Actual Receipt of Online Public-Records Requests as a Prerequisite for Mandamus and Statutory Damages:
Commentary on State ex rel. Barker v. Muskingum Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 2025-Ohio-5293

I. Introduction

In State ex rel. Barker v. Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office, 2025-Ohio-5293, the Supreme Court of Ohio addressed a problem that is increasingly common in the digital era: what happens when a requester tries to submit a public-records request online, but a technical failure prevents the public office from ever receiving it?

The relator, Dustin Barker, proceeding pro se, claimed to have submitted a public-records request to the Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office via the office’s online request form in October 2024. The prosecutor’s office produced evidence that the attempted submission “bounced back” and never reached the office’s email system. Barker then filed a mandamus action in the Supreme Court of Ohio seeking to compel production of records, as well as statutory damages, attorney’s fees, court costs, and injunctive relief under R.C. 149.351. He also sought sanctions and a “protective order” based on alleged intimidation and improper disclosure of mediation communications.

The Court’s opinion, issued per curiam, does more than simply resolve a dispute between one requester and one prosecutor’s office. It crystallizes several important principles in Ohio public-records law and jurisdictional doctrine:

• A public office’s duties under R.C. 149.43 are triggered by receipt of a public-records request, not by a requester’s mere attempt to send one.
• A failed online submission that never reaches the office does not constitute an enforceable “electronic submission” for purposes of mandamus or statutory damages.
• The Supreme Court of Ohio lacks original jurisdiction over injunctive claims under R.C. 149.351 and cannot grant non-ancillary injunctive relief in a mandamus action.
• Ohio’s mediation-privilege statute, R.C. 2710.03, restricts discovery and admissibility of mediation communications, but does not create a broad prohibition on their disclosure in other contexts.

The decision thus occupies an important place at the intersection of public-records enforcement, electronic communication, and the limits of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Factual Background

Barker alleged that on October 16, 2024, he used the Muskingum County Prosecutor’s Office’s website to submit a public-records request via its online form (¶ 2). He supported this assertion only with his own affidavit; he produced no documentary evidence (such as confirmation emails, screenshots, or server logs) showing successful submission.

The prosecutor’s office, by contrast, produced an affidavit from an assistant prosecutor explaining the office’s procedures for the online form and attaching a delivery notification from the website vendor (¶ 3). According to that evidence:

• When a user submits a request using the online form, it is supposed to be forwarded to the office’s general email address.
• On October 12, 2024, Barker attempted to use the form, but the submission “bounced back” and “delivery of the request failed.”
• The prosecutor’s office never received the request and was unaware of it until it was served with Barker’s mandamus complaint (¶ 6).

After being served with the complaint, the prosecutor’s office responded to Barker’s request and provided certain records in January 2025 (¶ 6).

B. Procedural History

Barker filed his complaint in December 2024, seeking:

• A writ of mandamus compelling disclosure of public records;
• Statutory damages, attorney’s fees, and court costs;
• Injunctive relief under R.C. 149.351 to prevent the destruction of records and to have the Court “inquire into the possibility of data recovery” for any destroyed records (¶ 4).

The case was briefly referred to mediation and then returned to the regular docket (¶ 5). The Court:

• Denied the prosecutor’s office’s amended motion to dismiss and issued an alternative writ (¶ 5);
• Ordered the filing of an answer and a schedule for evidence and briefs (¶ 5).

Barker later filed a motion for sanctions and a “protective order,” alleging:

• An intimidating email from an assistant prosecutor referencing both a Facebook post Barker had made and the elected prosecutor, Ron Welch (¶ 8);
• Public disclosure of mediation communications in violation of R.C. 2710.03 (¶ 9).

C. Holdings

The Supreme Court of Ohio held as follows:

1. Mandamus claim: Denied. Barker did not prove by clear and convincing evidence that the prosecutor’s office received his public records request before he filed his mandamus complaint. Without receipt, no duty under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) arose (¶¶ 12–14).
2. Statutory damages: Denied. Because the office never received a written request by “electronic submission” within the meaning of R.C. 149.43(C)(2), Barker could not satisfy the statutory requirements for damages (¶ 15).
3. Attorney’s fees: Denied. As a pro se litigant, Barker incurred no attorney’s fees and is ineligible for such an award under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b) (¶ 16).
4. Court costs: Denied. Barker filed an affidavit of indigency, so there were no court costs for the Court to award (¶ 16).
5. Injunctive relief under R.C. 149.351: Dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Such actions must be brought in a court of common pleas; the Supreme Court has no original jurisdiction over them (¶ 17).
6. Motion for sanctions and protective order: Denied. Barker provided no authority or evidence that the assistant prosecutor’s alleged conduct was sanctionable, and R.C. 2710.03 does not prohibit the kind of disclosures Barker alleged (¶¶ 8–11). The requested “protective order” was, in effect, an injunction, which the Court lacks original jurisdiction to issue in a mandamus case except as ancillary relief—and the requested relief was not ancillary (¶ 11).

