“Ordinary Opportunity” and Online Sex Stings: Entrapment Instructions after United States v. Medina‑Ortiz

I. Introduction

In United States v. Medina‑Ortiz, No. 24‑1233 (1st Cir. Nov. 24, 2025), the First Circuit revisits the doctrine of entrapment in the increasingly common context of online sex‑sting operations involving purported minors. The case addresses a focused but practically important question: when is a defendant in an undercover sting entitled to have the jury instructed on the defense of entrapment?

Nelson Medina‑Ortiz (“Medina”) was ensnared in an FBI operation where agents posed online as a 14‑year‑old girl named “Rolianas.” A federal jury in the District of Puerto Rico convicted him of attempted transportation of a minor with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2423(a), but acquitted him of attempted enticement of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b). On appeal, Medina challenged only one aspect of the trial: the district court’s refusal to give the jury an entrapment instruction.

The First Circuit, in an opinion by Judge Thompson (joined by Judges Aframe and Hamilton, with Judge Hamilton of the Seventh Circuit sitting by designation), affirms the conviction. The court holds that Medina failed to carry even the “modest” threshold burden of producing evidence of government inducement, and that, in consequence, the district judge correctly declined to instruct the jury on entrapment.

The opinion does not revolutionize entrapment doctrine. But it performs three important functions:

It clarifies what does not count as “inducement” in the setting of an online sex sting—specifically, the use of a casual‑encounters ad and open‑ended questions such as “fun! and what else?” when the defendant has already sexualized the interaction.
It reaffirms and sharpens the “plus factor” requirement in First Circuit entrapment law: mere opportunity is not enough; there must be excessive pressure, threats, or exploitation of an unfair advantage.
It harmonizes First Circuit doctrine with the Seventh Circuit’s “ordinary opportunity” formulation, adopting language that emphasizes the distinction between catching criminality and creating it.

II. Summary of the Opinion

The appeal centers on a narrow legal issue, reviewed de novo: whether the district court erred in denying Medina’s request for an entrapment instruction. Under First Circuit law, a defendant is entitled to such an instruction if he makes entrapment “plausible or superficially reasonable” by pointing to evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to him, that (1) the government induced him to commit the offense and (2) he was not predisposed to commit it.

Medina argued that:

the government initiated contact through a Craigslist “casual encounters” ad,
the agent “doggedly” pursued him and “played” with him, and
the agent’s coaxing him to name additional “fun” activities—beyond innocuous suggestions like the movies or the beach—constituted the “plus factor” of improper inducement.

The First Circuit rejects this theory, concluding that:

The FBI’s conduct amounted only to providing an ordinary opportunity to commit the crime; it did not exert excessive pressure or exploit any unfair advantage.
Critically, Medina re‑initiated and escalated the sexual nature of the communications after being told “she” was 14, and before the agent asked any “fun! what else?”‑type questions.
Under controlling precedent, this record does not plausibly show government inducement; and without inducement, the court need not even reach predisposition.

The court also:

rejects, as undeveloped, a cursory claim that agents “played on [his] sympathies,” finding it waived under ordinary appellate briefing rules; and
distinguishes United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), a leading First Circuit entrapment case, as factually “night‑and‑day” different because there the government first introduced the idea of sex with minors.

Concluding that the district judge properly denied the entrapment instruction, the court affirms the judgment of conviction.

III. Detailed Analysis

A. The Entrapment Framework in the First Circuit

The First Circuit applies the traditional, “subjective” entrapment test. As encapsulated in cases like United States v. Shinderman, 515 F.3d 5 (1st Cir. 2008), and United States v. Ramos‑Paulino, 488 F.3d 459 (1st Cir. 2007), a defendant raising entrapment must show two elements:

Government inducement of the crime; and
Lack of predisposition on his part to commit the crime.

The threshold question on appeal here is not whether Medina in fact established entrapment, but whether there was enough evidence to merit an instruction so the jury could decide the issue. This is a defendant’s “modest” burden of production: if, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, an entrapment defense is “plausible or superficially reasonable,” the instruction must be given. The court cites the district court’s earlier order in United States v. Medina‑Ortiz, 633 F. Supp. 3d 531 (D.P.R. 2022), which in turn relied on United States v. Pérez‑Rodríguez, 13 F.4th 1, 19 (1st Cir. 2021), for that standard.

