“Velasquez v. U.S. Attorney General”: The Eleventh Circuit Confirms that the INA’s 30-Day Review Period Is a Waivable Claim-Processing Rule

1. Introduction

In Pablo Velasquez v. U.S. Attorney General, No. 23-13293 (11th Cir. July 25 2025), the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit denied a Honduran national’s petition for review that challenged the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (BIA) denial of (i) withholding of removal under § 241(b)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), and (ii) protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).

Although the result for Mr. Velasquez was unfavorable, the decision carries doctrinal importance on a threshold question: whether the 30-day filing period for petitions for review set out in INA § 242(b)(1) (8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1)) is jurisdictional. Relying on the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025), the Eleventh Circuit held that the deadline is merely a claim-processing rule—not jurisdictional—and therefore can be waived by the Government.

Beyond that procedural holding, the court reaffirmed well-settled substantive standards: (1) the nexus requirement for withholding of removal, and (2) the “government acquiescence” element for CAT relief. Finally, it rejected due-process-based challenges alleging a “fundamentally unfair hearing.”

2. Summary of the Judgment

Timeliness: The Government expressly waived any objection to the petition’s timeliness; because § 1252(b)(1) is not jurisdictional, the court honored the waiver and proceeded to the merits.
Withholding of Removal: Substantial evidence supported the BIA’s finding that Velasquez failed to prove the required nexus between a protected ground (family-based particular social group or political opinion) and the harm feared.
CAT Protection: Substantial evidence also supported the BIA’s conclusion that the Honduran government would not “acquiesce” in any torture Velasquez might face and that the alleged torturer (his politically-connected former brother-in-law) would not act under color of law.
Due Process: The IJ and BIA did not deprive Velasquez of a full and fair hearing; alleged misstatements of the record were immaterial to the outcome.
Outcome: Petition for review DENIED on all grounds.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

The panel’s opinion draws heavily upon—and, in key respects, applies—these authorities:

Riley v. Bondi, 145 S. Ct. 2190 (2025): Held that INA § 242(b)(1)’s 30-day deadline is non-jurisdictional. This is the doctrinal cornerstone that allowed waiver here.
Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U.S. 188 (2019): Clarified that non-jurisdictional claim-processing rules can be forfeited or waived by the opposing party.
Sanchez-Castro v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 998 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2021): Defines the nexus requirement and describes what constitutes a “central reason” for persecution.
Sanchez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 392 F.3d 434 (11th Cir. 2004): Establishes that persecution must be on account of the victim’s political opinion, not the persecutor’s.
I.N.S. v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478 (1992): Allows the use of circumstantial evidence to prove persecutor motive, but warns that speculation is insufficient.
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783 (11th Cir. 2010): Provide the definition of “under color of law” for CAT purposes.
Reyes-Sanchez v. U.S. Atty. Gen., 369 F.3d 1239 (11th Cir. 2004): Clarifies that an inability or refusal to arrest wrongdoers does not automatically equal governmental acquiescence under CAT.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

3.2.1 Timeliness and Waiver

The court applied Riley to label § 1252(b)(1) a claim-processing rule. Under Nutraceutical, such rules are susceptible to waiver. The Attorney General, in his brief, both raised and waived the timeliness objection; the court therefore sidestepped jurisdictional dismissal and addressed the merits.

3.2.2 Nexus Requirement for Withholding of Removal

The panel focused solely on whether Velasquez had proved that a protected ground was “at least one central reason” for the harm he feared. The evidence showed:

No harm to other family members remaining in Honduras—undermining a claim that the family itself was the target.
The threat emanated from one individual (the ex-brother-in-law) with motives of personal vengeance and damaged reputation, not hostility toward Velasquez’s family or political beliefs.
Country-condition evidence merely illustrated general criminal activity, insufficient to satisfy nexus.

Because the nexus was unsupported, the court affirmed the BIA without reaching other elements such as past persecution or internal relocation.

3.2.3 CAT: Government Acquiescence & Color-of-Law Requirement

To secure CAT relief, Velasquez had to show it was “more likely than not” that he would be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of Honduran officials. The panel cited three evidentiary failings:

Police did, on one occasion, take a report—indicating at least some responsiveness.
Failure to arrest suspects, standing alone, is not acquiescence (Reyes-Sanchez).
The ex-brother-in-law’s “political” role was not clearly governmental; no color-of-law nexus was proven.

Given these gaps, substantial evidence supported the BIA’s rejection of CAT protection.

3.2.4 Due Process

A petitioner must show (i) a procedural defect and (ii) resulting substantial prejudice. Even accepting arguendo certain factual misstatements, the court found no prejudice because the dispositive rulings (nexus and acquiescence) would remain unchanged.

3.3 Likely Impact of the Decision

Procedural Impact: The Eleventh Circuit’s explicit recognition that § 1252(b)(1) can be waived aligns circuit practice with Riley. Counsel for non-citizens may now invoke waiver (or forfeiture) doctrines in the Eleventh Circuit when the Government does not press a timely-filing objection.
Substantive Immigration Law: The opinion reinforces the high evidentiary bar for both nexus under withholding and government involvement under CAT. It warns practitioners that “mixed-motive” evidence or generalized crime statistics rarely suffice.
Litigation Strategy: Government attorneys must conscientiously decide whether to waive timeliness defenses, knowing that such waiver will be binding. Petitioners may now invest fewer resources in motions to reopen or equitable-tolling arguments if the Government elects waiver.
Future Appeals: The decision may spur more merits-based immigration appeals that previously would have been dismissed as untimely, provided the Government chooses to reach substance rather than stand on the deadline.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Claim-Processing Rule vs. Jurisdictional Rule: A jurisdictional rule limits a court’s power; it cannot be waived. A claim-processing rule merely tells parties when and how to act and can be waived or forfeited.
Nexus Requirement: In asylum or withholding cases, the harm feared must be because of a protected characteristic—e.g., race, religion, political opinion. The protected ground must be a central (not peripheral) reason.
Particular Social Group (PSG): A collection of individuals sharing an immutable characteristic (e.g., family ties). Proof requires showing both the group’s existence and that the persecutor targets the victim because of that membership.
Government Acquiescence (CAT): It isn’t enough that bad actors exist. The applicant must show that officials either participate in, consent to, or deliberately ignore the torture despite knowing about it.
Color of Law: An act is done “under color of law” when the perpetrator abuses power given by governmental authority—not merely when the perpetrator happens to hold public office.

5. Conclusion

Velasquez v. U.S. Attorney General serves two principal functions. First, procedurally, it cements the emerging post-Riley understanding that the INA’s 30-day petition period is waivable, thereby broadening the circumstances under which federal appellate courts may reach the merits of immigration cases. Second, on substance, it reiterates the demanding evidentiary burdens that applicants shoulder for withholding of removal and CAT relief.

For practitioners, the decision underscores the importance of building a robust factual record on motive and government involvement, while also carefully monitoring—yet strategically navigating—the 30-day filing deadline. For scholars, the opinion offers a clear example of how a seemingly technical Supreme Court ruling on timeliness can quickly reshape practical outcomes in immigration litigation.

Ultimately, while Mr. Velasquez did not obtain relief, future litigants stand to benefit from the clarified (and waivable) nature of the § 1252(b)(1) deadline, a procedural door that, once closed by precedent, is now at least partially ajar.