Deferential Appellate Review of Restitution Findings in Nonprecedential Memorandum Decisions: Commentary on State v. O’Connell, 2025 MT 298N

I. Introduction

State v. O’Connell, 2025 MT 298N (DA 24-0229), is a memorandum opinion of the Montana Supreme Court affirming a district court’s restitution order in a theft and criminal possession of dangerous drugs case. Although the Court explicitly designates the decision as noncitable and nonprecedential under Section I, Paragraph 3(c) of its Internal Operating Rules, the opinion offers a clear illustration of how Montana appellate courts approach review of restitution determinations and credibility findings at sentencing.

The case arises from the large-scale theft of silver from a storage unit in Ravalli County. The defendant, Rusty Dale O’Connell, entered an Alford plea to a felony theft charge premised on his possession of silver stolen from the victim’s storage unit, and a guilty plea to felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs (CPDD). The district court sentenced him to a net 15-year term to the Department of Corrections, with 10 years suspended, and ordered restitution (joint and several with co-defendants) for what it found to be the victim’s total silver loss.

On appeal, O’Connell challenged only the restitution component of the sentence. He argued (1) that he was not criminally accountable for the entire quantity of silver stolen from the storage unit and (2) that the evidence did not support the district court’s finding of the amount/value of silver he possessed or controlled. The Montana Supreme Court rejected these arguments and affirmed.

The opinion, though brief, rests squarely on established principles:

• Restitution is a mixed question of law and fact reviewed de novo as to legal issues.
• The actual amount of restitution is a factual finding reviewed under the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard.
• Conflicts in witness testimony and evidence are for the district court to resolve, and appellate courts will uphold findings that are “plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety.”

This commentary examines the case in depth, explaining the factual background, the Court’s reasoning, the precedents invoked, and the broader (though nonbinding) implications for restitution practice in Montana.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Nonprecedential Status

At the outset, the Court clarifies that this is a memorandum opinion under Section I, Paragraph 3(c), Montana Supreme Court Internal Operating Rules:

“This case is decided by memorandum opinion and shall not be cited and does not serve as precedent. Its case title, cause number, and disposition shall be included in this Court's quarterly list of noncitable cases published in the Pacific Reporter and Montana Reports.” (¶ 1)

This designation means the decision does not create new binding law and may not be cited as authority in future litigation. However, it remains informative as an example of the application of existing doctrines.

B. Holding and Disposition

The Court affirms the Ravalli County District Court’s Amended Judgment and Commitment (February 7, 2024), including:

• The 15-year net sentence to the Department of Corrections with 10 years suspended; and
• The restitution order (after offset for recovered silver) in the amount of $81,574.10, imposed jointly and severally with co-defendants.

The Court holds:

• The district court’s restitution findings are supported by substantial evidence.
• The district court did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence.
• Review of the full record does not leave the Court with a “firm conviction that a mistake was made.”

Accordingly, the Court concludes there is no clear error in the restitution determination and the judgment is affirmed (¶¶ 6–7, 9).

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Offenses

The charges stem from the burglary of a storage unit belonging to Gene Huckstadt on September 18, 2020, during which silver was stolen. Co-defendants McCready and Edens physically entered the storage unit and removed the silver (¶ 5).

O’Connell did not personally break into the storage unit. Instead:

• After McCready was arrested, O’Connell, at McCready’s direction, took possession of silver that McCready had moved to his home (¶ 5).
• O’Connell admits he possessed at least a portion of the stolen silver, including a suitcase containing a substantial quantity of silver and several paint cans filled with coins (¶ 6).

The State charged O’Connell with:

• Felony theft, based on his knowing possession of stolen silver from the storage unit; and
• Felony criminal possession of dangerous drugs (CPDD).

B. Plea Disposition

O’Connell entered:

• An Alford plea to the theft charge, allowing him to plead guilty while maintaining that he did not actually commit the theft in the sense of admitting the conduct, so long as there was a factual basis and he believed the plea was in his best interest.
• A straight guilty plea to the CPDD charge (¶ 3).

The Court notes that § 46-12-212(2), MCA, codifies the Alford plea procedure (¶ 3 n.1), citing:

• N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), and
• Lawrence v. Guyer, 2019 MT 74, ¶ 8, 395 Mont. 222, 440 P.3d 1, which explains the conditions under which such a plea is valid.

C. Sentencing and Restitution Order

The district court imposed a net sentence of 15 years in the Department of Corrections, with 10 years suspended (¶ 3).

