“Produced From the Land” Means What It Says: Texas Supreme Court Holds Passive-Voice Habendum Clauses Do Not Require Lessee-Operated Production

I. Introduction

In David W. Cromwell v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, No. 23‑0927 (Tex. May 23, 2025), the Supreme Court of Texas resolved a recurring and practically important question in Texas oil-and-gas law: when a lease’s habendum clause says the lease continues “as long as oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said land,” must the lessee personally cause that production to keep the lease alive?

The answer is unequivocally no. The Court holds that a passive-voice habendum clause—“oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said land”—does not, by its own terms, impose a requirement that the lessee personally drill or otherwise “cause” production. Any production in paying quantities from the leased premises, regardless of who operates the wells, is sufficient to maintain such a lease, absent clear, express language to the contrary.

The decision reverses the El Paso Court of Appeals’ judgment and expressly disapproves a line of authority—beginning with the Fifth Circuit’s Mattison v. Trotti and followed by Hughes v. Cantwell and Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp.—that had read a lessee‑production requirement into similar passive-voice habendum clauses based on perceived “purpose” or “consideration” of oil‑and‑gas leases. The Court instead reaffirms a textual, contract-based approach, buttressed by a strong anti‑forfeiture canon in interpreting mineral leases.

A. Parties and Property Interests

Petitioner: David W. Cromwell, a non-operating working‑interest owner and lessee under two oil‑and‑gas leases (the “Ferrer Lease” and the “Tantalo Lease”).
Respondent: Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, a major operator and co‑tenant owning working interests in the same acreage in Loving County, Texas.

Before Cromwell entered the picture, Anadarko had already drilled three wells—Hughes & Talbot 75‑23‑1, 75‑25‑1, and 75‑26‑1—on the subject lands and later drilled additional wells. Production in commercial paying quantities was continuous and undisputed for all legally relevant periods.

B. The Leases and Their Habendum Clauses

Cromwell took two paid‑up leases in 2009:

Ferrer Lease – three-year primary term:
“This lease . . . shall be in force for a term of three (3) years from this date (called ‘primary term’) and as long thereafter as oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said land, or land with which said land is pooled hereunder, or as long as this lease is continued in effect as otherwise herein provided.”
Tantalo Lease – five-year primary term:
“Subject to other provisions contained herein, this lease shall be for a term of five (5) years from the date first above written (hereinafter called the ‘primary term’) and as long thereafter as oil, gas, liquid hydrocarbons or their constituent products, or any of them, is produced in commercial paying quantities from the lands leased hereby.”

Both clauses are classic “thereafter” habendum clauses in the passive voice: the leases continue “as long . . . as oil, gas . . . are produced” or “is produced” from the land. They do not say “produced by Lessee.”

C. The Dispute

Although Cromwell repeatedly sought to enter a joint operating agreement (JOA) and participate in new wells, Anadarko never furnished a JOA. Nevertheless, Anadarko:

treated Cromwell as a “working interest owner” in internal and external communications,
sent him monthly joint interest billings (JIBs) starting in 2009 and paid him net proceeds or billed him for net costs, and
sent him at least one authorization for expenditure (AFE) for a new compressor, which Cromwell signed and funded.

After the primary terms of Cromwell’s leases expired (2012 and 2014), Anadarko took the position—internally—that Cromwell’s leases had terminated because he had not personally caused production. Yet Anadarko continued to send JIBs and maintain records showing Cromwell’s leases as “held by production.” In 2017, believing Cromwell’s leases to have expired, Anadarko took “top leases” from Cromwell’s lessors, then later informed Cromwell that his interests had expired and been re‑leased to Anadarko and others.

Cromwell sued, seeking declaratory relief, trespass to try title, and other remedies. The trial court granted summary judgment for Anadarko, and the El Paso Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under its own Cimarex precedent, Cromwell’s leases automatically terminated because he did not take action to “cause production” during or at the end of the primary term. The Texas Supreme Court granted review.

