“Some Evidence” of Loss, Not Contemporaneous Dollar Proof, Satisfies Due Process for Prison Restitution Sanctions

Introduction

In Malcolm Wilson v. Angelita Castaneda, No. 22-3068 (7th Cir. July 15, 2025), the Seventh Circuit squarely addressed what the Fourteenth Amendment requires when a prison disciplinary hearing results in a restitution sanction against an inmate’s trust account. The case arose from a violent incident at Indiana State Prison, after which disciplinary officials found Malcolm Wilson guilty of battery and ordered sanctions that included restitution “up to $100,000” for another inmate’s medical costs. Wilson, proceeding under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged a due process violation on the theory that restitution was imposed without any evidence supporting the amount.

The district court dismissed the complaint at the screening stage under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that due process in the prison disciplinary context is satisfied where the record contains “some evidence” that the institution incurred financial loss from the misconduct—even if there is no contemporaneous evidence of the precise dollar figure at the time of the hearing. Judge Pryor authored the majority opinion, joined by Judge Brennan; Judge Jackson-Akiwumi dissented.

The decision clarifies, in a precedential opinion, that the “some evidence” standard from Superintendent v. Hill governs restitution sanctions and that the Constitution does not require contemporaneous proof of a specific restitution amount at the disciplinary hearing. The court also rejected Wilson’s claim that medical bills were “exculpatory evidence” to which he had a right under Wolff v. McDonnell.

Summary of the Opinion

The Seventh Circuit affirmed dismissal of Wilson’s § 1983 due process claim at screening. The court held:

Prisoners have a protected property interest in their trust account funds, so due process applies before funds are taken to satisfy restitution (Campbell v. Miller).
Wolff’s procedural safeguards (advance written notice, opportunity to be heard before an impartial decisionmaker with the ability to present evidence, and a written statement of reasons) apply to disciplinary hearings; Wilson did not allege violations of these safeguards.
In addition, disciplinary decisions must be supported by “some evidence” in the record (Hill; Webb; Scruggs). That lenient standard governs restitution sanctions.
Evidence in the record that the victim-inmate was transported to an outside hospital after the altercation was “some evidence” that the prison incurred financial costs, satisfying due process even without a precise dollar amount at the hearing.
Due process does not require contemporaneous proof of the particular amount of restitution, and it permits assessed or estimated amounts that are later documented; Indiana DOC policy itself contemplates estimates and later provision of redacted medical bills.
Medical bills were not “exculpatory” within the meaning of Wolff, because they do not tend to establish innocence of the battery charge.

The court distinguished unpublished Seventh Circuit decisions in Lindell v. Pollard and Tonn v. Dittmann, where complaints plausibly alleged a total absence of evidentiary support; here, by contrast, Wilson’s own attachments supplied “some evidence” of institutional loss, effectively pleading himself out of court. Judge Jackson-Akiwumi dissented, arguing that Hill requires “some evidence” tied not only to guilt but also to the actual or estimated amount of restitution, and that a hospital visit alone is not “some evidence” of the dollar amount owed.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Roles

Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974): Establishes minimum procedural safeguards for prison disciplinary proceedings—notice, an opportunity to be heard before an impartial decisionmaker, the ability to present evidence within institutional constraints, and a written statement of reasons. The majority notes Wilson did not challenge compliance with Wolff and accepts that Wolff was satisfied.
Superintendent v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445 (1985): Imposes the “some evidence” standard for disciplinary decisions that affect protected interests. The majority applies Hill to restitution sanctions, emphasizing the low threshold—any evidence in the record that could support the board’s conclusion is sufficient.
Webb v. Anderson, 224 F.3d 649 (7th Cir. 2000); Scruggs v. Jordan, 485 F.3d 934 (7th Cir. 2007); McPherson v. McBride, 188 F.3d 784 (7th Cir. 1999): Seventh Circuit applications of Hill that underscore the “meager” quantum of evidence necessary and the limited nature of judicial review in prison discipline.
Campbell v. Miller, 787 F.2d 217 (7th Cir. 1986): Recognizes an inmate’s property interest in prison trust account funds, thus triggering due process protections for restitution deductions. Campbell also implies that Wolff’s framework is adequate for deprivations involving either liberty (credits) or property (restitution).
Lindell v. Pollard, 681 F. App’x 518 (7th Cir. 2017) (unpublished); Tonn v. Dittmann, 607 F. App’x 589 (7th Cir. 2015) (unpublished): Unpublished screening-stage reversals where inmates alleged there was no evidence to support restitution amounts. The majority distinguishes these because Wilson’s own exhibits supplied evidence of institutional costs (hospital transfer), whereas Lindell and Tonn alleged a complete evidentiary void.
United States v. Kizeart, 505 F.3d 672 (7th Cir. 2007): Cited by the majority for the notion that a sanction will be set aside only if “plainly unreasonable.” The dissent questions importing that phrasing into the prison-discipline context, emphasizing Hill’s “some evidence” test as the controlling standard.
Edwards v. Snyder, 478 F.3d 827 (7th Cir. 2007): Notes that pro se litigants can “plead themselves out of court” by attaching materials that negate their claims; applied here because Wilson’s exhibits showed the injured inmate required outside hospitalization.
Indiana DOC Disciplinary Code (effective May 1, 2023), § IX(E)(3)(e): The majority quotes IDOC policy allowing restitution in an “estimated amount” and requiring later documentation, including provision of redacted medical bills. Although policy cannot alter constitutional minima, the court uses it to show that the process contemplates later precision and does not offend due process.

