“Substitution-Only” Means Substitution-Only: Third Circuit Reaffirms Dillon in Amendment 821 Resentencings and Denies Banks-Based and Medical Compassionate Release Relief

Introduction

In United States v. Evens Claude, No. 25-1634 (3d Cir. Oct. 14, 2025) (nonprecedential), the Third Circuit summarily affirmed a district court’s partial grant and partial denial of a motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). The defendant, convicted in 2013 of numerous bank and access-device fraud offenses, aggravated identity theft, and counterfeiting, originally received 232 months’ imprisonment and five years’ supervised release. Forty months of that sentence were imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3147 because he committed certain offenses while on pretrial release.

In his most recent § 3582(c) motion, Claude advanced three independent bases for sentence modification: (1) relief premised on United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022), via the Sentencing Commission’s 2023 policy statement at U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (change-in-law as a possible extraordinary and compelling reason); (2) compassionate release based on alleged inadequate and delayed eye care while incarcerated; and (3) a retroactive reduction under Amendment 821 to the Sentencing Guidelines. The Government opposed the first two grounds but conceded eligibility for a reduction under Amendment 821. The District Court reduced Claude’s sentence to 215 months on Amendment 821 grounds and denied the remaining requests. On appeal, the Government sought summary affirmance under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, which the panel granted.

This opinion—while nonprecedential—reiterates three practical rules that will shape § 3582 practice in the Third Circuit:

Banks will not justify relief where the sentencing record shows the loss figure reflected “actual loss” only.
Medical-care-based compassionate release requires a robust evidentiary showing; treatment rendered and offered can defeat claims even against a backdrop of significant delay.
In retroactive resentencings based on Amendment 821, Dillon’s substitution-only framework strictly applies: the court substitutes the retroactive amendment, leaves prior guideline application decisions (including § 3147-related adjustments) intact, and may not go below the new guideline minimum.

Summary of the Opinion

Exercising plenary review over the guideline interpretation issues and abuse-of-discretion review over the § 3582 disposition, the Third Circuit affirmed. The court:

Declined to resolve the validity of U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) or to decide whether Banks may be invoked via § 3582(c) (explicitly noting the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025) (Mem.) on a closely related question). Instead, the panel held that even if the theory were cognizable, Claude’s loss calculation rested on actual—not intended—loss, so Banks could not help him.
Held there was no abuse of discretion in denying compassionate release based on eye-care issues. The district court’s fact-finding, grounded in medical records, provided a sufficient basis to conclude that Claude failed to show an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), notwithstanding a lengthy delay in obtaining corrective lenses and despite his disagreement with proposed dry-eye treatments.
Upheld the Amendment 821 resentencing. Applying Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), the district court properly substituted the amendment, reduced Claude’s criminal history score (placing him in Criminal History Category III), retained the original guideline determinations—including the adjustment for offenses committed while on release—and set the new sentence at the low end of the amended range, then added the mandatory consecutive components totaling 64 months imposed at the original sentencing. The resulting sentence was 215 months.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited and Their Roles

United States v. Banks, 55 F.4th 246 (3d Cir. 2022): Banks holds that only actual loss, not intended loss, counts for the § 2B1.1 loss table. Claude sought to invoke Banks retroactively via § 1B1.13(b)(6) to argue that his loss computation overstated his guideline range. The panel avoided the threshold retroactivity/validity question and instead held the record showed only actual loss, foreclosing relief even if Banks could be considered.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Nov. 2023): Policy statement permitting courts to consider “change in law” as an extraordinary and compelling reason for certain defendants (after 10 years served and with a gross disparity) in § 3582(c)(1)(A) motions. The panel did not pass on its validity or applicability here, referencing a circuit split in development and ongoing Supreme Court activity.
United States v. Bricker, 135 F.4th 427, 444 (6th Cir. 2025): Cited as an example of another circuit considering § 1B1.13(b)(6)’s validity. The Third Circuit deliberately took no position.
Fernandez v. United States, 145 S. Ct. 2731 (2025) (Mem.): The Supreme Court granted certiorari on whether a basis for a discretionary sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(1)(A) can overlap with grounds for vacatur under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The panel flagged this open question and steered clear of it.
United States v. Folk, 954 F.3d 597, 601 (3d Cir. 2020): Discusses the types of claims cognizable under § 2255. The panel expressed no view on whether Claude’s Banks theory could be repackaged as a § 2255 claim.
Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010): Core authority for § 3582(c)(2) retroactive resentencings. It establishes the substitution-only rule, the requirement to leave other guideline decisions unaffected, and the prohibition on going below the amended guideline floor (absent specified exceptions not applicable here).
United States v. Dillon, 572 F.3d 146 (3d Cir. 2009), and United States v. Styer, 573 F.3d 151, 154–55 (3d Cir. 2009): Support that sentences modified under § 3582(c) are reviewable for reasonableness and clarify the appellate framework for such modified judgments.
United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152, 154 (3d Cir. 2009); United States v. Pawlowski, 967 F.3d 327, 330 (3d Cir. 2020); Hope v. Warden York County Prison, 972 F.3d 310, 320 (3d Cir. 2020): Provide standards of review: plenary for guideline-interpretation questions and abuse-of-discretion for § 3582 dispositions; define abuse-of-discretion parameters.
U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1 and Amendment 821: Amendment 821 retroactively benefits certain offenders by (among other things) reducing offense levels for “zero-point offenders” and revising criminal history calculations. The district court applied the retroactive component to reduce Claude’s criminal history score and hence his guideline range.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(b)(1), (d): Codify Dillon’s substitution-only rule in retroactivity proceedings and enumerate which amendments are retroactive.
18 U.S.C. § 3147: Requires a consecutive term of imprisonment and guideline adjustments when certain offenses are committed while on release. Both the statutory consecutive term and the guideline adjustment remained operative in Claude’s amended sentence.

