“Professional Courtesy Is Not Good Cause”: Nevada Supreme Court Clarifies Deadlines, Defaults, and Dismissals in El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO's Noble Pie Parlor

I. Introduction

This en banc decision of the Supreme Court of Nevada addresses a recurring and practically important problem in civil litigation: when can a party rely on “professional courtesy” and informal extensions, and when must it strictly comply with formal procedural rules?

In El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO's Noble Pie Parlor, 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 68 (Dec. 23, 2025), the court considered:

• Whether the district court abused its discretion in denying a post-deadline motion to extend time to oppose a Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss, where counsel had sought a last-minute extension based on “professional courtesy.”
• Whether the district court properly granted an unopposed motion to dismiss with prejudice under District Court Rule (DCR) 13(3), which allows a court to treat failure to oppose as an admission that the motion is meritorious.
• Whether it was error not to grant (or even expressly address) a further request for leave to amend the complaint, embedded in the untimely opposition.
• Whether the defendant-tenant, Noble Pie, was a “prevailing party” entitled to contractual attorney fees after obtaining dismissal of the landlord’s suit.

The case arises from a long-running commercial landlord–tenant dispute between El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC (“El Cortez”), owner of the El Cortez Hotel in Reno, and PFPCO's Noble Pie Parlor (“Noble Pie”), a restaurant tenant. Following an earlier lawsuit in which Noble Pie largely prevailed at a bench trial and on appeal, Noble Pie closed the restaurant. El Cortez then sued again, alleging breach of an agreed-use provision in the lease and other claims.

After an initial dismissal with leave to amend, El Cortez filed a first amended complaint. Noble Pie again moved to dismiss. On the day the opposition was due, El Cortez’s counsel sought a one-week extension based on workload and “professional courtesy.” Noble Pie refused, and El Cortez moved the court for an extension, filing its opposition a few days later. The district court denied the extension, treated the motion to dismiss as unopposed under DCR 13(3), dismissed the case with prejudice, and awarded Noble Pie attorney fees under the lease.

The Supreme Court (Justice Stiglich writing for the majority, with one dissent by Justice Pickering) affirmed. The majority’s opinion articulates a clear—arguably stricter—approach to extensions and defaults, while acknowledging the importance of civility and professional norms. The dissent, by contrast, emphasizes deciding cases on their merits, the limited prejudice caused by a one-week delay, and the role of professional courtesy in modern litigation.

II. Summary of the Opinion

A. Core Holdings

The court’s central holdings can be summarized as follows:

1. Good Cause vs. Professional Courtesy (NRCP 6(b)(1)(B)) The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying El Cortez’s post-deadline motion to extend the time to file an opposition. A last-minute reliance on “professional courtesy” from opposing counsel does not constitute “good cause” under NRCP 6(b)(1)(B). The majority stresses that:
   • “Good cause” requires circumstances beyond the movant’s control.
   • Choosing to prioritize other work, coupled with a pattern of lateness, does not satisfy that standard.
2. Two-Step Structure of NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) imposes a bifurcated test for post-deadline extensions:
   1. The party must first show “good cause” to extend the deadline.
   2. Only if good cause exists must the court assess whether the failure to act was due to “excusable neglect.”
   If good cause is lacking, the inquiry ends; there is no need to reach excusable neglect.
3. Use of DCR 13(3) to Grant Unopposed Dispositive Motions Under DCR 13(3), a district court may treat a failure to file a timely opposition as an admission that a motion is meritorious and as consent to granting it. The court:
   • Reaffirms that this rule applies to dispositive motions, including motions to dismiss.
   • Holds that granting the unopposed Rule 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss with prejudice was within the district court’s discretion.
4. Dismissal With Prejudice as a Sanction Dismissal with prejudice—although a “harsh” sanction—is proper where a party:
   • Fails to comply with a court’s order about how to amend the pleadings, and
   • Fails to timely oppose a dispositive motion.
   The majority treats the case as involving compounding derelictions: a nearly identical amended complaint contrary to the court’s instructions, and an untimely opposition.
5. Denial of Leave to Amend Although the district court did not expressly rule on El Cortez’s embedded request for further leave to amend, the dismissal with prejudice necessarily denied that request. On the record, the Supreme Court held:
   • There was no abuse of discretion in denying leave to amend, given undue delay and apparent bad faith/dilatory motive.
   • The court could affirm on any ground supported by the record, even if not expressly relied upon below.
6. Prevailing Party and Attorney Fees Under the lease’s fee clause, defining “Prevailing Party” as one who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought by judgment, settlement, compromise, or abandonment, Noble Pie was a prevailing party because it obtained dismissal of the complaint in its entirety. Therefore, the attorney fee award was affirmed.