Legal Reasoning

The majority proceeds in three steps.

It confirms that the Fourteenth Amendment applies because inmates have a protected property interest in their trust accounts (Campbell). Therefore, before funds are withdrawn to satisfy restitution, procedural due process must be afforded through Wolff’s safeguards and the substantive “some evidence” threshold of Hill.
It holds that the “some evidence” standard governs not only findings of guilt but also the decision to impose restitution as a sanction for the misconduct. The question is not whether the amount is precisely determined at the hearing but whether the record supports the conclusion that the institution suffered compensable loss due to the violation.
Applying that test at the screening stage, the court looks beyond bare allegations to the exhibits Wilson attached to his complaint—staff reports, video summaries, and written findings that the victim-inmate required outside hospitalization after the battery. That evidence suffices to show the prison incurred costs, even if the exact amount was unknown at the time the sanction issued. Consequently, Wilson’s own attachments undermine his claim that there was “no evidence.”

The court also rejects two ancillary arguments:

Exculpatory evidence: Wilson’s request to see medical bills did not trigger Wolff’s exculpatory-evidence right. “Exculpatory” means evidence tending to establish innocence of the charge. Medical bills concern the amount of restitution, not guilt of battery.
Specific dollar proof at the hearing: The Constitution does not require contemporaneous proof of a specific amount before restitution can be imposed. The majority notes the IDOC policy that permits estimated restitution “up to” an amount when medical treatment is ongoing or bills are not yet available, with later documentation (including redacted bills) to follow.

The Dissent’s Countervailing View

Judge Jackson-Akiwumi accepts that Hill’s “some evidence” standard applies, but reads Hill to require evidence tied to the disciplinary board’s ultimate conclusion—not merely to the underlying misconduct. Translating that to restitution, the dissent would require:

Some evidence supporting guilt of the rule violation; and
Some evidence supporting the actual or estimated restitution amount attributed to that violation.

In the dissent’s view, a hospital visit alone is not “some evidence” of an amount owed or likely owed; therefore, Wilson’s complaint should have survived screening, much like the allegations in Lindell and Tonn. The dissent also questions the majority’s nod to Kizeart’s “plainly unreasonable” gloss, warning against diluting Hill’s standard. Finally, it cautions that allowing open-ended “up to” restitution without amount-specific evidence at the time of decision risks granting prisons a “blank check.”

What This Decision Answers (and What It Leaves Open)

Question 1 (stated by the court): Does a complaint state a due process claim when restitution is imposed without evidence to support the amount?
Answer: Not where the record contains “some evidence” that the institution incurred loss due to the misconduct. Evidence of an injury requiring outside hospitalization sufficed here, even though no precise amount was known at the hearing.
Question 2: What evidence is necessary to satisfy federal due process for restitution?
Answer: Only “some evidence”—a modicum—that the violation caused institutional costs. Due process does not demand contemporaneous proof of a specific dollar figure at the hearing.
Question 3: Must evidence be relied on at the time the sanction is imposed, or can it be produced later?
Answer: Later documentation suffices; there is no federal due process requirement that the precise amount be supported at the disciplinary hearing. Policies that allow estimated “up to” amounts with later itemization are constitutionally permissible.

