§ 46504 Requires Only General Intent: Eleventh Circuit Reaffirms No Need to Prove Intent to Intimidate or to Interfere, and Clarifies that “Knowingly” Attaches to Conduct (United States v. Olvera)

Introduction

This commentary examines the Eleventh Circuit’s unpublished, per curiam decision in United States v. Billy Olvera (No. 24-12832, Oct. 7, 2025), affirming a conviction under 49 U.S.C. § 46504 for interference with flight crew members or attendants. The case involved an Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agent who surreptitiously recorded a flight attendant during flight, prompting the crew to reassign duties mid-flight and resulting in the attendant ceasing her service. On appeal, Olvera challenged (1) a jury instruction clarifying that the government need not prove he intended to intimidate or to interfere, and (2) the denial of his motion for judgment of acquittal.

The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed that § 46504 is a general-intent offense under United States v. Grossman, 131 F.3d 1449 (11th Cir. 1997), held that the government need not prove specific intent to intimidate or interfere, and concluded that “knowingly” attaches to the defendant’s conduct (voluntary, non-accidental acts), not to the defendant’s awareness that the victim felt intimidated. The court also distinguished Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015), and applied the Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel precedent rule to hold that Grossman controls.

Summary of the Opinion

The court affirmed Olvera’s conviction for violating § 46504. It held:

Section 46504 is a general-intent crime; the government need not prove the defendant specifically intended to intimidate a flight attendant or intended to interfere with her duties (Grossman controls).
The district court did not err by instructing the jury: “The Government does not have to prove that the Defendant acted with the intent to intimidate the flight attendant or acted with the intent to interfere with her performance of her duties.”
Elonis does not alter Grossman’s general-intent reading of § 46504. A “knowingly” requirement is sufficient to separate wrongful from innocent conduct for this statute.
The government was not required to show that Olvera knew the flight attendant was intimidated. It was enough that he knowingly engaged in conduct that intimidated her and interfered with her duties.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the government, ample evidence supported the verdict: the surreptitious recordings, the attendant’s testimony of feeling violated and helpless at 36,000 feet, her immediate cessation of duties, the captain’s instructions, and the forensic evidence (23 photos and 20 videos).

Factual and Procedural Background

On November 6, 2023, on American Airlines Flight 232 (Dallas–Miami), flight attendant A.G. noticed that ICE agent Olvera was seated in the aisle seat rather than his assigned middle seat and positioned himself so attendants had to brush by him. During beverage service, A.G. observed Olvera’s phone near his thigh with the camera angled upward. When she leaned in after he spoke softly to her, she saw the camera within inches of her knees; he quickly slid the phone up to conceal the screen. A.G. and another flight attendant, L.A., then devised a plan to film Olvera as she walked the aisle. L.A.’s video captured Olvera covertly recording A.G. with a second phone. A.G. reported the conduct to the captain, who directed her to cease duties and remain in the back with L.A.; the captain also arranged for a mid-flight jump-seat change and law enforcement to meet the plane in Miami.

After landing, agents seized Olvera’s phones; a warrant-backed forensic exam revealed 23 photos and 20 videos of A.G., many angled to capture up-skirt or backside images. Charged with intimidating or attempting to intimidate a flight attendant in violation of § 46504, Olvera went to trial. Over defense objection, the district court added to the pattern instruction that the government need not prove intent to intimidate or to interfere. The jury convicted. The district court denied both a mid-trial and a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal. Olvera received two years’ probation and appealed.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

