Exhaustion Under IDEA as a Nonjurisdictional Rule and the “Policy-or-Practice” Exception: Commentary on J.M. v. New York City Department of Education

I. Introduction

In J.M. v. New York City Department of Education, No. 25‑1046 (2d Cir. Dec. 9, 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit addressed a recurring and often contentious issue under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”): when can parents bypass the IDEA’s administrative hearing procedures and go straight to federal court?

The plaintiffs are parents of students with disabilities who were denied special education services by the New York City Department of Education (“NYC DOE”) after the school year in which the students turned 21. Relying on the Second Circuit’s earlier decision in A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 5 F.4th 155 (2d Cir. 2021), they alleged that the DOE’s policy of cutting off services before a student’s 22nd birthday violates the IDEA. They brought a putative class action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as compensatory education and other remedies.

The district court dismissed the case for “lack of subject-matter jurisdiction” on the ground that the parents had not exhausted the IDEA’s administrative remedies. The Second Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Robinson and joined by Judges Cabranes and Chin, vacated and remanded. The court held two important things:

1. The IDEA’s exhaustion requirement is a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, not a jurisdictional bar.
2. Plaintiffs’ challenge falls within a well-recognized but previously underdeveloped exception to exhaustion: the “policy or practice of general applicability that is contrary to law” exception.

In doing so, the Second Circuit clarified both the nature of IDEA exhaustion and the scope of the “policy-or-practice” futility exception, thereby significantly shaping IDEA litigation in the Circuit and beyond.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual and Regulatory Background

Under the IDEA, states that accept federal special education funds must ensure a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) is available to “all children with disabilities … between the ages of 3 and 21, inclusive,” 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(1)(A), with the upper age limit often turning on how a state structures its public education offerings, including adult education.

In A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education, the Second Circuit held that if a state provides publicly funded adult education programs to nondisabled students beyond age 21 that qualify as “public education” (in the sense of being publicly funded, state supervised, and aimed at secondary-level proficiency), then the IDEA requires that state to make FAPE available to students with disabilities until their 22nd birthday. The court held Connecticut’s age‑21 cutoff unlawful under that reasoning.

In July 2023, in direct response to A.R., the New York State Education Department (“NYSED”) issued a formal opinion concluding that A.R. applies to New York as well: because New York, like Connecticut, offers publicly funded adult education programs to nondisabled adults between 21 and 22, districts must provide FAPE to disabled students until age 22.

NYC DOE did not immediately implement this understanding. Plaintiffs allege that the DOE adhered to New York state and city rules that effectively cut off FAPE at the end of the school year in which a student with disabilities turned 21 (or upon receipt of a diploma), despite the availability of adult education programs for nondisabled peers.

In November 2023, several parents filed this putative class action in the Southern District of New York. They claimed DOE’s blanket cessation of services after the 21st school year violates the IDEA and sought:

• declaratory relief that the policy is unlawful;
• injunctive relief requiring DOE to provide FAPE until age 22;
• compensatory education for services denied; and
• other equitable and related relief.

While this litigation was pending, DOE adopted (and later extended) a temporary policy for the 2024–2025 and 2025–2026 school years extending FAPE eligibility until the end of the school year in which students with disabilities turn 22. DOE characterized this as an interim measure while related state‑court challenges to NYSED’s opinion proceeded. Crucially, that temporary policy did not benefit the plaintiffs here, who were already over 22.

Meanwhile, New York intermediate appellate courts (the Appellate Division, Third Department) held that districts must provide FAPE until age 22, in line with A.R.:

• Mahopac Central School District v. New York State Education Department, 240 N.Y.S.3d 534 (3d Dep’t 2025);
• Katonah–Lewisboro Union Free School District v. New York State Education Department, 239 N.Y.S.3d 336 (3d Dep’t 2025).

Requests for leave to appeal to the New York Court of Appeals were pending at the time of the Second Circuit’s decision.

