“Same-Risk” Foreseeability in Negligent-Security Claims: Seventh Circuit Holds Targeted, Unprovoked Drive‑Thru Shooting at Wendy’s Unforeseeable as a Matter of Law

Introduction

This appeal arises from a brutal, rapid, and seemingly targeted shooting of a customer in a late-night drive‑thru line at a company-owned Wendy’s on West Garfield Boulevard in Chicago. The plaintiff, Vonzell Scott, Sr., severely injured by assailants who approached his car and opened fire over a five‑second span, sued Wendy’s Properties, LLC for negligence—specifically for failing to provide overnight security guards. The district court granted summary judgment to Wendy’s, finding that although a business may owe some duty to protect patrons from third-party assaults, this particular attack was not proximately caused by any breach because it was not reasonably foreseeable. The Seventh Circuit affirmed.

At stake is a recurring and delicate question in negligent‑security litigation under Illinois law: when do prior incidents and neighborhood crime make a third-party attack on a business’s premises “foreseeable”? The court’s opinion clarifies and applies Illinois’s “legal cause” (foreseeability) analysis, emphasizing a “same‑risk” requirement: the prior incidents must be sufficiently similar in character to the harm suffered, and they must meaningfully connect to the defendant’s premises and operations. General neighborhood crime and off‑premises shootings, without more, will not suffice to impose liability for an extreme, isolated, unprovoked attack like the one here.

Summary of the Opinion

Procedural posture: After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for Wendy’s on proximate cause. The Seventh Circuit reviewed de novo and affirmed.
Governing law: Applying Illinois negligence principles in this diversity case, the court focused on proximate cause—specifically “legal cause” (foreseeability).
Cause in fact: The panel assumed without deciding that a jury could find “cause in fact” because experts agreed security guards can deter criminal activity. The court did not rest its decision on this element.
Legal cause (foreseeability): The court held, as a matter of law, that the shooting was not reasonably foreseeable. The attack was “extreme, isolated, and unprovoked,” involved no prior similar incidents on the Wendy’s premises, and bore no apparent connection to the property’s condition or business operations.
Duty left open: Though the district court had concluded Wendy’s owed a duty to protect patrons from intentional third‑party assault, the Seventh Circuit expressly did not decide duty because lack of legal cause disposed of the case.
Result: Summary judgment affirmed for Wendy’s.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and How They Shaped the Outcome

The court situates its foreseeability analysis within a well-developed line of Illinois authority, emphasizing several pillars:

Elements and structure of negligence: Johnson v. Armstrong (2022) reaffirms the elements, with proximate cause comprising cause in fact and legal cause (Lee v. CTA, 1992). Abrams v. City of Chicago (2004) underscores that although causation is often for the jury, courts may decide it as a matter of law where the undisputed facts foreclose recovery.
Cause in fact tests: Young v. Bryco Arms (2004), Turcios v. DeBruler (2015), Union Planters Bank (2010), and Thacker (1992) recognize the but‑for and substantial factor frameworks. The panel assumed cause in fact, keeping the doctrinal focus on legal cause.
Foreseeability as “legal cause” and policy limit: First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman (1999) and City of Chicago v. Beretta (2004) highlight that legal cause is a normative, policy-based limit, centered on whether the injury is the type a reasonable person would see as a likely result of the defendant’s conduct, especially where an intervening criminal act is involved.
The “same-risk” requirement: Rowe v. State Bank of Lombard (1988) and Duncavage v. Allen (1986) show that prior incidents must present the same kind of risk as the harm suffered. Witcher v. 1104 Madison St. Restaurant (2019) finds that dissimilar prior incidents do not make a targeted stabbing foreseeable. Kolodziejzak v. Melvin Simon & Assocs. (1997) held a gang shooting was not foreseeable despite prior robberies because the prior crimes did not indicate a likelihood of a gun attack on innocents.
Location and premises-specificity: Petrauskas v. Wexenthaller Realty Mgmt. (1989) held that a shooting across the street does not put a landlord on notice of crime on its property. Hills v. Bridgeview Little League (2000) discusses how premises conditions and business nature affect foreseeability.
When foreseeability exists: Reynolds v. CB Sports Bar (2010), synthesizing Haupt v. Sharkey (2005) and Osborne v. Stages Music Hall (2000), recognizes foreseeability where the business knows patrons plan to fight or have a propensity for violence. Cooke v. Maxum Sports Bar & Grill (2018) similarly links foreseeability to escalating on‑premises tensions within a tavern context.
Extreme violence as unforeseeable: Costa v. Gleason (1993) characterizes an assailant barging into a tavern and opening fire as so extreme that guarding against it is hard to conceive; the panel analogizes that principle here.
Tailored foreseeability inquiry: Galman and Abrams instruct courts to frame a precise “context-dependent” question (Inman v. Howe Freightways, 2019) about the likelihood of the specific harm resulting from the defendant’s conduct, rather than asking foreseeability at a high level of abstraction.
Duty/foreseeability overlap: Colonial Inn Motor Lodge (1997) flagged analytical overlaps between duty and legal cause. The panel notes Illinois Supreme Court cases, including Rowe and Marshall v. Burger King (2006) (relying on Bigbee v. Pacific Tel. & Tel., Cal. 1982), sometimes blend foreseeability in both inquiries, but the court resolves the case solely on legal cause.

