“Vulgarity Trumps Politics” in the Schoolhouse: Sixth Circuit Upholds Bans on Euphemistic Political Slogans under Fraser

Introduction

In B. A. v. Tri-County Area Schools, No. 24-1769 (6th Cir. Oct. 14, 2025), the Sixth Circuit addressed whether public school officials may prohibit students from wearing apparel with the political slogan “Let’s Go Brandon,” a widely known euphemism for “F*** Joe Biden.” The panel—Judge Nalbandian writing for the court, joined by Judge Moore, with Judge Bush dissenting—affirmed summary judgment for the school district and individual administrators. The court held that under Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, schools may restrict student speech reasonably understood as vulgar, even when the speech is political and even when it uses euphemism rather than explicit profanity.

The case squarely presented two questions:

Whether a euphemism that does not contain explicit profane words may nonetheless be treated as vulgar by school administrators; and
Whether Fraser’s “vulgarity” exception permits regulation of political speech without requiring a showing of disruption under Tinker v. Des Moines.

Answering both in the affirmative, the court concluded that “Let’s Go Brandon” was reasonably interpreted as profanity, and that “in the schoolhouse, vulgarity trumps politics.” The dissent would have applied Tinker’s “substantial disruption” standard, reasoning that the slogan is political speech, not plainly lewd, and that the record contained no disruption.

Summary of the Opinion

The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment for the defendants:

Euphemism as vulgarity: The majority held that although “Let’s Go Brandon” contains no explicit profanity, its commonly understood meaning is vulgar. Fraser permits schools to regulate vulgar speech, not merely vulgar words, and encompasses euphemisms that communicate profane messages.
Politics does not insulate vulgarity at school: The court ruled that Fraser applies even when the regulated speech is political. While student political speech enjoys robust protection, Fraser authorizes categorical bans on vulgar expression in school settings without a Tinker showing of actual or forecast disruption.
Deference to administrators: The decision underscores deference to reasonable, good-faith judgments by educators about what counts as vulgar or profane, while cautioning that Fraser must not be misused to mask viewpoint discrimination.
Precedential alignment: The panel reaffirmed the vitality of Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education, 220 F.3d 465 (6th Cir. 2000), rejected the Third Circuit’s Hawk framework that protects “ambiguously lewd” political/social speech, and declined to treat Justice Alito’s Morse concurrence as controlling under Marks.
Disposition: Because no constitutional violation occurred, the individual-capacity and Monell claims failed as a matter of law; injunctive and declaratory claims tied to superseded dress code language were moot.