B. Procedural History and Issues on Appeal

DOE moved to dismiss, arguing that plaintiffs failed to exhaust the IDEA’s administrative process (due process hearings before an impartial hearing officer and appeals to a state review officer) and that such failure deprived the district court of subject‑matter jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs conceded they had not exhausted but argued exhaustion was excused because:

1. it would be futile or inadequate (because hearing officers could not provide the system‑wide declaratory and injunctive relief sought); and
2. they were challenging a blanket policy or practice of general applicability that is contrary to law, one of the recognized exceptions to IDEA exhaustion.

The district court agreed with DOE that exhaustion was required and dismissed “for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.” Plaintiffs appealed.

C. Holdings

The Second Circuit made two critical holdings:

1. IDEA exhaustion is nonjurisdictional. Consistent with the Supreme Court’s approach in Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023), the court held that the IDEA’s exhaustion provisions are claim‑processing rules, not limits on federal courts’ subject‑matter jurisdiction. The IDEA contains no “unmistakable evidence” that Congress intended exhaustion to be jurisdictional.
2. Exhaustion is excused under the “policy-or-practice” exception. Plaintiffs sufficiently alleged that DOE maintained a blanket, city‑wide policy of denying FAPE after the school year in which students turn 21, and that such policy is contrary to the IDEA in light of A.R. and the statutory framework. Because this challenge raises pure questions of law, requires no individualized factual record, and would be inefficient to channel through hundreds of due process hearings, the court held that exhaustion would be futile and is not required.

The court therefore:

• vacated the district court’s dismissal; and
• remanded for further proceedings on the merits of plaintiffs’ claims.

The court deliberately did not decide whether DOE’s policy in fact violates the IDEA; it only resolved the exhaustion question and the nature of the exhaustion requirement.

III. Detailed Analysis

I. Statutory and Doctrinal Background

A. The IDEA Framework

The IDEA is a cooperative federal–state spending program. In exchange for federal funds, states must adopt policies and procedures to ensure that all eligible children with disabilities receive a “free appropriate public education” (“FAPE”) tailored to their unique needs through an individualized education program (“IEP”). See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1412(a)(1), 1414.

FAPE under the IDEA has two core components:

• it must be provided at public expense and under public supervision; and
• it must be appropriately designed to allow the child to make meaningful educational progress toward grade‑level or alternate achievement standards.

To enforce these rights, IDEA establishes:

• a procedural regime of evaluations, eligibility determinations, and IEP meetings;
• parental rights to participate and to be notified of decisions; and
• an administrative dispute-resolution system: due process hearings before an impartial hearing officer, followed by appeals to a state review officer. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(b), (f), (g).

Only after this two‑tiered administrative process is typically exhausted may “aggrieved” parties bring civil actions in state or federal court. Id. § 1415(i)(2).

B. Purposes of the Exhaustion Requirement

Second Circuit precedent has long emphasized three functional purposes of exhaustion under the IDEA:

1. Fact development: creating a detailed record concerning the child’s needs and the appropriateness of the educational program.
2. Use of agency expertise: allowing educators and specialized administrative officers to address technical educational issues first.
3. Efficiency and self-correction: giving school systems the opportunity to identify and fix errors without federal litigation, improving judicial efficiency.

These purposes are repeatedly cited in cases such as J.S. ex rel. N.S. v. Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d 107, 112–13 (2d Cir. 2004), and Polera v. Board of Education, 288 F.3d 478, 487 (2d Cir. 2002).

Nonetheless, the court has also consistently recognized that exhaustion is not absolute; it may be excused in specific circumstances, including where it would be futile, inadequate, or where the agency has adopted an unlawful policy of general applicability. Weixel v. Board of Education, 287 F.3d 138, 149 (2d Cir. 2002); Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987).

II. Precedents and Authorities Shaping the Decision

A. Second Circuit Precedent on Age Eligibility: A.R. v. Connecticut

Although J.M. is formally about exhaustion, the substantive backdrop is the Second Circuit’s 2021 decision in A.R. v. Connecticut State Board of Education, 5 F.4th 155 (2d Cir. 2021). In A.R., the court considered whether Connecticut could terminate special education eligibility at age 21 when it simultaneously offered publicly funded adult education programs to nondisabled adults ages 21–22.