As to restitution:

• The court initially ordered $120,000 in restitution for the total estimated value of the silver stolen from the storage unit, to be paid jointly and severally with co-defendants (¶ 3).
• In the Amended Judgment and Commitment, this figure was reduced to $81,574.10 after crediting the value of some silver recovered and returned from evidence (¶ 3 n.2).

The underlying dispute is not over the concept of restitution but over how much of the stolen silver O’Connell possessed or controlled and whether he can be held responsible for restitution reflecting the entire loss.

D. The Appeal

O’Connell appealed only the restitution component, arguing:

1. He was not criminally accountable for the theft from the storage unit or for the entirety of the $120,000 in stolen silver, implying that his involvement was limited to a smaller portion of the property (¶ 3).
2. The restitution order was not supported by substantial evidence because the State failed to prove that he possessed or controlled property equal in value to the restitution imposed (¶ 3).

The State defended the order, relying on: (1) testimony from the victim’s wife about the total loss; (2) co-defendant testimony describing a very large quantity of silver; (3) law enforcement evidence about the weight of recovered containers; (4) O’Connell’s own admissions about the number of containers and approximate weights; and (5) a recorded phone call in which McCready described the weight of the suitcase of silver in O’Connell’s possession (¶ 6).

IV. Standards of Review and Governing Law

A. Restitution as a Mixed Question of Law and Fact

Citing State v. Dodge, 2017 MT 318, ¶ 6, 390 Mont. 69, 408 P.3d 510, the Court reiterates that restitution:

• Involves legal questions (e.g., whether restitution is authorized under the statutes and under the facts of conviction), and
• Involves factual questions (e.g., the amount of the victim’s pecuniary loss).

Thus, it is characterized as a “mixed question of law and fact,” with:

• Legal components reviewed de novo (the appellate court gives no deference to the district court on questions of law); and
• Factual components reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard.

B. Clear Error Review of Restitution Amounts

The Court cites several cases for the clear error standard governing factual findings on the amount of restitution:

• State v. Cleveland, 2018 MT 199, ¶ 7, 392 Mont. 338, 432 P.3d 1074;
• State v. Patterson, 2016 MT 289, ¶ 9, 385 Mont. 334, 384 P.3d 92;
• State v. Pierre, 2020 MT 160, ¶ 10, 400 Mont. 283, 466 P.3d 494; and
• State v. Conley, 2018 MT 83, ¶ 9, 391 Mont. 164, 415 P.3d 473 (¶ 4).

A factual finding is “clearly erroneous” if any of the following are true:

1. It is not supported by substantial evidence.
2. The district court misapprehended the effect of the evidence.
3. After reviewing the record, the appellate court is left with a firm conviction that a mistake has been made (¶ 4).

“Substantial evidence” does not mean “beyond a reasonable doubt.” Rather, it means evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other evidence points in a different direction.

C. Deference to Trial Court on Witness Credibility and Conflicting Evidence

The Court draws heavily on In re Kesler, 2018 MT 231, 392 Mont. 540, 427 P.3d 77:

• It is the district court’s role “to weigh the testimony and determine witness credibility” (¶ 7, citing Kesler, ¶ 17).
• When the record contains conflicting evidence, it is the district court’s job to resolve those conflicts (¶ 7, citing Kesler, ¶ 21).
• The clear error standard is “a deferential one,” requiring affirmation of the trial court’s findings when its “account of the evidence is plausible in light of the record viewed in its entirety” (¶ 7, quoting Kesler, ¶ 23, which in turn quotes Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214, 223 (1988)).

Thus, disagreement with the district court’s interpretation of conflicting testimony is not enough to win on appeal; the appellant must show that no reasonable fact-finder could have reached the same conclusions based on the record as a whole.

D. Underlying Restitution Framework

While the opinion does not cite specific restitution statutes, Montana’s statutory scheme (e.g., § 46-18-241, MCA, and related provisions) generally requires that sentencing courts:

• Order defendants to pay restitution for the “full amount” of the victim’s pecuniary loss, and
• May impose joint and several restitution liability on multiple defendants responsible for the same loss.

The opinion operates against this background, focusing not on whether restitution is authorized in principle, but whether the proof supported the amount imposed on O’Connell.

V. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

A. Framing the Core Question

The Court does not squarely address O’Connell’s “criminal accountability” argument as a doctrinal question. Instead, it reframes the dispute as an evidentiary sufficiency issue:

“[T]here is sufficient evidence that he possessed or controlled at least $120,000 of the stolen silver.” (¶ 6)

Once the Court concludes that the evidence supports a finding that O’Connell personally possessed or controlled silver valued at or above the restitution amount, the debate over accountability (in the sense of liability for co-defendants’ acts) becomes largely moot.

B. Evidence Supporting the Restitution Amount

The Court carefully lists and synthesizes the various pieces of evidence available to the district court. There was conflicting testimony regarding weight and value, but crucially: there were no objections to any of the sentencing testimony (¶ 6), and the defense did not successfully undermine the witnesses’ credibility at sentencing.

1. O’Connell’s Concessions

In his opening brief and his sentencing testimony, O’Connell made several key admissions:

• He “was found in possession of a suitcase containing 50 to 200 pounds of silver and several paint cans of coins” (¶ 6).
• He admitted to possessing “at least seven of the paint cans full of silver” (¶ 6).
• He estimated each can weighed “anywhere from maybe 15 pounds, 20 pounds” (¶ 6).
• He admitted the suitcase full of silver weighed “50 pounds or more” (¶ 6).
• He testified that the sale price of silver was approximately $28 per ounce and that he had been a silver collector since youth (¶ 6 & n.3).

These admissions are significant because they:

• Confirm his possession and control over multiple containers of silver.
• Show that he had specialized knowledge of silver value, undermining any claim that he did not appreciate the scale or value of what he possessed.

2. Victim’s Wife’s Valuation

The victim, Gene Huckstadt, had passed away by the time of sentencing. His wife, Rosie Huckstadt, testified that, based on records kept by her husband, the value of the stolen silver was approximately $120,000 (¶ 6).

Her testimony provided a direct value estimate of the victim’s total loss. Importantly:

• No objection was made to her testimony.
• No competing valuation from a defense expert or independent documentation was presented.

3. Co-Defendant Edens’s Description of the Quantity

Co-defendant Jesse Edens testified in detail about the quantity of silver that he and McCready stole from the storage unit:

• They took “three safes that were two and a half feet by two and a half feet squared that were full.”
• There was also “maybe a dozen bags of like quarters, dimes, silver in the footlocker that we took also.”
• He characterized the haul as a “truckload of silver.”
• After the theft, they bought empty paint cans from a hardware store and filled “12 to 15 cans” with the silver.
• When asked whether he believed the cans weighed approximately 60 pounds each, Edens agreed this was “a reasonable assumption” and stated there had been more than 12 cans (¶ 6).

This description conveys a very large volume and weight of silver, consistent with the $120,000 valuation. Even if some of the weight estimates were overstated or imprecise, the testimony supports the district court’s conclusion that the overall amount of silver was substantial.

4. Detective Burlingham’s Weighing of a Recovered Can

Retired Detective Burlingham testified that he had weighed one recovered paint can of silver from Edens’s residence at “around 35 pounds” (¶ 6).

This figure is lower than the 60-pound-per-can assumption Edens agreed to, but it still indicates a large amount of silver per container. The discrepancy created a conflict in the evidence, but under Montana’s deferential standard, it was the district court’s role to reconcile this conflict, not the Supreme Court’s.

5. Recorded Telephone Call Between McCready and His Mother

The State introduced audio of a phone conversation between McCready and his mother, made while McCready was in custody and O’Connell was present with McCready’s mother at McCready’s home. During this call:

• McCready indicated that the suitcase full of silver—admittedly in O’Connell’s possession—weighed “150–200 pounds” (¶ 6).

Again, no objection is recorded to the admission of this call. While hearsay issues might arise in other contexts, evidentiary rules are more relaxed at sentencing, and the absence of an objection is critical: the district court was entitled to rely on this evidence in weighing the quantity of silver under O’Connell’s control.

6. Affidavit Supporting the Amended Information

The Court notes that:

• The State relied on the Affidavit in support of the Amended Information when establishing the factual basis for the Alford plea.
• O’Connell did not object to the affidavit.
• The affidavit stated that the spot price of silver at the time was $20.69 per ounce (¶ 6 n.3).

This supports a conservative valuation of the silver’s market value, independent of O’Connell’s $28-per-ounce estimate.

