“Request” Means “Ask”: Louisiana Supreme Court Holds Payment of Service Fees Is Not Required Within Ninety Days Under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C)

Introduction

In Lanell E. Darouse v. P.J.'s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC and New Orleans Roast, LLC (Supreme Court of Louisiana, No. 2025-CC-00078, Oct. 24, 2025), the Louisiana Supreme Court resolved a persistent split among the state’s courts of appeal over what it means to “request” service of citation within ninety days under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 1201(C). The defendants argued that, to comply with Article 1201(C), a plaintiff must not only request service but also pay all associated sheriff and clerk service fees within the ninety-day window after filing the petition. The plaintiff countered that a timely request for service, made to the clerk, satisfies the statute regardless of whether all service fees are paid within the ninety days.

Both the district court and the Fourth Circuit denied the defendants’ exception of insufficiency of service of process and motion for involuntary dismissal. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to clarify the meaning of “requested” in Article 1201(C) and to bring uniformity to conflicting appellate rulings. The Court affirmed, holding that “request” means to ask—full payment of service fees within ninety days is not required by Article 1201(C).

Summary of the Opinion

Justice Hughes, writing for a unanimous Court, held that Article 1201(C)’s directive—“Service of the citation shall be requested on all named defendants within ninety days”—requires only that the plaintiff ask (i.e., submit a request to the clerk for service) within ninety days of filing the petition. The Court rejected the contention that the request is ineffective unless accompanied by full payment of all service-related fees within the same period.

Emphasizing plain-meaning interpretation and separation-of-powers principles, the Court explained that when the Legislature intends to condition a procedural act’s effectiveness on payment of fees within a specified period, it says so expressly—as it did in statutes like La. R.S. 13:850 (fax filings) and La. R.S. 13:4532 (appellate transcripts). Because Article 1201(C) contains no such payment requirement, courts may not rewrite it to add one. The Court also noted that Title 13 separately empowers clerks and sheriffs to demand deposits and to withhold performance until fees are paid. Those fee-collection mechanisms obviate any need to distort the meaning of “request” in Article 1201(C).

Accordingly, the denial of the defendants’ exception of insufficiency of service of process and motion for involuntary dismissal was affirmed.

Background and Procedural Posture

- Plaintiff: Lanell E. Darouse.
- Defendants: P.J.'s Coffee of New Orleans, LLC and New Orleans Roast, LLC.
- Venue: Orleans Parish Civil District Court; writ to the Fourth Circuit; certiorari granted by the Louisiana Supreme Court.

The plaintiff filed his petition, expressly requested service on the defendants through the clerk, and paid the clerk’s initial filing fees (approximately $1,297.50). Thereafter, the Orleans Parish sheriff’s office sent an additional invoice for service-related charges (about $148.41) via a non-descript email (from “DoNotReply@opso.us,” subject line “A/R Invoice - Docket”). The additional sheriff’s fee was paid after the ninety-day period elapsed.

Defendants moved for involuntary dismissal and urged an exception of insufficiency of service of process, arguing that Article 1201(C) was not satisfied because all service fees were not remitted within ninety days. The district court denied relief; the Fourth Circuit affirmed; and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address a conflict among appellate decisions on this precise question.

