Seventh Circuit Commentary: Arrington v. City of Chicago – Joint Enterprise Doctrine Embraces Criminal Ventures & Rule 601 Trumps Illinois Dead Man’s Act in Mixed Claims

1. Introduction

The consolidated appeal in Juanita Arrington v. City of Chicago, Nos. 23-2093, 23-2102 & 23-2284 (7th Cir. Aug. 1 2025), arises from a tragic high-speed collision between a fleeing robbery suspect and a Chicago Police Department (“CPD”) officer responding to an Illinois State Police (“ISP”) pursuit. The crash killed two occupants—including decedent Ronald Arrington—and injured others. Surviving passengers Michael Cokes and Isiah Stevenson, together with Arrington’s estate, sued Officer Dean Ewing and the City of Chicago for federal civil-rights violations and assorted state-law torts. A jury returned a defense verdict. Plaintiffs sought a new trial, challenging (i) the late-pleaded joint enterprise / contributory negligence defense, (ii) admission of testimony supposedly barred by the Illinois Dead Man’s Act, and (iii) exclusion of a highly critical Civilian Office of Police Accountability (“COPA”) report. The Seventh Circuit affirmed across the board.

Although the opinion resolves several evidentiary and procedural disputes, its enduring significance lies in two doctrinal clarifications:

1. Illinois’s joint enterprise rule for imputing negligence is not limited to legitimate commercial ventures; it can extend to coordinated criminal activity.
2. When federal and state causes of action are tried together, Federal Rule of Evidence 601—not state competency statutes such as the Illinois Dead Man’s Act—governs witness competency whenever the testimony relates to the federal claim.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Jackson-Akiwumi held:

• The district court did not abuse its discretion by permitting the City and Ewing to assert a joint-enterprise affirmative defense after the original pleadings cutoff, because plaintiffs waived any objection to the scope of supplemental discovery.
• Illinois precedent—most notably Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 8 N.E.2d 934 (Ill. 1937)—does not foreclose applying joint-enterprise negligence to a criminal venture; the jury properly received the defense, even though it ultimately rejected it.
• Rule 601 rendered the Illinois Dead Man’s Act inapplicable because the challenged testimony (Arrington’s pre-collision statements and conduct) “related to” the § 1983 excessive-force claim as well as the state torts.
• The district court soundly excluded the COPA investigative report under Rule 403; any “door-opening” by Officer Ewing’s stray remarks was cured by striking testimony and issuing limiting instructions.

Concluding there was no legal error or evidentiary abuse affecting substantial rights, the panel affirmed denial of the motion for new trial and the defense judgment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Grubb v. Illinois Terminal Co., 8 N.E.2d 934 (Ill. 1937) – Classic joint-enterprise case; court relies on its broad language to reject plaintiffs’ argument that only “lawful business ventures” qualify.
• Restatement (Second) of Torts § 491 – Cited by both the Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions and the Seventh Circuit for a flexible, partnership-like definition of joint enterprise.
• Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) – Governs state substantive law in diversity or supplemental state claims; informs the panel’s state-law analysis.
• Estate of Suskovich v. Anthem Health Plans, 553 F.3d 559 (7th Cir. 2009) & Donohoe v. Consolidated O&P Corp., 736 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1990) – Applied Rule 601 over state dead-man statutes where testimony touched federal claims; adopted here.
• Young v. James Green Mgmt., 327 F.3d 616 (7th Cir. 2003) & Vance v. Peters, 97 F.3d 987 (7th Cir. 1996) – Support excluding agency investigative findings under Rule 403.
• Santiago v. Lane, 894 F.2d 218 (7th Cir. 1990) – Distinguished; contributory negligence may still be raised in § 1983 excessive-force cases not alleging intentional/reckless conduct.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Late-Pleaded Affirmative Defense
   Federal Rule 15(b) affords trial courts discretion to allow late amendments when they do not prejudice the opposing party. Here, the district judge granted 30 days of extra discovery and plaintiffs never sought more; waiver doctrine barred appellate challenge.
2. Substantive Viability of Joint Enterprise in Criminal Context
   Illinois authorities use “business” language merely to denote mutual pecuniary interest, not legality. No Illinois case squarely restricts the doctrine to lawful ventures, and pattern instructions are non-binding. The Seventh Circuit therefore predicted that Illinois Supreme Court would allow the defense even in an illegal scheme.
3. Sufficiency of the Evidence
   Under the deferential “more than a mere scintilla” standard, circumstantial proof—circling the lot, knowledge of Malone as a “getaway driver,” post-robbery cash, multiple chances to exit—permitted the jury to consider the defense (even though it ultimately declined to find a joint enterprise).
4. Rule 601 vs. Illinois Dead Man’s Act
   Because Arrington’s conduct was relevant to proximate cause on the § 1983 claim, testimony “related to” both federal and state causes of action. Applying the Senate Committee’s guidance (mirroring Rule 501 privilege notes), the federal rule favoring admissibility governed.
5. Exclusion of COPA Report
   The trial judge balanced probative value against unfair prejudice and jury confusion. Because plaintiffs could (and did) present the underlying facts via experts and other witnesses, the report’s conclusory administrative findings posed a Rule 403 hazard. Remedial “door-opening” was satisfied by striking offending testimony—not by admitting the entire report.