Two structural points frame the analysis:

Inducement is a gateway issue. If the defendant fails to show evidence of inducement, the court need not reach predisposition at all. That is exactly how the panel resolves Medina’s appeal: “Because Medina hasn’t met his burden on inducement, we needn’t consider predisposition.” (citing Shinderman, 515 F.3d at 15 n.6).
Standard of review is de novo. Entrapment‑instruction issues are reviewed de novo, as emphasized in United States v. Dávila‑Nieves, 670 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2012). The panel underscores this by saying it has taken its own “fresh” look at the record, quoting United States v. Rodríguez‑Torres, 939 F.3d 16, 23 (1st Cir. 2019).

The governing definition of “entrapment” appears in a notable footnote quoting Judge Posner’s explanation in United States v. Manzella, 791 F.2d 1263 (7th Cir. 1986):

Entrapment means the government induces a person to commit a crime he was not predisposed to commit—someone who “would not have committed it but for the particular inducement that the government held out.”
If the government simply affects “the timing of the offense,” enticing a person already disposed to crime to act at a time and place convenient for enforcement, that is not entrapment; it is legitimate “catching” of criminality.
If, by contrast, “the inducement was so great that it tempted the person to commit a crime that he would not otherwise have committed,” punishing him does not reduce crime; it “deflect[s] law enforcement into the sterile channel of causing criminal activity and then prosecuting the same activity.”

The First Circuit signals its agreement: “We can’t put it better ourselves.” This policy lens—avoiding the “sterile channel” of creating crime rather than preventing it—underlies the court’s later adoption of the “ordinary opportunity” concept from Seventh Circuit cases.

B. The Facts as They Bear on Inducement

The opinion devotes substantial space to the details of eight days of communications between Medina and the fictitious “Rolianas.” This fact‑intensive recitation serves a legal purpose: it shows which side first steered the interaction into sexual territory and how persistent (or not) the government was in encouraging criminal conduct.

1. Government’s Initial Approach: Craigslist Ad

An FBI agent posted a Craigslist “casual encounters” ad (“Bored – w4m”) on the rationale that predators use that section to “exploit minors.” The body of the ad read, in colloquial, error‑laden text:

On Spring break in PR. What's gud? Been boring so far! . . . looking for fun. Ideas??

Medina responded by sending a photo of himself. The agent, as “Rolianas,” replied with “nice pic!!!! where r u?” Medina answered that he was in Humacao, Puerto Rico, and could “go wherever you wanted me to go.”

Crucially, when “Rolianas” disclosed, “I am 14yo. Is that okay?” Medina wrote back, “I don’t go out with minors.” Standing alone, this could suggest some resistance—a fact the defense wanted to leverage as evidence he was not inclined toward sex with minors absent government pressure.

But the interaction did not stop there. A few hours later, Medina re‑initiated contact with a new message: “Hi.” Over the following days he continued to reach out, and after “Rolianas” suggested texting instead of email, Medina wrote, “I’m bore can I go pick u up?? Give me your # so I be able to text you girl.”

2. Medina’s Early Sexualization of the Exchange

Once the conversation moved to text, Medina rapidly sexualized the interaction:

Within “only a few minutes,” he sent a photo of a woman lying on a bed in a short dress with partially exposed buttocks—a photo Medina himself conceded was sexual in nature.
Moments later, he sent a shirtless photo of himself.

This matters because it pre‑dates the agent’s supposedly “coaxing” questions. The court uses this sequence to demonstrate that the defendant, not the government, turned the interaction from innocent or ambiguous “fun” into sexual overtures.

After “Rolianas” again said she was “14,” the following exchange took place:

Medina: “Are you having fun jet??”
Agent: “the days are fun but night is boring”
Medina: “What you really wanted to do??”
Agent: “im lookin 2 have fun … what do U want 2 do?”

From there, Medina proposed meeting, mentioned movies, eating out, the beach, and “cruising in my Polaris,” but then the conversation continued to deepen sexually, in large part driven by his own initiatives.