Analysis

Precedents and Authorities Cited

• Fourth Circuit line permitting “request means ask”:
  • Draten v. Univ. Med. Ctr. Mgmt. Corp., 20-0519 (La. App. 4 Cir. 7/21/21), 325 So.3d 441, writs denied, 21-01276, 21-01284 (La. 12/7/21), 328 So.3d 421.
  • Walker v. GoAuto Ins. Co., 20-0331 (La. App. 4 Cir. 6/10/21), 323 So.3d 918.
  These cases held that when a plaintiff asks for service in the original petition, the Article 1201(C) request is timely—actual service may occur after ninety days.
• First Circuit line requiring payment:
  • Miller v. Hirstius, 22-0740 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/15/23), 363 So.3d 532.
  • Methvien v. Our Lady of the Lake, 20-1081 (La. App. 1 Cir. 4/16/21), 318 So.3d 329.
  • Jenkins v. Larpenter, 04-0318 (La. App. 1 Cir. 3/24/05), 906 So.2d 656, writ denied, 05-1078 (La. 6/17/05), 904 So.2d 711.
  These cases treated a “request” as ineffective unless the plaintiff paid all required service fees or obtained pauper status within the ninety-day period. The Supreme Court rejects this approach.
• Jenkins v. Larpenter dissent by then-Judge (now Justice) Guidry:
  The Court quotes and embraces the Jenkins dissent’s textual analysis: the statutes require only that service “be requested”; they do not add a contemporaneous fee-payment requirement. If the Legislature wished to impose a payment condition within a stated period, it could have done so expressly.
• Naquin v. Titan Indem. Co., 00-1585 (La. 2/21/01), 779 So.2d 704:
  Cited for Article 1201(C)’s purpose—avoiding stale claims—and for interpretive principles: courts apply clear text and avoid rewriting statutes under the pretext of effectuating their spirit.
• Textual canons applied:
  • La. C.C. art. 9 and La. C.C.P. art. 5052 (clear text applied as written).
  • La. C.C. art. 10 (if ambiguous, interpret to conform to purpose).
  • La. C.C. art. 11 and La. C.C.P. art. 5053 (common meaning of words).
  • La. C.C.P. art. 5051 (procedural rules construed liberally as instruments of substantive law, not ends in themselves).
• Statutes demonstrating when payment is expressly required:
  • La. R.S. 13:850 (fax filings): the document has “no force or effect” unless the filer pays specified fees within seven days. Payment is an explicit prerequisite.
  • La. R.S. 13:4532 (appellate transcripts): clerks need not deliver transcripts until fees have been paid.
• Fee authority and collection mechanisms (Title 13):
  • La. R.S. 13:841, 13:1213 (clerks’ fee schedules).
  • La. R.S. 13:842, 13:843 (security for costs; refusal to perform services when deposits are exhausted; judgments for accrued costs).
  • La. R.S. 13:5530 (sheriffs’ fees and collection; fees taxed as costs under C.C.P. art. 1920).
  • La. R.S. 13:5588 (Orleans Parish sheriff may demand security or deposit and may decline to perform until paid).
  • La. C.C.P. arts. 5181–5188 (in forma pauperis procedures).
  These provisions confirm that collection and enforcement of fees is handled elsewhere in the statutory framework; Article 1201(C) was not the Legislature’s chosen vehicle to enforce payment.

Legal Reasoning

The Court’s reasoning proceeds from first principles of statutory interpretation:

• Plain meaning of “request.” Article 1201(C) requires service of citation to be “requested” within ninety days. The ordinary and generally prevailing meaning of “request” is to ask. The Court even noted the Merriam–Webster definition to reinforce that “request” is not ambiguous. Because the language is clear, it must be applied as written (La. C.C. art. 9; La. C.C.P. art. 5052).
• No judicial rewriting. Courts are not free to graft additional requirements (e.g., fee payment within ninety days) onto a statute where the Legislature has not included them, particularly where other statutes show the Legislature knows how to condition effectiveness on timely payment. Adding a payment requirement would “imping[e] on the legislative power.”
• Purpose of the ninety-day rule. As recognized in Naquin, the ninety-day request requirement exists to avoid stale claims by ensuring prompt initiation of service efforts. Requiring fee payment as part of the “request” would (a) conflate “asking” with “financing,” (b) penalize litigants for clerk/sheriff billing practices beyond their control, and (c) do little to advance the anti-staleness purpose, which is achieved once the plaintiff timely asks the clerk to issue service.
• Existing fee-enforcement tools. Title 13 already equips clerks and sheriffs to secure payment by demanding deposits, withholding services until costs are advanced, and obtaining judgments for accrued costs. Those tools suffice without distorting Article 1201(C).
• Resolution of the appellate split; alignment with Jenkins dissent. The Court expressly acknowledges conflicting appellate interpretations. It endorses the Fourth Circuit’s approach (e.g., Draten, Walker) and aligns with then-Judge Guidry’s dissent in Jenkins, which warned against conflating a “request” with payment and against judicially adding deadlines the Legislature did not express.

Applying these principles to the facts, the plaintiff’s petition asked the clerk to serve all named defendants and he paid the substantial initial fees to the clerk upon filing. Although the sheriff later sent an additional invoice that was paid after ninety days, Article 1201(C) was satisfied when the request was made within ninety days. Consequently, the exception and motion to dismiss were properly denied.

Impact and Practical Consequences

This decision establishes a clear, uniform statewide rule: for Article 1201(C), a timely “request” for service is satisfied by asking the clerk to issue service within ninety days; payment of service-related fees within that period is not required to preserve the action from dismissal for failure to request service.

