Beyond Pretext: The Eleventh Circuit’s Clarification of McDonnell Douglas and the “Convincing Mosaic” Standard in Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree

I. Introduction

In Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree, No. 25‑10604 (11th Cir. Dec. 5, 2025), the Eleventh Circuit issued an important, doctrinally ambitious opinion on how federal courts in this Circuit must evaluate employment discrimination and retaliation claims at the summary judgment stage.

The case arises from Deputy Sheriff Ahmed Ismael’s claim that he was fired in retaliation for complaining about racial harassment by his superior, Lieutenant Everette Jenkins, at the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office (“RCSO”) in Georgia. Ismael, an Iraqi-born deputy of Arab descent, alleged that Jenkins repeatedly called him a “terrorist,” told him to “go play in the sand,” and insinuated to others that he “may have a bomb.” After Ismael eventually filed an internal complaint about Jenkins, he was terminated eight days later for allegedly misusing his patrol vehicle to pursue employment in another county.

The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on Ismael’s 42 U.S.C. § 1981 retaliation claim, concluding that although Ismael had made out a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas framework, he failed to show that the employer’s stated reason for his termination (vehicle misuse) was a “pretext” for unlawful retaliation.

The Eleventh Circuit reversed. It held that the district court committed a legal error by treating the McDonnell Douglas “pretext” inquiry as identical to, and fully coextensive with, the Circuit’s “convincing mosaic” standard for summary judgment in discrimination and retaliation cases. The panel clarified that:

McDonnell Douglas is an evidentiary, burden-shifting device, not a substantive rule of decision.
A plaintiff’s failure to disprove the employer’s proffered reason (i.e., to show “pretext”) is not, by itself, a sufficient ground to grant summary judgment.
Courts must always ask the broader Rule 56 question: whether the entire record presents a “convincing mosaic” of circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination or retaliation.

The opinion thus reshapes how district courts in the Eleventh Circuit must structure summary judgment analysis in employment cases, particularly under § 1981 (via § 1983) and Title VII.

II. Summary of the Eleventh Circuit’s Opinion

A. Holding

The Eleventh Circuit held:

The district court erred as a matter of law by conflating the McDonnell Douglas pretext stage with the “convincing mosaic” standard, treating them as “identical.”
Pretext analysis is not the sole determinant at summary judgment. A court may not grant summary judgment merely because a plaintiff fails to prove that the employer’s proffered reason is false, unless that failure also means the plaintiff has not put forward enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find discrimination or retaliation. The panel articulated the rule explicitly:
“We hold that summary judgment should not be granted for failure to demonstrate pretext unless it also ‘reflects a failure to put forward enough evidence for a jury to find for the plaintiff on the ultimate question of discrimination’ or retaliation.”
Once an employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory (or non-retaliatory) reason, the McDonnell Douglas framework “drops out of the picture,” and the proper inquiry is the broader “convincing mosaic” / Rule 56 standard: whether all the circumstantial evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, could permit a reasonable jury to find intentional discrimination or retaliation.
Even if a plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case under McDonnell Douglas, the claim does not automatically fail at summary judgment. The court must still consider whether the plaintiff’s evidence, taken as a whole, forms a convincing mosaic of discriminatory or retaliatory intent.

B. Disposition

Applying these principles, the Eleventh Circuit did not decide whether Ismael’s evidence actually creates a convincing mosaic of retaliation. Instead, it:

Reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment; and
Remanded for the district court to apply the correct summary judgment standard in the first instance.

The appellate court also criticized some specific aspects of the district court’s handling of Ismael’s evidence, illustrating how the lower court’s focus on “pretext” improperly narrowed its view of the record.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. Employment and Harassment Allegations

Ismael was hired by the Richmond County Sheriff’s Office on March 21, 2020, and later assigned to an off-duty security detail at Urban Air Adventure Park in Augusta, Georgia. By mid‑2021, he was promoted to “officer-in-charge” at the Urban Air assignment.

Lieutenant Everette Jenkins, who also worked the Urban Air assignment and commanded the RCSO SWAT team, allegedly subjected Ismael—an Iraqi‑born officer of Arabic descent—to repeated racist abuse:

Calling him a “terrorist”;
Telling him to “go play in the sand”; and
Warning others that Ismael “may have a bomb.”

