“Retreating-Armed-Suspect” Qualified-Immunity Rule
Commentary on Carico v. Bristow, No. 24-40239 (5th Cir. Aug. 7, 2025)

1. Introduction

Carico v. Bristow addresses an increasingly common policing scenario—officers confronting suicidal, armed individuals on private property. When Colton Carico emerged from his home with a rifle pointed only at himself, then turned back inside after a single “drop the gun” command, Officer Derek Bristow shot him in the back, leaving him permanently paralyzed. The core legal issue was whether, at that moment, a reasonable officer could regard Carico as an “immediate threat,” thereby justifying the use of deadly force and entitling the officer to qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Fifth Circuit, affirming summary judgment, crystallises a new nuance in the excessive-force framework: an armed suspect who turns away but is still holding the firearm and moving toward cover may be treated as an imminent threat even though the weapon is not aimed at officers or third parties.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The panel (Southwick, Oldham, Ramirez, JJ.) held:

• No constitutional violation occurred because, under the totality of circumstances, an objectively reasonable officer could conclude Carico posed an immediate threat.
• Even had there been a violation, the right was not “clearly established” in the specific context; therefore qualified immunity would attach.
• Key factual anchors: Carico’s intoxication, prior evasion, presence of a loaded rifle, movement into a house of unknown occupancy, and limited split-second decision time.
• The court distinguished plaintiff-favoured precedents (Roque, Cole, Poole) and emphasised body-camera footage in resolving factual disputes.

3. Detailed Analysis

A. Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) – Provided the three core reasonableness factors (severity of crime, immediate threat, resistance/flight) and the “split-second” perspective.
• Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) – Deadly force permissible only if suspect poses threat of serious harm; cited for baseline standard.
• Roque v. Harvel, 993 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2021) – Held disputed facts about incapacitation precluded summary judgment after initial shot; distinguished because Roque was already wounded and possibly disarmed.
• Cole v. Carson, 935 F.3d 444 (5th Cir. 2019) (en banc) – Reversed summary judgment where officers fired without warning at a suicidal teen holding gun to head; distinguished here because Carico received warnings and moved toward concealment.
• Poole v. City of Shreveport, 13 F.4th 420 (5th Cir. 2021) – Shooting unarmed suspect in back held potentially unreasonable; court underscores that presence of firearm fundamentally alters threat calculus.
• Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736 (5th Cir. 2023); Winder v. Gallardo, 118 F.4th 638 (5th Cir. 2024) – Reaffirm that suspected presence of a gun can justify deadly force.

By threading these cases, the panel situates Carico between two lines of authority: (i) suspects obviously no longer a threat (Roque, Poole) and (ii) suspects who remain armed or could be perceived as reaching for a weapon (Allen, Winder). Carico aligns with the latter.

B. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Qualified-Immunity Framework Applied. The panel starts with the merits prong (constitutional violation) and finds none; thus qualified immunity attaches without reaching “clearly established.”
2. Totality of Circumstances. The court emphasises five interlocking factors: intoxication, deception/evasion, visible loaded rifle, motion toward interior “cover” with unknown occupants, and brief decision window (≈5 seconds).
3. Emphasis on Video Evidence. Citing Scott v. Harris, video “trumps” plaintiff’s interpretation where inconsistent. Footage showed rifle still in hand and Carico pushing door with other hand.
4. Threat Beyond Officers. Even if rifle initially directed only at self, turning inside created risk to girlfriend, unseen occupants, and officers once out of view—distinguishing suicidal intent cases where suspect remained stationary or visible.
5. Warning Was Adequate. One shouted command (“drop the gun”) sufficed; law does not require multiple warnings or extended compliance time when suspect remains armed.

C. Impact on Future Litigation and Policing

The decision concretises what may be dubbed the “retreating-armed-suspect” rule in the Fifth Circuit:

Practical ramifications include:

• Section 1983 Suits: Plaintiffs face steeper odds when suspect movement plus firearm equals potential threat, even if muzzle remains pointed away.
• Policing Tactics: Officers are incentivised to issue at least one audible command but are not required to wait for perfect compliance if suspect heads toward concealment.
• Mental-Health Encounters: The case underscores the legal latitude officers have, possibly prompting calls for policy reforms and specialised crisis-response units.
• Training & Use-of-Force Policies: Agencies in the Fifth Circuit may revise guidance to emphasise risk posed by armed retreat into structures and reliance on body-camera corroboration.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

5. Conclusion

Carico v. Bristow reinforces the judiciary’s deference to on-scene officer judgments where an armed suspect’s movements create a plausible, immediate danger—even if the suspect is momentarily turned away and threatening only self-harm. By expressly distinguishing Roque, Cole, and Poole, the Fifth Circuit delineates a clearer boundary: possession plus movement toward cover equals continuing threat. Expect future Section 1983 plaintiffs within the circuit to encounter this precedent whenever an armed individual, suicidal or otherwise, moves while still holding a weapon. From a broader perspective, the decision spotlights the tension between mental-health crisis management and traditional threat-assessment models, foreshadowing policy debates on alternative response frameworks. Ultimately, Carico stands as a significant waypoint in the Fifth Circuit’s evolving excessive-force jurisprudence, carving out a distinct “retreating-armed-suspect” doctrine within qualified-immunity analysis.