The court held:

• “Public education” for IDEA purposes includes publicly funded, state-supervised programs designed to bring students up to the level associated with completion of secondary education—even if labeled “adult education.”
• Because Connecticut offered such adult education programs to nondisabled peers, the IDEA required FAPE for students with disabilities until their 22nd birthday, not merely until age 21 or high school graduation.

This reasoning directly informs the plaintiffs’ claim in J.M.: New York, like Connecticut, operates adult education programs for nondisabled students aged 21–22 and therefore must likewise extend FAPE eligibility to age 22 under the IDEA.

B. Earlier Second Circuit Exhaustion and Exception Cases

The J.M. opinion is deeply grounded in earlier Second Circuit cases on IDEA exhaustion and its exceptions:

• Mrs. W. v. Tirozzi, 832 F.2d 748 (2d Cir. 1987).
  This decision first articulated several exceptions to exhaustion, drawing on the legislative history of the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986. It recognized that exhaustion is not required when:

  • it would be futile;
  • the agency has adopted a policy or practice of general applicability that is contrary to law;
  • it is improbable that adequate relief can be obtained through administrative remedies; or
  • parents were not properly notified of available remedies.

• Weixel v. Board of Education, 287 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2002).
  Weixel reaffirmed these exceptions and quoted them in essentially the same terms as Tirozzi, including the policy-or-practice exception, though the court did not fully explore its contours.

• J.S. v. Attica Central Schools, 386 F.3d 107 (2d Cir. 2004).
  This case emphasized that in assessing whether exhaustion is excused, courts must ask whether administrative review would actually serve the core purposes of exhaustion—fact development, use of expertise, and efficiency.

• Polera v. Board of Education, 288 F.3d 478 (2d Cir. 2002).
  Polera articulated exhaustion as a “bedrock” requirement but acknowledged the exceptions. Its broader rule about needing to exhaust IDEA remedies even when seeking non-IDEA relief has since been limited by the Supreme Court in Luna Perez v. Sturgis Public Schools, 598 U.S. 142 (2023), which narrowed when IDEA exhaustion is required for other statutes—but that aspect is only tangential here.

• Ventura de Paulino v. New York City Department of Education, 959 F.3d 519 (2d Cir. 2020).
  In a footnote, the court acknowledged but did not resolve whether IDEA exhaustion is jurisdictional. That open question is answered in J.M..

C. Supreme Court Authority: Smith v. Robinson, the 1986 Amendments, and Santos‑Zacaria

The policy-or-practice exception traces back to Congress’s response to Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992 (1984). Smith held that where the EHA (the predecessor to IDEA) applied, it was the exclusive avenue for claims to a FAPE, displacing other causes of action like § 504 and § 1983 and thereby limiting attorney’s fees.

Congress reacted by passing the Handicapped Children’s Protection Act of 1986, which:

• re‑affirmed that other federal remedies (e.g., under § 504, the Constitution) remain available; but
• required exhaustion of the EHA/IDEA process for suits “seeking relief that is also available” under the statute.

The accompanying House Report, H.R. Rep. No. 99‑296 (1985), explicitly listed exceptions to this exhaustion requirement—including where:

• exhaustion would be futile;
• an agency has adopted a policy or practice of general applicability contrary to law;
• it is improbable that adequate relief could be obtained administratively; and
• emergency circumstances exist.

Tirozzi and subsequent Second Circuit cases have drawn directly from that list. J.M. again invokes this legislative history to reaffirm the policy-or-practice exception and to refute DOE’s attempt to limit it to purely “structural” or “procedural” policy challenges.

On the jurisdictional question, the Second Circuit relies on the Supreme Court’s modern doctrinal framework in Santos‑Zacaria v. Garland, 598 U.S. 411 (2023). There, the Court explained that exhaustion requirements are ordinarily nonjurisdictional claim‑processing rules absent “unmistakable evidence” of congressional intent to the contrary. Because the IDEA lacks such language, and because treating exhaustion as jurisdictional would often undermine the doctrine’s efficiency purpose, the Second Circuit holds that IDEA exhaustion is not jurisdictional.

