“The Girley Standard”: Florida Supreme Court Clarifies the Limits of Lawyers’ Public Criticism of Judges

Introduction

On 26 June 2025 the Supreme Court of Florida decided The Florida Bar v. Brooke Lynnette Girley and The Florida Bar v. Jerry Girley (Nos. SC2022-0859 & SC2022-0860). The jointly-released opinion (“the Girley decision”) addresses the professional and constitutional boundaries of lawyers’ public statements—particularly on social media—about sitting judges.

After a high-profile employment-discrimination trial ended with a directed verdict favoring Adventist Health System, attorneys Brooke and Jerry Girley publicly accused the trial judge, Kevin Weiss, of racial bias and “stealing justice” from their Black client. Their comments, broadcast via social-media reposts (Brooke) and online interviews (Jerry), provoked harassment and death threats against Judge Weiss.

The Florida Bar prosecuted both lawyers for violating multiple Rules Regulating The Florida Bar. A referee recommended findings of guilt and thirty-day suspensions. On review, the Supreme Court of Florida largely affirmed, thereby refining Florida’s lawyer-speech jurisprudence and articulating what this commentary dubs “the Girley Standard”: a lawyer who publicly impugns a judge’s integrity without an objectively reasonable factual basis does so at the peril of suspension, regardless of First-Amendment arguments, when the speech exhibits reckless disregard for truth and threatens public confidence in the judiciary.

Summary of the Judgment

Brooke Girley: found guilty of violating rules 3-4.3 (misconduct), 4-8.2(a) (impugning judicial integrity), and the Oath of Admission. Thirty-day suspension upheld.
Jerry Girley: found guilty of rules 3-4.3, 4-8.2(a), 4-8.4(d) (prejudicial conduct), and the Oath. Not guilty under rule 4-4.1(a) (truthfulness to others) because the Court determined the record did not establish that his statements occurred “in the course of representing a client.” Thirty-day suspension plus mandatory Professionalism Workshop.
Constitutional challenges (free speech, equal protection, religious freedom) were rejected, largely because they were either unpreserved below or foreclosed by precedent recognizing a compelling state interest in protecting judicial integrity.
Process claims (notice, evidentiary rulings) were dismissed; the Court gave broad deference to the referee’s management of the quasi-judicial disciplinary hearings.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Rule-Based Precedent on Lawyer Speech
• Fla. Bar v. Ray, 797 So. 2d 556 (Fla. 2001) – reiterated that Rule 4-8.2(a) safeguards public confidence in impartial courts.
• Florida Bar v. Norkin, 132 So. 3d 77 (Fla. 2013) – two-year suspension for serially disparaging judges; used to calibrate sanction severity.
• Florida Bar v. Jacobs, 370 So. 3d 876 (Fla. 2023) – 91-day suspension for accusing judges of betraying the Constitution; demonstrates the sliding scale of discipline.
Constitutional Jurisprudence
• Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 575 U.S. 433 (2015) – upheld restrictions on judicial campaign speech, supporting the compelling-interest framework the Florida court relies on.
• Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335 (1871) – early articulation of lawyers’ duty to respect courts, situating the Bar rules within a longstanding doctrine.
Judicial-Deliberation Privilege
• United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409 (1941) & State v. Lewis, 656 So. 2d 1248 (Fla. 1994) – cited to justify refusal to compel Judge Weiss’s testimony.

Together, these authorities furnished a dual foundation: the Bar rules trace back to enduring common-law expectations of lawyer conduct, and any First-Amendment scrutiny is tempered by a compelling interest in judicial integrity.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

a. Findings of Fact
The Court relied on social-media screenshots and video transcripts showing that the Girleys:

Repeatedly attributed racial motives to Judge Weiss.
Asserted Judge Weiss “lacked authority” and committed “theft.”
Amplified these claims despite the order’s explicit citation to binding precedent (Ricks v. Loyola, 822 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 2002)).

b. Application of Rule 4-8.2(a)
To violate rule 4-8.2(a) the statements must (1) concern a judge’s integrity, and (2) be made with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard. The Court emphasized the lack of any “objectively reasonable factual basis”—crucial after In re Primus and other First-Amendment cases distinguishing protected commentary from sanctionable falsehood.

c. Rejection of Free-Speech Defense
The Court treated the rule as a content-based restriction that nonetheless survives strict scrutiny because it serves the “compelling interest” recognized in Williams-Yulee. Lawyer speech is not co-extensive with ordinary citizen speech; admission to the Bar entails acceptance of fiduciary-like duties toward the justice system.

d. Rule 4-4.1(a) Clarification
Not finding a violation illustrates an important limitation: statements to the press or public are not automatically deemed statements “to a third person in the course of representing a client.” The decision warns Bar counsel that a clearer evidentiary link is necessary to sustain this specific rule.

e. Aggravation and Mitigation
Aggravating factors: pattern of misconduct, experience, refusal to acknowledge wrongfulness.
Mitigators: no prior discipline, strong character evidence, (Brooke only) cooperation, absence of selfish motive, collateral consequences.
The Court balanced these factors against suspension lengths in Norkin, Jacobs, and McCallum, ultimately viewing 30 days as proportionate.

3. Impact of the Decision

Clear Guidance on Social-Media Conduct: Lawyers must vet the factual basis of any public claim about judicial wrongdoing, especially on viral platforms. Mere belief or second-hand frustration does not suffice.
“Objectively Reasonable Basis” Test Cemented: Future respondents will have to demonstrate concrete evidence before accusing judicial officers of bias or misconduct.
Narrowing of Rule 4-4.1(a): By declining to apply it here, the Court signals that Bar prosecutors must show the statement was within the representation context, avoiding over-breadth.
Practical Risk Management for Judges and Courthouses: The connection between lawyer speech and real-world threats (death threats to Judge Weiss) may influence security protocols and further underscore the seriousness of harmful rhetoric.
Professional-Responsibility Curriculum: Law schools and CLE providers will likely integrate the “Girley Standard” when teaching ethics of online advocacy.
Administrative Guidance for Referees: The Court reaffirmed referees’ broad discretion over evidence in Bar proceedings, consolidating quasi-judicial norms.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Rule 4-8.2(a): Think of it as the “no reckless mud-slinging at judges” rule. You can criticize rulings, but you can’t accuse a judge of corruption or racism unless you have hard facts.
Reckless Disregard: Not merely failing to check every detail; it means serious doubts about truthfulness but speaking anyway.
Judicial-Deliberation Privilege: Similar to attorney–client privilege, but for judges; it shields a judge’s mental processes behind decisions.
Conduct “Prejudicial to the Administration of Justice” (Rule 4-8.4(d)): Any lawyer action that undermines the fairness or perceived fairness of courts—here, inflammatory comments that spawned threats.
Suspension vs. Public Reprimand: A suspension temporarily removes the lawyer’s license; a reprimand is a public shaming on the lawyer’s record but allows continued practice.

Conclusion

The Girley decision crystallizes Florida’s stance on lawyers’ public commentary about the judiciary: zealous advocacy does not license unfounded attacks that erode public trust. By sustaining thirty-day suspensions and articulating an “objectively reasonable factual basis” benchmark, the Court sets a modern touchstone for lawyer speech in the social-media era. Future practitioners must navigate the digital landscape with heightened diligence—balancing the duty of candor, the right to critique, and the overarching obligation to uphold the integrity of the justice system.