II. Summary of the Supreme Court’s Opinion

A. Core Holding

The Supreme Court holds that:

A habendum clause stating that the lease continues “as long as oil, gas or other minerals are produced from said land” (or similar passive-voice phrasing) does not, by its own terms, require the lessee to personally produce oil or gas.
Because production in commercial paying quantities continuously occurred on the land, Cromwell’s leases did not terminate; they remain in their secondary terms.
Paragraph 16 of the Tantalo Lease, which purports to tie extension beyond the primary term to “Lessee” obtaining production or engaging in operations, is ambiguous and, under the anti‑forfeiture canon, is construed as a covenant rather than a special limitation causing automatic termination.
Cromwell preserved his “passive voice” textual argument in the court of appeals; there was no forfeiture of this theory.
The Court disapproves Mattison v. Trotti (5th Cir. 1959), Hughes v. Cantwell (Tex. App.—El Paso 1976), and Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp. (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019) to the extent those cases held that passive-voice habendum clauses silently require lessee‑caused production.

B. Result

The Court reverses the court of appeals and remands the case to the trial court for consideration of Cromwell’s remaining claims and defenses (other than his partnership-based claims, which he did not challenge on appeal).

III. Detailed Analysis

A. Procedural History and Preserved Issues

Anadarko argued in the Supreme Court that Cromwell had “waived” (technically, forfeited) his passive-voice argument by allegedly failing to ask the court of appeals to overrule Cimarex. The Court rejected that contention.

Relying on Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(f) and cases like Perry v. Cohen and Li v. Pemberton Park Community Ass’n, the Court explains:

A party’s “statement of an issue or point” covers all “subsidiary questions that are fairly included.”
Parties may construct new arguments for issues properly raised below, even if they did not use the same doctrinal labels.
Cromwell clearly put at issue whether his leases automatically terminated at the end of the primary terms; he argued against adding unwritten termination conditions—the opposite of Cimarex.
Anadarko itself acknowledged in the court of appeals that Cromwell’s position was “directly contrary to Cimarex.”
Arguing in the alternative—i.e., that even under Cimarex his leases did not terminate—did not forfeit Cromwell’s principal textual argument.

Thus, the Court holds that Cromwell preserved his passive-voice contention, and it proceeds to the merits.

B. Contract Interpretation: Text First, Purpose Second

The Court reiterates a now-firmly-settled methodology for interpreting mineral leases:

An oil-and-gas lease is a contract; ordinary contract-interpretation rules apply (Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp.).
Lease construction is reviewed de novo (Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson).
The goal is to discern the parties’ objective intent from the text they chose, read as an ordinary person would under the circumstances (URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County).
Surrounding circumstances may inform interpretation, but cannot justify making the lease “say what it unambiguously does not say” (First Bank v. Brumitt).

Against this backdrop, the Court focuses on the precise wording of the habendum clauses:

Cromwell’s leases say they last “as long as” minerals “are produced from said land” or “are produced in commercial paying quantities from the lands leased hereby.”
The clauses do not say “as long as oil and gas are produced by Lessee” or “as long as Lessee causes production.”
Other leases commonly do use such language, as illustrated by prior Texas cases where the clause explicitly stated “produced from said land by the lessee” (Ridge Oil, Fleming v. Ashcroft, W.T. Waggoner Estate v. Sigler Oil Co., etc.).

The Court emphasizes a strong no‑rewriting norm, citing recent authority like American Midstream (Ala. Intrastate), LLC v. Rainbow Energy Marketing Corp. and Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Products Co.: courts must not blue‑pencil missing words into contracts nor impose restraints or conditions the parties did not bargain for.

On that textual basis alone, the Court concludes:

“The habendum clauses in the Ferrer Lease and the Tantalo Lease do not specify which party must do the producing, and we won't write in such a term ourselves.”

C. The Habendum Clause and Lease Duration

The Court restates the foundational function of the habendum clause:

It defines the duration of the mineral estate (Anadarko v. Thompson).
Typically divides the lease into (1) a fixed primary term and (2) a secondary term that continues “as long as” some condition is met (e.g., production, operations, rentals) (Endeavor v. Discovery Operating).
Here, the primary terms were three and five years. The leases continue thereafter “as long as” production in commercial paying quantities occurs on the leased lands (or pooled units, in Ferrer).

The Court accepts the classic Walker formulation that a “thereafter” production clause generally creates a special limitation: the lease “automatically” terminates if production ceases. But that automatic termination is triggered by failure of the stated condition—here, the absence of production—not by unstated requirements about who must produce.

Because production never ceased and was continuously in paying quantities, the condition for continuation into the secondary term was always met. On a straightforward reading:

The Ferrer and Tantalo leases moved into their secondary terms and remain in force.
There is no textual trigger for automatic termination merely because Cromwell did not operate the wells.