D. Sister-Circuit Case Law on the Policy-or-Practice Exception

The court canvasses decisions from other circuits that explicitly grappled with the “policy or practice” exception:

• Tenth Circuit: Association for Community Living in Colorado v. Romer, 992 F.2d 1040 (10th Cir. 1993).
  Parents challenged Colorado’s policies on extended school day and extended school year services as systematically denying FAPE. The Tenth Circuit concluded that:

  • To invoke the policy-or-practice exception, a plaintiff must show the policy is “contrary to law” and that the purposes of exhaustion (fact development, expertise, efficiency) would not be served.
  • If resolving the challenge requires “factually intensive” inquiries into individual students’ circumstances, exhaustion is not excused.

• Ninth Circuit: Hoeft v. Tucson Unified School District, 967 F.2d 1298 (9th Cir. 1992).
  Parents alleged that district policies on extended school year services systematically denied appropriate individualized education. The Ninth Circuit drew an important distinction:

  • Challenges to the methodology and criteria used to grant services (which required educational expertise and factual development) required exhaustion.
  • But challenges to blanket policies—such as giving the same amount of extended year services to all eligible students regardless of need, or defective form notices—could be “purely legal” and fit within the policy-or-practice exception.

  Even then, the Ninth Circuit asked whether enforcing exhaustion would still promote system‑wide self‑correction.

• Additional Ninth and Tenth Circuit refinements.
  Later cases—such as McQueen v. Colorado Springs School District No. 11, 488 F.3d 868 (10th Cir. 2007), and Student A v. San Francisco Unified School District, 9 F.4th 1079 (9th Cir. 2021)—emphasize that:

  • the policy-or-practice exception is most appropriate when only questions of law are in dispute, not fact-rich individualized educational questions; and
  • plaintiffs must identify a specific policy or practice, not just poor outcomes or general dissatisfaction.

The Second Circuit’s approach in J.M. is consistent with, and explicitly informed by, this line of authority.

III. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. IDEA Exhaustion as a Nonjurisdictional Claim-Processing Rule

The court begins by correcting a threshold doctrinal point: the district court characterized IDEA exhaustion as a limit on subject-matter jurisdiction and dismissed under that rubric. The Second Circuit holds this is incorrect.

Drawing on Santos‑Zacaria, the court notes:

• Exhaustion provisions are “quintessential claim-processing rules” and are “typically nonjurisdictional.”
• To treat them as jurisdictional, there must be “unmistakable evidence” in the statutory text—language on par with explicit references to the court’s power to hear a class of cases.
• The IDEA’s exhaustion provisions, codified mainly in 20 U.S.C. § 1415, do not contain such language. They set out procedural prerequisites to suit but do not cabin the subject‑matter jurisdiction of federal courts (which is conferred by 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and related provisions).

The court therefore joins multiple other circuits (4th, 7th, 9th, 11th) in holding that IDEA exhaustion is nonjurisdictional:

• K.I. v. Durham Public Schools Board of Education, 54 F.4th 779 (4th Cir. 2022);
• Payne v. Peninsula School District, 653 F.3d 863 (9th Cir. 2011);
• Mosely v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 434 F.3d 527 (7th Cir. 2006);
• N.B. v. Alachua County School Board, 84 F.3d 1376 (11th Cir. 1996).

Consequences of this characterization include:

• Failure to exhaust is properly analyzed under Rule 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim) or on summary judgment, not under Rule 12(b)(1) (jurisdictional dismissal).
• Defendants can waive or forfeit exhaustion objections if not timely or properly raised.
• Courts have greater flexibility to entertain equitable exceptions without being constrained by rigid jurisdictional doctrines.

In J.M., the court accordingly applies the de novo standard for a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, assuming the complaint’s factual allegations are true and drawing all reasonable inferences in plaintiffs’ favor.

B. Framing the Policy-or-Practice Exception

After reaffirming that exhaustion is a requirement in the “normal course,” the court turns to whether this case fits within the “policy or practice” exception. It explicitly sets out the governing test by synthesizing domestic precedent and sister-circuit approaches.