7. Illustrative Calculations

Although the opinion does not do the math explicitly, the evidence suggests that the district court’s $120,000 valuation was well within a reasonable range. For illustration:

• Assume O’Connell possessed:
  • At least seven paint cans of silver; and
  • A suitcase weighing, conservatively, 150 pounds (based on McCready’s statement).

If each can weighed, conservatively, 35 pounds (Detective Burlingham’s figure for one can), then:

• Seven cans × 35 pounds = 245 pounds.
• Suitcase (conservatively) = 150 pounds.
• Total = 395 pounds of silver.

Converting to ounces (16 ounces per pound):

• 395 pounds × 16 = 6,320 ounces of silver.

At $20.69 per ounce (the affidavit’s spot price):

• 6,320 × 20.69 ≈ $130,758.80.

Even using only these conservative figures (and not the higher 50–200 pound or 60-pound-per-can estimates), O’Connell’s admitted possession could be valued above the $120,000 figure the district court used as the original total loss. This supports the Supreme Court’s observation that:

“[T]he District Court could have determined O'Connell possessed well more silver than the court determined he possessed.” (¶ 7)

C. Application of the Clear Error Standard

In light of the record, the Court concludes:

• The district court’s findings of fact regarding the amount of stolen silver and O’Connell’s possession/control are supported by substantial evidence (¶ 7).
• The district court did not misapprehend the effect of the evidence (¶ 7).
• The Supreme Court is not left with a firm conviction that a mistake was made after reviewing the record (¶ 7).

Accordingly, the Court finds no clear error and no basis to disturb the restitution determination.

D. Treatment of the “Criminal Accountability” Argument

O’Connell argued he was “not criminally accountable for the theft from the storage unit or the entire $120,000 in stolen silver” (¶ 3). The opinion does not enter into a detailed discussion of Montana’s criminal accountability statute(s) or accomplice liability.

Instead, by finding that O’Connell “possessed or controlled at least $120,000 of the stolen silver” (¶ 6), the Court effectively sidesteps the need to analyze whether he might be accountable for losses caused by others’ conduct:

• If he personally possessed or controlled property of that value, restitution for that amount is fully justified on a direct-actor theory.
• The question whether he could also be held accountable for silver never in his possession becomes academic in light of the evidence the Court accepts.

E. Importance of the Sentencing Record and Failure to Object

The Court explicitly notes that:

• “No objection was made to any of [the witnesses’] testimony” at sentencing (¶ 6).

This is important because:

• Sentencing hearings typically allow broader use of hearsay and unsworn reports than trials, but defense objections can still shape what the court may reasonably rely upon.
• Here, the defense’s failure to challenge the admissibility or reliability of testimony and the recorded call meant that the district court had a largely uncontested evidentiary basis for its findings.
• On appeal, it is especially difficult to argue that the district court misused evidence to which no contemporaneous objection was raised.

The Court’s deference to the sentencing court’s fact-finding underscores the practical importance of building, and challenging, the restitution record at the trial level.

VI. Precedents and Authorities Cited

A. State v. Dodge, 2017 MT 318

Dodge is cited for the proposition that restitution presents a mixed question of law and fact (¶ 4). In Dodge, the Court clarified:

• Legal questions—such as whether the type of loss is compensable under Montana’s restitution statutes—are reviewed de novo.
• Factual determinations—such as the amount of the loss—are reviewed for clear error.

In O’Connell, there is no serious dispute over whether the type of loss (stolen silver) is compensable; the dispute is over amount and attribution. Thus, only the factual prong is truly implicated.

B. State v. Cleveland, Patterson, Pierre, and Conley

These cases collectively reinforce the three-part definition of clear error (¶ 4). They illustrate that:

• Substantial evidence does not require certainty; it requires only sufficient evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to support the finding.
• A misapprehension of the effect of evidence can occur if the district court plainly misunderstands or misuses the testimony or exhibits.
• The “firm conviction” prong is a catch-all: even if evidence is technically present, the appellate court may reverse if the overall picture strongly suggests a mistake.

In O’Connell, the Court quickly concludes that none of these bases for reversal are satisfied.

C. In re Kesler, 2018 MT 231, and Amadeo v. Zant, 486 U.S. 214 (1988)

Kesler is cited for:

• The basic rule that credibility and weight of testimony are uniquely the province of the trial court (¶ 7, citing Kesler, ¶ 17).
• The role of the trial court in resolving conflicting evidence (¶ 7, citing Kesler, ¶ 21).
• The characterization of the clear error standard as a “deferential” one, requiring affirmation where the trial court’s view is “plausible” (¶ 7, quoting Kesler, ¶ 23).