The Court’s Legal Reasoning

The Seventh Circuit’s reasoning proceeds in layered steps:

Framework and posture: Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-movant, the court assumes arguendo that security guards could deter crime and thus “cause in fact” might be shown. It focuses instead on legal cause: whether this attack was a reasonably foreseeable result of the alleged negligence.
Tailored foreseeability question: Following Galman and Abrams, the court poses a narrow, context-specific inquiry. The question is not whether “a crime” or “a shooting” could occur generally, but whether, in light of what Wendy’s knew, it was reasonably likely that two armed assailants would enter its parking lot and execute a swift, unprovoked, multi-angle shooting of a drive‑thru patron, then flee—an “extreme, isolated, and unprovoked” attack with no apparent robbery motive or on‑premises escalation.
“Same-risk” requirement not met:
- Prior calls and records: The OEM log reflected 29 calls over several years related to disturbances, batteries, EMS, and guns, but none involved shootings on Wendy’s property.
- Employee testimony: The overnight supervisor saw carjackings and shootings across the street at a gas station and urged overnight guards. But off‑premises crimes do not put a business on notice of similar on‑premises violence (Petrauskas). Moreover, generic references to “shootings” are too broad to establish the same specific risk of a targeted, rapid ambush of a customer in a drive‑thru lane.
- Nature and condition of premises: There was no evidence of property conditions (e.g., dilapidation, darkness, known access points like the ladder in Duncavage) making such an ambush more likely on this site, nor any on‑premises escalation comparable to tavern fights in cases like Reynolds and Cooke.
- Character of the attack: The video’s short, targeted burst of gunfire resembled the surprise tavern shooting deemed unforeseeable in Costa, not crimes like burglaries or robberies where the risk of violent confrontation is inherent (Rowe).
No premises-based nexus: The court underscores the absence of a causal link between Wendy’s operations or property conditions and the assailants’ decision to carry out this attack on this property. The attack appeared as likely to occur off‑premises as on, undercutting premises-specific foreseeability.
Policy gatekeeping: Consistent with Beretta, legal cause serves as a boundary on liability for extreme criminal acts that a reasonable person would not anticipate as likely results of ordinary business operations. Imposing liability here would effectively transform general neighborhood crime into a duty to prevent virtually any violent act, a step Illinois law resists.
Holding: On these undisputed facts, the shooting was not foreseeable as a matter of law. That conclusion obviates the need to decide duty and affirms summary judgment for Wendy’s.