Legal Reasoning

1) The Banks Theory Fails on the Facts: The Record Shows Actual Loss Only

Claude argued that his guideline range was inflated by the inclusion of intended loss, thereby invoking Banks’s “actual loss only” rule through § 1B1.13(b)(6). The panel intentionally sidestepped two threshold questions—(i) the validity of § 1B1.13(b)(6) and (ii) whether a Banks-based argument can be repurposed as an extraordinary and compelling reason under § 3582(c)(1)(A)—because it concluded that, on this record, no intended loss was counted.

The Presentence Report set the total loss at $609,210.30 and assigned enhancements accordingly. Claude pointed to footnote seven in the PSR, suggesting that $144,331 might reflect intended, not actual, loss. The panel acknowledged that the footnote “read in isolation” could appear ambiguous. But contextualized with the appended loss list and the referenced PSR paragraph, its meaning was clear: the entire $144,331 was actual loss. As a result, even assuming § 1B1.13(b)(6) could be validly used to reach Banks issues, the predicate factual showing was missing and Banks afforded no relief.

2) Medical Compassionate Release: No Abuse of Discretion Given Care Provided and Offered

Claude also pursued compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) based on near-legal blindness and severe dry-eye problems, emphasizing a delay exceeding four years in obtaining corrective contact lenses and his belief that certain treatments were ineffective. The panel upheld the district court’s finding that Claude did not meet his burden to demonstrate an “extraordinary and compelling” reason, emphasizing:

The district court grounded its decision in medical records documenting both care provided and care offered.
Even if the delay in procuring lenses was significant—and the panel noted he has since received new lenses—the overall record still supported the conclusion that the statutory standard was not met.
Declining offered treatments, even if based on a subjective belief in their inefficacy, did not convert the situation into one warranting release on this record.

The court also rejected the notion that layering the Banks argument atop the medical claim would “move the needle” toward an extraordinary and compelling showing.

3) Amendment 821 Resentencing: Dillon’s Substitution-Only Rule Controls

The district court reduced Claude’s sentence to 215 months by applying Amendment 821 retroactively. Claude insisted that the court should have eliminated the adjustment for offenses committed while on release and sentenced him to 167 months. The Third Circuit reaffirmed Dillon’s teaching that a § 3582(c)(2) modification is not a de novo resentencing. Rather:

The court must determine the guideline range that would have applied had Amendment 821 been in effect at the original sentencing.
Except for substituting the amendment, all other guideline application decisions remain unchanged. That includes the § 3147-related guideline adjustment for committing offenses while on release.
The court may not reduce the sentence below the floor of the amended guideline range (absent exceptions not relevant here).

Here, the district court lowered Claude’s criminal history score by two points—placing him in Criminal History Category III under the amended rules—and retained his total offense level of 32, which included the § 3147 related guideline adjustment. It then selected the low end of the amended guideline range and added the separate mandatory consecutive components totaling 64 months that had been imposed at the original sentencing (which included the § 3147 consecutive term and other consecutive components from the original judgment). The resulting 215-month sentence was affirmed as error-free under Dillon, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10, and the applicable standards of review.

Impact

A. Banks via § 1B1.13(b)(6): The Threshold Fight Remains Open, but Facts Still Matter Most

The panel consciously left unresolved two live issues: the validity and scope of § 1B1.13(b)(6) and whether purported legal errors cognizable under § 2255 can also serve as extraordinary and compelling reasons under § 3582(c)(1)(A). With the Supreme Court’s grant of certiorari in Fernandez and other circuits weighing in (e.g., the Sixth Circuit in Bricker), district courts in the Third Circuit continue to operate without binding circuit-level guidance on § 1B1.13(b)(6).