III. Analysis of the Opinion

A. Precedents and Authorities Cited

1. State ex rel. Ware v. Gabbard, 2025-Ohio-1022

The Court’s central doctrinal move is to analogize Barker’s failed online submission to the situation in State ex rel. Ware v. Gabbard (¶ 13). In Gabbard, the relator tried to send public-records requests by mail but addressed them incorrectly, so they never reached the public office. The Court held that the relator had not proven, by clear and convincing evidence, that he had submitted a public-records request to the respondent (¶ 13).

Barker extends that reasoning from physical to electronic communications. Just as misaddressed mail that never arrives cannot trigger a public office’s duties, a web-form submission that technically fails and “bounces back” likewise never becomes a “request” that the office is obliged to honor. The Court emphasizes that receipt, not mere attempted transmission, is the legally operative event (¶ 13).

2. Strothers v. Norton, 2012-Ohio-1007

The Court also relies on Strothers v. Norton to frame the requirement of a prior public-records request as a prerequisite to mandamus relief. In Strothers, the Court held that “a prior public-records request is a prerequisite to a mandamus action” (¶ 14). In other words, the mandamus action cannot be used as the first instance of a request; it can only be used to enforce an existing, previously made request.

In Barker, the Court synthesizes Gabbard and Strothers to conclude:

• The “prior request” must have been received;
• A request that comes into being only through service of the mandamus complaint itself is not enforceable in that same mandamus action (¶ 14).

3. State ex rel. Wells v. Lakota Local Schools Bd. of Edn., 2024-Ohio-3316, and State ex rel. Griffin v. Sehlmeyer, 2021-Ohio-1419

These cases are cited for well-established propositions:

• A writ of mandamus is an appropriate vehicle to enforce Ohio’s Public Records Act, R.C. 149.43 (¶ 12; citing Wells).
• To obtain a writ, the requester must prove, by clear and convincing evidence, both a clear legal right to the records and a clear legal duty on the part of the public office to provide them (¶ 12; citing Griffin).

These cases establish the evidentiary and remedial framework within which the Court evaluates Barker’s proof of receipt.

4. State ex rel. Grim v. New Holland, 2024-Ohio-4822

Grim is cited to reinforce that a relator must prove entitlement to statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) by clear and convincing evidence (¶ 15). It underscores that statutory damages are not automatic; they require strict compliance with the statute’s procedural conditions, including the method of submission of the request.

5. State ex rel. Huth v. Animal Welfare League of Trumbull Cty., Inc., 2022-Ohio-3583

Huth confirms that a pro se litigant cannot recover “attorney’s fees” because that party has not, in fact, incurred any such fees (¶ 16). Barker simply applies this principle to R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b), which conditions attorney’s-fee awards on the incurring of fees.

6. State ex rel. Woods v. Lawrence Cty. Sheriff’s Office, 2023-Ohio-1241

Woods is cited for the proposition that when a relator files an affidavit of indigency, there are no court costs for the Court to award (¶ 16). Thus, even if the Court were inclined to award costs, there is nothing to shift.

7. State ex rel. Barr v. Wesson, 2023-Ohio-3028, and State ex rel. Police Officers for Equal Rights v. Lashutka, 1995-Ohio-19

These cases are central to the Court’s treatment of Barker’s motion for a “protective order,” which the Court correctly characterizes as a request for an injunction (¶ 11). In Barr, relying on Lashutka, the Court held:

• The Supreme Court does not possess original jurisdiction to grant injunctive relief as such in a mandamus case (¶ 11).
• The Court has only “such jurisdiction as ancillary to other appropriate relief,” meaning ancillary measures that are necessary to effectuate its primary jurisdiction (¶ 11, quoting Lashutka, ¶ 11).
• A request for temporary restraining orders or preliminary injunctions to prevent retaliation is not ancillary to a mandamus claim seeking the disclosure of public records (¶ 11; applying Barr and Lashutka).

The Court in Barker holds that a similar request—to bar alleged intimidation and references to Barker’s past prosecution—is likewise not ancillary and thus beyond the Court’s original jurisdiction (¶ 11).