D. The Court’s Treatment of Lease “Purpose” Language

The court of appeals had relied heavily on the “purpose” recital language in Cromwell’s leases (e.g., “for the purpose of exploring . . . and drilling, producing and operating wells”), treating those provisions as indicative that the lessee had to be the party responsible for production.

The Supreme Court sharply corrects that approach, invoking U.S. Polyco, Inc. v. Texas Central Business Lines Corp.:

Courts are not empowered to make every provision harmonize with some “grander theme or purpose” unless the parties themselves clearly subordinate all other terms to that purpose.
Purpose recitals cannot override or silently amend the operative habendum clause, which directly governs duration.

By elevating purpose language over the clear, passive-voice habendum text, the court of appeals “ran afoul of the habendum clauses’ plain language.” The Supreme Court insists that the habendum clause is the “key language” for duration, and the parties’ choice of the passive voice in that clause is controlling.

E. Paragraph 16 of the Tantalo Lease: Ambiguity and Anti-Forfeiture

A more complex interpretive issue arises from Paragraph 16 of the Tantalo Lease, which provides that rights beyond the primary term exist “if, and only if” one of several lessee-focused conditions occurs, including:

Lessee has “obtained production in commercial paying quantities” before the primary term expires; or
Lessee is “then engaged in exploration operations” at the end of the primary term, etc.

On its face, Paragraph 16 appears to shift from the passive-voice “is produced” in the habendum clause to active “Lessee has obtained production” language. Anadarko seized on this and argued that the Tantalo Lease unambiguously required Cromwell himself to “obtain” production to extend the lease.

The Court declines to adopt that reading, for several related reasons:

Cross-subjectivity / circularity: Paragraph 16 is expressly “[s]ubject to Paragraphs 6 and 11,” which themselves are drafted in the passive voice and similarly fail to specify who must act.
Mutual subordination: Paragraph 11 is also “[s]ubject to Paragraph 16,” creating a circular hierarchy of provisions.
Resulting ambiguity: These cross-references and inconsistent drafting (passive vs. “Lessee” language) render Paragraph 16 ambiguous as to whether and how it imposes an automatic termination condition distinct from the habendum clause.

Given that residual ambiguity, the Court invokes a key interpretive canon: the rule against forfeiture of mineral interests. Citing Energen, Anadarko v. Thompson, Fox v. Thoreson, and Rogers v. Ricane, the Court reiterates:

Texas law disfavors constructions that result in forfeiture of property rights, especially in oil-and-gas leases.
A lease term will not be construed as a special limitation causing automatic termination unless the language is “so clear, precise, and unequivocal” that it can reasonably be given no other meaning.
Where doubt remains, courts should treat such language as creating covenants, enforceable by damages or conditional cancellation, rather than special limitations that auto‑terminate the estate.

Applying that canon, the Court holds:

Paragraph 16 is ambiguous in how and when it purports to impose special limitations.
Accordingly, it is construed as a covenant, not a special limitation.
It does not create an independent automatic‑termination mechanism beyond that already contained in the habendum clause’s production condition.

This reinforces the central message: forfeiture of a lessee’s acreage position will not be inferred from ambiguous or loosely drafted language that can reasonably be read as something short of a special limitation.

F. Co‑Tenancy and Remedies: Why Anadarko Does Not Need Termination

The Court notes that Cromwell and Anadarko are co‑tenants in the same tract, both owning working interests. Under Texas co‑tenancy principles:

A producing co‑tenant may develop the property without the other’s consent but must account to non‑producing co‑tenants for their share of net profits, after deducting reasonable and necessary costs (Cox v. Davison).
A non-producing co‑tenant is typically obligated to bear its share of development and operating expenses in proportion to its working interest.

Thus, if the concern is that a non‑producing co‑tenant like Cromwell may fail to pay his share of costs, the law already provides a well‑developed remedy: an action for accounting and recovery of unpaid expenses. The Court explicitly observes:

“Tenancy law already provides Anadarko a remedy if Cromwell fails to fulfill his obligations as a co‑tenant; it need not (and, here, cannot) seek termination of Cromwell's leases.”

Therefore, there is no policy or remedial gap that would justify judicially imposing a draconian automatic-termination rule where the lease text does not clearly provide one.