3. Movement to Explicit Sexual Planning

Over the next series of texts and calls, Medina:

Suggested going to a jacuzzi and sent photos of a hotel room with a heart‑shaped jacuzzi filled with bubbles.
Proposed meeting at a hotel room and asked whether “Rolianas” had any sexual “fantasy’s” she wanted to fulfill.
Expressed physical arousal with emojis (water droplets and umbrella) that an agent testified signified sexual arousal and fluids.
Assured “Rolianas” that he was “safe,” would use condoms, and would not cause her harm, explicitly negotiating health and safety concerns raised by her.
Discussed his sexual experience and, through a joking racialized comparison, suggested he was well endowed. When she worried about pain, he responded, “My [tongue emojis] won’t hurt lol.”
Asked whether she was a virgin and commented “It would be easier that way … For you not being virgin.”

Perhaps most tellingly, Medina sent this message:

I asked God to forgive me but at the same time I thanks him for sending you my way I was stressing for real I needed something like this to happen HE knows how to do things when they needed to be done.

This passage shows not only desire but awareness of moral (and implicitly legal) wrongfulness. It will later matter for predisposition, but it also undermines any claim that the government had to push him over some psychological threshold.

4. Express Acknowledgment of Risk and Continued Pursuit

In two phone calls—agents pretending to be “Rolianas” speaking directly with Medina—he confirmed his intentions:

He said they could “make sex” at the hotel if she was “cool with it.”
He admitted he initially thought the police might be waiting for him when she said she was 14, but concluded that she did not “really sound like a cop.”

These statements show that he considered the possibility of a sting operation and proceeded anyway—a strong indicator of predisposition and of the absence of overpowering pressure by agents.

C. Precedents and Authorities: How They Shape the Decision

1. Distinguishing Opportunity from Inducement

A central legal spine of the opinion comes from earlier First Circuit decisions that draw a sharp line between:

Permissible opportunity to commit a crime; and
Impermissible inducement involving excessive pressure, threats, or exploitation.

The court cites:

United States v. Gendron, 18 F.3d 955, 961 (1st Cir. 1994): It is “proper” for the government to use a sting operation “where it amounts to providing a defendant with an ‘opportunity’ to commit a crime.”
Ramos‑Paulino, 488 F.3d at 462: Inducement requires more than mere solicitation or suggestion; it needs “something akin to excessive pressure, threats, or the exploitation of an unfair advantage.”
United States v. Gifford, 17 F.3d 462, 468 (1st Cir. 1994), quoting United States v. Coady, 809 F.2d 119, 122 (1st Cir. 1987): Inducement refers to turning someone “from a righteous path to an iniquitous one.”

These cases support the proposition that simply placing a temptation in front of someone already bent toward wrongdoing is not entrapment. The First Circuit reiterates that “clearing the way for criminal activity is not the same as pushing the defendant down a pathway toward crime,” quoting United States v. Guevara, 706 F.3d 38, 47 (1st Cir. 2013).

2. The “Plus Factor” Requirement and Online Stings

The court also leans on the “plus factor” terminology, which demands more than an opportunity to commit a crime:

United States v. O’Donovan, 126 F.4th 17, 40 (1st Cir. 2025): “Providing an opportunity to commit a crime is not improper inducement, although proof of opportunity plus something else may be adequate” (quoting United States v. Saemisch, 18 F.4th 50, 61 (1st Cir. 2021)).
United States v. González‑Pérez, 778 F.3d 3, 11 (1st Cir. 2015): “‘Plus’ factor[s] include ‘excessive pressure’” (quoting Guevara, 706 F.3d at 46).

Medina tried to fit within this framework by characterizing the agent’s behavior—especially repeated queries like “fun! and what else?....” and requests that he say what they should do—as the requisite “plus factor.” The First Circuit flatly rejects this, describing itself as “unconvinced.”

The reasoning rests on sequence and context: those questions occurred after Medina had:

learned “she” was 14,
chosen to re‑initiate contact after saying he didn’t go out with minors, and
sent sexually suggestive photos and moved the conversation into sexual territory.