8. State ex rel. Culgan v. Jefferson Cty. Prosecutor, 2024-Ohio-4715

Culgan is used to dispose of Barker’s separate claim for injunctive relief under R.C. 149.351 (¶ 17). R.C. 149.351(B)(1) authorizes a “civil action in the court of common pleas” for injunctive relief and other remedies when public records are removed or destroyed in violation of R.C. 149.351(A).

Culgan holds that the Supreme Court of Ohio has no original jurisdiction under R.C. 149.351(B), even when such a claim is coupled with a mandamus action under R.C. 149.43 (¶ 17). Barker simply applies this rule and dismisses the R.C. 149.351 claim for lack of jurisdiction.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. The Trigger for Public-Records Obligations: Receipt, Not Attempt

R.C. 149.43(B)(1) provides that “upon request by any person, a public office or person responsible for public records shall make copies of the requested public record available to the requester at cost and within a reasonable period of time.”

The Court reads “upon request” to mean that the public office’s duty is triggered only when the office has been actually put on notice of the request—i.e., when it has received the communication. The logical steps in the Court’s reasoning are:

1. A mandamus relator must show a clear legal duty on the part of the respondent office (¶ 12).
2. That duty arises only “upon request” under R.C. 149.43(B)(1) (¶ 12).
3. A “request” in this sense is a communication that has been received by the office; it is not enough that the relator tried to send something that never arrived (¶ 13, analogizing to Gabbard).
4. The unrefuted evidence here shows that Barker’s attempted online submission “bounced back” and never reached the prosecutor’s office (¶ 3, ¶ 13).
5. Accordingly, Barker has not carried his burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that the prosecutor’s office had a legal duty to produce records based on a request it never received (¶¶ 12–13).

The Court therefore denies the writ of mandamus. This is not a holding that Barker was forbidden from making such a request, nor that the office may ignore properly received electronic requests. Rather, it is a holding that technical failure in transmission leaves no enforceable request for purposes of mandamus.

2. Timing: The Request Must Precede the Mandamus Case

The Court notes that once the prosecutor’s office received the mandamus complaint in January 2025, it did respond to Barker and produced some records (¶ 6). The parties dispute in their briefs whether that response was adequate (¶ 14).

However, the Court declines to reach that issue because a mandamus action to enforce the Public Records Act must be based on a request that existed before the case was filed:

• “For a public-records request to be enforceable in mandamus, it must have been received before the mandamus case was filed.” (¶ 14, citing Strothers).
• Service of the complaint cannot retroactively cure the lack of a prior request.

This respects the function of mandamus as an extraordinary remedy to compel performance of a preexisting duty, not as an alternative method of initiating requests.

3. Statutory Damages: What Counts as a “Written Request” by “Electronic Submission”

R.C. 149.43(C)(2) allows statutory damages if the requester proves, by clear and convincing evidence, that:

• The public office failed to comply with its obligations; and
• The requester submitted a written request by:
  • hand delivery,
  • electronic submission, or
  • certified mail
  to the public office or the person responsible for the records.

The Court’s key point is that Barker did not successfully submit his request by “electronic submission” because the message never reached the office (¶ 15). The phrase “electronic submission” is therefore read in parallel with hand delivery and certified mail: in each case, the receipt by the office is what defines a completed submission. If the email or online-form result never arrives, no “submission” has occurred for purposes of statutory damages.

The Court concludes that Barker is not entitled to statutory damages (¶ 15).

4. Attorney’s Fees and Costs for a Pro Se Relator

Under R.C. 149.43(C)(3)(b), attorney’s fees may be awarded when certain conditions are met, but the fundamental predicate is the existence of attorney’s fees actually incurred. Applying Huth, the Court reiterates that a self-represented litigant cannot recover fees that were never paid (¶ 16).

As to court costs, the filing of an affidavit of indigency means that the Court did not assess costs to Barker. Consistent with Woods, there is nothing to award or shift to the prosecutor’s office (¶ 16).

5. Jurisdiction over Injunctive Relief under R.C. 149.351

R.C. 149.351 protects public records from unlawful destruction or removal. Subsection (B)(1) gives an “aggrieved” person a cause of action for injunctive and other relief, specifically designating the court of common pleas as the forum.

The Supreme Court stresses two points (¶ 17):

1. The statute vests subject-matter jurisdiction over such actions in the courts of common pleas, not the Supreme Court.
2. In Culgan, the Court confirmed that it lacks original jurisdiction to adjudicate R.C. 149.351(B) claims, even when they are bundled with an R.C. 149.43 mandamus claim.

