“Substantively-the-Same” State Tort Claims Survive: Second Circuit Narrows HMTA Pre-emption in DCC Propane LLC v. KMT Enterprises, Inc.

1. Introduction

The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, in its August 2025 decision DCC Propane LLC v. KMT Enterprises, Inc., injected fresh clarity into the long-simmering debate over the pre-emptive reach of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (“HMTA”), 49 U.S.C. § 5101 et seq. A routine oil-delivery mishap—an unattended truck causing a 10,000-gallon spill—spawned a fundamental doctrinal question: may a private plaintiff rely on state common-law negligence and recklessness theories when those theories use federal Hazardous Materials Regulations (“HMRs”) as the substantive standard of care? The district court said “no” and dismissed the complaint as pre-empted; the Second Circuit disagreed, vacated, and remanded. At stake is the balance between Congress’s goal of regulatory uniformity in hazardous-materials transport and the states’ historic police power to provide tort remedies.

Parties & Background

• Plaintiff-Appellant: DCC Propane, LLC – owner of the damaged Putnam, Connecticut facility.
• Defendant-Appellee: KMT Enterprises, Inc. – carrier hired to deliver 10,000 gallons of No. 2 heating oil.
• Key Facts: KMT’s driver allegedly remained in the cab, failed to monitor unloading, oil overflowed for at least seven minutes, contaminating soil and groundwater (≈$500k cleanup).
• Claims: Connecticut common-law Negligence and Recklessness, pleaded in parallel with alleged violations of 49 C.F.R. § 177.834(i)(2)–(3) (HMR attentive-unloading rules).
• Procedural Posture: District court (D. Conn., Judge Nagala) dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6) on HMTA pre-emption; alternative holding—recklessness not sufficiently pleaded. DCC Propane appealed.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Second Circuit unanimously (Judges Sack, Chin, Robinson) held:

1. HMTA does not pre-empt state negligence or recklessness claims that are “substantively the same” as federal requirements—here, the HMR attentive-unloading rules.
2. The statutory definition of “knowingly” for HMTA civil penalties (49 U.S.C. § 5123(a)(1)(B))—failure to know what a reasonable person exercising reasonable care would know— mirrors the state negligence standard; therefore, a negligence claim is parallel, not different.
3. Recklessness, as a heightened form of negligent misconduct, likewise survives because it does not impose duties “different from or in addition to” the HMR; rather, it demands a higher culpability using the same federal duty.
4. The district court’s reliance on Buono v. Tyco Fire Products, LP (2023) was misplaced; Buono’s discussion of mental-state mismatch was dicta and involved state duties additional to federal regulations.
5. Judgment of dismissal VACATED; case REMANDED. Whether the pleadings adequately allege recklessness is left to the district court on remand.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited & Their Influence

• Buono v. Tyco Fire Products, 78 F.4th 490 (2d Cir. 2023)
  – Addressed HMTA express pre-emption; plaintiff conceded his claims required additional labeling beyond HMR. – Second Circuit here distinguishes Buono: the “mental-state” passage was dicta; Buono never argued substantive-sameness.
• Roth v. Norfalco LLC, 651 F.3d 367 (3d Cir. 2011)
  – Tank-car design claims pre-empted because they sought extra safety devices not required by HMR. – Court contrasts: DCC Propane invokes only HMR-defined duties, not extra.
• Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470 (1996) (Medical Device Amendments)
  – State “parallel” tort duties survive express pre-emption. Cited to analogize HMTA § 5125(b)’s “substantively the same” to MDA § 360k’s “different from, or in addition to.”
• Mink v. Smith & Nephew, 860 F.3d 1319 (11th Cir. 2017); Riegel v. Medtronic, 552 U.S. 312 (2008)
  – Further illustrate permissible state “parallel” claims and the concept that additional state elements (e.g., causation, damages) do not create “different” device requirements.
• DOT Administrative Decisions & Fed. Reg. Notices
  – Mountain States Trailer decision: “knowingly” = negligence-like. – 77 Fed. Reg. 39567 (2012) and 84 Fed. Reg. 50882 (2019) – DOT opined HMTA doesn’t pre-empt state tort claims premised on HMR violations; mental-state carve-out in § 5125(h).