3.3 Likely Impact on Future Litigation

• Expanded Use of Joint Enterprise Negligence – Defendants in Illinois tort actions—particularly involving co-participants in crime—may more confidently plead imputed contributory negligence, forcing plaintiffs to distinguish or limit the doctrine.
• Dead Man’s Act Narrowed in Federal Court – Litigants cannot assume Illinois (or other states’) competency bars will apply where any federal claim is asserted and the testimony overlaps; strategic pleading must account for Rule 601 supremacy.
• Agency Investigative Reports – The opinion reinforces a cautious approach to high-level findings by oversight bodies (COPA, EEOC, etc.); trial counsel should anticipate Rule 403 challenges and prepare to present underlying evidence independently.
• Door-Opening Doctrine – The panel signals that trial judges retain broad remedial discretion short of admitting otherwise-inadmissible evidence; practitioners should tailor objections and offers of proof accordingly.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

4.1 Joint Enterprise & Imputed Negligence

Think of a joint enterprise as a temporary partnership on wheels. If two or more people embark on a venture for mutual gain and share control over the car, the negligence of one driver is legally treated as the negligence of all, blocking any of them from recovering damages against a third party. The Seventh Circuit confirms the rule applies even when the “gain” is illicit.

4.2 Illinois Dead Man’s Act vs. Federal Rule 601

Illinois generally bars a living party from testifying about conversations or events in the presence of a deceased opponent, to prevent one-sided accounts. Federal Rule 601, however, says witnesses are competent unless a state rule applies to a claim governed solely by state law. Where federal claims are also in play and the same testimony matters, Rule 601 overrides, so the witness can speak.

4.3 Federal Rule of Evidence 403

Even relevant evidence can be excluded if it is likely to derail the jury through prejudice or confusion. “Unfair prejudice” means a tendency to make the jury decide on an improper, emotional basis; “confusion” covers evidence that invites jurors to decide issues the court must resolve (e.g., whether an agency said the officer was at fault).

5. Conclusion

Arrington v. City of Chicago solidifies two practical rules for litigants in the Seventh Circuit:

1. Illinois joint-enterprise negligence is alive, well, and not confined to lawful pursuits.
2. State dead-man statutes give way to Federal Rule 601 whenever testimony overlaps a federal cause of action.

The decision also underscores the appellate deference accorded to trial judges in managing late affirmative defenses and balancing Rule 403 concerns, and it supplies fresh guidance on curing “door-opening” errors without derailing a civil jury trial. Future plaintiffs—especially those injured while participating (willingly or not) in criminal conduct—must now anticipate defenses grounded in joint-enterprise imputations, while defense counsel must still marshal more than a “mere scintilla” of proof. Equally, parties should be keenly aware that injecting a federal claim into their pleadings may nullify the protective shield of the Illinois Dead Man’s Act.