B. The Dissent

Justice Pickering dissented, concluding that:

• The district court abused its discretion in denying a one-week extension where:
  • The extension was requested (albeit at the last moment) before the deadline expired.
  • No meaningful prejudice resulted from such a short delay.
• Both “good cause” and “excusable neglect” were established on this record, and the district court erred by focusing solely on timing (and not the need for the extension) and by failing to analyze excusable neglect at all.
• The matter should be remanded to decide the motion to dismiss on the merits, rather than by procedural default under DCR 13(3).

The dissent draws heavily on federal and Nevada authority emphasizing that short, reasonable extension requests made in reliance on professional norms should ordinarily be granted absent real prejudice, so that cases can be resolved on substantive merits rather than procedural traps.

III. Factual and Procedural Background

A. The Underlying Relationship and Prior Litigation

• Noble Pie leased retail space for its restaurant in the El Cortez Hotel in Reno.
• El Cortez acquired the property and the parties coexisted uneventfully for several years.
• Relations deteriorated over operational disputes: gas leaks, grease and oil disposal, and a stolen camera near shared bathrooms.
• El Cortez eventually locked Noble Pie out of the premises, prompting litigation.
• After a bench trial, Noble Pie largely prevailed; attorney fees and costs were awarded to Noble Pie, and that judgment (and fee award) was affirmed on appeal in El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO's Noble Pie Parlor, Nos. 83704 & 84173 (Nev. Dec. 23, 2022) (Order of Affirmance).

B. The New Dispute and Amended Pleadings

• Following the prior litigation, Noble Pie announced it was permanently closing the restaurant.
• El Cortez asserted that this permanent closure violated an agreed-use provision in the lease, and filed a new complaint alleging:
  • Breach of contract
  • Breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
  • Unlawful detainer
  • Declaratory relief
• Noble Pie moved to dismiss under NRCP 12(b)(5). The district court granted the motion but allowed leave to amend to “restate or clarify”:
  • The second cause of action, and
  • Any other claims affected by Noble Pie vacating the premises and the earlier appellate decision.
• After an extension (to which Noble Pie stipulated), El Cortez filed a first amended complaint.

C. The Missed Deadline and Extension Request

• Noble Pie again moved to dismiss the first amended complaint.
• Under Washoe District Court Rule (WDCR) 12(2), El Cortez had 14 days to file an opposition.
• At 4:54 p.m. on the day the opposition was due, El Cortez’s counsel emailed Noble Pie’s counsel requesting a one-week extension, citing:
  • A trial beginning the next week
  • A hectic schedule at his office
  • A request for “professional courtesy”
• The next morning, after a follow-up from El Cortez, Noble Pie declined to stipulate, explaining that:
  • The issue was not courtesy in the abstract, but timeliness and diligence.
  • It would have been willing to consider a timely request, but viewed the last-minute request as unjustified.
• That same day, El Cortez filed a motion in the district court seeking an extension of time to file its opposition.
• Within less than a week, and within the one-week extension it had requested, El Cortez filed its proposed opposition, which also included a request for leave to amend yet again to add a property damage claim.

D. The District Court’s Rulings

At the hearing, the district court focused on the timing and pattern of delay:

• It emphasized that the extension request came at “the 59th minute of the 11th hour.”
• It observed that El Cortez had “been late on every motion thus far.”
• It concluded that counsel had simply prioritized other work, assumed an extension would be forthcoming, and failed to exercise proper diligence.

The district court:

• Denied the motion for an extension of time, finding:
  • No “good cause” under NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) because reliance on an anticipated courtesy extension is not cause beyond the party’s control.
  • Prejudice to Noble Pie in the form of uncertainty over the briefing schedule.
• Granted Noble Pie’s motion to dismiss, treating the failure to file a timely opposition as:
  • An admission that the motion was meritorious, and
  • Consent to granting it under DCR 13(3).
• Dismissed the amended complaint with prejudice, citing:
  • Noncompliance with its prior order regarding the scope of amendment (the first amended complaint was largely a word-for-word copy of the original), and
  • The absence of a timely opposition.
• Awarded Noble Pie attorney fees as the prevailing party under the lease’s fee provision.

