“The Sentencing-Date Rule” & the Limits of the Abandonment Doctrine
Commentary on Christopher A. Scott v. State of Missouri
Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, July 22, 2025

1. Introduction

In Christopher A. Scott v. State of Missouri, the Supreme Court of Missouri revisited the procedural architecture that governs collateral attacks on criminal convictions under Rule 29.15. The case offered the Court an opportunity to:

• Clarify which version of Rule 29.15 controls a post-conviction action when the rule has been amended after the defendant’s sentencing but before the amended motion is due; and
• Reaffirm that the “abandonment doctrine” – a judge-made mechanism that occasionally rescues untimely amended motions – is strictly limited to situations involving appointed counsel, not counsel who enter voluntarily or otherwise appear without a formal appointment order.

Christopher A. Scott (“Scott”) was convicted of first-degree robbery, armed criminal action, and unlawful use of a weapon. After his direct appeal failed, he sought post-conviction relief. Although he timely filed a pro se motion, his public defender filed an amended motion four months late and without seeking an extension. The motion court ultimately denied relief.

On transfer, the Supreme Court unanimously affirmed, holding that: (i) the 2018 version of Rule 29.15, in force on Scott’s sentencing date, governed every subsequent deadline; (ii) the abandonment doctrine did not rescue the late filing because counsel was not “appointed” within the meaning of the rule; and (iii) only the pro se claims were properly before the motion court, none of which Scott pursued on appeal.

2. Summary of the Judgment

1. Version of Rule Governs by Sentencing Date. Under Rule 29.15(m) (2018), “this Rule 29.15 shall apply to all proceedings wherein sentence is pronounced on or after January 1, 2018.” Hence, even though the Court amended the rule effective November 4, 2021 (before Scott’s amended-motion deadline ran), the 2018 version still controlled. The Court labelled this the “sentencing-date rule.”
2. Strict Enforcement of Time Limits. Rule 29.15(g) required an amended motion within 60 days of both (a) the appellate mandate and (b) appearance/appointment of counsel. The public defender missed this deadline and sought no extension. The motion therefore was untimely.
3. Abandonment Doctrine Inapplicable. Abandonment applies only where counsel was appointed. Because the public defender filed a voluntary entry of appearance – and no appointment order issued – abandonment could not excuse lateness.
4. No Waiver by the State. The State’s failure to argue untimeliness below or on appeal cannot waive non-compliance with mandatory post-conviction deadlines.
5. Result. Scott advanced no argument regarding the merits of his original pro se claims; thus the Court affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Dorris v. State, 360 S.W.3d 260 (Mo. banc 2012)
  Established that non-compliance with the filing deadlines in Rules 29.15 and 24.035 results in a “complete waiver.” The Court here quoted Dorris extensively to justify self-initiated enforcement of time bars.
• Price v. State, 422 S.W.3d 292 (Mo. banc 2014)
  Reaffirmed that deadlines are “mandatory” and non-waivable by the State. Scott’s Court relied upon Price to underscore a tribunal’s sua sponte duty to enforce timeliness.
• Gittemeier v. State, 527 S.W.3d 64 (Mo. banc 2017)
  Limited abandonment to appointed counsel. Scott’s opinion uses Gittemeier as the lynchpin to reject a broader abandonment doctrine.
• Watson v. State, 536 S.W.3d 716 (Mo. banc 2018)
  Remanded for abandonment inquiry where a public defender (who may not have been appointed) filed late. Scott reconciles Watson, characterizing it as silent on the appointment question and not overruling Gittemeier.
• Stanley v. State, 420 S.W.3d 532 (Mo. banc 2014) and Moore v. State, 458 S.W.3d 822 (Mo. banc 2015)
  Cited for the proposition that appointed counsel must either file a timely amended motion or declare the pro se motion sufficient.
• Older seminal cases on abandonment – Sanders v. State and Luleff v. State (1991) – provided the historical foundation.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual Interpretation of Rule 29.15(m).
   Applying ordinary-meaning canons, the Court concluded that Rule 29.15(m) unambiguously fixes a temporal anchor: the rule version “in effect” on the sentencing date governs the entire post-conviction proceeding. Any contrary reading would “render a nullity” the express language of subdivision (m) and violate the presumption against superfluity.
2. Mandatory & Jurisdictional Character of Deadlines.
   The Court re-characterized the time limits as jurisdictional prerequisites: motion courts lack authority to adjudicate untimely claims irrespective of the State’s stance. This aligns post-conviction practice with statutes of limitation in civil law.
3. Confined Scope of Abandonment.
   Because abandonment is a judicially created equitable safety valve, the Court strictly construes it. Extending it to non-appointed counsel would transgress Gittemeier and undermine the rule’s deadlines. The opinion differentiates between:
   • Counsel appointed by formal order (where abandonment may apply); and
   • Counsel who self-enter or appear without appointment (where abandonment never applies).
4. Procedural Consequences.
   Because the amended motion was untimely and not salvageable, the motion court possessed jurisdiction only over Scott’s original pro se allegations. Scott abandoned those on appeal, so the denial stood.

3.3 Potential Impact on Future Litigation

• Codifies the “Sentencing-Date Rule.” Practitioners must now consult the version of Rule 29.15 (or 24.035) in force on the day of sentencing; subsequent amendments – even favorable ones – will not apply.
• Narrows Abandonment. Defense lawyers who voluntarily enter appearances must vigilantly observe the 60-day amendment deadline; no abandonment lifeline exists for them.
• Heightened Clerk & Court Duties. Motion courts must sua sponte dismiss untimely claims, and clerks must guard the docket. The opinion signals that failure to enforce deadlines can itself be reversible error.
• Strategic Choice for Defendants. A defendant who anticipates a helpful future amendment to Rule 29.15 now has an incentive to delay sentencing – not possible in most cases – rather than rely on retroactivity.
• Legislative & Rulemaking Feedback Loop. Because the Court’s own rule amendments will no longer apply retroactively (absent explicit language), drafters may craft future amendments with express retroactivity clauses.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 29.15

The Missouri rule that allows prisoners who went to trial (as opposed to pleading guilty) to challenge their conviction or sentence on constitutional and certain statutory grounds after direct appeal.

Post-Conviction “Amended Motion”

An optional, lawyer-drafted pleading that refines or supplements the defendant’s initial pro se motion. It must normally be filed within 60 days of counsel’s appointment/appearance or the appellate mandate, whichever is earlier.

Abandonment Doctrine

A judge-made rule excusing an inmate when court-appointed counsel fails to act, thereby “abandoning” the movant. The court conducts an inquiry; if abandonment is found, the amended motion is treated as timely.

In pari materia

A canon of construction directing that related rules (here, Rule 29.15 and Rule 24.035) be interpreted together to maintain consistency.

Mandate

The formal order from an appellate court that transfers jurisdiction back to the trial court after appeal. In post-conviction practice, its issuance starts the 60-day clock.

5. Conclusion

Scott v. State crystallizes two pivotal procedural doctrines:

1. The “sentencing-date rule” fixes the governing version of Rule 29.15/24.035 as the one in effect when sentence is pronounced.
2. The abandonment doctrine remains a narrow equitable remedy reserved for failures by counsel appointed by the court – not for any attorney who volunteers or is retained.

By insisting on strict adherence to filing deadlines and curtailing forgiveness for untimely practice, the Court reinforces finality and efficiency in post-conviction litigation. Defense counsel must now docket deadlines with precision, and trial courts must police those deadlines sua sponte. Although the decision may seem harsh in individual cases, it aims to prevent protracted collateral proceedings and honor society’s interest in the prompt conclusion of criminal litigation.