“Statute-of-Conviction” Limiting Principles for Cell-Phone Warrants: Commentary on United States v. Judkins (10th Cir. 2025)

“Statute-of-Conviction” Limiting Principles for Cell-Phone Warrants:
A Comprehensive Commentary on United States v. Judkins (10th Cir. 2025)

1. Introduction

United States v. Judkins, decided on 17 June 2025 by the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, addresses three discrete questions:

  1. whether a digital search warrant for a cell-phone satisfied the Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement;
  2. whether the evidence was sufficient to convict the defendant of possessing a firearm in furtherance of drug trafficking under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A); and
  3. whether the sentencing court clearly erred in relying on YouTube videos as proof of ongoing gang affiliation.

Juleus Judkins was arrested after police recognized him as having outstanding warrants. A subsequent search of his vehicle and a judicially authorized search of his dropped cell-phone uncovered drugs, a loaded handgun and electronic communications indicative of drug dealing. He was convicted in the District of Colorado of (i) possession with intent to distribute (21 U.S.C. § 841), (ii) use of a telephone to facilitate a felony drug offense (21 U.S.C. § 843(b)), and (iii) possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug offense (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)), and was sentenced to seventy months’ imprisonment. Judkins challenged the validity of the cell-phone warrant, the sufficiency of the firearm count, and the sentencing court’s reliance on rap videos for his criminal-history determination.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Tenth Circuit (Judges Tymkovich, Carson and Federico) affirmed in all respects. Key holdings include:

  • Particularity of Digital Warrants: A cell-phone warrant that expressly limits the search to evidence of violations of specified federal statutes (i.e., “statute-of-conviction” language) contains an adequate limiting principle and therefore meets the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement.
  • Sufficiency of § 924(c) Evidence: The loaded handgun found on the vehicle floor, within immediate reach of the defendant and located next to drugs and drug profits, was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude constructive possession and that the firearm furthered the drug crime.
  • Sentencing Fact-Finding: The district court did not clearly err by relying on publicly available YouTube videos to find ongoing gang affiliation, and any arguable error was harmless in view of overwhelming independent evidence of drug trafficking and firearm possession.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

  • United States v. Palms, 21 F.4th 689 (10th Cir. 2021) – The court’s central authority for the “limiting principle” doctrine in digital searches. Palms permitted a byte-for-byte extraction so long as the search focused on evidence of human trafficking. Judkins imports the same rationale to narcotics investigations.
  • United States v. Otero, 563 F.3d 1127 (10th Cir. 2009) & United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 2005) – Early Tenth-Circuit opinions emphasizing heightened particularity for computer searches; cited to frame the doctrinal requirement the warrant be more than a “general search.”
  • United States v. Russian, 848 F.3d 1239 (10th Cir. 2017) – Provided the phrase “some limiting principle” adopted in Palms and echoed in Judkins.
  • United States v. King, 632 F.3d 646 (10th Cir. 2011), United States v. Trotter, 483 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 2007), United States v. Basham, 268 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. 2001) – Trio of firearm-and-drugs cases supplying the multi-factor test for “in furtherance” and demonstrating how spatial proximity, loading status, and accessibility support § 924(c) convictions.

3.2 The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The pivotal Fourth-Amendment discussion proceeds in three steps:

  1. Nature of Electronic Information. The court acknowledges that cell-phones contain vast troves of personal data, invoking Otero’s admonition that particularity is “that much more important.”
  2. Existence of a Limiting Principle. Echoing Palms, the panel holds that a warrant referencing the specific crimes under investigation— here, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841, 843(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)—is sufficiently tailored. The court explicitly rejects any need to specify file types, search protocols, or date ranges ex ante.
  3. Comparative Case Law. By surveying Palms, Christie, Brooks and Loera, the panel demonstrates doctrinal consistency: if a warrant directs officers to search only for evidence relating to the statutorily identified crimes, it avoids the “general rummaging” condemned by the Framers.

On the § 924(c) issue, the court methodically applies the non-exclusive King/Trotter factors, concluding that every factor—weapon type (handgun), loaded status, proximity to drugs, and accessibility—favored the government.

3.3 Impact on Future Litigation

  • Digital-Search Doctrine Hardened. Although designated a non-precedential “Order and Judgment,” the reasoning amplifies Palms and will likely be cited (under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1) as persuasive authority that “statute-of-conviction” language alone is enough to particularize a warrant for an entire cellphone’s contents.
  • Reduced Demands for Temporal Limits. The panel explicitly declines to impose a date-range requirement, providing law enforcement and magistrate judges clearer, more flexible drafting guidance.
  • Sentencing Evidence Flexibility. By approving the district court’s reliance on publicly available social-media content, the opinion signals that judges may consider a defendant’s own online persona at sentencing absent a specific evidentiary rule to the contrary.
  • Firearm-Drug Nexus Clarified. The reaffirmation of the King/Trotter/Basham analysis tightens the link between spatial proximity and “furtherance,” offering prosecutors a blueprint and warning defendants that loaded weapons near drugs remain practically per se § 924(c) evidence in the Tenth Circuit.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

  • Particularity Requirement: The Fourth Amendment obliges a warrant to tell officers exactly what they are allowed to look for and seize, preventing a fishing expedition through a person’s private data.
  • Limiting Principle: A phrase or condition inside the warrant that confines the search to evidence of specific crimes or items, thereby satisfying particularity.
  • Constructive Possession: Having the power and intention to control an object—even if it is not physically in one’s hand (e.g., a gun on the car floor beneath the driver’s seat).
  • “In Furtherance” (18 U.S.C. § 924(c)): The firearm must promote or advance the drug crime— not just be coincidentally nearby. Courts look at factors like distance, loading status, and temporal relationship to the drug activity.
  • Plain Error vs. Forfeiture vs. Waiver: If a defendant fails to raise an argument in the trial court, it is “forfeited.” To resuscitate it on appeal, the defendant must show “plain error” (obvious error affecting substantial rights). If the appellant omits a plain-error argument altogether, the issue is deemed “waived” and the appellate court will not consider it.

5. Conclusion

United States v. Judkins solidifies a pragmatic path for law-enforcement officers and magistrate judges drafting digital search warrants: reference the federal or state statutes under investigation, and you have likely satisfied the Fourth Amendment particularity requirement—no file-type, keyword or temporal limitations required, at least in the Tenth Circuit. The decision also reiterates that loaded firearms situated near drugs typically suffice for § 924(c) liability, and it endorses judicial reliance on defendants’ public social-media content at sentencing. Taken together, these holdings strengthen prosecutorial tools in narcotics cases while clarifying constitutional boundaries for digital searches, thereby influencing warrant-drafting protocols and evidentiary strategies far beyond Colorado.

© 2025 – Commentary prepared for educational purposes. All rights reserved.

Case Details

Year: 2025
Court: Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

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