El Cortez appealed, leading to the consolidated appeals resolved in this decision.

IV. Legal Analysis

A. Extension of Time and NRCP 6(b)(1)(B)

1. Governing Rule and Standards

NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) (paralleling FRCP 6(b)(1)(B)) governs late requests for extensions:

When an act must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time ... on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.

Key features highlighted by the court:

• Standard of Review: Denial of a motion for relief from a missed deadline is reviewed for abuse of discretion (Saavedra-Sandoval v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 126 Nev. 592, 598, 245 P.3d 1198, 1202 (2010)).
• Rule Interpretation: Interpretation of procedural rules is a legal question reviewed de novo (Moseley v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 124 Nev. 654, 662–63, 188 P.3d 1136, 1142 (2008)).
• Good Cause:
  • A “non-rigorous standard” construed broadly in many contexts (Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2010), cited by the majority).
  • Generally established when “the circumstances causing the failure to act are beyond the individual’s control” (Moseley, 124 Nev. at 668 n.66, 188 P.3d at 1146 n.66; Spar Bus. Servs., Inc. v. Olson, 135 Nev. 296, 300, 448 P.3d 539, 543 (2019)).

2. The Bifurcated Framework: Good Cause First, Then Excusable Neglect

A key doctrinal clarification in the opinion is the structural reading of NRCP 6(b)(1)(B):

• Step One: Good Cause The court must first decide whether there is “good cause” to extend the deadline at all. This is a threshold showing. As the court noted, drawing on Wright & Miller’s federal practice treatise, courts may exercise their discretion “only ‘for good cause’” and “a party must demonstrate some justification for the issuance of the extension.”
• Step Two: Excusable Neglect If, and only if, good cause exists, the court must then determine whether the party failed to act “because of excusable neglect.” The two standards are “distinct” (Moseley, 124 Nev. at 668 n.66, 188 P.3d at 1146 n.66).

Crucially, the majority holds that if good cause is not shown, the court need not reach excusable neglect. That is exactly what happened here: the district court found no good cause and therefore stopped the analysis.

3. Application: Why “Professional Courtesy” Was Not Good Cause

The district court concluded—and the Supreme Court affirmed—that El Cortez did not show good cause:

• Pattern of Tardiness: The court noted that El Cortez had “been late on every motion thus far,” suggesting a systemic lack of diligence, not an isolated and unavoidable problem.
• Prioritization, Not Force Majeure: The perceived cause of the delay was counsel’s decision to prioritize other work (a trial in another matter), not an event beyond his control.
• Assumption of Courtesy: The court found that counsel simply assumed an extension would be granted—either by stipulation or court order—without acting diligently to secure one promptly.
• Nothing Beyond Control: On these facts, the circumstances did not meet the Moseley formulation of good cause (“beyond the individual’s control”).

The court then framed this reasoning within the nature of the adversarial system:

• In an adversarial system, the parties frame the issues; the court acts as neutral arbiter (State v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct. (Doane), 138 Nev. 896, 900, 521 P.3d 1215, 1221 (2022)).
• Orderly procedure is essential; civil rules are “guardrails” that prevent litigation from devolving into “lawyerly brawling” (citing Geary v. Schroering, 979 S.W.2d 134, 136 (Ky. Ct. App. 1998)).
• Procedural rules are “the backbone of the legal system” and are necessary to ensure efficiency, predictability, and fairness.

The majority acknowledges and endorses professional civility:

• It “lauds” attorneys’ cooperation when client interests are not harmed, referencing Canon 12 of the State Bar of Nevada’s Creed of Professionalism & Civility.
• In Craig v. Harrah, 65 Nev. 294, 195 P.2d 688 (1948), the court recognized that, absent exceptional circumstances, counsel “should, and doubtless would” grant a timely extension request as a matter of courtesy, but is “not legally required to do so.”

But the majority draws a hard line:

Here, El Cortez’s failure to request an extension until the last minute was patently unreasonable and did not warrant the usual courtesy.

Even if Noble Pie had agreed to an extension “the next day,” any stipulation would have been “futile” because the deadline would already have passed (Craig’s logic that an extension granted after time expires cannot retroactively validate an untimely filing). The court emphasizes:

• Attorneys should not unreasonably oppose extensions; but
• Attorneys must also be diligent in seeking extensions; last-minute reliance on unguaranteed favors is risky and not “good cause.”