Judge Bush dissented, urging application of Tinker to offensive but political speech. He emphasized that “Let’s Go Brandon” is not plainly lewd, that other circuits apply Tinker to analogous political messages, and that the majority’s approach risks viewpoint discrimination cloaked as vulgarity control. He identified emerging circuit splits and invited Supreme Court clarification.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Tinker v. Des Moines (1969): Establishes that student speech may be restricted only if it materially and substantially disrupts school operations or if disruption is reasonably forecast. The majority accepted Tinker as the default rule but emphasized Fraser’s recognized exceptions. The dissent would have applied Tinker because the slogan is political and not plainly lewd, and because there was no evidence of disruption.
Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser (1986): Authorizes schools to prohibit indecent, lewd, or vulgar speech in the school environment, even absent evidence of disruption. The majority applies Fraser directly, stressing that Fraser concerns vulgar speech (including innuendo), not just taboo words, and that its rationale (teaching civility) applies even to political contexts. The dissent reads Fraser narrowly as addressing plainly sexual content; it sees “Let’s Go Brandon” as political criticism, not sexual innuendo or per se vulgarity.
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier (1988): Allows editorial control over school-sponsored speech. Cited principally for the broader principle that educational judgments belong to educators, not federal judges. Not directly controlling here because the apparel was not school-sponsored.
Morse v. Frederick (2007): Permits restrictions on speech reasonably interpreted as promoting illegal drug use, with Justice Alito’s concurrence cautioning against restricting political/social commentary. The majority declines to treat that concurrence as controlling and rejects the Third Circuit’s reliance on it to narrow Fraser. The dissent invokes Morse to show the Supreme Court’s discipline in crafting narrow exceptions and to reinforce that Fraser should remain limited.
Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021): Reaffirms Tinker and delineates the three principal exceptions (Fraser vulgarity; Hazelwood school-sponsored; Morse drug advocacy) while discussing schools’ “special characteristics.” Used to frame the doctrinal landscape; on-campus apparel sets this squarely within Fraser’s ambit.
Cohen v. California (1971): “One man’s vulgarity is another’s lyric.” The majority leverages Cohen to acknowledge subjectivity in vulgarity determinations but emphasizes that schools may forbid Cohen’s jacket in class even as they must allow Tinker’s armband.
FCC v. Pacifica Foundation (1978): Referenced to rebut any “seven dirty words” limit; Fraser is not confined to a closed list of taboo terms.
Boroff v. Van Wert City Board of Education (6th Cir. 2000): Upheld a ban on Marilyn Manson shirts as contrary to the school’s educational mission, reading Fraser to afford deference to reasonable school judgments about vulgarity/offensiveness. The majority relies on Boroff’s continued validity; the dissent distinguishes Boroff as non-political speech and insists Sixth Circuit cases apply Tinker in political contexts.
Barr v. Lafon (6th Cir. 2008), Defoe v. Spiva (6th Cir. 2010), C.S. ex rel. Stroub v. McCrumb (6th Cir. 2025): Confederate flag apparel and AR-15 “Come and Take It” hat cases applying Tinker. The dissent cites these as examples of offensive political (or ideological) speech analyzed under Tinker; the majority treats Fraser as controlling here because of vulgar content.
Guiles v. Marineau (2d Cir. 2006): Shirt calling President Bush a “Chicken-Hawk-In-Chief,” “Lying Drunk Driver,” and “Cocaine Addict” protected under Tinker; Fraser not applied. The dissent cites Guiles to show other circuits keep Fraser narrow for political speech; the majority does not adopt that approach.
L.M. v. Town of Middleborough (1st Cir. 2024): “There Are Only Two Genders” shirt analyzed under Tinker as ideological, not lewd. The dissent uses this to demonstrate a circuit consensus favoring Tinker for political/ideological messages.
B.H. ex rel. Hawk v. Easton Area School District (3d Cir. en banc 2013): Articulates a three-tier approach: (1) plainly lewd speech may be banned; (2) ambiguously lewd may be restricted unless plausibly political/social; (3) non-plainly lewd political/social speech may not be categorically restricted. The majority rejects Hawk’s reliance on Justice Alito’s Morse concurrence and its blending of Fraser and Morse; the dissent endorses Hawk’s cabining of Fraser.
Historical sources, in loco parentis: The majority canvasses 19th-century authorities (Blackstone, Kent, Burke) and cases like Peck v. Smith (Conn. 1874) to support deference to educators regarding profanity in schools, while acknowledging in loco parentis is not a complete doctrinal basis today.

Legal Reasoning

1) Euphemisms can be regulated as vulgar speech under Fraser

The court’s first step is linguistic and practical: vulgarity resides in communicative content, not merely in the presence of “forbidden” words. Fraser itself concerned sexual innuendo rather than explicit obscenity, yet the Court approved discipline. Drawing on common usage and the phrase’s origin at Talladega, the majority held that a school may reasonably treat “Let’s Go Brandon” as conveying the profane message “F*** Joe Biden,” and thus as “vulgar” within Fraser. The opinion declines to reduce Fraser to a “seven dirty words” test and explicitly includes euphemisms, minced oaths, and sanitized expressions within the ambit of regulable vulgarity when their commonly understood meaning is profane.