G. Disapproval of Mattison, Hughes, and Cimarex

A central jurisprudential move in this opinion is the Court’s explicit rejection of the reasoning and holdings of three frequently cited passive-voice cases:

Mattison v. Trotti, 262 F.2d 339 (5th Cir. 1959)
The Fifth Circuit, making an Erie guess about Texas law, held that a passive-voice habendum clause implicitly required production by the lessee because “drilling for and the production of oil or gas by the lessee is the [lease’s] prime consideration.” On that basis, it treated the lessee’s failure to drill or participate as lease‑terminating.
Hughes v. Cantwell, 540 S.W.2d 742 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1976)
Relying on Mattison, Hughes held that a passive-voice habendum clause nonetheless required the lessee (a non-operating co‑tenant) to maintain the lease by drilling operations “directly or constructively,” particularly where the lessee had declined an opportunity to join the operator’s wells.
Cimarex Energy Co. v. Anadarko Petroleum Corp., 574 S.W.3d 73 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2019)
Pushing the logic even further, Cimarex held that a non‑operator lessee’s passive-voice habendum clause failed even where the operator prevented the lessee from participating in production. The non‑operator’s failure to personally produce was deemed fatal to its lease, despite the absence of such a requirement in the text.

The Supreme Court disapproves these cases on two major grounds:

Textual departure
Each case “depart[ed] from the plain language of the lease” and, in effect, rewrote passive-voice clauses to read “produced by the lessee,” contrary to Brumitt’s admonition against making contracts say what they do not say.
Mistaken premise about “consideration”
Mattison and its progeny assumed that the “prime consideration” of an oil‑and‑gas lease is the lessee’s drilling and production. The Court corrects this:
“[T]he ‘vital consideration’ in an oil-and-gas lease is ‘royalties on mineral production.’” (Texas Co. v. Davis)
The lessor’s core bargain is a royalty stream, not necessarily that a particular lessee will be the operator. So long as the lease continues and production exists (from whoever), royalties can be paid and the primary economic purpose is fulfilled.

Accordingly, the Court explicitly “disapprove[s]” Mattison, Hughes, and Cimarex “to the extent they hold otherwise” than the rule announced here.

H. The New Clarified Rule

From this opinion, the following rule can be distilled:

Where an oil‑and‑gas lease’s habendum clause is written in the passive voice—“as long thereafter as oil or gas is produced from said land” or similar—and does not specify who must produce, any production in commercial paying quantities from the leased lands (or pooled unit, if so provided) is sufficient to maintain the lease into and through its secondary term.
Courts will not infer a requirement that production be undertaken by the lessee (or by the lessee directly or constructively) absent clear, express, and unequivocal language to that effect.
Ambiguous “Lessee must obtain production” or operations clauses that purport to affect lease duration will generally be treated as covenants, not special limitations, under the strong Texas presumption against forfeiture.

IV. Precedents and Authorities Cited: How They Shape the Decision

A. Core Contract and Lease Interpretation Cases

Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Energen Res. Corp., 615 S.W.3d 144 (Tex. 2020)
Confirms that oil-and-gas leases are contracts and that standard contract principles govern their interpretation. Emphasized the importance of text and the use of default rules (like anti‑forfeiture) when ambiguity persists.
Anadarko Petroleum Corp. v. Thompson, 94 S.W.3d 550 (Tex. 2002)
Describes the habendum clause as defining the duration of the mineral estate and sets the high bar (“clear, precise, and unequivocal”) for language to operate as a special limitation automatically terminating the lease.
URI, Inc. v. Kleberg County, 543 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. 2018)
Provides the “ordinary person” objective-intent standard and explains how surrounding circumstances may inform, but not override, text.
First Bank v. Brumitt, 519 S.W.3d 95 (Tex. 2017)
The key quote: courts cannot interpret a contract to “say what it unambiguously does not say.” This principle is the direct doctrinal basis for rejecting the addition of “by lessee” to passive-voice habendum clauses.