Open issues:

How much specificity is required when there is no clear evidence that any institutional cost was incurred? The court does not say, but suggests that where the record is “so devoid” of evidence, a due process claim would lie.
Whether restitution sanctions might implicate the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines Clause: the majority declines to opine because the argument was not pleaded below.
The contours of an inmate’s right to inspect evidence bearing only on the amount of restitution (as opposed to guilt), beyond what state policy may provide, remain to be defined in future cases.

Practical Impact

For correctional officials: The decision affirms that restitution sanctions may be imposed at a hearing based on evidence that some institutional cost will be incurred, even if the amount is presently unknown. Documentation can follow. Officials should ensure the record contains at least minimal evidence linking the misconduct to a compensable institutional expense (e.g., medical treatment, property damage, or transport).
For inmates and advocates: Challenges to restitution must target the absence of any evidence of institutional loss, not merely the absence of a precise bill at the time of the hearing. To preserve broader arguments (e.g., Excessive Fines, state-law or policy violations), they must be pleaded in the complaint and raised in the district court.
For district courts: At § 1915A screening, exhibits attached to a pro se complaint are part of the complaint. If those materials show “some evidence” of institutional loss, dismissal is appropriate. Pro se plaintiffs can “plead themselves out of court” by including documents that supply the needed evidentiary link.
For policy: The court nods to IDOC’s approach—assessing estimated restitution when bills are not yet available and later providing redacted bills. Agencies may wish to codify clear timelines and documentation procedures to mitigate due process concerns and to avoid the “blank check” worry expressed in the dissent.
For future litigation: Lindell and Tonn remain relevant but are now constrained. Where a complaint plausibly alleges a complete lack of evidence of loss, it may proceed; where attachments show medical treatment or other cost‑incurring consequences, Hill’s “some evidence” is likely met.

Complex Concepts Simplified

“Some evidence” standard: A very low evidentiary threshold from Hill. The question is whether any evidence in the record could support the disciplinary board’s conclusion. Courts do not reweigh evidence; they look for a minimal evidentiary link.
Wolff protections: Basic procedural safeguards in prison discipline—written notice of charges, an opportunity to be heard and present evidence (with institutional limits), and a written statement of reasons.
Restitution in prison discipline: A monetary sanction against an inmate’s trust account to reimburse the institution for losses caused by misconduct (e.g., medical bills, property damage).
“Exculpatory evidence”: Evidence that tends to show the inmate did not commit the charged violation. Evidence relevant only to the size of a sanction (e.g., the amount of medical bills) is not “exculpatory” as to guilt.
§ 1915A screening: Early judicial review of prisoner complaints to dismiss frivolous or non-meritorious actions before service. Courts consider attached documents as part of the complaint.
“Up to” restitution and estimates: Policies may allow hearing officers to set a maximum estimated amount when exact bills are pending, with later itemized proof. The Seventh Circuit holds this approach satisfies due process if the record shows some evidence of an institutional loss.

Conclusion

Wilson v. Castaneda establishes a clear rule in the Seventh Circuit: the Fourteenth Amendment’s “some evidence” standard governs restitution sanctions arising from prison disciplinary proceedings, and the Constitution does not require contemporaneous proof of a specific dollar amount at the hearing. Evidence that the violation caused institutional costs—here, outside hospitalization—is enough to support the restitution sanction, with later documentation permissible. The court also cabins inmates’ access-to-evidence arguments by clarifying that medical bills are not “exculpatory” within Wolff’s meaning.

The dissent rightly highlights a tension: tying the evidentiary requirement more closely to the amount could better cabin discretion. But unless and until the Supreme Court or an en banc court refines Hill for the restitution context, Wilson signals that minimal, non-quantified proof of institutional loss suffices. Going forward, prison officials should make a record showing a causal link between the misconduct and some institutional expense; inmates seeking to challenge restitution must focus on the absence of any such link at the time of the disciplinary decision, and they must preserve all constitutional theories from the outset.

In sum, the opinion lowers the bar for sustaining restitution sanctions at the hearing stage while preserving the possibility of later precision through institutional policy. It is a significant clarification for prison-discipline due process in the Seventh Circuit, harmonizing Wolff and Hill with the practical realities of delayed billing for medical and other costs.