“Translator-Conspirator”: Seventh Circuit Clarifies the Buyer-Seller Limitation and the Scope of Criminal Liability for Non-Traditional Roles in Drug Conspiracies

Introduction

United States v. Eduardo Santana (consolidated with United States v. Sheldon Morales), decided on 1 August 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, arises from a sophisticated multi-kilogram drug distribution scheme operating in Chicago’s northern suburbs. The defendants, Morales and Santana, were convicted of conspiring to possess and distribute methamphetamine, fentanyl, and cocaine. On appeal, they mounted a series of challenges—Morales focusing on jury instructions and counsel-of-choice, Santana attacking the sufficiency of evidence and his sentence. The Court, in an opinion by Judge Brennan, affirmed across the board.

Beyond resolving the individual grievances, the decision crystallises two important doctrinal points:

The “buyer-seller” defence is inapplicable when the alleged co-conspirators are on the same side of the transaction, even if other relationships in the distribution chain could fit that label.
Individuals occupying seemingly ancillary roles—here, a translator and logistical aide—can nonetheless be deemed equal partners for conspiracy liability and denied a minor-role reduction under the Sentencing Guidelines.

Summary of the Judgment

The Court:

Affirmed Santana’s conviction, holding that ample circumstantial evidence established his knowing participation in the conspiracy, notwithstanding his characterisation of himself as “only a translator.”
Upheld the district court’s refusal to grant Santana a two-level “minor role” reduction under USSG §3B1.2(b), endorsing the finding that he was an “equal” in the venture.
Rejected Morales’s claim that the jury should have received a buyer-seller instruction. The Court found the instruction irrelevant because the government proved a conspiracy between Morales and Santana, who were co-distributors, not a simple buyer-seller relationship.
Dismissed Morales's Sixth Amendment argument, concluding that he either never actually sought new counsel or expressly withdrew that request, so the district court acted within its discretion.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

United States v. Shabani, 513 U.S. 10 (1994) – confirmed that §846 conspiracy does not require proof of an overt act; relied on to dismiss Santana’s insistence on tangible drug possession.
United States v. Page, 123 F.4th 851 (7th Cir. 2024) (en banc) – articulated the buyer-seller rule; cited to show its limits and to enumerate indicators of concerted activity (advice, expansion, warnings).
United States v. Hidalgo-Sanchez, 29 F.4th 915 (7th Cir. 2022) – reinforced Page; used to classify Santana’s “advice” behaviour as conspiratorial.
United States v. Jones, 56 F.4th 455 (7th Cir. 2022) – supplied language on “shared interests” criterion in conspiracies.
United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795 (7th Cir. 2015) & United States v. Payton, 328 F.3d 910 (7th Cir. 2003) – affirmed irrelevance of buyer-seller defence where conspirators are not on opposite sides of the sale.
United States v. Velazquez, 772 F.3d 788 (7th Cir. 2014) – framed the boundaries of the counsel-of-choice right.
United States v. Guzman-Ramirez, 949 F.3d 1034 (7th Cir. 2020) – summarised factors for minor-role adjustment; used to uphold the denial to Santana.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

i. Sufficiency of Evidence (Santana)
The Court applied the well-worn Jackson v. Virginia standard (could any rational juror find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt?), emphasising:

Santana’s proactive suggestions—e.g., staging a fake seizure video—to cheat suppliers.
Plans to “run” Chicago and share profits, reflecting a stake in the venture.
Circumstantial corroboration (video of kicking the empty box, security tips about phones, distribution to Morales’s brother).

Because membership in a conspiracy under §846 requires only agreement plus intent—not physical possession—the absence of drugs on Santana’s person was immaterial.

ii. Buyer-Seller Instruction (Morales)
An instruction is required only if:

It is a correct statement of law;
Supported by the evidence;
Not covered elsewhere;
Its omission would deny a fair trial.

Even assuming a buyer-seller relationship with other actors, the conspiratorial partnership between Morales and Santana rendered the defence irrelevant. Giving the instruction would risk confusing the jury. The Court drew a bright line: where defendants are “on the same side of the sale,” the buyer-seller doctrine simply does not apply.

iii. Minor-Role Reduction (Santana)
Applying §3B1.2 and its commentary, the panel deferred to the district court’s factual findings, highlighting Santana’s knowledge, planning participation, and expected financial gain. Merely being less culpable than leaders is insufficient; the benchmark is the average participant, and on that scale Santana was not “substantially less.”

iv. Counsel-of-Choice (Morales)
A structural right, but not absolute. The timeline showed either no valid request for new counsel or an explicit withdrawal of that request. Hence, no Strickland or Faretta inquiry was necessary, and the district court’s calendar management was reasonable.

3. Potential Impact of the Decision

Expanded liability for translators / facilitators: The opinion will likely be cited to defeat “I was just a translator/driver/tech guy” defences in drug-conspiracy prosecutions across the Seventh Circuit and perhaps beyond.
Narrowed utility of buyer-seller instruction: By clarifying that the defence evaporates when defendants collaborate to distribute rather than occupy opposite ends of a sale, the ruling tightens the evidentiary window in which the instruction is warranted.
Sentencing jurisprudence: Contributes to a growing line limiting minor-role reductions where the defendant had operational knowledge and profit share, even if not a mastermind.
Counsel-of-choice guidance: Reinforces that equivocal or withdrawn requests do not trigger mandatory hearings, providing trial courts with procedural confidence.

Complex Concepts Simplified

21 U.S.C. § 846 Conspiracy: Unlike some conspiracies, the drug-conspiracy statute does not require proof that conspirators took an overt step. Agreement + intent is enough.
Buyer-Seller Doctrine: A defence arguing that a mere commercial transaction—even in drugs—does not equal a conspiracy absent evidence of shared criminal objective (e.g., credit sales, fronting, joint planning). It guards against over-criminalising routine purchases/sales.
USSG §3B1.2 Minor-Role Reduction: A sentencing discount (2–4 levels) for defendants “substantially less culpable than the average participant.” Courts weigh knowledge, decision-making authority, and relative gain.
Structural Error vs. Harmless Error: Structural errors affect the framework of the trial and generally require automatic reversal; yet the right to chosen counsel is limited by practicality and defendant conduct.

Conclusion

United States v. Santana fortifies Seventh Circuit precedent on two fronts: first, it underscores that functional participation—translation, planning, security advice—is sufficient for conspiracy liability; second, it confines the buyer-seller instruction to scenarios where the government’s proof genuinely hinges on a purchase-sale relationship. Sentencing courts gain further guidance on refusing minor-role reductions where a defendant’s involvement transcends menial tasks. And trial courts are reminded that the counsel-of-choice right does not oblige them to indulge serial attorney substitutions where the defendant vacillates. The judgment thus serves as a multi-faceted precedent sharpening prosecutorial, defence, and judicial understanding of conspiracy law in the federal narcotics arena.