“Same Website, Same Clock” – Second Circuit Clarifies the Limits of the Single-Publication Rule and Equitable Tolling in Online Defamation and Fraud Actions

Introduction

Case: Sarkar v. City of New York, No. 24-1219 (2d Cir. June 30 2025)
Court: United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (Summary Order)
Panel: Circuit Judges Lynch, Sullivan, and Menashi

Pro se plaintiff Jay Sarkar sued the City of New York, its Department of Education, the Special Commissioner of Investigation (“SCI”), and several officials, alleging that a 2006 SCI report defamed him, that defendants committed fraud in connection with his 2006 contract termination, and that they conspired under 42 U.S.C. § 1985 to violate his civil rights. The District Court (S.D.N.Y., Vyskocil, J.) dismissed the complaint as untimely. On appeal, Sarkar argued that (i) repeated web postings of the SCI report restarted the limitations period for defamation, (ii) the City’s alleged concealment tolled the fraud claim, (iii) a “continuing violation” preserved his § 1985 claim, and (iv) the District Court erred by ruling on the papers without oral argument.

The Second Circuit affirmed, holding that (1) New York’s single-publication rule starts the defamation clock at first online availability absent a republication to a new audience; (2) equitable tolling does not apply to state-law fraud claims against a municipality and equitable estoppel was not justified; (3) discrete acts, not continuing violations, triggered the § 1985 claim; and (4) the District Court acted within its discretion in deciding the motion on written submissions.

Summary of the Judgment

Defamation: Time-barred. Posting the same unaltered report on the same agency websites does not constitute “republication”; therefore the one-year limitation under N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 215(3) expired in 2007.
Fraud: Time-barred. Even assuming accrual in 2017, the one-year-and-90-day period of N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-i(1) and N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2) elapsed by early 2018. Equitable tolling is unavailable for New York state causes of action, and equitable estoppel requirements were not met.
42 U.S.C. § 1985 Conspiracy: Time-barred. Termination and publication of the report were discrete acts; “continuing violation” doctrine inapplicable.
Procedural Due Process: No error in deciding motion without oral argument where plaintiff had extensive written submissions and himself requested paper resolution.
Disposition: District court’s dismissal affirmed.

Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Van Buskirk v. New York Times Co., 325 F.3d 87 (2d Cir. 2003) – reaffirmed New York’s single-publication rule; court relied on it to find Sarkar’s defamation claim accrued upon first online publication.
Firth v. State, 98 N.Y.2d 365 (2002) – extended the single-publication rule to the Internet; pivotal in treating the 2006 website posting as “publication.”
Martin v. Daily News L.P., 990 N.Y.S.2d 473 (1st Dep’t 2014) – articulated four conditions for a “republication” exception. The court applied these factors and found none satisfied.
Jang Ho Choi v. Beautri Realty Corp., 22 N.Y.S.3d 431 (1st Dep’t 2016) – held equitable tolling unavailable for state claims; dispositive for Sarkar’s fraud count.
Ross v. Louise Wise Servs., Inc., 8 N.Y.3d 478 (2007) – prohibition against using the very fraud alleged as the basis for equitable estoppel; foreclosed Sarkar’s estoppel theory.
Gonzalez v. Hasty, 802 F.3d 212 (2d Cir. 2015) – clarified “continuing violation” doctrine; distinguished between discrete acts and continuing conditions.
Procedural precedents such as Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2015) and Greene v. WCI Holdings Corp., 136 F.3d 313 (2d Cir. 1998) guided de novo review and discretion over oral hearings.

B. Legal Reasoning

Single-Publication Rule
- The statute of limitations for defamation starts on the first “publication.” Re-hosting the same content on the same domain is not a new audience, occasion, or modified statement.
- The exceptions (new audience, distinct occasion, control, modification) from Martin were not met.
Statutory Bars for Fraud Against Municipalities
- N.Y. Gen. Mun. Law § 50-i(1) and N.Y. Educ. Law § 3813(2) impose a one-year-and-90-day limit—shorter than the usual six-year fraud period.
- Even delayed discovery did not help because the municipal-law period operates from accrual.
- Equitable tolling unavailable; equitable estoppel requires (a) misrepresentation separate from the tort and (b) due diligence. Sarkar pleaded neither.
Section 1985 and Continuing Violation
- Termination (2006) and report publication (2006) are discrete injuries; after each act damages were immediately ascertainable.
- Alleged later failures to retract or disclose are inaction, not affirmative new acts.
Procedural Discretion
- Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b) and Second Circuit precedent, oral argument is not mandatory when the record is fulsome; plaintiff actually preferred a paper proceeding.

C. Impact of the Judgment

Online Defamation Claims: Plaintiffs cannot rely on routine server migrations, URL changes, or reposting on the same governmental websites to restart the statute. Plaintiffs must sue within one year of first public posting.
Municipal Liability for Fraud: The decision reminds practitioners that the special one-year-and-90-day clock applies even when the usual six-year fraud discovery rule might suggest otherwise.
Equitable Doctrines: Reinforces that in New York the equitable tolling doctrine is unavailable in purely state causes of action; practitioners must instead plead equitable estoppel with particularity—showing both wrongful concealment and diligent pursuit.
Continuing Violation Doctrine: Emphasizes the narrowness of the doctrine; failure to remedy past wrongs does not create an ongoing violation.
Courtroom Practice: Affirms district courts’ discretion to adjudicate Rule 12(b)(6) motions on written submissions, particularly where voluminous briefing exists.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Single-Publication Rule: All claims for defamation based on a given “publication”—whether a newspaper, book, or website post—must be brought within one limitations period that starts when the content becomes first publicly available. Later views, downloads, or internal reposts do not reset the clock.
Republication Exception: A fresh limitations period arises only if (1) the defendant meaningfully changes the content or (2) disseminates it to a new audience on a distinct occasion under its control.
Equitable Tolling: A doctrine that pauses the statute of limitations where external circumstances (e.g., extraordinary events) prevent timely filing. New York does not apply this doctrine to state-law claims.
Equitable Estoppel: Stops a defendant from asserting a limitations defense when the defendant’s separate misconduct caused the plaintiff reasonably to delay suit, and the plaintiff acted diligently once the truth surfaced.
Continuing Violation Doctrine: In civil-rights law, certain ongoing discriminatory practices can be treated as a single continuing act, letting plaintiffs sue for older conduct. Discrete acts such as termination or publication do not qualify.

Conclusion

The Second Circuit’s summary order in Sarkar v. City of New York offers an instructive—if non-precedential—guidepost for litigants confronting statutes of limitation in the digital age. By holding that routine web repostings do not constitute republication, the court tightened the window for online defamation suits. Its strict application of the municipal fraud limitations period, coupled with a refusal to import equitable-tolling doctrines, highlights the rigid temporal protections New York affords its public entities. Finally, the opinion underscores the narrow confines of the continuing violation doctrine and the deference given to district courts when handling dispositive motions on the papers. Practitioners should heed the message: when publication occurs online and defendants are governmental bodies, the litigation clock starts immediately, ticks quickly, and rarely pauses.