The Urban Air owner (Gilbert) and general manager (Chambliss) corroborated these allegations in detail, describing Jenkins’s comments as frequent and pervasive. Jenkins admitted using the “terrorist” slur but denied the other comments.

Ismael alleged that he delayed reporting Jenkins’s conduct because Jenkins controlled entry to the SWAT team—a goal important to Ismael—and allegedly warned him that complaining would ruin his prospects.

B. Protected Activity and Termination

In September 2021, Ismael attended a SWAT training course in Forsyth County. He failed the written exam on the last day, and Jenkins told him he could not join the team.

While driving home in his patrol car and uniform, Ismael stopped briefly at the Burke County Sheriff’s Office to inquire about job openings and was told to apply online.

No longer dependent on Jenkins for SWAT admission, Ismael filed an internal affairs complaint on September 20, 2021, detailing Jenkins’s alleged racial harassment. Gilbert and Chambliss submitted corroborating letters. At that time, Ismael had no prior disciplinary infractions and was in “good standing.”

The RCSO assigned Sergeant William McCarty to investigate. McCarty interviewed several officers and Jenkins, tried but allegedly failed to reach Gilbert and Chambliss, and ultimately concluded on October 19, 2021, that the complaint was “not sustained.”

While the Jenkins investigation was pending, McCarty received an email from Burke County (on September 23, 2021) inquiring about Ismael. McCarty replied that Ismael “isn’t very impressive,” noted he had failed SWAT school, and disclosed that Ismael had filed a hostile work environment complaint against Jenkins, which McCarty was “having to deal with.” He added that Ismael’s disciplinary record was “ok…thus far,” implying that might change.

Around this time, Colonel Calvin Chew claimed to have received an anonymous call from a Burke County deputy disclosing Ismael’s visit in a patrol vehicle to inquire about jobs. Phone records later suggested no such call occurred. McCarty then confirmed with Burke County that Ismael had indeed come there in an RCSO vehicle.

On September 28, 2021, Ismael scheduled a noon job interview in Burke County, planning to return for his 6 p.m. RCSO shift. Shortly before the interview, McCarty phoned Ismael and directed him to report to RCSO “as soon as possible.” Ismael attended the Burke County interview in uniform, then went to RCSO.

During or around this time, Chew purportedly received a second anonymous call stating that Ismael had again been in Burke County. Captain Rahn then emailed Chew and Sheriff Roundtree:

“Just confirmed Deputy [Ismael] was in Burke County in our vehicle doing an interview to be hired. He will not be hired and we will have the DR for Termination ready by the time we finish talking with him.”

Minutes later, McCarty began drafting the disciplinary report for termination. The report cited violations of RCSO’s “Manner of Conduct” Rule 4.4.1—specifically:

The September 17 visit to Burke County in a patrol car to inquire about employment while allegedly “on Richmond County time”; and
The September 28 visit in a patrol car for a formal job interview.

Sheriff Roundtree signed the termination report that same day. Notably, the report was prepared before Ismael was interviewed about—or even informed of—any investigation into his alleged misconduct, contrary to RCSO’s standard procedures.

C. The Lawsuit and Evidence of Retaliation

Ismael initially sued under § 1981, Title VII, and §§ 1985–1986, later narrowing his case to a single § 1981-based retaliation claim (brought through § 1983, as required by Jett for state actors).

In opposing summary judgment, Ismael marshaled extensive circumstantial evidence suggesting retaliatory motive, including:

Timing: His termination occurred only eight days after filing his internal harassment complaint.
McCarty’s email to Burke County: Describing Ismael as unimpressive, disclosing his harassment complaint, and stating his disciplinary file was okay “thus far,” implying potential forthcoming discipline.
Questionable “anonymous calls”: Phone records for Colonel Chew showing no incoming anonymous calls at the times he claimed to have been alerted about Ismael’s job search.
Comparator-type affidavits: Affidavits from former RCSO personnel stating that officers routinely used patrol vehicles for personal errands (picking up food, going to the gym, collecting children), that supervisors knew of this practice, and that no one was ever disciplined for such conduct.
No similar discipline history: McCarty could not recall any other officer being investigated or punished for such personal use of patrol vehicles, and Sheriff Roundtree—although claiming it had happened in the past—could not identify or produce any such examples.
Friendship with Jenkins: Roundtree testified that he had been “very good friends” with Jenkins for over twenty-five years.
Irregular process: The termination paperwork was prepared before Ismael was even questioned about the alleged misconduct, contrary to normal investigatory practice; and the investigation into Ismael’s alleged misconduct appeared more aggressive and decisive than the investigation into Jenkins’s alleged harassment.
Shifting/uncertain rationale: Roundtree and McCarty initially asserted that Ismael was on duty when he went to Burke County, but McCarty later conceded he would “probably say that he was off duty,” undercutting the initial justification.

