“Uncontested Vocational-Expert Testimony as Substantial Evidence”
Commentary on Kerrie Klarner v. Commissioner of Social Security
(United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, No. 24-11613, 25 June 2025)

1. Introduction

This Eleventh Circuit decision addresses a multi-faceted challenge to an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ’s) denial of Disability Insurance Benefits (DIB) and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) to claimant Kerrie Lynn Klarner. Four principal arguments were advanced by the claimant:

• That the vocational expert’s (“VE’s”) job-numbers testimony was inaccurate and therefore could not constitute “substantial evidence”.
• That the ALJ failed to develop the record fully by omitting exhibits from a prior 2015 DIB application.
• That the ALJ lacked “good cause” to discount the medical opinions of treating physician Dr. Trevor Cox.
• That the residual functional capacity (“RFC”) finding omitted a conceded limitation regarding “difficulty with detailed instructions”.

After a meticulous review of voluminous medical and vocational records the Court affirmed the district court, which had itself affirmed the Commissioner’s decision. Although the outcome is fact-specific, the panel’s treatment of Vocational-Expert testimony, of an ALJ’s record-development duty, and of the interaction between “simple tasks” RFC findings and Level-2 DOT reasoning raises issues of recurring significance in Social Security litigation.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Eleventh Circuit (Judges Jordan, Branch, and Kidd; per curiam) held:

1. The VE’s unchallenged testimony as to national job numbers — even without documentary back-up — constituted substantial evidence, and later-supplied contradictory statistics submitted only to the Appeals Council were outside the scope of appellate review.
2. No reversible error arose from the omission of older exhibits because the claimant had expressly declined to reopen the 2015 file, affirmed that no further evidence was outstanding, and could not show prejudice.
3. The ALJ articulated legally sufficient “good cause” to give little weight to Dr. Cox’s restrictive assessments, which were inconsistent with his own clinical notes and other objective findings.
4. The RFC limitation to “simple tasks” and “low-stress work” was not inconsistent with Level-2 reasoning jobs under the DOT, aligning with the Circuit’s earlier decision in Buckwalter.

3. Detailed Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited

• Biestek v. Berryhill, 587 U.S. 97 (2019) — Supreme Court held VE testimony may constitute substantial evidence even without supporting data. Used to validate reliance on the VE here.
• Goode v. Commissioner, 966 F.3d 1277 (11th Cir. 2020) — Job-number estimates need only be reasonable; precise tallies are not mandated.
• Falge v. Apfel, 150 F.3d 1320 (11th Cir. 1998) & Ingram v. Commissioner, 496 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir. 2007) — Appellate record ordinarily limited to evidence presented to ALJ unless Appeals Council denial itself is challenged.
• Winschel v. Commissioner, 631 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2011) — Good-cause standard for discounting treating physicians; duty to articulate weight.
• Buckwalter v. Acting Commissioner, 5 F.4th 1315 (11th Cir. 2021) — Level-2 reasoning consistent with “simple tasks”; relied upon to reject claimant’s argument on detailed instructions.
• Additional supporting authorities: Crawford, Simon, Brown, Ellison, Graham, Hunter.

Collectively these cases frame a consistent doctrinal path: VE testimony is presumptively reliable absent timely challenge; the claimant bears an evidentiary burden; ALJs have but limited sua sponte duties; and “simple” RFC restrictions co-exist with Level-2 reasoning work.

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Vocational Evidence. The Court stressed that an ALJ may rely on VE testimony that is “uncontested, internally consistent, and complete.” Because Klarner did not cross-examine or otherwise question the VE at hearing, the testimony enjoyed a presumption of reliability under Biestek. Post-hearing statistical print-outs (SkillTRAN/Job Browser) submitted only to the Appeals Council could not retroactively infect the ALJ’s decision.
2. Record Development. While ALJs have a “basic obligation” to develop a full and fair record, the duty is tempered by the claimant’s burden to supply evidence and by strategic litigation choices. Here, the claimant’s representative (a) twice affirmed that no additional evidence was needed and (b) explicitly refused to reopen the 2015 DIB claim — actions the panel deemed “invited error”. Prejudice was not shown because the existing 1000-plus-page record sufficed for informed decision-making.
3. Treating-Physician Rule. Applying the pre-2017 regulations (because the SSI application dated to 2017), the Court confirmed that “good cause” existed to discount Dr. Cox’s extreme limitations: they were internally inconsistent with his own clinical observations (normal gait, full ROM, “active lifestyle”), contradicted objective imaging, and undermined by claimant’s part-time driving work. The ALJ therefore permissibly gave them little weight.
4. Residual Functional Capacity & DOT Levels. The claimant’s main RFC critique concerned omission of “difficulty with detailed instructions.” The panel reaffirmed that Level-2 jobs — described as involving “detailed but uninvolved” directions — are not precluded by an RFC limiting the claimant to “simple tasks.” By repeating Buckwalter, the Court signalled a settled rule within the Circuit.

3.3 Anticipated Impact

• VE Practice. Claimants’ representatives must challenge VE methodologies at the administrative level or risk forfeiture. Merely submitting post-hearing statistics to the Appeals Council will be insufficient unless the Council’s denial is itself appealed.
• Record-Development Claims. The decision narrows arguments predicated on an ALJ’s failure to obtain prior-file evidence when the claimant expressly disavows such evidence. Practitioners must weigh carefully the strategic cost of refusing consolidation or reopening.
• Treating-Source Opinions. The case illustrates how ALJs can marshal internal inconsistency, objective imaging, and activities of daily living to discount restrictive treating opinions — especially those rendered for litigation purposes.
• RFC–DOT Alignment. The reaffirmation of Buckwalter solidifies within the Eleventh Circuit that “simple instructions” limitations do not inherently conflict with Level-2 reasoning occupations, reducing the likelihood of remand on that ground.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Substantial Evidence.” A legal threshold meaning “more than a mere scintilla” but less than “preponderance.” If the ALJ’s finding passes this low bar, appellate courts must affirm even where contrary evidence exists.
• Vocational Expert (VE). A specialist who synthesises labor-market data and the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) to tell the ALJ which jobs a claimant can do and how many exist.
• Reasoning Levels (DOT). Scale 1-6 describing the complexity of instructions a job entails. Level 2 means following “detailed but uninvolved” instructions; courts have ruled that “simple-task” claimants can usually handle Level 2.
• Treating-Physician Rule. (Pre-2017 claims) — ALJs must give controlling weight to a treating doctor’s opinion unless they have “good cause” to discount it; post-2017 rules use a persuasiveness framework instead.
• Residual Functional Capacity (RFC). Administrative shorthand for “the most a claimant can still do” on a regular and continuing basis, taking into account physical and mental limitations.
• Appeals Council vs. Court Review. Evidence first presented to the Appeals Council matters only if the claimant challenges the Council’s denial of review; otherwise appellate courts look solely to what was before the ALJ.

5. Conclusion

Kerrie Klarner v. Commissioner underscores four enduring principles in Social Security adjudication: (1) uncontroverted VE testimony, even without raw data, will usually survive substantial-evidence scrutiny; (2) the ALJ’s record-development duty is not a license for claimants to withhold or later “ambush” with evidence; (3) treating-source deference is contingent and rebuttable; and (4) “simple tasks” RFC findings dovetail with Level-2 reasoning jobs under the DOT. By crystallising these points, the Eleventh Circuit provides clear guidance for litigants and lower tribunals, encouraging timely, proactive evidentiary development and precise articulation of objections at the administrative level. In doing so, the Court fortifies procedural efficiency while clarifying the boundaries of “substantial evidence” in disability determinations.