3.2 Legal Reasoning

1. Two-Part HMTA Pre-emption Test
   (i) Subject-Matter Requirement – plaintiff concedes: claims are “about” handling of hazardous material (§ 5125(b)(1)(B)).
   (ii) Substantive-Similarity Requirement – focus of appeal.
2. Interpreting “Substantively the Same”
   – Regulation 49 C.F.R. § 107.202(d): must “conform in every significant respect”; de minimis editorial differences allowed.
   – Court finds identical duties because complaint literally pleads breach of § 177.834(i)(2)-(3).
3. Mens Rea Comparison
   – HMTA Civil: “knowingly” = (A) actual knowledge, or (B) constructive knowledge of a reasonable person.
   – Connecticut Negligence: failure to exercise reasonable care under circumstances.
   – Therefore, prong (B) and negligence are interchangeable—substantively the same.
4. Recklessness Question
   – Connecticut recklessness = “extreme departure,” “reckless disregard.”
   – Greater-includes-the-lesser logic: if negligence standard survives, heightened recklessness standard (no extra duty, just higher culpability) also survives.
   – Possible textual support in HMTA criminal § 5124(d) definition of “recklessly.” Court notes but does not rely.
5. Policy Harmony
   – Allowing parallel state remedies encourages compliance and does not fracture uniformity because the operative duty is federal.
   – Damages remedy resembles private “shadow enforcement,” analogous to Lohr.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Second Circuit Precedent – Provides binding guidance in NY, CT, VT: parallel negligence or recklessness claims based on HMR violations are presumptively not pre-empted.
• Nationwide Persuasive Authority – Joins a growing line of district-court cases; may influence other circuits (particularly Third/Ninth) to revisit rigid readings of Roth.
• Litigation Strategy – Plaintiffs can plead state tort counts that expressly incorporate federal regulations as the standard of care (safer drafting template).
• Carrier & Shipper Compliance – Heightens exposure; insurers likely to demand stricter unloading protocols, monitoring technology, and driver training to forestall parallel tort liability.
• Regulatory-Enforcement Synergy – Private suits complement DOT civil enforcement, relieving budgetary constraints while reinforcing uniform standards.
• Legislative Reaction? – Congress could narrow § 5125(h) or create federal cause of action to unify remedies; this decision may catalyze policy debate.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Express Pre-emption – When a federal statute explicitly says conflicting state “requirements” are invalid.
• HMTA – Federal law regulating transport of hazardous materials; seeks nationwide uniformity to avoid a patchwork of state rules.
• HMR – Regulations issued by DOT (49 C.F.R. §§ 171-185) specifying packaging, labeling, unloading, etc.
• “Knowingly” under HMTA – Not just actual knowledge; includes what a reasonable person would have known exercising due care—effectively negligence.
• Substantive-Similarity Test – State rule survives if it mirrors federal duty; difference in labels or additional state elements (damages, causation) is tolerated.
• Parallel Claim – State tort claim that enforces the same substantive standard required by federal law.

5. Conclusion

DCC Propane cements an important doctrinal proposition: State negligence and recklessness claims that merely track federal hazardous-materials duties are not ousted by HMTA pre-emption, even if they supply a tort damages remedy. By declaring that the HMTA’s civil mens-rea definition “knowingly” subsumes the negligence standard and by upholding higher-culpability recklessness claims, the Second Circuit narrows the sweep of its own dicta in Buono, aligns with DOT’s administrative interpretation, and preserves an essential avenue of private redress. The decision harmonises federal uniformity with state accountability, signaling to carriers that compliance with HMRs is not only a regulatory obligation but also a shield against (and yardstick for) private liability. Going forward, litigants and courts must scrutinise whether a complained-of state duty truly parallels federal law; if it does, the courthouse doors remain open.