In that light, vague prompts to elaborate on “fun” activities look like ordinary conversational back‑and‑forth, not improper pressure.

3. Adoption of the Seventh Circuit’s “Ordinary Opportunity” Language

A noteworthy feature of the opinion is its express reliance on recent Seventh Circuit entrapment cases:

United States v. Sewell, 103 F.4th 1292, 1298 (7th Cir. 2024), quoting United States v. Barta, 776 F.3d 931, 939 (7th Cir. 2015): Government conduct that “posed no risk of inducing [the defendant’s] criminality ‘rather than ca[tching] it’” is permissible.
United States v. Mayfield, 771 F.3d 417, 433 (7th Cir. 2014) (en banc): Where the government offered only “the ‘ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime’ and [the defendant] eagerly took it,” there is no entrapment.

The First Circuit borrows both the language and the conceptual frame: agents here gave Medina “the ‘ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime’ and he eagerly took it.”

This cross‑circuit borrowing is not entirely new—Manzella had already been cited for policy—but Medina‑Ortiz makes the Seventh Circuit’s “ordinary opportunity” formulation overtly part of First Circuit rhetoric. It signals a shared understanding: the core question is whether law enforcement is merely uncovering someone’s predisposed criminal behavior or actively manufacturing crime.

4. Threshold for the Instruction: Perez‑Rodríguez and Medina’s District Court Case

The district court’s own earlier opinion—United States v. Medina‑Ortiz, 633 F. Supp. 3d 531 (D.P.R. 2022)—figures into the appellate analysis. There, the trial judge articulated the entrapment‑instruction standard:

“An entrapment instruction is warranted if the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the defendant, ‘makes [the entrapment defense] plausible or superficially reasonable.’” (quoting Pérez‑Rodríguez, 13 F.4th at 19).

When Medina later asserted (in a single sentence) that the district court failed to apply the “light most favorable” standard during the final oral ruling, the First Circuit rejected that claim, noting that the judge had already demonstrated an accurate understanding of the standard in writing. The panel, conducting its own de novo review “in the required light,” agreed with the district court’s bottom line.

5. Waiver and Underdeveloped Arguments

The panel also relies on standard appellate waiver doctrine:

Miller v. Jackson, 152 F.4th 258, 270 (1st Cir. 2025);
FinSight I LP v. Seaver, 50 F.4th 226, 236 (1st Cir. 2022).

When Medina suggested that the FBI “play[ed] on [his] sympathies,” he offered no elaboration or record‑based argument. The court deems that point waived as a “cursory comment” not developed on appeal. This reinforces the message that entrapment claims must be factually and legally developed, not merely gestured at.

6. The Gamache Comparison

At oral argument, defense counsel identified United States v. Gamache, 156 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 1998), as their strongest case. In Gamache, an undercover officer posed as a mother, “Frances,” who eventually steered conversations toward sex with her minor children. The panel in Medina‑Ortiz highlights key distinctions:

In Gamache, the defendant initially expressed interest only in sex with the adult “Frances.” It was the government, not the defendant, that first “mentioned the ‘children’ as sex objects” and “escalated the subject of sex with children.”
By contrast, in Medina’s case, there is no similar escalation by the government. Agents did not first inject sex with minors into the conversation; indeed, once “Rolianas” disclosed her age, it was Medina who re‑initiated the interaction, sexualized the conversation, and proposed illicit conduct.

The court underscores that “Nothing like that happened here,” and notes that Pérez‑Rodríguez itself treated Gamache as a case where government was the “first mover” into child‑sex territory. The implication is that Gamache remains good law but marks a factual boundary: if the government first proposes sex with minors to a defendant not otherwise seeking that, an entrapment instruction may be warranted; when the defendant himself drives that theme, it is not.