Key implications:

• Uniformity across circuits. The Court resolves the split between the First Circuit’s “request plus payment” approach and the Fourth Circuit’s “request means ask” approach. Litigants and courts now have a single rule statewide.
• Reduced trap-for-the-unwary dismissals. Plaintiffs who timely ask for service will not face dismissal merely because a sheriff or clerk issues an additional invoice after filing that is not paid within the ninety-day window—especially when billing communications are unclear or delayed.
• Fee enforcement remains intact—separate path. Clerks and sheriffs retain all statutory leverage to demand deposits and to delay or refuse performance of services until costs are advanced (see La. R.S. 13:842, 13:843, 13:5530, 13:5588). This decision does not excuse payment; it simply prevents dismissal under Article 1201(C) for failure to pay within ninety days.
• Actual service may still be delayed. Because sheriffs can condition performance on deposits, late payment may postpone actual service, with downstream risks, including:
  • Potential prescription issues in situations where filing alone does not protect the claim against particular defendants or claims (context specific).
  • Exposure to other procedural remedies for delay (e.g., rules to show cause, potential sanctions, or long-term risk of abandonment under La. C.C.P. art. 561 if no step is taken for three years).
• Guidance for practice.
  • Always include an express request for service on all named defendants in the original petition and identify correct agents for service.
  • Follow up promptly with the clerk/sheriff on cost deposits; monitor e-filing portals and email communications (including spam folders) for invoices.
  • Consider advancing deposits proactively where local practice indicates sheriffs will not act without them.
  • If indigent, promptly seek in forma pauperis status under La. C.C.P. arts. 5181–5188.
• Local administrative practices. The Court’s description of the sheriff’s ambiguous email underscores the need for clear, identifiable billing communications. Sheriffs and clerks may wish to adopt unmistakable subject lines and sender identities to reduce confusion and disputes over notice of fees.
• Legislative prerogative preserved. If the Legislature chooses to couple the effectiveness of a service request to timely payment, it can amend Article 1201(C) explicitly, as it has done in areas like fax filing (§ 13:850).

Complex Concepts Simplified

• “Requesting service” vs. “service effected.” Louisiana’s Article 1201(C) is about asking the clerk to issue service on the defendants within ninety days—not about completing service within ninety days. Actual service often depends on the sheriff and may occur later.
• Exception of insufficiency of service of process. A defendant may challenge the adequacy or timeliness of service via a declinatory exception. Here, defendants argued that service was not “requested” within ninety days because fees were not paid. The Supreme Court rejected that theory of insufficiency.
• Involuntary dismissal for failure to request service (La. C.C.P. art. 1672(C)). This remedy allows dismissal without prejudice if service is not requested within ninety days, absent good cause. Today’s decision clarifies that the request requirement is satisfied by asking, even if all fees are not yet paid.
• Security for costs; deposits. Title 13 provisions let clerks and sheriffs demand deposits up-front or when advances are exhausted, and they may refuse to proceed until deposits are made. This is how the system ensures payment—separately from Article 1201(C).
• In forma pauperis (IFP). An indigent litigant can seek permission to proceed without paying costs in advance (La. C.C.P. arts. 5181–5188). If granted, costs may be deferred or waived, allowing service to proceed despite inability to pay at the outset.
• Writ denials vs. reasoned opinions. The Court notes that it previously touched similar issues in summary writ rulings that are not authoritative. A full, reasoned opinion like this one sets binding statewide precedent.

Conclusion

The Louisiana Supreme Court’s decision in Darouse sets a definitive, text-driven rule: Under La. C.C.P. art. 1201(C), a plaintiff satisfies the ninety-day requirement by asking the clerk to serve all named defendants within that period. The statute does not require contemporaneous payment of all service-related fees to render that request effective. By reading “request” to mean “ask”—and only that—the Court honors the text, advances the rule’s anti-staleness purpose, resolves conflicting appellate decisions, and preserves the Legislature’s role in attaching payment conditions where it chooses to do so expressly.

For practitioners, the message is twofold: include a clear service request at filing to protect the case from dismissal under Article 1201(C), and promptly address fee deposits with clerks and sheriffs to avoid delays in actual service. For administrators, the opinion highlights the value of clear, unambiguous billing communications. And for the law as a whole, the Court’s approach reaffirms a core interpretive commitment: procedural statutes are applied as written, not as courts might wish them to be.