The district court nonetheless granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding that:

Ismael established a prima facie case of retaliation under McDonnell Douglas;
The defendants articulated a legitimate, non-retaliatory reason (vehicle misuse); and
Ismael failed to prove that reason was pretextual.

The court declined to conduct a separate “convincing mosaic” analysis, reasoning—based on dicta in Ossman v. Meredith Corp.— that the “convincing mosaic” inquiry was “identical” to the pretext stage of McDonnell Douglas.

IV. Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

1. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green

The seminal 1973 decision in McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, established a three-step burden‑shifting framework for proving discrimination via circumstantial evidence:

Plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of discrimination.
Employer articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason.
Plaintiff shows the reason is pretextual.

In Ismael, the Eleventh Circuit accepts this structure but heavily limits its role:

It is an evidentiary tool, not a pleading standard (Swierkiewicz) and not a jury instruction (Dudley).
It only “has work to do” until the employer offers a legitimate reason; once that happens, the framework “drops out” (Hicks, reaffirmed in Tynes).

2. Texas Dep’t of Community Affairs v. Burdine and St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks

Burdine and Hicks refined McDonnell Douglas. Hicks explained that to prove “pretext,” a plaintiff must show both:

The employer’s reason is false; and
Discrimination was the real reason.

Burdine clarified that the plaintiff can meet the ultimate burden either:

Directly, by persuading the factfinder that discrimination more likely motivated the employer; or
Indirectly, by showing the employer’s explanation is “unworthy of credence.”

The Eleventh Circuit leans on this to emphasize: pretext is one route to proving discrimination, not the only route.

3. Smith v. Lockheed‑Martin Corp. and the “Convincing Mosaic” Standard

In Smith v. Lockheed‑Martin Corp., 644 F.3d 1321 (11th Cir. 2011), the Eleventh Circuit held that a plaintiff can survive summary judgment in a discrimination case even without satisfying McDonnell Douglas if the record presents a “convincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence” from which a reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination.

Subsequent cases refined this concept:

Lewis v. City of Union City, 934 F.3d 1169 (11th Cir. 2019) (en banc): clarified the use of comparator evidence and identified three broad types of circumstantial evidence that may form a mosaic: suspicious timing/ambiguous statements, better treatment of similarly situated comparators, and evidence of pretext.
Berry v. Crestwood Healthcare, 84 F.4th 1300 (11th Cir. 2023): reaffirmed that a “convincing mosaic” can prove retaliation and that “convincing mosaic” is a metaphor, not an independent legal test or rigid framework.
Tynes v. Florida Dep’t of Juvenile Justice, 88 F.4th 939 (11th Cir. 2023): explicitly described the convincing mosaic standard as a “rearticulation of the summary judgment standard” and explained that once an employer offers a legitimate reason, McDonnell Douglas “no longer has any work to do.”

Ismael builds upon these decisions by resolving lingering confusion: the “convincing mosaic” standard is broader than the pretext inquiry and not subsumed by it.

4. Causation: Comcast Corp. v. NAAAOM and Bostock v. Clayton County

The panel draws heavily on modern Supreme Court causation doctrine:

Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African American‑Owned Media, 589 U.S. 327 (2020), held that § 1981 requires “but-for” causation.
Bostock v. Clayton County, 590 U.S. 644 (2020), clarified that under “but-for” causation, an employer cannot escape liability by pointing to another factor that also contributed to the decision:
“[S]o long as the plaintiff’s [protected characteristic] was one but-for cause of that decision, that is enough to trigger the law.”