United States v. Grossman, 131 F.3d 1449 (11th Cir. 1997): The controlling Eleventh Circuit decision holding § 46504 is a general-intent offense. There is no specific-intent element on the face of the statute, and nothing in the legislative change from § 1472(j) to § 46504 indicated a shift to specific intent. Grossman is the linchpin that forecloses the defense’s specific-intent theory.
Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions (Criminal) O118: Provides elements for § 46504 and defines “intimidate” two ways: (a) intentionally saying or doing something that would cause a person of ordinary sensibilities to fear bodily harm; or (b) saying or doing something to make another person fearful or cause them to refrain from (or do) something they otherwise would not. The comments cite Grossman and state the statute does not require specific intent. The panel reiterates that pattern instructions are not binding authority where they diverge from case law (United States v. Dohan, 508 F.3d 989, 994 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Ettinger, 344 F.3d 1149, 1158 (11th Cir. 2003)).
Elonis v. United States, 575 U.S. 723 (2015): Interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (threats), the Supreme Court held that when a statute is silent on mens rea, courts should read in a mental state sufficient to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. For § 875(c), that required knowledge of the threatening nature of the communications. The Eleventh Circuit distinguishes Elonis, concluding that a general “knowingly” requirement is sufficient for § 46504 to screen out accidents or mistakes.
United States v. Lynch, 881 F.3d 812, 816 (10th Cir. 2018): Cited as consistent with Elonis, holding that a general-intent reading of § 46504—requiring voluntary, deliberate conduct—satisfies Elonis’s mens rea principles.
United States v. Knight, 490 F.3d 1268, 1271 (11th Cir. 2007): For general-intent crimes, the government must prove the defendant “knowingly engaged in the conduct” prohibited by the statute; no additional specific intent is required.
Prior Panel Precedent Rule: United States v. Archer, 531 F.3d 1347, 1352 (11th Cir. 2008) and United States v. Dubois, 139 F.4th 887, 892–93 (11th Cir. 2025): A panel is bound by prior published precedent unless overruled by the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc; intervening Supreme Court authority abrogates only if “clearly on point” and “clearly contrary.” Elonis did not meet that standard vis-à-vis Grossman.
Standards of Review: United States v. Hill, 643 F.3d 807, 850 (11th Cir. 2011) (de novo review of correctness of legal content of instructions); United States v. Carter, 776 F.3d 1309, 1323 n.11 (11th Cir. 2015) (deference to phrasing); United States v. Prather, 205 F.3d 1265, 1270 (11th Cir. 2000) (broad discretion; reversal only if charge misstates law or improperly guides jury); United States v. Maxi, 886 F.3d 1318, 1332 (11th Cir. 2018) (must affect substantial rights); United States v. Beasley, 72 F.3d 1518, 1525 (11th Cir. 1996) (instructions considered as a whole); United States v. Chafin, 808 F.3d 1263, 1268 (11th Cir. 2015) (de novo review of denial of judgment of acquittal); United States v. Clay, 832 F.3d 1259, 1294 (11th Cir. 2016) (verdict sustained if any reasonable construction supports it).

Legal Reasoning

The panel’s reasoning proceeds in three principal steps.

Mens rea under § 46504: General intent suffices. The panel reaffirms Grossman’s holding that § 46504 contains no specific-intent element. The statute criminalizes “assaulting or intimidating” a flight attendant such that their performance is interfered with or lessened; it does not require an intent to achieve that interference or to cause intimidation. As a result, the district court correctly instructed that the government did not have to prove an intent to intimidate or to interfere.
Pattern instruction language does not override binding precedent. Olvera argued that the pattern instruction’s second “intimidation” clause—“to say or do something to make another person fearful or make that person refrain from doing something”—implies specific intent to “make” a result occur. The panel responds: (a) pattern instructions are not binding; (b) any tension yields to Grossman’s published holding; and (c) even read alongside Elonis, a general “knowingly” requirement across the conduct elements adequately separates wrongful from innocent behavior for § 46504.
Elonis does not abrogate Grossman. Elonis dealt with threats under § 875(c) and required knowledge of the threatening nature of the communication because that was the “crucial element” distinguishing lawful from unlawful conduct in that statute. For § 46504, the crucial line is whether the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that “assaults or intimidates” and that in fact interferes with or lessens the attendant’s ability to perform duties. The general-intent requirement (“knowingly”—voluntary, non-accidental conduct) suffices. By the Eleventh Circuit’s prior panel rule, Grossman remains controlling because Elonis is neither clearly on point nor clearly contrary.

Application to the Record

On the instruction challenge, the panel found the charge, taken as a whole, accurately stated the law. The district court also provided the pattern definition of “knowingly” as “voluntarily and intentionally and not because of a mistake or by accident,” rejecting the defense’s attempt to morph “knowingly” into “knowing that the victim knows.” The jury’s note asking whether “knowingly” means “he knows that she knows what he is doing” or “he knows what he is doing (such as recording)” underscores the very confusion the supplemental instruction was designed to forestall; the court properly directed jurors back to the correct legal definitions provided.

On sufficiency, the government did not need to prove the defendant’s subjective awareness that A.G. felt intimidated. It needed to show he knowingly engaged in conduct that intimidated her and interfered with or lessened her ability to perform. The record easily cleared that bar:

Olvera knowingly repositioned himself in the aisle seat and physically angled his body and phones to surreptitiously record A.G., including up-skirt angles.
A.G. testified credibly to feeling violated, enraged, helpless, and “stuck in a metal tube” at 36,000 feet; she ceased duties immediately at the captain’s direction.
L.A.’s corroborating video showed Olvera watching and recording as A.G. walked the aisle; forensic evidence recovered 23 photos and 20 videos from his devices.
Additional context—Olvera’s soft-spoken request to prompt A.G. to lean in; quick concealment of the phone upon making eye contact; a comment about “preferring [her] heels” while he stood armed near the galley—supported a finding of intimidation and interference in the close quarters of flight.

