“Equal-Impact, No Violation” – Sixth Circuit Clarifies the Causation Threshold for ADA Title II Claims Arising from Alterations to Public Facilities

1. Introduction

In John Reinhart v. City of Birmingham, Michigan, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit addressed the reach of Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) when a municipality redesigns public streetscapes and, in the process, reduces the number of available parking spaces—including designated accessible spaces—nearby private businesses.

Plaintiff John Reinhart, a 77-year-old Pilates patron with serious mobility impairments, alleged that Birmingham’s 2022 “South Old Woodward Avenue” streetscape project violated 28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b) (the ADA’s “alterations” regulation) and constituted intentional discrimination. The district court granted summary judgment for the City; the Sixth Circuit affirmed in an opinion by Judge Ritz, joined by Judges Cole and Readler, with Judge Readler also penning a substantial concurrence questioning the circuit’s earlier precedent on regulatory-based Title II claims.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court assumed, without deciding, that Reinhart was “disabled” but held he failed to satisfy the third element of a Title II claim—exclusion or denial “by reason of” disability.
§ 35.151(b) claim. Birmingham’s removal of roughly 60 on-street spaces (one of which was accessible) affected disabled and non-disabled motorists equally; therefore, Reinhart did not show causation tied to his disability. The regulation obligates the City only to keep the altered facility itself (street parking) accessible, not to guarantee access to a private destination such as a Pilates studio.
Intentional-discrimination claim. Statements by city officials urging the public “to walk twice as far” evidenced insensitivity but not animus “because of” disability. Absent evidence of discriminatory motive, the claim failed.
Because both theories failed on the merits, the panel did not reach forfeiture arguments or the disability-status element.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Finley v. Huss, 102 F.4th 789 (6th Cir. 2024) – Supplies the three-part Title II prima facie framework.
Ability Center of Greater Toledo v. City of Sandusky, 385 F.3d 901 (6th Cir. 2004) – Recognized a private right of action to enforce § 35.151(b); relied upon but simultaneously questioned in Judge Readler’s concurrence.
Jones v. City of Monroe, 341 F.3d 474 (6th Cir. 2003) – Holds that neutral parking limitations that burden everyone alike do not violate the ADA.
Ability Center, Johnson v. City of Saline, Alexander v. Choate, and Title VI/Titles I & III analogues frame the causation debate.

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

(a) Element-by-Element Approach

Qualifying disability: Skipped as unnecessary.
“Otherwise qualified”: Not disputed; street parking and related amenities are public “services.”
Discriminatory exclusion:
• For § 35.151(b): the plaintiff must prove the reason he was deprived of the altered facility’s benefits was his disability. The mere scarcity of spots, which burdens everyone, is not enough.
• For intentional discrimination: evidence must show disability was a “significant factor.” Officials’ comments were at worst indifferent, not discriminatory.

(b) Scope of § 35.151(b)

The panel draws a bright line: the regulation speaks to making the altered portion of the facility “readily accessible.” It does not guarantee that a disabled patron can reach a particular private establishment served by that facility.

(c) Concurring Opinion – A Call to Re-examine Ability Center

Judge Readler urges a doctrinal reset:

Argues Title II’s textual focus is intentional discrimination, mirroring Title VI.
Contends that reading Title II to require “reasonable accommodations” or to allow disparate-impact suits lacks clear statutory grounding and strains federalism principles.
Invites future litigants—and possibly the Supreme Court—to reconsider whether regulations like § 35.151(b) are privately enforceable at all.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

Higher Causation Bar. Plaintiffs attacking municipal design changes must connect the alleged barrier directly to disability-based exclusion, not common-to-all inconvenience.
Urban-planning Latitude. Cities may pursue “walkability” or “green” initiatives without per se violating the ADA, provided they preserve some accessible options and avoid discriminatory motives.
Regulatory-enforcement Uncertainty. The concurrence, though not controlling, plants a seed for en banc or Supreme Court review of Ability Center and similar precedents. If adopted, it could narrow private enforcement of numerous DOJ regulations.
Strategic Litigation Shifts. Plaintiffs may pivot toward (i) program-specific exclusion theories (e.g., parking-permit schemes) rather than generalized scarcity, or (ii) state-law avenues (e.g., Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act) offering lower causation hurdles.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Title II vs. Title III. Title II governs government entities; Title III governs private “places of public accommodation.” Street parking is a Title II service.
28 C.F.R. § 35.151(b). This DOJ rule says: when a city alters a facility (e.g., repaves a street or rebuilds sidewalks), the newly-touched parts must be made accessible “to the maximum extent feasible.” It does not obligate the city to create more parking than existed or to ensure access to private tenants.
“By reason of” disability. A shorthand for causal nexus: the disability must be the reason for denial, not mere happenstance.
Intentional discrimination standard. Requires proof of discriminatory animus or that disability was a “significant factor” in the policy. Indifference ≠ intent.
Summary judgment. A procedural device ending a case before trial when “no genuine dispute of material fact” exists and one side is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

5. Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision crystallizes an important doctrinal point: alterations to public facilities trigger ADA scrutiny only when disabled individuals are denied access because of their disabilities, not when a redesign makes life marginally less convenient for everyone. Municipalities remain accountable for accessible design, but plaintiffs must anchor their claims in disability-specific exclusion or bias.

Beyond the holding, Judge Readler’s concurrence signals a brewing circuit and Supreme-Court-level debate over the very foundation of regulatory-based Title II litigation. Should the concurrence’s skepticism gain traction, future plaintiffs may find many DOJ regulations unenforceable through private suits—dramatically recalibrating disability-rights litigation nationwide. For now, however, Reinhart teaches that when a policy’s impact falls equally on all, “equal-impact” means “no violation” under Title II.