“Who Bears the Clock?” – First Circuit Clarifies Burden-Shifting and Tolling in Puerto Rico Medical-Malpractice Actions
Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral, No. 23-1609 (1st Cir. Aug. 8 2025)

1. Introduction

Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral arises from a tragic pediatric death that prompted parallel Commonwealth and federal malpractice suits. On appeal from the federal district court in Puerto Rico, the parents of the deceased child challenged summary judgment granted to one treating physician, Dr. Fernando Vega-Moral, on statute-of-limitations grounds and contested the later denial of their motion for reconsideration. The First Circuit affirmed, delivering a meticulous exposition of Puerto Rico’s prescriptive rules, the federal summary-judgment framework, and the allocation of burdens when timeliness is in dispute. Most notably, the Court re-emphasised that once a defendant properly raises prescription, Puerto Rico law shifts the onus to the plaintiff to prove the existence and scope of tolling—even when an earlier, related complaint had been timely filed.

Although the panel also confronted an unaddressed question—whether unserved “Doe” defendants destroy finality for § 1291 purposes—it exercised its discretionary power to bypass that issue, resolving the appeal on the merits in favour of the party who would benefit from dismissal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The First Circuit affirmed (1) the grant of summary judgment to Dr. Vega because the parents failed to carry their burden of showing that the one-year limitations period for Articles 1802/1803 claims was tolled with respect to him, and (2) the denial of the parents’ motion for reconsideration because their new tolling theories and evidence were untimely.
• Key Determinations:
  • A defendant’s Rule 8(c) typo (“the statute of limitations has tolled” rather than “has not tolled”) is immaterial when plaintiffs did not timely challenge the answer; the defence is deemed preserved.
  • Under Puerto Rico law, once limitations is raised, plaintiffs must marshal competent evidence of tolling; bare allegations or reliance on deficiencies in the movant’s exhibit list are insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
  • A prior, timely Commonwealth malpractice complaint that failed to name the federal defendant does not, without more, satisfy the “identical parties” requirement for tolling.
  • Arguments and evidence first offered in a post-judgment motion cannot ordinarily rescue a losing party absent newly discovered facts or manifest error.
  • The Court bypassed an unresolved finality question about unserved defendants under § 1291, invoking the pragmatic bypass doctrine of Caribbean Management Group v. Erikon LLC.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Rodríguez v. Suzuki Motor Corp., 570 F.3d 402 (1st Cir. 2009) – The Court relied heavily on Rodríguez for Puerto Rico’s three-part “identicality” test (same relief, same substantive claims, same defendants in same capacity) and for the principle that proof of tolling shifts to the plaintiff once prescription is raised.
• Tokyo Marine & Fire Ins. Co. v. Pérez & Cía., 142 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998) – Reaffirmed the same burden-shifting rule; cited to underscore Puerto Rico’s statutory scheme for interrupting prescription.
• Bonilla-Avilés v. Southmark San Juan, Inc., 992 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1993) – Provided summary-judgment methodology: once defendant shows the action was filed after one year, plaintiff must produce evidence of tolling.
• Caribbean Management Group, Inc. v. Erikon LLC, 966 F.3d 35 (1st Cir. 2020) – Support for bypassing difficult jurisdictional issues when merits favour the same party who would benefit from dismissal.
• Multiple procedural decisions (Suarez v. Pueblo Int’l, Pina v. Children’s Place, Merrimon v. Unum) guided the Court’s Rule 56 and waiver analyses.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Rule 8(c) Statute-of-Limitations Defence Was Adequately Preserved.
Plaintiffs argued Dr. Vega “admitted” tolling because his answer omitted the word “not.” The Court considered the omission a clerical error. More importantly, because plaintiffs failed to raise the issue before judgment, the argument was deemed waived under Merrimon.

2. Burden-Shifting under Puerto Rico Law.
Puerto Rico treats prescription as an affirmative defence, but the evidentiary burden ultimately rests on the plaintiff to show tolling. The defendant need only point to lateness on the face of the complaint. Dr. Vega did so by highlighting: (a) death in Oct 2016; (b) federal suit filed May 2019. Once that prima facie showing was made, plaintiffs had to adduce competent proof that tolling applied to Dr. Vega.