This matters for pretext: if the employer’s stated reason is partially true and genuinely causal (e.g., vehicle misuse), the plaintiff might still prevail if retaliation was also a but-for cause. Demanding that the plaintiff show the employer’s reason is false can be incompatible with a multiple-causation but‑for regime.

5. Other Key Authorities

Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454 (1975): § 1981 provides a federal remedy for private employment discrimination independent of Title VII.
CBOCS West, Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442 (2008): § 1981 supports a cause of action for retaliation against employees who complain about discrimination.
Jett v. Dallas Independent School District, 491 U.S. 701 (1989): § 1983 is the exclusive federal remedy for § 1981 violations by state actors; hence Ismael’s § 1981 claim necessarily runs through § 1983.
Swierkiewicz v. Sorema, 534 U.S. 506 (2002): McDonnell Douglas is not a pleading standard.
Postal Service Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 (1983) and Dudley v. Wal‑Mart, 166 F.3d 1317 (11th Cir. 1999): McDonnell Douglas has no role at trial and is not a jury instruction.
Hittle v. City of Stockton, 604 U.S. __ (2025) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari): cited by the panel for Justice Thomas’s criticism that McDonnell Douglas has generated “widespread confusion” and can distort summary judgment analysis by over-focusing on pretext.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. McDonnell Douglas is Limited and Non-Determinative

The Eleventh Circuit reiterates and deepens a line of its own cases: McDonnell Douglas is a procedural device, “designed only to establish an order of proof and production.” It is not:

A pleading requirement;
A trial standard; or
A post‑trial standard.

Critically, once the employer carries its burden of producing a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the presumption created by the prima facie case vanishes. At that point, the only question is whether the evidence as a whole permits a reasonable jury to find discriminatory or retaliatory intent.

2. Why Pretext ≠ Convincing Mosaic

The panel forcefully rejects the district court’s conclusion that “the convincing mosaic inquiry is identical to the final stage of the McDonnell Douglas framework.”

The pretext inquiry asks: has the plaintiff shown that the employer’s reason is false and that discrimination was the real reason? That is narrower than the ultimate Rule 56 question: could a reasonable jury, based on all the circumstantial evidence (including but not limited to pretext), infer intentional discrimination or retaliation?

Several points drive this distinction:

Under Comcast and Bostock, multiple but-for causes can exist: an employer might genuinely discipline someone for a rule violation and also be motivated by retaliatory animus. In such a case, insisting that the plaintiff prove the employer’s stated reason is false is doctrinally incorrect.
Focusing exclusively on discrediting the employer’s account risks ignoring strong affirmative evidence of discriminatory intent—e.g., timing, hostile remarks, patterns of unequal enforcement.
The Eleventh Circuit has already described pretext as just one type of circumstantial evidence within the larger “entire evidentiary picture.” Treating it as dispositive contradicts its own precedents (Yelling, Berry, Tynes).

As the panel puts it, the convincing mosaic standard is simply “a rearticulation of the summary judgment standard” in employment cases. Summary judgment must be denied whenever the record allows a reasonable jury to find intentional discrimination or retaliation—whether or not the plaintiff has “negated” all aspects of the employer’s explanation.

3. The Roadmap for District Courts

To prevent further doctrinal drift, the court offers a clear roadmap.

a. When the Plaintiff Establishes a Prima Facie Case

The plaintiff enjoys a rebuttable presumption of unlawful motive (discrimination/retaliation). If the employer does not respond with any legitimate reason, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment (or, at minimum, the employer’s summary judgment motion must be denied).
If the employer does articulate a legitimate reason, the presumption disappears and the McDonnell Douglas framework “drops out.” At this point:
- The court should not continue to treat the case as governed by “stages” of McDonnell Douglas.
- Instead, the court must apply the convincing mosaic/Rule 56 inquiry: whether the full evidence, viewed in the plaintiff’s favor, permits a reasonable jury to find unlawful intent.
- Evidence of pretext remains relevant and important—but failure to show pretext cannot be the sole basis for granting summary judgment.

b. When the Plaintiff Fails to Establish a Prima Facie Case

The plaintiff does not automatically lose. Instead:

The plaintiff simply does not obtain the temporary presumption that arises from establishing a prima facie case.
The court must still evaluate all the evidence under Rule 56 to determine whether a reasonable jury could find intentional discrimination or retaliation.