Ultimately, the majority concludes:

• A “busy schedule” is not enough; NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) was properly applied.
• “A party refusing to grant a favor is not something beyond the requester’s control.”
• Professional courtesy, although commendable, is “ethereal” and cannot substitute for adherence to rules.

B. Failure to Oppose and DCR 13(3)

1. Text and Function of DCR 13(3)

DCR 13(3) provides:

Failure of the opposing party to serve and file a written opposition may be construed as an admission that the motion is meritorious and a consent to granting the same.

The rule does not mandate that an unopposed motion be granted; rather, it:

• Gives the district court discretion to treat non-opposition as an admission and consent.
• Applies broadly to motions, including dispositive ones (summary judgment, dismissal).

2. Precedents on DCR 13(3)

The majority relies on several earlier Nevada cases:

• Walls v. Brewster, 112 Nev. 175, 912 P.2d 261 (1996) The court held it was proper to construe a failure to respond to a motion to dismiss as an admission that the motion was meritorious and to grant it under DCR 13(3).
• King v. Cartlidge, 121 Nev. 926, 124 P.3d 1161 (2005) The court affirmed summary judgment where the opposition was filed late and was unsupported. DCR 13(3) played a key role; repeated delays and noncompliance justified a dispositive ruling.
• Weddell v. Stewart, 127 Nev. 645, 261 P.3d 1080 (2011) The court emphasized that procedural derelictions—especially in the appellate context—have consequences, and that rules must be enforced to ensure timely, efficient dispute resolution.

3. Applying DCR 13(3) to Grant Dismissal

In this case, the district court:

• Deemed the failure to file a timely opposition as:
  • An admission that Noble Pie’s motion to dismiss was meritorious, and
  • Consent to granting it.
• Granted the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion to dismiss accordingly.

The Supreme Court underscores that:

• The district court had already given El Cortez a prior opportunity to amend after dismissing the original complaint.
• The amended complaint largely replicated the original, contrary to the court’s instructions (“word-for-word copy” with only superficial changes).
• The combination of noncompliance with the court’s amendment order and the absence of a timely opposition justified the use of DCR 13(3).

Although DCR 13(3) does not explicitly say “dismissal,” that is “the inevitable outcome” where the underlying unopposed motion is a motion to dismiss. The court thus holds the district court was within its discretion to:

• Treat the failure to oppose as an admission.
• Grant the motion to dismiss.
• Do so with prejudice in light of the broader context.

C. Dismissal With Prejudice and Inherent Authority

Dismissal with prejudice is the most severe procedural sanction. The court relies on:

• Moore v. Cherry, 90 Nev. 390, 528 P.2d 1018 (1974) Acknowledges that courts have inherent power to dismiss for failure to prosecute or comply with orders, but the sanction must be tempered by “careful exercise of judicial discretion.” The key element is lack of diligence by the plaintiff or counsel.
• Sparks v. Bare, 132 Nev. 426, 373 P.3d 864 (2016) Inherent powers must be exercised with “restraint and discretion”; the court should fashion a sanction proportionate to the abuse of the judicial process.
• NRCP 41(b) Authorizes dismissal when a plaintiff fails to comply with court orders, with such dismissal operating as an adjudication on the merits (i.e., with prejudice unless otherwise specified).

The majority’s reasoning:

• The district court initially dismissed the original complaint but gave El Cortez a targeted opportunity to amend.
• Instead of genuinely tailoring its pleadings to the new posture (Noble Pie having vacated and the prior appellate decision), El Cortez filed an almost unchanged complaint.
• Then, when faced with a second motion to dismiss, El Cortez failed to timely oppose, relying on last-minute courtesy.

These steps—noncompliance with a specific court order and repeated procedural laxity—constitute the sort of “lack of diligence” that supports dismissal with prejudice under Moore and NRCP 41(b). The majority views this not as a mere technical misstep, but as a pattern undermining orderly adjudication.

D. Leave to Amend Under NRCP 15(a)(2)

1. Legal Standard

NRCP 15(a)(2) provides that courts “should freely give leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Nevada decisions, however, recognize legitimate reasons to deny leave:

• Allum v. Valley Bank of Nev., 109 Nev. 280, 849 P.2d 297 (1993): Amendments should be allowed where justice requires and they are not futile.
• Kantor v. Kantor, 116 Nev. 886, 8 P.3d 825 (2000): The decision is committed to the trial court’s discretion; denial is not reversible absent abuse. Sufficient reasons for denial include:
  • Undue delay,
  • Bad faith, or
  • Dilatory motive.
• Connell v. Carl’s Air Conditioning, 97 Nev. 436, 634 P.2d 673 (1981): Quoted by Kantor for the same principles.