3. Failure of Evidence.
Plaintiffs’ opposition raised only the Hurricane María extension and the filing/dismissal timeline of their earlier Commonwealth case—facts that, even if true, did not speak to “identical defendants.” Because Dr. Vega was unnamed in the 2017 pleadings, those pleadings did not interrupt prescription as to him. Plaintiffs supplied no alternate tolling mechanism (e.g., solidarity, acknowledgment, extrajudicial claim) at the summary-judgment stage.

4. Motion for Reconsideration Was Too Little, Too Late.
Plaintiffs’ post-judgment reliance on “perfect solidarity” (joint and several liability) and newly attached evidence failed under the well-established principle that reconsideration cannot be used to cure earlier omissions. The Court also dismissed complaints about judicial notice of public docket entries, noting that the dates at issue had already been pleaded and admitted.

5. Bypassing the Unserved-Defendant Finality Question.
Recognising the issue as one of first impression yet unresolved, the panel followed Erikon to decide the appeal on the merits, a move that promotes judicial economy without prejudicing the prevailing party.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

• Practical Litigation Effect: Plaintiffs in Puerto Rico diversity tort cases must include every potentially liable codefendant in the earliest action or later produce concrete evidence linking unnamed defendants to earlier tolling acts. “Doe-pleading” alone will rarely suffice.
• Summary-Judgment Strategy: Defendants can shift the burden with minimal effort—simply by pointing to dates—whereas plaintiffs must be ready to file supporting documents at the opposition stage. The decision signals that Rule 56 courts will not rescue parties who “wait for rebuttal” in hopes that movants’ technical errors will save them.
• Reconsideration Standards Reinforced: The ruling reiterates that Rule 59/Rule 60 motions are not vehicles for second-chance briefing, sharpening the already stringent First Circuit standard for post-judgment relief.
• Appellate Jurisdiction Flexibility: Though not decided, the Court’s willingness to bypass an unresolved finality question hints at continued pragmatic use of the bypass doctrine, potentially influencing future litigants to argue merits first when jurisdictional benefits align.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Prescription / Statute of Limitations: A deadline for filing suit. In Puerto Rico, most tort claims expire one year after the injury is known.
• Tolling (Interruption): A legal event that stops the limitations clock and, once the event ends, restarts it anew. Filing a complaint against the proper defendant is the classic example.
• Perfect Solidarity: Puerto Rico’s version of joint-and-several liability. If defendant A is sued in time and defendant B is in “perfect solidarity” with A (they’re liable for the same harm), the suit against A can toll prescription as to B—but only if B is adequately identified.
• Summary Judgment (Rule 56): A procedure allowing a court to decide a case without trial when no material facts are in dispute. The moving party must show entitlement to judgment; the non-movant must then present admissible evidence creating a factual dispute.
• Motion for Reconsideration: Post-judgment request asking the court to correct a clear error or consider new evidence unavailable earlier. It is not to re-argue positions or present evidence that could have been filed before.
• Bypass Doctrine: Appellate practice permitting a court to sidestep a difficult jurisdictional or procedural question when the merits clearly favour the party arguing the absence of jurisdiction.

5. Conclusion

Cruz-Cedeño v. Vega-Moral reinforces two intertwined tenets of Puerto Rico civil procedure as applied in federal court: (1) defendants need only raise prescription; plaintiffs must then prove tolling with admissible evidence, and (2) litigants cannot revive lapsed arguments through motions for reconsideration. The decision serves as a cautionary tale for plaintiffs who rely on earlier unnamed-defendant filings to salvage later suits and for practitioners who wait until post-judgment to unveil pivotal evidence. By upholding the district court’s ruling, the First Circuit provides a clear, structured blueprint for analysing limitations defences in diversity malpractice actions and underscores the strategic importance of meticulous pleading and timely evidentiary submissions.