Under the deferential sufficiency standard, these facts permitted a reasonable jury to find the elements proved beyond a reasonable doubt.

Impact and Forward-Looking Consequences

Instructional clarity across the Eleventh Circuit. This opinion squarely approves an explicit instruction that the government need not prove an intent to intimidate or to interfere under § 46504. Trial courts now have appellate confirmation to include clarifying language—particularly when a defendant attempts to inject specific-intent concepts or Elonis-based arguments into § 46504 cases.
Elonis defenses curtailed in § 46504 prosecutions. Defendants cannot leverage Elonis to demand proof that they knew their conduct was intimidating, or that the victim recognized or felt intimidated, so long as the government proves the defendant knowingly engaged in the conduct and that the conduct in fact intimidated and interfered.
Scope of “intimidation.” The case demonstrates that non-verbal, surreptitious conduct—such as sexualized voyeurism—may constitute “intimidation” when it causes fear, violation, or the need to withdraw from duties, even in the absence of explicit threats or physical contact.
Proof of interference or “lessening ability.” The interference element is satisfied where the attendant ceases duties or must be repositioned mid-flight at the captain’s instruction due to the defendant’s conduct. The result need not be intended by the defendant.
Operational implications for airlines. Crews should contemporaneously document safety-driven duty changes and crew reassignments in response to passenger conduct; those operational responses became key proof of “interference” here.
Pattern instructions and practice. Although pattern instructions already note that § 46504 lacks a specific-intent component, this decision encourages courts to consider adding the explicit no-intent-to-intimidate/interfere clarification when warranted by defense arguments or jury confusion about “knowingly.”
Inter-circuit harmony. The Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning aligns with the Tenth Circuit’s view (Lynch) that general intent for § 46504 is compatible with Elonis, promoting uniformity in federal aviation safety prosecutions.

Complex Concepts Simplified

General intent vs. specific intent: A general-intent crime requires proof that the defendant knowingly engaged in the prohibited conduct (i.e., did it voluntarily and not by accident). A specific-intent crime requires proof that the defendant not only did the act, but also did it with the purpose of achieving a particular result (e.g., intending to intimidate or intending to interfere). Section 46504 is general intent.
“Knowingly” in § 46504: Means the defendant acted voluntarily and intentionally in performing the conduct (e.g., covert recording), not that he knew the victim recognized or felt intimidated by it. It screens out accidents or mistakes.
“Intimidate” under the pattern instruction: Includes (a) doing or saying something that would cause a reasonable person to fear bodily harm; or (b) doing or saying something that makes a person fearful or alters their behavior (e.g., stops performing duties). Either route can satisfy intimidation under § 46504.
Interference/lessening ability: The statute requires that the intimidation actually interfered with or lessened the flight attendant’s ability to perform duties. It does not require that the defendant intended that outcome. Evidence of duty cessation or reassignment often suffices.
Elonis’s mens rea principle: When a criminal statute is silent on mental state, courts read in enough mens rea to separate wrongful from innocent conduct. For some statutes (like threats), that may mean knowledge of the threatening nature. For § 46504, a general “knowingly” standard suffices.
Prior panel precedent rule: In the Eleventh Circuit, a published panel decision (here, Grossman) binds future panels unless the Supreme Court or the Eleventh Circuit en banc clearly abrogates it. Elonis did not clearly abrogate Grossman.

Conclusion

United States v. Olvera reinforces a clear rule for § 46504 prosecutions in the Eleventh Circuit: the statute is a general-intent offense. The government need not prove the defendant intended to intimidate a flight attendant or intended to interfere with her duties, nor must it prove that the defendant knew the attendant felt intimidated. It is enough to show that the defendant knowingly engaged in conduct that intimidated the attendant and that the intimidation interfered with or lessened her ability to perform duties. By reaffirming Grossman in the wake of Elonis and endorsing a clarifying jury instruction, the court supplies practical guidance to trial judges and litigants. The opinion also validates that covert, sexualized recording can constitute “intimidation” in the close confines of an aircraft when it triggers safety-driven operational changes. In short, the decision strengthens the enforceability of § 46504 by dispelling mens rea misconceptions and by aligning doctrine with on-the-ground realities of cabin safety.