2. The Specific Request Here

In its untimely opposition to the motion to dismiss, El Cortez:

• Requested leave to amend solely in the alternative—only if the court intended to dismiss the existing claims.
• Proposed to add a new claim for property damage, asserting it discovered these damages after filing the first amended complaint.

The majority found:

• El Cortez knew of the potential new property damage claim before filing the untimely opposition but took no action to amend until confronted with the motion to dismiss.
• The conditional nature of the request and its timing (embedded in an untimely filing) suggested:
  • Bad faith, in that the amendment appeared tactical—proposed only to defeat the pending motion.
  • Undue delay, in that no prompt motion to amend was brought upon discovering the new damages.

Although the district court did not expressly rule on leave to amend, the Supreme Court reasoned:

• A dismissal with prejudice necessarily denies further leave to amend.
• The record amply supports denial on grounds of undue delay and bad faith; thus there was no abuse of discretion.
• Under Saavedra-Sandoval, the Supreme Court may affirm on “any ground supported by the record,” even if not relied on below.

E. Attorney Fees and “Prevailing Party” Status

1. Contractual Definition and Standards of Review

The lease defined “Prevailing Party” as:

[A] Party or Broker who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, as the case may be, whether by compromise, settlement, judgment, or the abandonment by the other Party or Broker of its claim or defense.

Legal framework:

• Standard for Fee Awards: Abuse of discretion (MB America, Inc. v. Alaska Pacific Leasing Co., 132 Nev. 78, 88, 367 P.3d 1286, 1292 (2016)).
• Contract Interpretation: Question of law reviewed de novo (Nev. State Educ. Ass’n v. Clark Cnty. Educ. Ass’n, 137 Nev. 76, 80, 482 P.3d 665, 671 (2021)).

2. Application: Noble Pie as Prevailing Party

In the operative complaint, El Cortez sought damages and declaratory relief on four contract-related causes of action. Noble Pie:

• Obtained dismissal of every claim with prejudice.
• Achieved this final disposition by a court judgment, not settlement or abandonment.

Under the lease’s language, Noble Pie thus:

• “Defeated the relief sought” by judgment.
• Qualified as “the Prevailing Party.”

The Supreme Court therefore upheld the attorney fee award as a straightforward application of the contract’s terms.

F. The Dissent: Good Cause, Excusable Neglect, and Merits-Based Adjudication

Justice Pickering’s dissent provides an important counterpoint, both doctrinally and in policy terms.

1. Good Cause and Excusable Neglect Revisited

The dissent agrees that NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) requires both good cause and excusable neglect, but finds both satisfied here:

• Good Cause:
  • The request was for a one-week extension of a 14-day opposition period—short and reasonable.
  • Counsel’s schedule—a small-firm lawyer with an imminent trial needing time to revise his associate’s draft opposition—is a legitimate basis to seek additional time.
  • Nevada professional norms, including Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2(b), contemplate that attorneys may and should grant such accommodations where client interests are not prejudiced.
• Excusable Neglect:
  • Neglect in not seeking the extension earlier was understandable, given prevailing norms that such requests are often granted as a matter of professional courtesy.
  • The request was made before the deadline expired (though at the last moment), and the subsequent motion to extend time followed promptly when the stipulation was refused.
  • The opposition itself was filed within the requested week, showing diligence in responding once the extension was sought.

The dissent criticizes the district court (and by implication the majority) for:

• Focusing too narrowly on the timing of the extension request, rather than the substantive need for it.
• Failing to analyze excusable neglect at all, despite NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) requiring both elements.

2. Prejudice (or Lack Thereof)

Both good cause and excusable neglect analyses consider prejudice to the opposing party. The dissent notes:

• The only prejudice identified was:
  • A one-week delay in the opposition being filed.
  • Some “uncertainty” for Noble Pie about when its reply would be due once the opposition was filed late but before the motion to extend was resolved.
• El Cortez had offered to adjust the reply deadline correspondingly—a reciprocal extension—mitigating even this minor prejudice.

