“Pending-Litigation Abeyance” Doctrine:
Sullivan v. Baker Ranches and the State Engineer’s Discretion to Suspend Water-Rights Investigations

1. Introduction

Case: Sullivan, P.E. v. Baker Ranches, Inc., 141 Nev., Adv. Op. 36 (Nev. Sup. Ct. en banc, Aug. 14 2025).

The Supreme Court of Nevada confronted two intertwined questions of water-law administration:

1. Does the State Engineer possess implied authority to suspend (“hold in abeyance”) an investigation into alleged water-rights violations while overlapping federal litigation is pending?
2. Is the Engineer’s decision to suspend such an investigation a “final, reviewable decision” under NRS 533.450?

The litigation began when Baker Ranches, holder of decreed surface-water rights in Baker and Lehman Creeks, complained that the National Park Service (NPS) allowed rock dams and cave diversions in Great Basin National Park, allegedly diminishing Baker’s decreed flows. The State Engineer opened an investigation, performed two site visits, but—citing parallel federal litigation between Baker Ranches and the Department of the Interior—formally placed the investigation “in abeyance.” Baker petitioned for judicial review; the district court ordered the Engineer to finish his work. The State Engineer appealed. The Nevada Supreme Court vacated the district-court order.

2. Summary of the Judgment

The Court, per Justice Stiglich, held:

• Implied Discretionary Power. Nevada’s statutory and regulatory water-law framework bestows several explicit enforcement tools on the State Engineer; those explicit grants “encompass an implied power” to control when and how to deploy them. Therefore, suspending an investigation pending related litigation falls within the Engineer’s discretion.
• Non-Reviewable Interlocutory Act. A suspension letter that merely delays, rather than terminates, the investigation is not a “final order or decision” under NRS 533.450. Consequently, the district court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain judicial review.
• Outcome. The district-court order compelling the Engineer to resume the investigation was vacated.

3. Analysis

3.1 Precedents Cited and Their Influence

• Sullivan v. Lincoln County Water Dist., 140 Nev. (2024)
  Confirmed that the State Engineer’s powers are cabined to those expressly or implicitly delegated by the Legislature. The Court relied on this analytical framework to recognize an implied abeyance power.
• Application of Filippini, 66 Nev. 17 (1949)
  Emphasized water-law proceedings are “strictly limited” to statutory parameters, guiding the Court’s inquiry into whether the abeyance practice derived from statutory purpose.
• Howell v. Ricci, 124 Nev. 1222 (2008)
  Laid down the three-part test for reviewability (affects interests, written, final). The Court applied this test to label the abeyance letter as non-final.
• Valley Bank of Nev. v. Ginsburg, 110 Nev. 440 (1994)
  Provides the “what the order does, not what it is called” standard for finality, analogized to the administrative context.
• Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985)
  U.S. Supreme Court precedent that agency decisions not to enforce are presumptively unreviewable; cited to bolster the discretionary aspect of enforcement timing.
• Other supportive authorities: Gray Line Tours (reasonable-time argument rejected), General Foods v. Cryo-Maid (courts’ inherent stay power), Gould v. Control Laser (when a stay becomes effectively final), and Colorado’s Peabody Sage Creek Mining (what constitutes consummation of agency process).

3.2 Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. Textual and Structural Reading of NRS 533. The Court canvassed NRS 533.475, 533.481, 533.482 and allied regulations (NAC 532.200-.220) to show that:
   • Each enforcement tool (“may arrest,” “may fine,” “may seek injunction”) is framed in permissive language.
   • The permissive structure implies managerial discretion over whether, when, and how to deploy those tools.
   • No statute imposes a mandatory timeline for investigations.
2. Implied-Power Doctrine. Because the Legislature gave the Engineer explicit discretionary enforcement powers, the power to manage an investigation’s timing is implied, analogized to a court’s inherent docket-management power.
3. Finality Analysis.
   • An order is final when it “disposes of all issues.”
   • The abeyance letter merely postponed action; it did not purport to decide the merits, terminate the investigation, or declare lack of jurisdiction.
   • Thus the letter was interlocutory. Under Howell, interlocutory acts are not subject to judicial review.

3.3 Potential Impact

• Administrative Law—Agency Discretion. The decision strengthens Nevada’s presumption of non-reviewability over interim enforcement choices, aligning state law with Heckler v. Chaney. Expect agencies (not just the State Engineer) to cite this case when pausing or sequencing enforcement work.
• Water-Rights Litigation Strategy. Water users may see longer timelines when parallel federal or interstate disputes exist. Parties must either (a) accelerate the collateral litigation, or (b) demonstrate that an abeyance is effectively permanent before seeking relief.
• Judicial Economy & Federal-State Comity. The Court implicitly encourages administrative and judicial bodies to avoid inconsistent rulings with federal courts, promoting comity and efficient final resolution.
• Future Challenges. The Court signaled that an indefinite or effectively dismissive suspension could be reviewable. Litigants will focus on demonstrating excessive delay to pierce the non-finality shield.

4. Complex Concepts Simplified

• State Engineer. Nevada’s chief water-rights administrator. Functions like a specialized regulator, combining investigative, quasi-judicial, and enforcement roles.
• Abeyance. A procedural pause. The underlying matter is neither dismissed nor decided; it simply waits.
• Interlocutory vs. Final Decision. An interlocutory step happens mid-process; a final decision ends the controversy before that decision-maker. Only final decisions are normally appealable.
• Judicial Review under NRS 533.450. A statutory “appeal” from a State Engineer decision to district court; limited to written, final orders that affect a person’s water-rights interests.
• Sovereign Immunity. Doctrine preventing suits against the United States unless Congress says otherwise. It explains why the parallel federal case was dismissed—shaping the Engineer’s calculus on abeyance.

5. Conclusion

Sullivan v. Baker Ranches clarifies two critical points in Nevada water law and administrative practice:

1. The State Engineer possesses an implied discretionary power to pause enforcement investigations when prudentially warranted—here, until related federal litigation clarifies overlapping rights or obligations.
2. A suspension letter that merely delays, without disposing of, the merits is not a “final order or decision”; hence, it is not immediately reviewable under NRS 533.450.

The decision harmonizes Nevada law with federal administrative-law principles, reinforces agency autonomy in managing enforcement dockets, and prescribes a clear roadmap for future litigants: show that an agency’s pause is tantamount to a final refusal, or wait until the agency ultimately acts. In the broader legal landscape, the case inaugurates the “Pending-Litigation Abeyance” doctrine for Nevada administrative agencies, serving as a significant precedent for both water-rights governance and administrative-law finality.