2) Fraser applies even to political speech; “vulgarity trumps politics” in school

The majority then addresses whether the political character of the message alters the analysis. It answers no: while political speech is central to the First Amendment, Fraser permits schools to enforce norms of civility in the classroom. The opinion emphasizes the “Tinker armband versus Cohen jacket” distinction—schools must tolerate political expression like Tinker’s silent armbands but may prohibit vulgar political expression like Cohen’s jacket. To the majority, Fraser’s application does not turn on whether speech is “political”; Fraser itself occurred in an explicitly political context (a student government election speech) but was sanctionable due to its lewd content.

To frame “who decides,” the court adopts a deferential standard: educators’ reasonable, good-faith judgments about vulgarity should prevail, absent misuse to mask viewpoint discrimination. It grounds that deference in both Supreme Court doctrine and historical practices surrounding school regulation of profanity.

3) Rejecting the Third Circuit’s “ambiguously lewd political speech” carveout

The majority explicitly declines to follow Hawk’s three-tier framework, refusing to elevate Justice Alito’s Morse concurrence to controlling status under Marks. It views Fraser (vulgarity) and Morse (drug-advocacy) as distinct exceptions to Tinker, and sees Hawk as improperly cross-pollinating the two to create quasi-protection for ambiguously lewd political speech. The opinion stresses that neither Morse’s majority nor Alito’s concurrence purported to modify Fraser and that most circuits treat Chief Justice Roberts’s Morse majority as controlling.

4) Application to the record

Dress code: The school banned attire with lewd, indecent, vulgar, or profane messages. Administrators uniformly deemed “Let’s Go Brandon” vulgar, and at least three students were asked to remove such apparel.
No disruption required: Although there was no evidence of disruption, Fraser allows categorical restriction of vulgar speech without Tinker’s disruption showing.
No viewpoint discrimination shown: The record showed that other political messages (MAGA, candidate support across parties) were allowed; the restriction targeted vulgarity, not a political side, and thus was content-based (vulgarity) rather than viewpoint-based.

The Dissent’s Counter-Reasoning

Tinker controls offensive political speech: Judge Bush characterizes “Let’s Go Brandon” as political, not plainly lewd or sexual, and thus within Tinker’s default rule. With no evidence of disruption, the restriction cannot stand. He cites Sixth Circuit cases (Barr, Defoe, McCrumb) applying Tinker to offensive political/ideological imagery and other circuits’ protection of pointed presidential criticism (Guiles) and ideological slogans (L.M.).
Plainly lewd versus euphemistic political critique: The dissent reads Fraser narrowly, limited to overtly sexual or per se vulgar content, warning against equating euphemistic political criticism with Fraser’s sexual innuendo. He contends that the slogan’s “vulgar” gloss only appears when administrators import its political meaning—raising viewpoint-discrimination risks.
Hawk’s framework: He endorses the Third Circuit’s approach cabining Fraser to plainly lewd speech and protecting ambiguously lewd political/social commentary under Tinker, warning that the majority’s broad deference reduces Tinker to an empty promise.
Circuit splits and Supreme Court review: The dissent identifies two emerging splits: (1) whether to apply Tinker or Fraser to political/ideological but offensive slogans (First and Second Circuits apply Tinker; the Sixth here applies Fraser), and (2) how narrowly to cabin Fraser (Third and Ninth limit it to per se vulgarity; the Sixth extends to euphemisms reasonably understood as vulgar). He would vacate and remand for qualified immunity analysis only.

Impact and Implications

Within the Sixth Circuit

Fraser applies to euphemistic political slogans: Schools in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, and Tennessee may prohibit student apparel bearing euphemisms that are reasonably understood to communicate profanity (e.g., “Let’s Go Brandon,” acronyms like “FJB,” sanitized profanities like “F**k,” and comparable coded phrases), without proving disruption under Tinker.
Administrator deference, with guardrails: Courts will defer to reasonable, good-faith determinations of vulgarity. However, schools must administer such policies in a viewpoint-neutral manner and avoid selective enforcement that disfavors a political side. Evidence of inconsistent treatment (e.g., allowing euphemistic pro-leader vulgarity but banning anti-leader equivalents) could invite successful challenges.
Policy drafting: Districts should update dress codes to encompass euphemisms, acronyms, and sanitized forms that are “reasonably understood” as profane, with examples for clarity and training for staff. Documenting viewpoint-neutral rationales will be critical.

