“Solvent Traps” as Silencers & the Post-Zherka Constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)
A Structured Commentary on United States v. Sternquist, 24-2135-cr (2d Cir. July 2 2025) (Summary Order)

Introduction

In United States v. Sternquist the Second Circuit confronted two recurring questions in the wake of New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen: (1) the continuing constitutionality of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as applied to non-violent felons and (2) the evidentiary threshold for treating ostensibly innocuous “solvent traps” as firearm silencers, thereby triggering significant Guideline enhancements.

Defendant Kara Sternquist—already twice convicted of federal identification-document offenses—pleaded guilty to a single felon-in-possession count after agents recovered firearms, “ghost gun” components, law-enforcement badges, and several cylindrical devices marketed as “solvent traps.” She received sixty months’ imprisonment, near the bottom of her advisory Guidelines range (57–71 months). On appeal she raised:

• a facial and as-applied Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1);
• a claim that the district court mischaracterised her solvent traps as silencers, inflating her offense level; and
• procedural & substantive unreasonableness arguments directed at her sentence.

The panel (Judges Nardini, Merriam & Kahn) summarily affirmed in full, leaning heavily on its earlier precedential opinion in Zherka v. Bondi, decided only months earlier.

Summary of the Judgment

• Constitutional Holding: Reliance on Zherka forecloses any Second Amendment challenge to § 922(g)(1); the statute remains valid against both facial and as-applied attacks by non-violent felons.
• Guidelines Calculation: ATF technical reports supported the district court’s factual finding that Sternquist’s solvent traps—complete with end caps, baffles and pre-drilled “dimples”—were intended for use as silencers. That finding justified a base offense level of 20 under §2K2.1(a)(4)(B) and a 4-level firearm-count enhancement under §2K2.1(b)(1)(B).
• Procedural Reasonableness: The sentencing judge neither relied on clearly erroneous facts nor ignored §3553(a) factors. References to “gang bangers” and terrorism merely contextualised the seriousness of ghost-gun and fake-ID possession.
• Substantive Reasonableness: A within-Guidelines 60-month sentence fell “within the range of permissible decisions” and did not “shock the conscience.”
• Disposition: Judgment of conviction and sentence AFFIRMED.

Analysis

1. Precedents Cited & Their Influence

1. Zherka v. Bondi, ___ F.4th ___ (2d Cir. 2025).
   After Bruen, lower courts grappled with whether the historical-analogical method undermines felon-dispossession statutes. Zherka held that § 922(g)(1) satisfies that test, emphasising Founding-era loyalty-oath and dangerousness-based disarmament practices. The Sternquist panel adopted Zherka’s reasoning wholesale, treating it as controlling circuit precedent.
2. United States v. Yilmaz, 910 F.3d 686 (2d Cir. 2018). Supplies the bifurcated standard of review for sentencing (de novo for legal issues, clear error for factual determinations).
3. United States v. Cooper, 131 F.4th 127 (2d Cir. 2025). Recent restatement of what constitutes “significant procedural error.”
4. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) & United States v. Kane, 452 F.3d 140 (2d Cir. 2006). Both endorse consideration of motive and personal background during sentencing.
5. United States v. Broxmeyer, 699 F.3d 265 (2d Cir. 2012) & United States v. Messina, 806 F.3d 55 (2d Cir. 2015)— Guide substantive-reasonableness review and reinforce that a within-Guidelines sentence is ordinarily reasonable.

2. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The opinion, though labelled a “summary order,” still maps out a clear chain of analysis:

• Step 1 – Binding Circuit Authority: The court begins with Zherka, observing that the defendant “concedes” its applicability. Under the Second Circuit’s vertical stare decisis, the constitutionality challenge dies at the threshold.
• Step 2 – Fact-Finding on Silencers: Applying the clear-error standard, the panel accepts the district judge’s reliance on ATF forensic reports. Physical characteristics (baffles, end caps, perf-drilled dimples) equate to “design” and “intent” for §921(a)(25)’s silencer definition.
• Step 3 – Guidelines Mechanics: • Base offense level 20 under §2K2.1(a)(4)(B) requires (i) felon status + (ii) any silencer.
  • A separate 4-level bump under §2K2.1(b)(1)(B) attaches when the countable “firearms” (including silencers) total 8–24.
  Because at least one device qualifies as a silencer and the aggregate items exceed eight, the precise classification of every object is irrelevant— any error would be harmless.
• Step 4 – Procedural Claims: The court sweeps aside assertions that the judge’s rhetoric (“gang bangers,” terrorism) signified bias, treating it instead as permissible context. Likewise, discussion of Metropolitan Detention Center conditions was accurate and showed mitigating consideration.
• Step 5 – Substantive Reasonableness: The panel reaffirms its deferential stance—so long as the sentencing judge covered the §3553(a) field and chose a within-Guidelines term, reversal requires “manifest injustice,” a showing Sternquist could not make.

3. Anticipated Impact

• Second Amendment Litigation: By reiterating Zherka’s holding so soon, the court signals to district judges and litigants that felon-in-possession challenges in the Second Circuit are effectively foreclosed absent Supreme Court intervention.
• “Solvent Trap” Prosecutions: The opinion furnishes a succinct, fact-based template for classifying such devices as silencers. Prosecutors may rely on ATF technical features (baffles, end caps, “dimples”) instead of proving actual use, easing the path to higher Guidelines exposure.
• Sentencing Advocacy: The ruling clarifies what a defendant must provide to invoke §3553(a)(6) disparity arguments: specific comparator cases with congruent facts and criminal histories, not general statistics about downward variances in the district.
• Summary Orders’ Persuasive Weight: Though non-precedential under Local Rule 32.1.1, the order will still carry persuasive authority, especially on the silencers issue, until the Circuit squarely addresses it in a published opinion.

Complex Concepts Simplified

• Facial vs. As-Applied Challenge: A facial attack says a law is unconstitutional in all its applications; an as-applied challenge says it is unconstitutional only as applied to this defendant’s circumstances.
• 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1): The federal “felon-in-possession” statute—it forbids anyone convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year in prison from possessing a firearm.
• 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(25) — “Firearm Silencer”: Broad definition covering any device (or combination of parts) designed or intended to reduce a firearm’s sound signature.
• U.S.S.G. §2K2.1: The Guideline governing firearm offenses. It assigns a base offense level and then adds (or subtracts) specific offense characteristics—e.g., number of firearms or presence of a silencer.
• Procedural vs. Substantive Reasonableness: • Procedural: Did the judge follow the correct steps—calculate the range, consider §3553(a) factors, explain?
  • Substantive: Is the length of the sentence itself fair in light of the record, or does it “shock the conscience”?
• Summary Order: A non-precedential disposition resolving an appeal without a full published opinion. It may be cited under Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 but does not bind future panels.

Conclusion

United States v. Sternquist reinforces two key propositions: (1) in the Second Circuit, § 922(g)(1) remains fully intact against Second Amendment attacks—even by non-violent felons—after Zherka; and (2) ostensibly lawful “solvent trap” devices may readily be deemed silencers when their physical characteristics reveal an intended suppressive function, carrying significant sentencing consequences. Beyond these holdings, the decision underscores the appellate court’s deference to district-court fact-finding and sentencing discretion when those courts reflectly engage with the §3553(a) factors and rely on a sound evidentiary record. Practitioners should therefore:

• Expect constitutional challenges to § 922(g)(1) to meet swift defeat in the Second Circuit absent Supreme Court guidance;
• Prepare detailed technical rebuttals—and not merely commercial-use labels—when disputing silencer classifications;
• Present concrete comparator cases (with PSRs and judgments) if urging a sentencing-disparity reduction.

As an interpretive marker, Sternquist may be a summary order, but it functions as a practical roadmap for future firearms prosecutions and sentencing debates in the post-Bruen legal landscape.