“Shock‐the‐Conscience” Limits on State‐Created Danger Claims Against School Officials

Introduction

In the wake of the November 30, 2021 Oxford High School shooting—where a fifteen-year-old student, E.C., brought a gun to campus and killed four classmates and injured others—multiple civil suits arose against school and law-enforcement officials. Among these, a subset of claims was pursued in federal court by victims and survivors against two Oxford Community School District employees: counselor Shawn Hopkins and dean of students Nicholas Ejak. The plaintiffs invoked a rare “state-created danger” theory under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, alleging that Hopkins and Ejak’s decisions and omissions not only failed to protect students but affirmatively increased the risk of harm. After the district court dismissed the complaints for failure to state a plausible constitutional violation (with one narrow exception), both sides appealed. On March 20, 2025, a Sixth Circuit panel affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to dismiss the remaining claims.

Summary of the Judgment

The Sixth Circuit reaffirmed that to prevail on a state-created danger claim, a plaintiff must allege: (1) an “affirmative act” by a state official that creates or increases risk; (2) a risk that is “special” to the individual victim; and (3) conduct that is so “egregious” as to “shock the conscience.” In this case:

The court held that returning E.C.’s backpack after a counseling session—even if it contained the handgun—did not place victims in any worse position than before and was not an actionable “affirmative act.”
Failing to inform other school employees of E.C.’s warning signs was an omission rather than an affirmative decision and therefore not actionable under the doctrine.
The one act the district court had found potentially actionable—Hopkins’s warning to E.C.’s parents that he would call Child Protective Services if they failed to obtain counseling within 48 hours—was aimed at mitigating, not increasing, risk and could not be characterized as “conscience shocking.”

Accordingly, the Sixth Circuit affirmed dismissal of all claims and remanded with instructions to dismiss the complaints in their entirety.

Analysis

4.1 Precedents Cited

The court’s decision rests on a line of Supreme Court and Sixth Circuit authorities defining the contours of state-created danger liability and the “shock-the-conscience” standard:

DeShaney v. Winnebago Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. (489 U.S. 189, 1989): Established that the Due Process Clause generally does not obligate the state to protect individuals from private violence, absent a “special relationship” or state-created danger.
County of Sacramento v. Lewis (523 U.S. 833, 1998): Held that executive-type actions violate substantive due process only if they are “so egregious, so outrageous” as to “shock the contemporary conscience.”
McQueen v. Beecher Cmty. Sch. (433 F.3d 460, 2006): Recognized the “state-created danger” exception to DeShaney in the Sixth Circuit, outlining its three elements.
Doe v. Jackson Local School Dist. (954 F.3d 925, 2020): Clarified that officials’ conduct must reflect “reckless or callous indifference” to the risk they themselves have created or increased.
Bukowski v. City of Akron (326 F.3d 702, 2003) and Stiles v. Grainger County (819 F.3d 834, 2016): Distinguish affirmative acts from omissions, holding that mere failure to act or return someone to pre-existing danger does not give rise to liability.
Estate of Romain v. City of Grosse Pointe Farms (935 F.3d 485, 2019): Reiterated that a plaintiff must plausibly allege an affirmative act specifically intended to or manifestly knowing of increased risk.

4.2 Legal Reasoning

The panel applied de novo review of the district court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal and assessed qualified immunity in two steps:

Did the plaintiffs plausibly allege a violation of their Fourteenth Amendment rights under the state-created danger doctrine?
If so, was the law “clearly established” such that defendants would have known their conduct was unlawful?

On the first step, the Sixth Circuit concluded:

Returning E.C.’s backpack did no more than replicate pre-existing risk—it was not an “affirmative act” that increased danger.
Concealment of dangerous information from other staff was an omitted act and not actionable absent concealment with the purpose or knowledge of increased risk.
Hopkins’s 48-hour counseling ultimatum—delivered to motivate parents to seek mental-health assistance—was directed toward decreasing, not elevating, the danger. It served a legitimate governmental purpose of protecting E.C. from self-harm and others from violence. Even under the more deferential summary-judgment standard, the conduct failed to “shock the conscience.”

Because none of the alleged actions met the strict “shock-the-conscience” threshold, the court found no constitutional violation. Because there was no cognizable right infringement, the court did not need to reach whether the law was clearly established.

4.3 Impact

This decision reinforces the narrow scope of substantive due process claims against public officials for harms caused by private actors. In particular, it underscores:

Affirmative-act requirement: Decisions and omissions by school officials—absent intentional cover-up or purposeful creation of risk—will ordinarily be non-actionable, even when tragic outcomes follow.
High bar for conscience-shocking behavior: Efforts to secure counseling and involve parents, though perhaps flawed in hindsight, will less likely meet the “outrageous” standard necessary for due process liability.
Qualified immunity protection: Officials who act to mitigate risk, even imperfectly, generally remain shielded from constitutional claims in the absence of deliberate indifference or malice.

Future plaintiffs seeking to invoke the state-created danger doctrine in school-shooting contexts will face a formidable hurdle: they must allege facts showing that officials both knowingly increased risk and did so in a manner that truly “shocks the contemporary conscience.”

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A doctrine that protects government officials from civil liability unless they violated “clearly established” statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.
State-Created Danger Doctrine: A narrow exception to the rule that the Due Process Clause does not protect against private violence. It applies when a government actor’s affirmative conduct creates or increases the risk of private harm.
“Shock‐the‐Conscience” Standard: The most stringent test for substantive due process. Only the most egregious government actions—those demonstrating callous indifference to a known risk of harm—can violate it.
Rule 12(c) Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings: A procedural vehicle permitting dismissal after the complaint and answer are filed, where all well-pleaded allegations must be accepted as true, and the plaintiff must show a “plausible” entitlement to relief.

Conclusion

The Sixth Circuit’s decision in St. Juliana v. Oxford Community School District cements the high threshold plaintiffs must clear to hold school officials constitutionally liable for the violent acts of private actors. By reaffirming the strict requirements of the state-created danger doctrine and the shock-the-conscience standard, the court both protects well-intentioned risk‐mitigation efforts and clarifies the limited circumstances under which substantive due process can be invoked. This ruling will guide future litigation in the troubled intersection of school safety, mental health interventions, and constitutional tort claims.