To invoke the policy-or-practice exception, plaintiffs must:

1. Identify a specific policy or practice of broad applicability adopted or applied by the educational agency.
2. Allege that this policy or practice is contrary to law—i.e., facially inconsistent with the IDEA or other applicable federal law.

But satisfying these two elements alone is not sufficient. The decisive inquiry is whether, in the particular case, enforcing exhaustion would serve or disserve the basic purposes of the exhaustion doctrine. The court identifies several nonexclusive considerations:

• Pure question of law.
  Does the challenge raise a purely legal question that does not require, or would not significantly benefit from, fact‑specific inquiry into individual students’ circumstances?
• Technical educational policy.
  Does the challenge instead implicate “technical questions of educational policy” that would benefit from agency expertise and a detailed administrative record? If so, exhaustion is less likely to be excused.
• Efficiency.
  Would requiring numerous individual hearings be inefficient or duplicative relative to directly resolving a recurring legal question in a single judicial proceeding? Or, conversely, would administrative remedies offer a meaningful path to systemic self‑correction?

This analysis aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s focus on factual intensity and the Ninth Circuit’s distinction between:

• policy disputes that are essentially legal (e.g., whether a blanket rule is facially inconsistent with the IDEA); and
• disputes that require child‑specific or pedagogical analysis (e.g., whether a given amount of services is educationally sufficient).

The court also underscores that the policy-or-practice exception is distinct from other recognized exceptions (e.g., futility in the sense that hearing officers lack authority to grant the relief sought, or emergency circumstances). It is not subsumed into them; reading it that way would render it redundant, contrary to Congress’s disjunctive listing in the legislative history.

C. Applying the Exception to NYC DOE’s Age-21 Cutoff Policy

Turning to the complaint, the court identifies what plaintiffs have alleged:

• Their children with disabilities were 21, had not graduated with a regular high school diploma, and—under the logic of A.R. and NYSED’s 2023 guidance— remained entitled to FAPE until age 22.
• Nonetheless, DOE denied them FAPE after the end of the school year or summer session in which they turned 21.
• DOE followed state and city provisions that purported to limit FAPE to the end of the school year in which a student turns 21 (or upon diploma), even though New York simultaneously offers publicly funded adult education for nondisabled adults in the 21–22 age range.
• DOE maintained a city-wide policy, procedure, or practice of discontinuing services before the student’s 22nd birthday, rather than making individualized determinations.

The court accepts these allegations as true at the pleading stage and analyzes them under the newly clarified policy-or-practice framework.

First, the plaintiffs have clearly identified a specific policy or practice of general applicability: an across‑the‑board rule that FAPE ends at the conclusion of the school year in which a student turns 21, regardless of individualized need or the existence of adult education programs.

Second, whether this policy is contrary to law is essentially a binary legal question: given the structure of New York’s adult education system and the Second Circuit’s reasoning in A.R., does the IDEA require FAPE until age 22? Plaintiffs succinctly describe the issues they want the court to resolve at this stage:

1. Are special education students in New York City entitled to FAPE until age 22?
2. If yes, does DOE’s failure to provide such services entitle them to compensatory education in general?

Crucially, the court observes that these questions:

• do not turn on any one student’s particular disability, IEP, or educational progress;
• do not require factual development of a record about individual harms; and
• do not implicate “technical educational policy” judgments, but rather the straightforward application of legal principles to the structure of New York’s statutes and DOE policies.

Consequently:

• Fact development through administrative hearings would add little to the legal analysis.
• Agency expertise in pedagogy is minimally relevant; the issue is legal, not pedagogical.
• Requiring “many hundreds of individual hearings” would be inconsistent with efficiency and would not meaningfully enhance the quality of judicial review.

On these grounds, the court holds that the policy-or-practice exception applies and that exhaustion is excused. It emphasizes that the case sits at the core of the exception: a facial challenge to a blanket policy alleged to violate the IDEA, raising a largely pure question of federal law.