Citing Ahanchian v. Xenon Pictures, Inc., 624 F.3d 1253 (9th Cir. 2010), the dissent argues that such minimal prejudice does not justify denying a short, reasonable extension request made in good faith and consistent with professional norms.

3. Policy: Deciding Cases on the Merits and Professional Courtesy

The dissent invokes longstanding Nevada policy favoring decisions on the merits over procedural defaults:

• Dornbach v. Tenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 130 Nev. 305, 324 P.3d 369 (2014): Emphasizes that courts should strive to decide cases on their merits rather than technical defaults.
• Rowland v. Lepire, 95 Nev. 639, 600 P.2d 237 (1979): Annulled a default judgment entered without notice where a party had sought an extension of time.
• Lombardo v. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics, No. 88093, 2025 WL 1711537 (Nev. June 18, 2025): Reversed a denial of an extension and dismissal for untimely service because the district court had not correctly analyzed “good cause.”
• Scrimer v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 116 Nev. 507, 998 P.2d 1190 (2000): Granted mandamus to correct a failure to apply appropriate good cause criteria.
• AA Primo Builders, LLC v. Washington, 126 Nev. 578, 245 P.3d 1190 (2010): “Deference is not owed to legal error”; appellate courts must correct misapplications of legal standards, even in discretionary contexts.

In the dissent’s view, this body of law, together with Nevada’s rules of professional conduct and civility norms, strongly favors granting the requested extension and reaching the merits of the NRCP 12(b)(5) motion.

4. Proposed Disposition

Justice Pickering would:

• Reverse the denial of the motion to extend time as an abuse of discretion.
• Remand for the district court to:
  • Consider the motion to dismiss and the already-filed opposition on the merits under NRCP 12(b)(5), and
  • Avoid reliance on DCR 13(3) as a default mechanism in this context.

V. Impact and Practical Implications

A. Clarification of Nevada Law on Extensions (NRCP 6(b)(1)(B))

The decision provides a clear, precedential roadmap for trial courts and practitioners:

• Two-Step Test: For post-deadline motions to extend time:
  1. Ask first: Is there “good cause” to extend the deadline at all, i.e., some justification beyond mere oversight or preference?
  2. Only then ask: Was the failure to act due to “excusable neglect” (typically evaluated using equitable factors like danger of prejudice, length of delay, reason for delay, and good faith)?
• Busy Schedules and Courtesy: Heavy workloads and hoped-for courtesies are not, standing alone, “circumstances beyond [counsel’s] control.”
• Pattern Matters: A history of lateness or repeated missed deadlines will weigh heavily against good cause and may justify strict enforcement.

For practitioners, the message is blunt: Do not rely on last-minute courtesy requests to preserve your client’s rights. If you need more time:

• Seek stipulations early.
• File a formal motion for extension before the deadline if at all possible.
• Be prepared to demonstrate specific, uncontrollable circumstances—not just office busyness.

B. Strengthening the Teeth of DCR 13(3)

The opinion reinforces that DCR 13(3) is more than a housekeeping rule:

• Failure to oppose a motion—especially a dispositive one—can and will result in the motion being granted based solely on the procedural default.
• Courts maintain discretion; they are not compelled to grant every unopposed motion. But they are well within their rights to treat silence as admission.
• For litigants, this elevates the risk of ignoring or mishandling motion deadlines, particularly in busy or understaffed practices.

C. Dismissal With Prejudice and Case Management

By affirming a dismissal with prejudice in a situation involving both:

• Noncompliance with a prior amendment order, and
• Untimely response to a dispositive motion,

the court signals:

• District courts have robust tools to manage dockets and sanction dilatory conduct.
• Inherent authority, NRCP 41(b), and DCR 13(3) together provide a strong framework for disposing of cases where plaintiffs fail to diligently prosecute or comply with court directives.
• Yet the opinion also reiterates that dismissal with prejudice is a “harsh sanction” that must be used judiciously and proportionately (Moore, Sparks).

D. Tension Between Civility Norms and Strict Procedural Enforcement

One of the most interesting aspects of the case is the interplay between:

• Civility and Professional Courtesy:
  • The majority expressly endorses civility and cooperation, citing the Creed of Professionalism and recognizing that counsel generally “should” grant reasonable extension requests.
  • Nevada Rule of Professional Conduct 3.2(b) supports extending professional courtesies when consistent with client interests.
• Procedural Discipline:
  • The majority nonetheless concludes that parties cannot depend on courtesy as a legal justification for missing deadlines.
  • The adversarial system presumes that opposing counsel may, at times, decline favors, especially when requests are tardy or appear strategic.