Kesler in turn quotes Amadeo v. Zant, a U.S. Supreme Court case that explained the deference federal courts afford to state court factual findings in habeas corpus proceedings. By invoking Amadeo, the Montana Supreme Court emphasizes that it will not reweigh evidence or second-guess district courts on close factual questions so long as the findings are reasonably supported.

In O’Connell, this deference leads the Court to uphold the district court’s acceptance of certain weight and value testimony over O’Connell’s more conservative estimates.

D. Lawrence v. Guyer and N.C. v. Alford

Footnote 1 discusses § 46-12-212(2), MCA, and explains the Alford plea, citing:

• N.C. v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), which held that a defendant can voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently plead guilty while maintaining innocence if he concludes the plea is in his best interest and there is a strong factual basis for guilt.
• Lawrence v. Guyer, 2019 MT 74, ¶ 8, which explains Montana’s implementation of Alford, emphasizing:
  • The requirement of a factual basis;
  • Defendant’s review of evidence against him;
  • Voluntariness and competence; and
  • Defendant’s belief that the plea serves his best interest.

While O’Connell does not expand on the implications of an Alford plea for restitution, the case implicitly shows that:

• Even when the defendant does not admit all underlying facts, the court may rely on the plea colloquy, supporting affidavits, and unobjected-to evidence to identify a factual basis and, subsequently, to determine restitution.

E. Internal Operating Rules: Section I, Paragraph 3(c)

The opinion is issued under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules, Section I, Paragraph 3(c), which allows for memorandum opinions:

• When a case is “controlled by settled law” or
• When it presents a “clear application of applicable standards of review” (¶ 8).

The Court expressly characterizes O’Connell as fitting within this category, reinforcing that:

• No novel question of restitution law or criminal accountability is decided.
• The result follows from routine application of well-established doctrinal principles.

VII. Simplifying Key Legal Concepts

A. The Alford Plea

An Alford plea is a type of guilty plea where:

• The defendant formally pleads guilty to the charge,
• But does not admit to committing the criminal act in the ordinary sense,
• And instead concedes that the State has enough evidence to likely secure a conviction at trial.

Under § 46-12-212(2), MCA, and Alford, the judge must ensure:

• There is a factual basis in the record supporting guilt.
• The defendant has reviewed the evidence and understands the risks of going to trial.
• The plea is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent.

In O’Connell, the defendant’s Alford plea to theft did not prevent the court from examining the underlying facts (e.g., quantity of stolen silver) for purposes of sentencing and restitution.

B. Restitution and Joint & Several Liability

Restitution is a court-ordered payment by a criminal defendant to compensate the victim for financial losses caused by the crime. In Montana:

• Restitution must generally cover the “full amount” of the victim’s pecuniary loss.
• When multiple defendants participate in a crime causing a single loss, the court may impose joint and several liability, meaning:
  • Each defendant is individually responsible for the entire amount, though
  • The victim may collect only once; as one defendant pays, the others’ obligations are correspondingly reduced.

In O’Connell, restitution was ordered jointly and severally with co-defendants, reflecting a single, indivisible loss: the theft of silver from the Huckstadt storage unit.

C. “Substantial Evidence” and “Clear Error”

Substantial evidence is:

• Evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• It does not require unanimity, perfection, or complete consistency; it requires sufficiency.

The clear error standard means the appellate court will overturn a factual finding only if:

1. There is no substantial evidence in the record to support it;
2. The trial court misunderstood the import or effect of the evidence; or
3. After reviewing everything, the appellate judges are left with a strong conviction that the trial court was wrong.

Under this standard, the appellate court does not re-try the case or re-weigh credibility. It asks only whether the trial court’s conclusions are within the range of reasonable outcomes supported by the record.

D. Memorandum Opinions and Noncitable Decisions

A memorandum opinion is a short opinion, usually reserved for cases that:

• Do not raise novel legal questions, and
• Are controlled by settled law or straightforward application of standard doctrines.

Under the Montana Supreme Court’s Internal Operating Rules:

• Memorandum opinions “shall not be cited and do not serve as precedent” (¶ 1).
• They are nonetheless reported in a quarterly list of noncitable cases (¶ 1).

This means:

• Lawyers cannot cite O’Connell as authoritative precedent in future briefs.
• Trial courts are not bound by its specific reasoning in other cases.
• However, the opinion still illustrates how the Court is likely to apply existing principles in similar factual settings.