D. What the Court Deliberately Did Not Decide

The Second Circuit is careful to limit its holding to the exhaustion and jurisdictional issues. It expressly does not decide:

• whether, as a matter of ultimate merits, DOE’s age‑21 cutoff violates the IDEA (though A.R., NYSED’s 2023 guidance, and the Third Department’s decisions strongly suggest the answer);
• whether other futility or inadequacy exceptions (such as lack of remedial authority in the administrative forum) also apply;
• what specific remedies (e.g., injunctive relief, class certification, compensatory education) are appropriate if plaintiffs prevail on the merits.

Those questions are left to be addressed on remand in the district court.

IV. Impact and Implications

A. Impact on IDEA Litigation in the Second Circuit

1. Doctrinal clarity on jurisdiction.
After J.M., IDEA exhaustion in the Second Circuit is definitively a nonjurisdictional claim‑processing requirement. This:

• prevents premature jurisdictional dismissals where exhaustion may be excused;
• requires defendants to raise exhaustion as an affirmative defense, subject to waiver or forfeiture; and
• aligns IDEA practice with modern Supreme Court doctrine on the distinction between jurisdictional rules and claim‑processing rules.

2. Systemic and class-wide challenges are more viable.
The clarified policy-or-practice exception significantly enhances the viability of putative class actions and systemic challenges under the IDEA. Parents and advocacy groups can now:

• bring facial challenges to district‑wide or state‑wide policies (e.g., age cutoffs, categorical exclusions from programs, uniform “caps” on services) without first forcing large numbers of families to pursue repetitive and time‑consuming individual hearings;
• frame claims around clearly identified policies of general applicability, especially those that turn on pure questions of law; and
• argue persuasively that the purposes of exhaustion are not served by requiring hundreds of near‑identical due process complaints on the same legal issue.

At the same time, the decision imposes discipline: plaintiffs must clearly specify the policy they attack and show why resolution does not require individualized factual development or substantial educational expertise.

3. Continued importance of exhaustion in individualized FAPE disputes.
J.M. does not dilute the exhaustion requirement for typical, individualized IDEA disputes—such as disagreements over the content of an IEP, the amount of related services, or the appropriateness of a particular placement. In such cases:

• factual development about the student’s profile and progress is central; and
• agency educational expertise is especially valuable.

For those claims, exhaustion will remain mandatory absent independent grounds such as emergency circumstances or clear lack of remedial authority in the administrative forum.

B. Implications for School Districts and State Education Agencies

The decision sends a clear message to districts and state agencies:

• Maintaining policies of general applicability that appear facially inconsistent with the IDEA—especially where those policies are legal, rather than technical, in nature—exposes the agency to direct federal litigation without the buffer of administrative exhaustion.
• Agencies should proactively review statutes, regulations, and system‑wide practices to ensure they conform to evolving federal interpretations, such as A.R. regarding age limits.
• Temporary or limited policy fixes (like DOE’s time-bound extension of age‑eligibility) that do not remedy past violations or address all affected students may not moot systemic challenges.

For NYC DOE and the New York State Education Department, J.M. increases the pressure to settle on a legally compliant, long‑term position regarding FAPE eligibility through age 22 and the provision of compensatory services to those who were unlawfully cut off.

C. Relationship to State Litigation Over Age Cutoff in New York

The opinion notes ongoing New York state litigation—Mahopac and Katonah‑Lewisboro—where the Appellate Division, Third Department, has already aligned itself with A.R. and NYSED’s view that districts must provide FAPE until age 22 where adult education is offered.

Although the New York Court of Appeals had not yet weighed in, the Second Circuit’s reasoning:

• lends further federal support to the view that state and local age‑21 cutoffs are incompatible with the IDEA in New York’s current adult‑education structure; and
• underscores that, irrespective of state court outcomes, federal IDEA rights and remedies remain enforceable in federal court without exhaustion when an unlawful policy is at issue.

Potentially, if the New York Court of Appeals affirms the Third Department, that could settle the state-law side of the question and make federal adjudication of the remaining issues (e.g., compensatory education) more straightforward.