Practically, however, Claude highlights a threshold that will defeat many Banks-based bids: the movant must show that the original loss calculation actually used intended loss. Ambiguous snippets of a PSR will not suffice. The Third Circuit will read footnotes in the context of the PSR’s loss listings and narrative to determine whether the loss figure truly reflects intended loss. Absent that factual predicate, Banks simply does not move the guideline dial.

B. Medical Compassionate Release: Treatment Records Are Often Dispositive

The opinion reflects a familiar pattern in compassionate release jurisprudence: allegations of delay or dissatisfaction with care will face an uphill climb when medical records show that treatment was provided and/or reasonably offered. Even substantial delays (here, more than four years for contact lenses) may not compel relief where care is now in place and the record, in context, does not demonstrate an extraordinary and compelling impairment of the ability to provide self-care in prison. Movants must marshal detailed, longitudinal medical documentation and show that their conditions—and the prison’s response—meet the heightened standard.

C. Amendment 821 Resentencings: No Re-litigation of Unrelated Guideline Decisions

For defendants seeking retroactive relief under Amendment 821, Claude underscores that Dillon’s substitution-only constraint is ironclad. Movants cannot use Amendment 821 to reopen other guideline components, such as § 3147-related adjustments, role enhancements, or obstruction enhancements. The court must:

Substitute the amendment(s) listed in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(d),
Recompute the range using the unchanged offense level determinations (other than the substituted amendment’s effect) and the amended criminal history rules, and
Stay at or above the recalculated floor, then re-append any mandatory consecutive terms from the original sentence.

Defendants should expect sentence movements that track the specific amendment’s effect (for Amendment 821, often through status-point changes or the zero-point offender reduction), but not wholesale reopening of prior enhancements or consecutive components required by statute.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Actual vs. Intended Loss (Banks): In fraud cases, “actual loss” means money victims actually lost; “intended loss” is what the defendant hoped to steal. After Banks, only actual loss counts for the § 2B1.1 loss table in the Third Circuit. If the PSR’s loss figure already reflects actual loss, Banks does not change the guideline calculation.
Compassionate Release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i): A court may reduce a sentence for “extraordinary and compelling reasons,” guided by U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 and the § 3553(a) factors. Serious medical conditions can qualify if they substantially diminish the ability of the defendant to provide self-care in a correctional setting and are not adequately addressed there. Documentary proof is critical.
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13(b)(6) (Change in Law): Adopted in 2023, it allows certain “change in law” considerations for defendants who have served at least 10 years and received unusually long sentences, if the change would create a gross disparity today. Its validity and precise scope are being litigated; the Third Circuit did not resolve that question here.
Amendment 821 (2023): A suite of changes that, among other things, benefits some offenders with minimal or no criminal history. It includes a two-level reduction for “zero-point offenders” (U.S.S.G. § 4C1.1) and revisions to criminal history scoring (e.g., status points). Many parts of Amendment 821 are retroactive, allowing certain inmates to seek reductions under § 3582(c)(2).
Dillon’s Substitution-Only Rule: When a sentence is reduced based on a retroactive guideline amendment, the court substitutes that amendment to recalculate the range but does not revisit other guideline determinations. The court generally cannot go below the new guideline floor.
18 U.S.C. § 3147 (Offenses Committed While on Release): If a defendant commits a new offense while on release, § 3147 requires the court to impose a consecutive term of imprisonment. The Guidelines also direct a corresponding increase to the offense level. Both the consecutive component and the guideline adjustment remain in place during a retroactive resentencing unless directly affected by the targeted amendment.
Summary Affirmance and Nonprecedential Dispositions: Under 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6, the court may summarily affirm when no substantial issue is presented. Nonprecedential decisions, by I.O.P. 5.7, are not binding precedent in the Third Circuit.

Conclusion

United States v. Claude is a careful, fact-driven application of settled principles in a summary affirmance posture. The Third Circuit avoided hot-button doctrinal questions surrounding § 1B1.13(b)(6) and Banks-as-§ 3582 relief (especially in light of the Supreme Court’s grant in Fernandez), and instead resolved the case on narrow grounds:

Banks afforded no relief because the PSR’s loss figure reflected actual loss.
The compassionate release record did not demonstrate extraordinary and compelling medical circumstances given the care provided and offered, even against a backdrop of significant delay.
Amendment 821 resentencing remained cabined by Dillon: the district court properly substituted the amendment, retained prior guideline decisions—including § 3147-related adjustments—and imposed a sentence at the amended range’s floor plus the original mandatory consecutive components, yielding 215 months.

For practitioners, the case underscores the evidentiary rigor required to convert Banks into § 3582 relief, the continuing centrality of medical records in compassionate release adjudications, and the inflexibility of Dillon’s substitution-only rule in retroactive resentencings under Amendment 821. While nonprecedential, Claude provides a clear roadmap for district courts confronting similar § 3582 motions pending further guidance from the Supreme Court and the Third Circuit on § 1B1.13(b)(6) and the intersection of change-in-law arguments with compassionate release.