The practical takeaway:

• Lawyers should continue to extend reasonable courtesies and avoid unreasonably objecting to justified extension requests.
• At the same time, they must advise clients that such courtesies are discretionary and cannot replace timely compliance with rules.

E. Prevailing Party Clauses and Fee-Shifting

The case also underscores:

• The importance of precise contractual definitions of “prevailing party.”
• That a defendant who obtains a dismissal with prejudice of all claims will almost invariably qualify as a prevailing party under broad fee clauses like the one at issue here.

For contract drafters and litigators, this reinforces the power of fee-shifting provisions to alter litigation dynamics and post-judgment exposure.

VI. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. NRCP 6(b)(1)(B): Extensions After a Deadline

• What it is: A rule allowing courts to extend deadlines after they’ve passed, but only if:
  • There is good cause to extend, and
  • The missed deadline was due to excusable neglect.
• Good cause: A reasonable, specific justification for needing more time; usually something not entirely within your control.
• Excusable neglect: A forgivable reason for missing the deadline, often assessed by considering:
  • The danger of prejudice to the other side,
  • The length and impact of the delay,
  • The reason for the delay, and
  • Whether you acted in good faith.

2. DCR 13(3): Default Through Non-Opposition

• What it says: If you don’t file a written opposition to a motion, the court may treat that silence as:
  • An admission that the motion is correct, and
  • Consent to granting it.
• What it means: You can effectively lose a motion—including one that ends your case—just by missing the opposition deadline, even if you have strong substantive arguments.

3. “Dismissal With Prejudice”

• Dismissal without prejudice: The case is dismissed, but you can refile the lawsuit.
• Dismissal with prejudice: The case is dismissed on the merits; you cannot bring the same claims again.
• In this case: The complaint was dismissed with prejudice, ending El Cortez’s claims under the lease in this action.

4. “Prevailing Party” in Fee Clauses

• Many contracts say the “prevailing party” in a dispute gets its attorney fees paid by the other side.
• Here, the lease defined “prevailing party” as the one who substantially obtains or defeats the relief sought, by judgment, settlement, compromise, or abandonment.
• Because Noble Pie got all claims dismissed by judgment, it “defeated the relief sought” and thus was the prevailing party entitled to recover fees.

5. Inherent Powers and NRCP 41(b)

• Inherent power: Courts have inherent authority to control their dockets and sanction misconduct, including dismissing cases where parties do not diligently prosecute or obey orders.
• NRCP 41(b): Expressly allows a defendant to seek dismissal when the plaintiff fails to comply with court rules or orders, and such a dismissal normally counts as “on the merits” (with prejudice).

VII. Conclusion

El Cortez Reno Holdings, LLC v. PFPCO's Noble Pie Parlor is a significant Nevada Supreme Court decision at the intersection of civil procedure, professional norms, and docket management. It establishes or reinforces several key principles:

• NRCP 6(b)(1)(B) imposes a two-step test for post-deadline extensions: good cause first, excusable neglect second. Courts may deny relief at the threshold for lack of good cause.
• Last-minute reliance on “professional courtesy,” particularly in the context of a pattern of tardiness and deliberate prioritization of other work, does not constitute good cause.
• DCR 13(3) gives district courts real power to treat an unopposed motion—including a motion to dismiss—as admitted and to grant it, leading to dismissal with prejudice in appropriate circumstances.
• Courts have broad discretion to deny further amendments where there is undue delay and apparent bad faith, especially when new claims are raised only as a tactical response to a pending dismissal motion.
• Broadly drafted prevailing party clauses will generally entitle a defendant who obtains dismissal of all claims with prejudice to contractual attorney fees.

While the dissent warns of the dangers of allowing procedural defaults to eclipse adjudication on the merits and urges greater solicitude for short, reasonable extension requests grounded in professional norms, the majority’s message is unmistakable: courtesy and civility are encouraged and valued, but they do not override clear procedural rules. As the court succinctly concludes:

We encourage respect and civility among colleagues, but rules still matter.

For Nevada practitioners, this opinion heightens the importance of proactive deadline management, timely extension motions grounded in demonstrable good cause, and prompt compliance with court orders. In the broader legal landscape, it exemplifies the ongoing tension between efficiency and fairness, between form and substance, and between the aspirational ideals of professional courtesy and the hard edges of procedural law.