Impact and Practical Implications

The decision strengthens several themes in Illinois negligent‑security jurisprudence and will shape future litigation strategies:

Reaffirmation of the “same-risk” standard: Plaintiffs must marshal premises-specific evidence of prior incidents that closely resemble the harm—both in type (e.g., targeted shootings vs. property crimes or generalized disturbances) and location (on‑premises, not merely in the vicinity). Vague references to “crime” or off‑site incidents will not suffice.
Summary judgment viability for defendants: Courts may resolve legal cause at summary judgment where the record lacks prior similar on‑premises incidents or property-based risk enhancers. This decision supplies a roadmap and citations to do so.
Security measures are not admissions of foreseeability of extreme acts: That Wendy’s employed armed guards during dining hours, and employees desired overnight guards, did not make an unprovoked targeted shooting foreseeable. Businesses should not fear that tailored security measures will be treated as concessions of foreseeability for all violent crimes.
Premises conditions and business type remain critical: Liability is more likely where conditions or operations increase risks (e.g., poor lighting; known access points; environments conducive to escalation, such as alcohol service with observed tensions). In fast-service contexts, absent those factors, extreme targeted attacks remain legally unforeseeable.
Plaintiff strategy: To survive summary judgment, plaintiffs should develop:
- Documented history of similar violent incidents on the premises;
- Evidence that property conditions or operations facilitated the attack;
- Specific pre-incident warnings or knowledge (e.g., threats, escalating confrontations, known assailants or violent patrons);
- Data showing a pattern of on‑premises shootings or armed assaults at that location or materially indistinguishable locations under the same control.
Defense strategy: Emphasize the absence of prior similar on‑premises incidents, the adequacy of premises conditions, the targeted/aberrational nature of the event, and lack of on‑site escalation. Tie arguments to the tailored question from Galman and Abrams.
Duty vs. legal cause: The panel consciously avoided deciding duty, signaling that future cases may turn on either element. But the opinion embraces the permissibility of resolving foreseeability under legal cause when the facts warrant.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Negligence: Liability for failing to use reasonable care, requiring proof of duty, breach, injury, and proximate cause.
Cause in fact: The “actual cause.” Would the injury have occurred “but for” the defendant’s conduct, or was the conduct a substantial factor in bringing it about?
Legal cause (foreseeability): A policy-based limit on liability. Even if a defendant’s conduct actually played a role, courts ask whether the harm was the type a reasonable person would anticipate as a likely result. With third-party crimes, courts look for evidence the particular kind of crime was a natural and probable outcome of the defendant’s conduct.
“Same-risk” rule: Prior incidents make a later harm foreseeable only if they involve the same kind of risk—e.g., prior on‑premises armed assaults can make a later on‑premises armed assault foreseeable; general disturbances or off‑premises crimes usually do not.
Intervening efficient cause: An independent act (here, the assailants’ crime) that contributes to the injury. If that act was not a natural and probable result of the defendant’s conduct, it breaks the chain of legal causation.
Summary judgment: A procedural tool allowing courts to decide cases without trial when there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
Diversity jurisdiction: A federal court’s authority to hear a case because the parties are citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000; the court applies state substantive law.

Conclusion

Scott v. Wendy’s Properties, LLC clarifies and reinforces Illinois’s approach to foreseeability in negligent‑security cases, particularly those alleging failure to protect patrons from violent third‑party crime. The Seventh Circuit, assuming the potential for cause in fact, held that legal cause fails as a matter of law because the attack was not reasonably foreseeable: it was an “extreme, isolated, and unprovoked” shooting with no on‑premises antecedents of similar character and no property‑specific risk factors linking Wendy’s operations to the crime. The opinion underscores the “same‑risk” requirement, the importance of premises‑specific history, and the tailored nature of the foreseeability inquiry mandated by Galman and Abrams.

For future cases, the decision signals that generalized neighborhood crime, off‑premises incidents, and even a business’s use of some security measures will not, without more, convert aberrational, targeted violence into a foreseeable risk. Plaintiffs must develop detailed, on‑premises, similar‑incident histories or show how property conditions and business operations materially contributed to the specific crime. Defendants, conversely, can marshal this opinion—and the robust Illinois authorities it synthesizes—to seek summary judgment where the record lacks those critical links. In short, the case fortifies the policy boundary that prevents the imposition of open‑ended liability on businesses for extraordinary criminal acts unmoored from their premises, operations, or known histories.