Barker’s request for injunctive relief and for an “inquiry” into possible destruction of records thus runs into a jurisdictional wall. The Court dismisses this portion of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, without reaching the merits (¶ 17).

6. Sanctions, Mediation Confidentiality, and First Amendment Claims

Barker’s motion for sanctions rested on two allegations (¶¶ 8–9):

• An assistant prosecutor sent an email that was allegedly intended to intimidate him by referencing his prior prosecution and prison sentence (“P.S. Ron Welch sends his regards”).
• The prosecutor’s office improperly disclosed mediation communications in response to Barker’s social-media posts, purportedly violating R.C. 2710.03.

The Court denies the motion, emphasizing:

• Barker submitted no evidentiary support (such as the actual email) and cited no authority establishing that the alleged conduct is sanctionable (¶ 10).
• R.C. 2710.03 makes mediation communications privileged and non-discoverable/non-admissible in proceedings; it does not create a broad, free-standing prohibition on all forms of public disclosure (¶ 10).
• The “protective order” Barker seeks would, in substance, be an injunction against future conduct (intimidation, references to past prosecution), and as explained under Barr and Lashutka, this Court has no original jurisdiction to grant that type of relief in a mandamus action (¶ 11).

In short, the Court both finds no substantive basis for sanctions and no jurisdictional basis for the requested injunctive-type “protective order.”

C. Impact on Future Cases and Public-Records Practice

1. Clarifying the Legal Risk of Technical Failures in Electronic Requests

Barker sends a clear message to both requesters and public offices:

• Requesters bear the risk of non-delivery. If a request is never received—whether because of a wrong mailing address, an email bounce, or a web-form error—the requester will have great difficulty proving an enforceable request by clear and convincing evidence.
• Public offices are not deemed to have violated R.C. 149.43 if they never, in fact, received the request. A technical failure on the requester’s side, or somewhere in the digital pipeline, does not convert an unreceived submission into a legal breach.

As a precedent, Barker will likely be cited when disputes arise about lost or bounced emails, failed uploads, and malfunctioning online portals. It aligns electronic communications with postal mail in the evidentiary and doctrinal sense: no delivery, no enforceable request.

2. Litigation Strategy and Burden of Proof

Because mandamus and statutory damages both require clear and convincing evidence of a qualifying request, this opinion underscores the importance of:

• Retaining proof of successful electronic submission (confirmation emails, automated receipts, screenshots, server logs);
• Using multiple channels (e.g., email plus certified mail) if the requester anticipates potential litigation or significant resistance.

For public offices, Barker may encourage clearer documentation of how online request systems function and better recordkeeping of submissions. If disputes arise, the office’s server logs and vendor-generated delivery reports, like those used here (¶ 3), will be key evidence.

3. Jurisdictional Line-Drawing under R.C. 149.351

On the remedial side, Barker, following Culgan, draws a bright jurisdictional line:

• Claims about destruction or removal of public records under R.C. 149.351 must be filed in a court of common pleas.
• Those claims cannot be shoehorned into the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction, even when combined with a mandamus claim over public records.

Practically, this means litigants may have to pursue a dual-track strategy:

• A mandamus action (often in the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court) to compel production of existing records under R.C. 149.43.
• A separate civil action in the court of common pleas under R.C. 149.351(B) for injunctive relief or damages arising from destruction or removal of records.

This division of forums may affect timing, costs, and strategic choices, particularly in complex disputes involving both non-disclosure and alleged destruction.

4. Mediation Communications and Public Records Disputes

The Court’s brief but pointed reading of R.C. 2710.03 has implications beyond this case:

• It clarifies that the mediation privilege is procedural (concerning discovery and admissibility) and does not necessarily regulate public commentary, press statements, or other disclosures outside “proceedings.”
• Parties engaged in court mediation remain protected against having their mediation statements used as evidence against them, but the statute does not, by itself, create an all-purpose gag rule.

This may matter in high-profile public-records disputes where parties discuss the mediation process publicly. While there may be ethical, strategic, or professional constraints on such disclosures, R.C. 2710.03 alone is not as broad a shield as Barker claimed.

IV. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Mandamus

A writ of mandamus is a court order commanding a public official or office to perform a clear legal duty. In the public-records context:

• The relator must show a clear legal right to the records (they are public, and the law entitles the requester to them).
• The respondent must have a clear legal duty to provide the records (a proper request was received, and no valid exemption or excuse applies).
• The relator must show this by clear and convincing evidence, a standard that requires proof stronger than a mere preponderance but less than beyond a reasonable doubt.