The court analogizes this to the common law doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in negligence:

If a plaintiff qualifies for a res ipsa inference, the defendant may face a rebuttable presumption of negligence, but even if res ipsa is unavailable, the case is not automatically dismissed—the court simply applies ordinary negligence standards without the presumption.
Similarly, McDonnell Douglas creates an evidentiary presumption for plaintiffs who satisfy its elements but is not an on–off switch for viability of claims.

C. Application to Ismael’s Evidence

The Eleventh Circuit did not definitively hold that Ismael’s evidence forms a convincing mosaic of retaliation, leaving that to the district court. But it clearly signaled that the prior analysis was improperly narrow.

The district court dismissed much of Ismael’s evidence because it did not:

Provide perfect “comparators,” or
Directly “contradict” the employer’s stated rationale.

For example, it found “immaterial” the affidavits stating that other officers routinely used patrol vehicles for personal errands without discipline and that supervisors knew it. The court reasoned:

“[E]ven assuming the alleged personal errands were common and Defendants were aware of these practices, they do not show the reason for [Ismael’s] termination was unworthy of credence because these are not appropriate comparators, nor do they establish conflicting testimony regarding the reason for [Ismael’s] termination.”

The Eleventh Circuit criticized this approach on multiple grounds:

Comparator evidence need not be perfect: Even where there are “material differences” between the plaintiff and others, such evidence can be probative. The weight of such evidence is for the jury.
Evidence need not negate the employer’s rationale to be relevant: Patterns of non-enforcement, suspicious timing, inconsistent statements, favoritism, or procedural irregularities can all support an inference of retaliatory or discriminatory intent even if the employer’s basic facts (e.g., that a rule was technically violated) are true.
The district court treated the summary judgment inquiry as if the only question were whether Ismael had discredited the employer’s reason, rather than whether all of his evidence together could lead a jury to infer retaliation.

The panel’s instruction on remand is explicit: the district court must now consider whether Ismael’s evidence—timing, hostile remarks by a friend of the sheriff, unusual use of termination for a commonly tolerated practice, the “Lookie here” email and negative reference to Burke County, the questionable “anonymous calls,” procedural irregularities, and shifting explanations—could, when viewed together, allow a reasonable jury to find that Ismael was terminated because he complained about racial harassment.

D. Impact on Future Cases and the Law

1. For District Courts

Ismael significantly constrains how district courts in the Eleventh Circuit may use McDonnell Douglas:

Courts may not treat failure to prove pretext as a short‑form conclusion that summary judgment must be granted.
Courts must separately, and explicitly, consider whether the full body of circumstantial evidence constitutes a convincing mosaic from which a reasonable jury could infer discrimination or retaliation.
Comparator analysis at summary judgment is not confined to an “all‑material‑respects identical” standard; differences go to weight, not admissibility or relevance.

2. For Plaintiffs

Plaintiffs gain a clearer path to trial even where:

They cannot find perfect comparators;
The employer’s stated reason has some factual truth; or
The evidentiary record supports multiple legitimate and illegitimate motives.

They can survive summary judgment by:

Assembling any combination of circumstantial evidence that creates a persuasive narrative of unlawful motive;
Emphasizing suspicious timing, hostile comments, irregular investigation or discipline, inconsistent explanations, patterns of leniency for others, and the like;
Framing their arguments explicitly in terms of the convincing mosaic / Rule 56 standard rather than relying exclusively on “pretext” rhetoric.

3. For Employers and Defendants

Employers can no longer assume that showing a plausible, documented non-discriminatory reason and attacking comparator evidence will suffice. They must:

Be prepared to address the totality of circumstances, including timing, internal communications, differential enforcement, and relationships between decisionmakers and alleged harassers.
Understand that even partial credibility of their rationale does not guarantee summary judgment if other evidence points to retaliatory motive as a but-for cause.