Beyond the Sixth Circuit

Doctrinal divergence: The decision deepens tension with circuits that apply Tinker to political/ideological speech even when offensive (First and Second), and with those that limit Fraser to plainly lewd speech (Third and Ninth). This increases the likelihood of Supreme Court review to define Fraser’s reach and its interaction with political speech.
Litigation strategy: Plaintiffs challenging bans on euphemistic slogans should build records showing multiple non-vulgar meanings, consistent non-disruptive contexts, and selective enforcement suggestive of viewpoint discrimination. Defendants should compile evidence of common understanding of vulgar meaning, consistent application across viewpoints, and staff training.
Practical reach: The rationale extends to other coded or sanitized slogans that plainly connote profanity directed at public figures, institutions (“F— the Police”), or groups. By contrast, political messages without a vulgar component (e.g., “MAGA,” “Dark Brandon,” “Tax the Rich,” “There Are Only Two Genders”) remain governed by Tinker unless another exception applies.

What the ruling does not do

It does not authorize viewpoint discrimination; schools must target vulgarity as a category and apply rules even-handedly.
It does not address off-campus speech; Mahanoy still governs substantial portions of students’ off-campus expression.
It does not foreclose Tinker’s application to political messages lacking a vulgar component, even if offensive or controversial.
It does not decide qualified immunity; because the court found no constitutional violation, it did not reach that issue.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Tinker’s disruption test: Schools may restrict student speech if it materially disrupts school operations or reasonably portends such disruption. It’s the default rule for on-campus student speech.
Fraser’s vulgarity exception: A categorical, disruption-free exception: schools may prohibit “indecent,” “lewd,” or “vulgar” speech on campus. It is about speech content, not just specific taboo words. Under this opinion, euphemisms that convey profanity can fall within Fraser.
Hazelwood school-sponsored speech: Schools may control speech that bears the school’s imprimatur (e.g., school newspaper), if controls are reasonably related to pedagogical goals.
Morse drug-advocacy exception: A narrow carveout letting schools restrict speech reasonably seen as advocating illegal drug use, not broader social or political commentary.
Viewpoint discrimination: Government may not suppress speech because it disagrees with the viewpoint expressed. Even when restricting categories like vulgarity, enforcement must be even-handed across viewpoints.
Marks rule (plurality decisions): When no majority agrees on a rationale, the holding is the narrowest grounds shared by those concurring in the judgment. The Sixth Circuit here says Morse had a clear majority opinion, so Justice Alito’s concurrence is not controlling.
In loco parentis (historical context): Historically, teachers exercised some parental authority at school, including discipline for profanity. Modern doctrine uses the history as context but recognizes limits given compulsory education and constitutional constraints.
Monell liability: A local government (e.g., school district) can be liable under § 1983 for constitutional violations caused by official policy or custom. If there’s no underlying constitutional violation, the Monell claim fails.

Conclusion

B.A. v. Tri-County Area Schools sets a clear Sixth Circuit marker: under Fraser, public schools may prohibit euphemistic political slogans that are reasonably understood as vulgar—without proving disruption under Tinker. The court’s watchword—“in the schoolhouse, vulgarity trumps politics”—captures the governing principle: civility norms in educational settings allow schools to restrict vulgar speech even in the course of political expression, provided they do so in a viewpoint-neutral, reasonable, and good-faith manner.

The dissent highlights a competing vision: political speech, however abrasive, should presumptively receive Tinker’s protection absent disruption, and Fraser should be confined to plainly lewd or sexual content. That tension mirrors broader circuit disagreements and signals a live question for the Supreme Court: how far does Fraser reach when political speech uses coded or sanitized profanity?

For now, in the Sixth Circuit, students may wear political messages to school—but not when those messages, even in euphemistic form, reasonably convey profanity. Administrators should apply this authority consistently and neutrally; students and parents should understand that the choice of words—or euphemisms—matters in the schoolhouse, even for core political expression.