“Still Smells Like Probable Cause” – The Eleventh Circuit’s Re-affirmation that the Odor of Marijuana Alone Justifies a Warrantless Automobile Search
(United States v. Gregory LaMarcus Green, 24-12642, 11th Cir. July 11 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Gregory LaMarcus Green addresses whether a law-enforcement officer may rely solely on the odor of marijuana emanating from a vehicle to establish probable cause for a warrantless search, even after the legalization of hemp products whose odor is indistinguishable from marijuana. Gregory Green, already subject to an outstanding felony warrant, was stopped for minor traffic infractions. During the encounter, Officer Christopher Brown stated he reeked of weed, deployed a trained canine for a free-air sniff, and ultimately discovered a stolen firearm and narcotics. Green moved to suppress the evidence, arguing that canine intrusions into the open car violated the Fourth Amendment and that the smell of marijuana was insufficient because hemp (legal in Alabama) smells the same. Both the district court and, now, the Eleventh Circuit rejected those arguments.

2. Summary of the Judgment

• Holding: The smell of marijuana, credibly detected by an officer, provides probable cause to search a vehicle under the automobile exception, irrespective of the later-raised possibility that the odor could have been legal hemp. Consequently, the firearm and narcotics recovered from Green’s car are admissible, and the district court correctly denied the motion to suppress.
• Disposition: Judgment AFFIRMED. Green’s 15-month sentence for being a felon in possession of a firearm stands.
• Key Determinative Facts: (1) Officer Brown’s immediate detection of marijuana odor, (2) his credible testimony corroborated by body-camera footage, and (3) the vehicle’s ready mobility.
• Issues Rendered Moot: Because probable cause arose before any canine sniff, the panel declined to rule on whether the dog’s three intrusions (two permitted, one arguably improper) independently violated the Fourth Amendment.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• United States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506 (11th Cir. 1991) (en banc) – Established that an agent’s detection of marijuana odor as a trained officer creates probable cause. The panel explicitly relied on this “no-doubt” rule.
• United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) – Supreme Court precedent that the distinct odor of marijuana emanating from vehicles provides probable cause.
• Merricks v. Adkisson, 785 F.3d 553 (11th Cir. 2015) – Reaffirmed the sufficiency of marijuana odor for probable cause; cited to demonstrate doctrinal continuity.
• United States v. Lanzon, 639 F.3d 1293 (11th Cir. 2011) – Articulated the two-part automobile-exception test: mobility plus probable cause.
• Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) – Allowed a lapse in time between the moment probable cause arises and the actual search.
• D.C. v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48 (2018) – Clarified that officers need not eliminate innocent explanations—all that is required is a “fair probability” of criminality.
• United States v. Campbell, 26 F.4th 860 (11th Cir. 2022) (en banc) – Cited to emphasize limits on traffic-stop duration, yet distinguished because Brown proceeded diligently.
• Other supportive authorities: Perkins, Magluta, Ramirez-Chilel, Clark, Lebowitz, reinforcing objective probable-cause analysis and deference to credibility findings.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Standard of Review: Mixed questions—factual findings upheld unless clearly erroneous; legal conclusions reviewed de novo.
2. Automobile Exception Applied: (a) Vehicle was readily mobile. (b) Officer’s smell of marijuana created probable cause that contraband was present.
3. Credibility Assessment: Substantial deference given to the district court’s finding that Officer Brown’s testimony was credible, consistent with video, and not “contrary to the laws of nature.”
4. Objective v. Subjective Motive: Even though Brown sought canine confirmation and omitted the odor from his report, probable cause is judged objectively; his subjective caution does not negate earlier justification.
5. Hemp Argument Rejected: Under Wesby, officers need not rule out innocent explanations; the existence of legal hemp does not diminish a “fair probability” that the odor signals illegal marijuana.
6. Dog Sniff Issues Bypassed: Once odor-based probable cause was affirmed, the panel deemed canine intrusion arguments unnecessary to resolve, demonstrating judicial economy and adherence to the harmless-error concept.

3.3 Potential Impact of the Decision

This opinion is unpublished (Do Not Publish), yet it carries persuasive weight and signals the Eleventh Circuit’s current stance on three developing areas:

• Odor-Based Probable Cause Post-Hemp Legalization – The decision confirms that legalization of hemp in Alabama (and by extension other states) does not lower the probable-cause threshold where the odor of cannabis-like substances is involved.
• Police Report Omissions – Courts may still credit in-court testimony and body-camera evidence even when an officer’s written report omits a key fact, so long as credibility findings survive clear-error review.
• Scope of Canine Sniff Doctrine – Although not squarely decided, the dicta and magistrate analysis highlight how officers can avoid Fourth-Amendment pitfalls by limiting canine entry to portals already open for legitimate reasons.

Practically, defense attorneys within the Eleventh Circuit face an uphill battle arguing that mere odor of marijuana (or cannabis-smelling hemp) is insufficient. Conversely, officers are reminded to articulate olfactory observations contemporaneously—to strengthen credibility—and to anticipate defense claims arising from hemp legalization.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• Probable Cause – A reasonable belief, based on facts and circumstances, that evidence of a crime will be found. It is more than a hunch but less than proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
• Automobile Exception – A Fourth Amendment doctrine allowing warrantless searches of vehicles if (1) the car is mobile and (2) officers have probable cause to think it contains contraband.
• Free-Air Sniff – When a trained drug-detection dog sniffs the air surrounding a vehicle; traditionally not considered a “search” if the dog remains outside.
• Motion to Suppress – A request by a defendant asking the court to exclude evidence obtained in violation of constitutional rights.
• Objective v. Subjective Analysis – Courts evaluate search legality based on what a reasonable officer could believe under the circumstances, not on the searching officer’s private motives.
• Standard of Review – Clear Error – Appellate courts will overturn factual findings only if left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Green reinforces a long-standing tenet: in the Eleventh Circuit, an officer’s credible detection of marijuana odor alone supplies probable cause to search a vehicle, even in an era when legal hemp complicates olfactory certainty. The decision underscores the continuing vitality of the automobile exception, the deference appellate courts afford credibility determinations, and the irrelevance of an officer’s internal deliberations once the objective facts justify the search. While unpublished, the case is a potent reminder—both to practitioners and law-enforcement personnel—that the scent of cannabis remains a powerful trigger for warrantless automobile searches, and challenges premised on hemp’s legality are unlikely to prevail absent contradictory evidence undermining the officer’s credibility.