B. Anti-Forfeiture and Special Limitations

BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 526 S.W.3d 389 (Tex. 2017)
Reiterates that lease termination questions are resolved by ascertaining parties’ intent from the lease “as a whole,” with caution against implying harsh termination consequences.
Endeavor Energy Res., L.P. v. Discovery Operating, Inc., 554 S.W.3d 586 (Tex. 2018)
Explains primary vs. secondary terms and recognizes that a habendum clause often creates a special limitation; also reaffirms the use of default canons (including anti‑forfeiture) when ambiguity persists.
Fox v. Thoreson, 398 S.W.2d 88 (Tex. 1966) and Rogers v. Ricane Enters., Inc., 772 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. 1989)
Both stand for the principle that doubts should be resolved against finding conditions that result in automatic termination of mineral interests.
A.W. Walker Jr., The Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 8 Tex. L. Rev. 483 (1930)
Quoted by the Court for the classic proposition that a lease with a “thereafter” production clause automatically terminates if oil or gas is not being produced at the end of the primary term or later ceases—but only when that condition (lack of production) actually occurs.

C. Drafting and Non-Blue-Penciling

Tenneco Inc. v. Enterprise Prods. Co., 925 S.W.2d 640 (Tex. 1996)
Warns that courts may not rewrite agreements “to insert provisions parties could have included or to imply restraints for which they have not bargained.”
American Midstream (Ala. Intrastate), LLC v. Rainbow Energy Mktg. Corp. (Tex. May 23, 2025)
Cited as a fresh reaffirmation that courts must not blue‑pencil contractual language—used here to underscore that the Court will not add a “by lessee” requirement into a passive clause.

D. Co‑Tenancy and Working Interest Obligations

Cox v. Davison, 397 S.W.2d 200 (Tex. 1965)
Establishes that a producing co‑tenant must account to a nonproducing co‑tenant for net profits, after charging reasonable costs—showing that a non‑operator working‑interest owner has obligations, but the remedy is accounting, not automatic forfeiture of the lease.

E. The “Vital Consideration” of an Oil-and-Gas Lease

Texas Co. v. Davis, 254 S.W. 304 (Tex. 1923)
Provides the key correction to Mattison’s assumption: royalties, not the lessee’s identity as operator, are the “vital consideration” of the lease. This undercuts the logic of imposing a lessee‑production requirement in the name of the lessor’s expectations.

F. Predictability in Property Law

Cosgrove v. Cade, 468 S.W.3d 32 (Tex. 2015)
Invoked in conclusion for the proposition that “legal certainty and predictability” are especially vital in property ownership, which requires “bright lines and sharp corners.” This undergirds the Court’s insistence on clear textual rules for lease termination.

V. Complex Concepts Simplified

A. Habendum Clause

The habendum clause in a lease is the “to have and to hold” provision that sets how long the lessee’s interest lasts. In oil-and-gas leases:

Primary term: a fixed number of years (e.g., three or five), during which the lease is held regardless of production (especially in a “paid‑up” lease).
Secondary term: an indefinite period that continues “as long as” a condition is met, commonly “as long as oil or gas is produced in paying quantities.”

If that condition fails (e.g., production ceases beyond allowed shut‑in/operations savings clauses), the lease often automatically ends.

B. Passive Voice vs. Active Voice in Habendum Clauses

Passive voice: “as long as oil or gas is produced from the land” – does not say who is doing the producing.
Active voice with actor specified: “as long as oil or gas is produced from said land by the lessee.”

The entire dispute here turns on this drafting nuance. The Court holds that passive-voice clauses do not silently incorporate “by lessee.” If the lessor wants to require lessee‑operated production, the lease must say so.

C. Special Limitation vs. Covenant

Special limitation – A condition that, if it occurs, automatically ends the estate. In oil-and-gas leases, a habendum clause is usually a special limitation: when its condition (e.g., production) fails, the lease automatically terminates without the need for suit.
Covenant – A contractual promise. If breached, the non‑breaching party may seek damages or, in equity, conditional cancellation, but the estate does not automatically terminate solely by the breach.

Because Texas courts dislike forfeiture, ambiguous language is usually construed as creating covenants, not special limitations. Paragraph 16 of the Tantalo Lease, for example, is treated as a covenant.

D. Working Interest and Co‑Tenancy

Working interest: The right to develop the land for oil and gas and to share in production, subject to the obligation to pay the costs of drilling, completing, and operating wells.
Co‑tenants: When two or more parties each hold undivided interests in the same mineral estate (e.g., Anadarko and Cromwell), each has the right to develop the property, subject to accounting duties to the others.

A non‑operator working‑interest owner like Cromwell shares in revenues and expenses but may not physically operate the wells. Co‑tenancy rules give the producing co‑tenant a remedy for unpaid costs without annihilating the non‑operator’s leasehold interest.

