(a), including the line that the nexus element means “proof that the crime committed was the sort of crime that the gang does.” Appellant argued counsel should have objected because this language purportedly created (1) a non-statutory, alternative path to liability or (2) an unconstitutional presumption. The Court held:

• No deficiency. Counsel requested the pattern charge; at the time of trial, no precedent held the language improper. Counsel is not ineffective for failing to press novel arguments or anticipate legal developments (Esprit; Griffin; Rhoden).
• The Court has granted certiorari in Lee v. State to consider whether proving that a crime is of the “sort” a gang commits suffices to show the requisite nexus. But counsel’s failure to object here was not deficient for that reason.
• The presumption argument is foreclosed by Jackson (2025), which held the pattern language does not create a mandatory presumption or shift the burden; rather, it explains “furthering the interests of the gang.”

(e) Cumulative prejudice

Considering the deficient failure to object to the arrest warrant together with the failure to seek a rebuke/curative instruction, the Court found no reasonable probability of a different outcome, given the overall strength of the evidence and corrective measures taken at trial. No new trial was warranted under cumulative-error principles.

Legal Reasoning: Themes and Takeaways

• The Strickland framework remains highly deferential. The Court explicitly warns against hindsight bias and emphasizes that many reasonable trial strategies can exist; counsel’s silence or choices are presumed strategic unless the record shows otherwise.
• Evidence law matters to Strickland deficiency. Where the evidence rule is clear (e.g., Rule 609 bars impeachment via accusations), failure to object can be “patently unreasonable.” Conversely, where the law is unsettled or strategic considerations abound (e.g., old convictions, pattern charges awaiting further clarification), deficiency is far harder to show.
• Prejudice remains the fulcrum. Even when deficiency is found, the Court will examine the full trial context — other evidence, limiting instructions, corrective rulings, and the centrality of the disputed evidence — before concluding that confidence in the verdict is undermined.

Impact on Georgia Law and Practice

1) Evidentiary rule clarified — OCGA § 24‑6‑609

The Court squarely held that arrest warrants and indictments are inadmissible to impeach witnesses under Rule 609. This firm alignment with federal practice reduces uncertainty and provides a bright-line rule for trial courts and practitioners:

• Prosecutors: Do not elicit or introduce arrests, charges, indictments, or warrant narratives for impeachment. Limit impeachment to convictions, and generally to their fact, nature, and punishment (Sinkfield), subject to Rule 403/609 balancing.
• Defense counsel: Object immediately to any impeachment attempt using non-conviction materials, and scrutinize exhibits for erroneous “prior record” content. Request redactions and limiting instructions where warranted.
• Trial judges: Exclude impeachment by accusation; sustain objections and consider curative instructions if the jury hears improper references.

2) Using older convictions under § 24‑6‑609(b)

Although the Court did not decide a 609(b) issue on the merits, its analysis underscores two practice points:

• Strategic disclosure is a legitimate defense approach where old convictions are cumulative of admissible newer convictions; counsel may prefer to “own” the record rather than highlight older similar misconduct.
• Where the State seeks to use >10-year-old convictions, it must satisfy the heightened test: specific facts supporting probative value that substantially outweighs prejudice and advance written notice. Defense counsel should be prepared to object and demand on-the-record balancing.

3) Street Gang Act instructions

The pattern charge, including the “sort of crime the gang does” phrasing, remains viable post-Jackson (2025) against mandatory-presumption challenges. The Court’s note that certiorari has been granted in Lee signals possible refinement of the nexus element’s articulation. For now:

• Prosecutors: Ensure the evidence demonstrates a nexus between the predicate offense and the furtherance of gang interests; avoid relying solely on “type of crime” arguments.
• Defense: Consider requesting clarifying language emphasizing the statutory “through” nexus (Rodriguez) and objecting if the State attempts to substitute “type of crime” for intent to further gang interests.

4) Prosecutorial questioning and curative measures

The Court did not condone the prosecutor’s insinuations about violent prison behavior, but it found no prejudice where the objection was sustained and no answer given. Still, OCGA § 17‑8‑75 is a tool:

• Defense counsel should consider, in real time, whether to request a rebuke and curative instruction to neutralize improper insinuations that reach the jury.
• Failure to do so may not be prejudicial in a strong-evidence case, but curative measures remain critical in closer cases.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Strickland deficiency: Lawyer performance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness — i.e., no competent attorney would do (or fail to do) what was done in the circumstances.
• Strickland prejudice: A reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, the result would have been different; not a mere possibility, but sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.
• Rule 609 impeachment (OCGA § 24‑6‑609): Allows attacking a testifying defendant’s credibility with prior convictions. It does not allow impeachment with arrests, charges, warrants, or indictments. For convictions older than 10 years, a heightened standard and advance notice apply.
• Limiting instruction: A directive from the judge telling the jury to consider evidence only for a specific purpose (e.g., credibility) and not as substantive proof of guilt on the current charges.
• OCGA § 17‑8‑75: If counsel states prejudicial matters not in evidence in front of the jury, the court must, upon objection, rebuke the offender and instruct the jury to disregard, or consider a mistrial.
• Street Gang Act nexus: Under OCGA § 16‑15‑4(a), the State must prove the defendant, while associated with a criminal street gang, participated in criminal gang activity “through” the commission of an enumerated offense — meaning a link between the act and the intent to further gang activity.
• “Depraved indifference murder”: A New York offense terminology. Here, the warrant’s reference to a New York “murder: depraved indifference” conviction was erroneous; no certified murder conviction existed in the record.
• Alford plea: A guilty plea in which the defendant maintains innocence but concedes the State can prove its case (North Carolina v. Alford).

Practical Guidance for Practitioners

• Scrutinize every document the State proposes to use for impeachment. Arrest warrants and indictments are out under § 24‑6‑609; move to exclude or redact; request limiting instructions for any permissible conviction evidence.
• When the prosecution references prejudicial facts not in evidence, object and consider invoking OCGA § 17‑8‑75 to seek a rebuke and curative instruction immediately.
• Carefully manage older convictions. Evaluate whether objecting under § 24‑6‑609(b) is worth the risk of highlighting them if similar, more recent convictions are admissible anyway.
• On gang charges, request instructions that emphasize the statutory “through” nexus and specific intent to further gang interests; preserve objections tailored to your theory in case Lee alters the landscape.

Conclusion

Copney v. State delivers a clear and authoritative rule on impeachment in Georgia: OCGA § 24‑6‑609 allows impeachment by convictions, not by accusations. Arrest warrants and indictments are inadmissible for impeachment of any witness. While the Court held defense counsel was deficient in failing to object to a warrant that erroneously recited a prior murder conviction, that error did not produce Strickland prejudice in light of robust corrective measures and overwhelming evidence of guilt, including video contradicting the self-defense claim, gang-motive testimony, flight, and multiple admissible convictions undermining credibility.

The decision also underscores enduring Strickland principles: deference to strategic choices, no duty to foresee changes in the law, and the centrality of prejudice. On gang prosecutions, the Court leaves the pattern instruction intact pending further review in Lee and reaffirms that the “sort of crime” language does not create a mandatory presumption (Jackson 2025). For trial practice in Georgia, Copney’s most immediate and durable effect is evidentiary: impeachment is limited to convictions, and attempts to impeach with accusations should draw swift objections and exclusion. All Justices concurred in affirmance.