D. Practical Effects for Students and Families

For families, the decision has several practical consequences:

• Pathway for older students. Students who were denied services after their 21st school year may be able to seek compensatory education—extended services beyond standard age limits—without first having exhausted administrative remedies, as long as their claims are tied to the challenged system‑wide policy.
• Encouragement for class-wide claims. Families facing identical harms from unlawful blanket policies now have clearer support to pursue coordinated or class‑wide relief, avoiding the burden and delay of individual hearing processes.
• Continued need to exhaust for individualized disputes. Families should understand that most disagreements about the quality or content of services for a particular child still require exhaustion unless a recognized exception clearly applies.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. “Free Appropriate Public Education” (FAPE)

FAPE means special education and related services that:

• are provided at public expense and under public supervision;
• meet state educational standards;
• include appropriate schooling and supports tailored to the child’s unique needs; and
• are documented in a written IEP developed by a team including parents and school staff.

It does not guarantee the “best” possible education, but it must be reasonably calculated to enable the child to make appropriate progress.

B. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

“Exhaustion” means that, before going to court, parents must typically:

1. file a due process complaint and have a hearing before an impartial hearing officer; and
2. if dissatisfied, appeal that decision to a state review officer.

Only after completing these steps (or where an exception applies) can they sue in federal or state court under the IDEA.

C. Claim-Processing Rule vs. Jurisdictional Rule

A jurisdictional rule limits the court’s very power to hear a case. If a requirement is jurisdictional, a court must enforce it at any time, it cannot be waived, and a violation requires dismissal even if the parties do not raise it.

A claim-processing rule, by contrast, is a procedural requirement that governs how and when claims are brought. It can often be:

• waived or forfeited if not timely raised by the parties; and
• subject to equitable exceptions, such as futility or inadequacy of administrative remedies.

J.M. clarifies that IDEA exhaustion falls into this latter category.

D. “Policy or Practice of General Applicability That Is Contrary to Law”

This phrase, from the legislative history and cases like Tirozzi and Weixel, refers to:

• a rule, policy, or practice that applies broadly (e.g., to all students of a certain category, or across a region or district), not just to one child; and
• that, on its face, conflicts with the IDEA or other governing federal law.

When parents challenge such a policy in court, and the challenge turns on a largely legal question, courts may excuse exhaustion because little is gained by litigating the same issue repeatedly in administrative hearings.

E. Compensatory Education

“Compensatory education” is a remedy courts (and sometimes hearing officers) may award when a student has been denied FAPE in the past. It typically consists of:

• additional services—such as more years of special education, tutoring, therapies, or transition services—provided beyond the normal age limits or school schedule;
• designed not to punish the school district but to put the student as close as possible to the educational position they would have been in had FAPE been provided earlier.

In J.M., plaintiffs seek compensatory education for the period after DOE unlawfully stopped services (if the policy is ultimately found unlawful).

VI. Conclusion

J.M. v. New York City Department of Education is a significant development in IDEA jurisprudence in the Second Circuit. The decision:

• definitively characterizes IDEA exhaustion as a nonjurisdictional claim-processing rule, aligning the Circuit with modern Supreme Court doctrine and multiple sister circuits;
• clarifies the scope and application of the “policy-or-practice” exception to exhaustion, making clear that facial challenges to blanket, unlawful educational policies—particularly those turning on pure questions of law—need not be funneled through repetitive administrative hearings;
• provides a practical framework for assessing when exhaustion serves its intended purposes and when it simply imposes unnecessary delay and burden; and
• opens the door for systemic, class‑wide challenges to district‑wide policies under the IDEA, especially in contexts like age‑eligibility where the core dispute is legal, not factual.

Although the Second Circuit does not rule on the merits of DOE’s age‑21 cutoff, the opinion strongly signals that policies inconsistent with A.R. and with the IDEA’s age‑coverage provisions are vulnerable to facial attack. For students and families, the decision strengthens the ability to challenge unlawful systemic policies and to seek meaningful remedies, including compensatory education, when FAPE has been unlawfully curtailed.

In the broader legal context, J.M. exemplifies a careful, functional approach to exhaustion—honoring its purposes where they are served, but refusing to elevate procedure over substantive rights when a facially unlawful policy stands between students with disabilities and their statutory entitlement to an appropriate public education.