E. Top Lease

A top lease is a later‑in‑time lease granted on top of an existing mineral lease. It becomes fully effective only if and when the prior lease terminates. Top leases are often used by operators who believe an old lease has lapsed; if that belief is wrong, the top lease is vulnerable, as illustrated here, where Anadarko took top leases while Cromwell’s leases were still held by production.

F. Erie Guess

Because federal courts must apply state substantive law in diversity cases, when precedent from a state’s highest court is lacking, a federal court may make an “Erie guess” about what that court would decide. Mattison v. Trotti was such a guess about Texas law. The Texas Supreme Court’s opinion here effectively corrects that guess retroactively, clarifying the true rule of Texas law.

VI. Impact and Practical Implications

A. For Lease Drafting and Negotiation

The opinion sends a clear drafting signal:

Clarity about “who must produce”: If lessors or lessees intend that continued lease validity depend on the lessee personally operating or directly participating in wells, they must include express language such as “produced from said land by Lessee.”
Purpose and recitals will not be enough: Generic “purpose” clauses emphasizing exploration and drilling by “Lessee” will not override a passive-voice habendum clause.
Paragraph cross‑referencing must be precise: Circular or ambiguous cross‑references (as in Paragraphs 6, 11, and 16 of the Tantalo Lease) are likely to be resolved against forfeiture and in favor of continued lease validity.

B. For Non‑Operating Working Interest Owners

The decision is especially protective of non‑operator lessees who hold working interests but are not the operator of record:

They may rely on the operator’s production to satisfy passive-voice habendum clauses.
Even if operators refuse to execute JOAs or AFEs, the lessee’s lease does not silently forfeit so long as production exists and the lease text does not clearly impose a lessee‑production condition.

This substantially reduces the risk that passive-voice leases will be deemed to have quietly lapsed simply because the lessee was unable—practically or contractually—to become the actual driller.

C. For Operators and Top Lease Strategies

Operators like Anadarko who seek to “wash out” non‑operating co‑tenants or lessees via top leases must now be more cautious:

Top leases taken on the theory that passive-voice habendum clauses require lessee‑driven production are now on shaky ground.
Operators must carefully review lease language and any express “by lessee” requirements before concluding that an older lease has terminated.
Reliance on Mattison, Hughes, or Cimarex as legal justification is no longer viable in Texas state courts.

D. Litigation and Transactional Certainty

The Court’s insistence on textual fidelity and bright lines reinforces predictability:

Reduction in litigation over “implied” lessee production requirements: Parties can more readily evaluate whether a lease is “held by production” by examining objective production data rather than subjective participation histories.
Strengthened anti‑forfeiture doctrine: The opinion confirms that ambiguous lease language affecting duration will rarely, if ever, be construed to cause automatic termination, aligning with a long trend of forfeiture‑averse decisions.
Clarification of federal vs. state authority: The Court explicitly corrects the Fifth Circuit’s Mattison Erie guess, ensuring uniformity in Texas law going forward.

VII. Conclusion

Cromwell v. Anadarko establishes an important and clarifying principle in Texas oil-and-gas law: a passive-voice habendum clause—“as long as oil or gas is produced from the land”—means exactly what it says. It is satisfied by production from the land, regardless of who does the producing, unless the lease explicitly says otherwise.

In reaching this conclusion, the Supreme Court of Texas:

Reaffirms a strict textual approach to oil-and-gas leases, rejecting attempts to rewrite contracts based on perceived “purposes” or policy preferences.
Strengthens the longstanding anti‑forfeiture canon, construing ambiguous “Lessee must obtain production” language as covenants rather than automatic‑termination provisions.
Corrects a decades‑long line of contrary authority emanating from Mattison, Hughes, and Cimarex, and restores alignment with earlier Supreme Court teachings like Texas Co. v. Davis on the nature of the lease’s “vital consideration.”
Clarifies that, where co‑tenancy and working interests are involved, the proper remedy for disputes over participation is an accounting for costs and revenues—not the judicial creation of termination conditions absent from the lease.

The decision thus promotes “legal certainty and predictability” in mineral title, providing the “bright lines and sharp corners” that Cosgrove v. Cade identified as essential in property law. Going forward, Texas practitioners—both litigators and transactional lawyers—can rely on a clear rule: if a lease’s habendum clause is written in the passive voice and does not expressly require lessee‑operated production, continued production in paying quantities by any party is sufficient to hold the lease.