B. Clear and Convincing Evidence

“Clear and convincing” means the evidence must create a firm belief or conviction in the fact-finder’s mind about the facts being asserted. It is not enough for the evidence to barely tip the scales; it must be substantially persuasive.

In Barker, this standard applied to:

• Whether a public-records request was submitted and received (¶ 12–13);
• Whether the conditions for statutory damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2) were met (¶ 15).

C. Statutory Damages under R.C. 149.43(C)(2)

Statutory damages in Ohio public-records cases are a kind of fixed monetary remedy that the law provides when certain requirements are met, even if actual monetary loss is hard to quantify. Among those requirements:

• The requester must have made a written request by one of the authorized methods (hand, electronic, or certified mail);
• The public office must not have complied properly;
• The requester must prove these facts by clear and convincing evidence (¶ 15, citing Grim).

In this case, the key failure was the absence of a successful electronic submission.

D. Pro Se Litigant and Attorney’s Fees

A “pro se” litigant is someone who represents himself or herself without a lawyer. Courts generally do not award attorney’s fees to pro se litigants because:

• There is no attorney-client relationship; and
• No actual legal fees were paid or incurred.

Thus, even where a statute authorizes an attorney-fee award, it is limited to parties who have actually retained and paid (or become liable to pay) a lawyer. Barker applies this principle directly (¶ 16).

E. Jurisdiction and Ancillary Relief

“Jurisdiction” refers to a court’s power to hear and decide certain kinds of cases. The Ohio Constitution and statutes define:

• Which courts can issue mandamus writs (including the Supreme Court); and
• Which courts can grant injunctive relief in specific statutory actions (such as the courts of common pleas under R.C. 149.351).

“Ancillary” jurisdiction means a court’s power to issue orders that are necessary to carry out or protect its primary jurisdiction. In Barker:

• The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over mandamus actions but not over general injunction actions.
• It can issue injunction-like orders only when they are strictly necessary to make its mandamus power effective (ancillary relief).
• A broad injunction against alleged “intimidating conduct” is not necessary to resolve a public-records mandamus claim and thus lies outside ancillary jurisdiction (¶ 11).

F. Mediation Privilege under R.C. 2710.03

R.C. 2710.03 makes “mediation communications” privileged, which means:

• Parties generally cannot be forced (through discovery) to disclose what was said in mediation; and
• Those communications are generally not admissible as evidence in court proceedings.

The statute, however, does not explicitly prohibit all statements about mediation from being made publicly. The Court in Barker underscores that the statute’s effect is limited to discovery and admissibility, not to every conceivable kind of disclosure (¶ 10).

V. Conclusion

State ex rel. Barker v. Muskingum Cty. Prosecutor’s Office serves as a significant clarification of how Ohio’s Public Records Act operates in an era dominated by electronic communication. The decision cements several key principles:

• Actual receipt of a public-records request is required before any duty to respond arises under R.C. 149.43(B)(1), and before mandamus or statutory damages can be pursued.
• A failed online or electronic submission—like misaddressed snail mail—does not create an enforceable request; technical transmission errors fall on the requester, not the public office.
• Requests that come into being only through the filing or service of a mandamus complaint cannot be enforced in that same mandamus action.
• Pro se litigants cannot recover attorney’s fees, and an affidavit of indigency eliminates court costs to be shifted.
• Jurisdiction over destruction-of-records claims under R.C. 149.351 belongs exclusively to the courts of common pleas; the Supreme Court cannot adjudicate such claims in its original jurisdiction.
• The Supreme Court’s ability to issue injunction-like relief in mandamus cases is strictly limited to ancillary measures, and broad behavioral injunctions (such as those sought by Barker) exceed that authority.
• Ohio’s mediation-privilege statute limits the use of mediation communications in litigation but does not create a comprehensive ban on all public disclosures of such communications.

Taken together, these holdings reinforce a structured and relatively formal view of public-records enforcement: rights and remedies depend not merely on a requester’s intent or attempts, but on documented receipt, statutory jurisdiction, and clearly defined procedural prerequisites.

For practitioners, Barker underscores the importance of documenting public-records requests, understanding the separate remedial paths for non-disclosure and destruction of records, and appreciating the jurisdictional and evidentiary limits within which the Supreme Court of Ohio operates in this domain.