4. Doctrinally

Doctrinally, Ismael pushes the Eleventh Circuit further along a trajectory already evident in Smith, Lewis, Berry, and Tynes:

It demotes McDonnell Douglas from a quasi-substantive three-stage test to a conditional evidentiary presumption that may or may not be used, and that evaporates once the employer offers a legitimate reason.
It solidifies the “convincing mosaic” as the core articulation of Rule 56 in employment discrimination/retaliation cases.
It aligns the Circuit’s approach with modern causation doctrine (multiple but-for causes) and with Supreme Court concerns about overcomplication of summary judgment analysis in discrimination cases.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1983 in Public Employment

Section 1981 guarantees all persons the same right to make and enforce contracts as white citizens. Employment is a contractual relationship, so wrongful terminations and discriminatory refusals to hire can implicate § 1981.

However, when the defendant is a state or local governmental entity (like a sheriff’s office), the Supreme Court in Jett held that § 1983 is the exclusive vehicle for enforcing § 1981 rights. That is why Ismael’s § 1981 retaliation claim is, procedurally, a § 1983 claim alleging violation of § 1981.

2. Retaliation vs. Discrimination

Discrimination means treating someone worse because of a protected characteristic (race, sex, etc.).
Retaliation means punishing someone because they engaged in a protected activity, such as complaining about discrimination or filing a charge.

Many of the same frameworks (including McDonnell Douglas and “convincing mosaic”) apply to both, although the specific elements of the prima facie case differ.

3. The McDonnell Douglas Framework in Plain Terms

Prima facie case: The plaintiff shows basic facts that raise an initial inference of discrimination or retaliation (e.g., membership in protected group or protected activity, adverse action, and some indication of causation).
Employer’s reason: The employer must then produce a legitimate, non-discriminatory/non-retaliatory reason. (This is a burden of production, not proof.)
Pretext: The plaintiff gets a chance to show that this reason is not the true explanation and that unlawful motive actually drove the decision.

After the employer responds, the artificial “presumption” created in step one disappears. The factfinder (or summary judgment court) then simply asks: did discrimination/retaliation actually occur?

4. “Convincing Mosaic” of Circumstantial Evidence

A “convincing mosaic” is not a special legal test but a metaphor. Think of each piece of circumstantial evidence as a tile in a mosaic:

Suspicious timing;
A pattern of punishing some people but not others for similar conduct;
Comments revealing bias or animus;
Changing or inconsistent explanations;
Departures from normal procedures;
Evidence that the employer knew of the protected activity; and
Evidence undermining the credibility of the employer’s story.

The question is whether, when all these pieces are viewed together in the plaintiff’s favor, a reasonable juror could “see” a picture of discrimination or retaliation.

5. But-For Causation with Multiple Motives

“But-for causation” does not mean that the unlawful motive was the only reason. It means:

If you remove the unlawful motive, would the outcome have been different?

More than one factor can be a but-for cause. For example:

An employer legitimately dislikes an employee’s performance; and
The employer is also angry that the employee filed a discrimination complaint.

If, without the retaliatory anger, the employer would not have fired the employee (even with performance concerns), then retaliation is a but-for cause—even if performance problems were real.

6. Comparator Evidence

Comparator evidence asks: how did the employer treat others who were similarly situated but did not engage in the protected activity or do not have the protected characteristic?

While some cases use a strict “similarly situated in all material respects” standard at certain stages, Ismael makes clear that:

Imperfect comparators can still be probative; differences go to weight, not admissibility.
Patterns of differential treatment may support the mosaic even if no one is literally identical to the plaintiff.

VI. Conclusion

Ahmed S. Ismael v. Sheriff Richard Roundtree is a significant Eleventh Circuit decision that recalibrates the relationship between McDonnell Douglas and the “convincing mosaic” standard in employment discrimination and retaliation cases under § 1981 (and by extension, Title VII).

The court squarely holds that:

Failure to prove pretext does not automatically entitle an employer to summary judgment.
District courts must always conduct the broader Rule 56 inquiry—whether the totality of circumstantial evidence would allow a reasonable jury to find intentional discrimination or retaliation.
McDonnell Douglas is a procedural “order of proof,” not a rigid framework that controls outcomes once an employer offers a facially legitimate reason.

For practitioners, Ismael underscores the importance of building and analyzing the entire evidentiary record: not just attacking the employer’s explanation, but also assembling timing, remarks, comparators, procedural irregularities, and all other circumstantial indicators of unlawful motive into a coherent, “convincing mosaic” that can carry a case past summary judgment and into the hands of a jury.