“Desk-Notes Are Not Business Records” & The Re-affirmed Sufficiency of Pretext:
A Comprehensive Commentary on Brian Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc., 24-1517 (7th Cir. June 18 2025)

1. Introduction

The Seventh Circuit’s decision in Brian Murphy v. Caterpillar Inc. addresses two recurring flash-points in federal employment litigation:

• Whether informal “desk notes” kept by a supervisor can be admitted as business records under Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) at the summary-judgment stage, and
• Whether evidence that an employer’s stated reason is pretextual is, by itself, enough to defeat summary judgment on a discrimination claim.

Brian Murphy, a 38-year veteran engineer at Caterpillar, alleged constructive discharge based on age discrimination under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) and unlawful retaliation for litigation he brought in the early 2000s. The district court granted summary judgment to Caterpillar on all claims, heavily relying on the supervisor’s handwritten notes. The Court of Appeals reversed on the age-discrimination claim, affirmed on retaliation, and in the process established important evidentiary and substantive standards that will guide future employment disputes.

2. Summary of the Judgment

Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge Hamilton held:

• Age Discrimination – Reversed & Remanded. Murphy produced evidence from which a jury could conclude he was constructively discharged and that Caterpillar’s stated performance-based rationale was pretextual. Summary judgment was therefore improper.
• Retaliation – Affirmed. A gap of more than ten years between protected activity and the adverse action, coupled with an absence of retaliatory animus, doomed the retaliation claim.
• Evidence – Desk Notes Excluded. The “desk notes” did not qualify as business records under Rule 803(6); the district court erred in relying on them.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Pierce v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 110 F.3d 431 (7th Cir. 1997) – Established that sporadically prepared personnel memos lack the reliability required for 803(6). Murphy extends Pierce’s rationale to routine summary-judgment practice, explicitly rejecting employer attempts to convert ad-hoc notes into business records.
• St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993) – The panel re-emphasised Hicks’ core holding: proof of pretext permits (though does not compel) an inference of discrimination. The opinion cautions against misreading Seventh Circuit dicta that seemed to require additional evidence beyond pretext.
• Brown v. M & M/Mars, 883 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1989) and Shager v. Upjohn Co., 913 F.2d 398 (7th Cir. 1990) – Both stand for the proposition that sudden negative reviews after years of good performance can support a finding of pretext. The court analogised Murphy’s decades of strong evaluations followed by an impossible Performance Action Plan (PAP).
• Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760 (7th Cir. 2016) – Reinforces the holistic evaluation of evidence and the irrelevance of the direct/indirect dichotomy at summary judgment; the panel explicitly grounded its analysis in Ortiz.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

a) Hearsay and Business-Records Exception

Rule 803(6) requires (i) a record made at or near the time of the event by someone with knowledge, (ii) kept in the regular course of business, (iii) as part of a regular practice, and (iv) supported by testimony from a qualified witness, unless circumstances indicate untrustworthiness.

The panel found Rampenthal’s desk notes failed prongs (ii) and (iii): they were ad-hoc, focused solely on Murphy, never shown to be a standard managerial practice, and lacked any systematic verification. The court also noted the potential litigation-preparation motive, invoking Palmer v. Hoffman. Absent an affidavit attesting to regularity and reliability, the notes were inadmissible. Consequently, any summary-judgment reliance on them was error.

b) Constructive Discharge

The PAP required Murphy to meet a deadline that had already expired and bore signatures indicating failure before he had a chance to perform. This, coupled with a threat of termination, could lead a reasonable employee to feel termination was inevitable. The court analogised the scenario to cases where the “handwriting is on the wall” (Lindale).

c) Pretext and Sufficiency

Caterpillar’s performance criticism clashed with:

• Four years of “meets/exceeds” reviews by the same supervisor.
• Recent accolades for successfully leading a critical engine-noise project.
• Inconsistent explanations (poor performance vs. allegedly insensitive remarks).

Under Hicks, once a plaintiff discredits the employer’s stated reason, no additional “animus” evidence is compulsory. The panel clarified that earlier Seventh Circuit phrases (“pretext and animus”) are often misunderstood; showing the asserted rationale is “phony” is enough to survive summary judgment.

d) Retaliation Analysis

While Murphy’s ADEA claim survived, his retaliation theory failed because:

• A ten-year gap between lawsuit and PAP made causation implausible.
• The decision-maker had earlier opportunities (2013) to retaliate but did not.
• No ambiguous remarks or comparator evidence hinted at retaliatory motive.

3.3 Impact of the Judgment

1. Evidence Gate-Keeping at Summary Judgment. Employers can no longer assume that a supervisor’s informal running notes will slide into evidence as business records. Litigants must secure proper affidavits or risk exclusion, and courts must apply 803(6) rigorously.
2. Clarification of the Pretext Standard. By reiterating that evidence of pretext itself can carry a plaintiff past summary judgment, the Seventh Circuit closes the door on defense arguments that plaintiffs must produce some further “smoking gun.” This realigns circuit rhetoric with Supreme Court precedent.
3. Performance Action Plan (PAP) Design. The decision cautions employers against issuing PAPs that are impossible to satisfy or pre-marked as failed; such tactics may convert what looks like corrective coaching into evidence of constructive discharge.
4. Retaliation Timing Guidance. The opinion re-affirms that, absent other indicia, multi-year gaps are ordinarily fatal to causal inference, while also emphasizing that context still matters.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Business Records Exception (Rule 803(6)). Think of it as an “autopilot” rule for reliable paperwork: if a document is produced + kept in the ordinary, routine operations of a business, courts assume it’s trustworthy and allow it in—even though it’s hearsay. Ad-hoc notes, personal diaries, or litigation-prepared memos don’t qualify.
• Pretext. A “pretext” is a bogus reason an employer gives to hide the real motive. In court, if a worker shows the given reason is false or shifting, the jury is free to infer discrimination—much like discovering an alibi is fake can suggest guilt in a criminal case.
• Constructive Discharge. Instead of firing an employee outright, an employer creates such unbearable conditions that a reasonable person would feel forced to quit—akin to making the workplace “so toxic that walking away is the only sane choice.” It counts legally the same as being fired.
• Performance Action Plan. A structured list of goals and deadlines for an under-performing employee. Properly used, it’s a chance to improve; misused, it can be a paper trail to termination.

5. Conclusion

Murphy is significant on two fronts. Procedurally, it tightens evidentiary standards by holding that informal managerial notes do not become business records simply because the employer says so. Substantively, it restores doctrinal clarity: under Hicks and Ortiz, discrediting the employer’s explanation suffices to reach a jury on discrimination. At the same time, the opinion confirms that retaliation claims demand a plausible causal chain—mere temporal distance, without more, will not do. Practitioners should heed the court’s warnings: craft PAPs in good faith, document performance problems through legitimate business channels, and ensure affidavits support any records proffered at summary judgment. Conversely, plaintiffs should focus on uncovering inconsistencies and demonstrating the unreasonableness of employer demands; if the stated rationale looks phony, the Seventh Circuit has reaffirmed—the case belongs to the jury.