VIII. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Doctrinal Impact: Reaffirmation Rather than Innovation

Because O’Connell is expressly nonprecedential, it does not create new binding law. Instead, it:

• Reaffirms Montana’s existing restitution and appellate review framework.
• Illustrates the Court’s continued commitment to:
  • Deference to district courts on factual and credibility determinations at sentencing.
  • Strict application of the clear error standard in restitution appeals.

In this sense, the case signals continuity rather than change in Montana sentencing law.

B. Practical Lessons for Defense Counsel

O’Connell highlights several important practice points for defense attorneys:

1. Challenge sentencing evidence contemporaneously.
   The Court repeatedly notes that no objections were made to critical testimony and the recorded call. Failure to object:
   • Makes it more likely that the evidence will be considered fully by the sentencing court.
   • Complicates or undermines arguments on appeal about the unreliability or inadmissibility of that evidence.
2. Present alternative valuations.
   If the defendant disputes the victim’s valuation, counsel should:
   • Offer expert testimony on market value.
   • Present documentation contradicting the victim’s inventory or price assumptions.
   • Provide specific, supported alternate calculations rather than merely asserting that the State’s evidence is “insufficient.”
3. Recognize the collateral consequences of an Alford plea.
   Although an Alford plea allows a defendant to avoid an explicit admission of guilt, the court may still:
   • Rely on unobjected-to evidence and affidavits to determine the factual basis for the plea, and
   • Use those same facts to determine restitution and other sentencing conditions.
   Pleading under Alford does not insulate the defendant from adverse factual findings about the scope of harm caused.

C. Guidance for Prosecutors

For prosecutors, O’Connell shows the value of:

• Developing a robust sentencing record, including:
  • Victim or family testimony about inventory and value;
  • Co-defendant testimony about quantity and distribution of stolen property;
  • Law enforcement measurements (e.g., weights of containers); and
  • Defendant’s own admissions and recorded conversations.
• Linking physical measurements (weights, numbers of containers) to market prices (e.g., spot price of silver) to demonstrate total loss.

This case demonstrates that when such a record is developed, appellate courts are very reluctant to disturb restitution awards.

D. Considerations for Trial Courts

The Supreme Court’s affirmance also offers implicit guidance to trial judges:

• Make explicit factual findings. Detailing how the court reconciled conflicting evidence (weights, valuations, testimony) strengthens the record against clear error challenges.
• Note the evidentiary basis. Identifying the specific testimony and exhibits supporting restitution helps demonstrate that the court did not misapprehend the evidence.
• Recognize the role of conservative estimates. As illustrated by the Court’s observation that the district court could have found a higher value than it did (¶ 7), using conservative valuations can reinforce the plausibility of the findings.

E. Broader Implications for Restitution Jurisprudence

Although not citable, O’Connell is consistent with and reinforces several broader trends:

• Montana courts emphasize full compensation of victims’ economic losses in property crime cases.
• Restitution determinations are treated as quintessentially factual questions, highly insulated from appellate second-guessing when the record is adequately developed.
• Defendants who play a role in the post-theft handling, storage, or sale of stolen property may be held responsible for restitution that reflects the entire loss when the evidence supports their possession or control of the bulk of the property.

IX. Conclusion

State v. O’Connell, 2025 MT 298N, does not establish new binding precedent, but it provides a clear and instructive application of Montana’s restitution and appellate review doctrines in a significant theft case involving a large quantity of silver.

The key takeaways are:

• Restitution determinations are grounded in factual findings about the extent of the victim’s loss and the defendant’s role, reviewed only for clear error.
• Conflicting evidence regarding quantity and value of stolen property is resolved by the district court, and appellate courts will not reweigh those conflicts so long as the findings are plausible in light of the entire record.
• Unobjected-to sentencing evidence—including co-defendant testimony, victim’s estimates, law enforcement measurements, and recorded phone calls—can heavily influence the restitution outcome.
• An Alford plea, while preserving a defendant’s protestation of innocence, does not prevent the court from making robust factual findings for sentencing and restitution based on the record.

Ultimately, O’Connell underscores that in Montana, challenges to restitution amounts face an uphill battle on appeal where the sentencing record is well-developed and the trial court has reasonably resolved evidentiary conflicts. For practitioners, the decision is a reminder that the most important work on restitution—whether seeking it or contesting it—must be done at the sentencing stage.