D. The Court’s Legal Reasoning

1. No Government Inducement: Only “Ordinary Opportunity”

The heart of the opinion is the conclusion that the FBI did not “induce” Medina within the meaning of entrapment doctrine. Several strands of reasoning converge:

Government’s role was limited to creating an opportunity.
Posting a casual‑encounters ad and responding to overtures is, under Gendron and related cases, squarely within permissible investigative tactics. The ad was not extraordinarily suggestive; it invited “fun” and “ideas,” but did not mention sex, minors, or anything illicit. Medina chose to respond, and after learning “Rolianas” was 14, chose to persist.
Sequence shows Medina as the sexual initiator.
Before any “fun! what else?” questions, Medina:
- re‑engaged after the age disclosure;
- shifted to text messaging at his own suggestion;
- sent sexualized photos; and
- pushed the interaction toward nudity, hotel rooms, and jacuzzis.
The court stresses “perspective matters” (citing United States v. Saccoccia, 10 F.4th 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2021))—in perspective, the agent’s open‑ended inquiries appeared more like neutral prompts than coercive prodding.
No evidence of “excessive pressure, threats, or exploitation of unfair advantage.”
There were no repeated pleas that he participate, no threats, no offers of extraordinary money, and no exploitation of unusual vulnerabilities. The reference to “playing on [his] sympathies” was not supported by any identified statements in the record and was treated as waived.
Medina had time to reflect and still moved forward.
The exchanges spanned eight days. After first disclaiming interest in minors (“I don’t go out with minors”), he had time to stop, but instead re‑initiated contact and escalated the sexual nature of the communications. This temporal spacing strongly suggests self‑propelled criminal intent rather than a momentary lapse induced by government pressure.
His own words show contemplation and commitment.
His remark about asking God for forgiveness yet thanking God for sending “Rolianas” his way shows he understood what he was doing and embraced it nonetheless. His expressed worry that she might be a cop, followed by his conclusion that she “didn’t really sound like a cop,” and his decision to proceed, further undercut any theory of undue pressure.

On this record, the panel concludes that the government merely “posed no risk of inducing [Medina’s] criminality ‘rather than catching it,’” quoting Sewell and Barta, and that agents provided only “the ‘ordinary opportunity to commit the charged crime’ and he eagerly took it,” echoing Mayfield.

2. Treatment of Defense Arguments

Medina’s specific arguments fare poorly:

Agent started the conversation.
Medina points out that agents initiated the ad, and in that sense “started the communications.” The court responds that starting an undercover dialogue is not, by itself, inducement; it is the paradigmatic way to offer an opportunity.
“Fun! what else?” as a “plus factor.”
The claim that the agent’s open‑ended prompts count as a “plus factor” collapses once one recognizes that Medina had already introduced sexual elements. The court highlights that the unlawful idea—transporting and having sex with a 14‑year‑old—came from Medina, not the government.
“Light most favorable” standard.
His argument that the district court misapplied the “light most favorable” standard is dismissed as both factually unsupported (in light of the earlier written order correctly stating the law) and legally irrelevant, given the First Circuit’s own de novo review, conducted under the correct standard.
“Playing on sympathies”.
This theory—perhaps suggesting that the government exploited Medina’s loneliness, emotional state, or desire to help—was not fleshed out. Under Miller and FinSight, underdeveloped arguments are deemed waived.
Reliance on Gamache.
The panel explains that in Gamache, the undercover agent, posing as a mother, introduced sex with children as a topic to a defendant who had been interested only in sex with the adult. In Medina’s case, the FBI did not first propose sex with a minor; Medina did, after multiple clear reminders of “Rolianas’s” age. The factual gulf between these cases means Gamache does not assist Medina.

3. The Decision Not to Reach Predisposition

Having found no evidence of inducement sufficient to meet even the threshold burden for an instruction, the court explicitly declines to analyze predisposition. The law is clear: both elements are required for a successful entrapment claim, and failure on one is dispositive.

Implicitly, however, the opinion’s description of the evidence would make a predisposition finding likely:

He responded enthusiastically to the idea of meeting a 14‑year‑old he thought was on spring break.
He quickly sexualized the conversation and suggested a hotel room, jacuzzi, condoms, and specific sexual acts.
He persisted despite moral qualms (“I asked God to forgive me”) and legal suspicion (wondering whether she might be a cop).

By stopping at inducement, the court keeps the opinion narrow, but the factual narrative clearly signals its view that this is not a close case on either element.

E. Complex Concepts Simplified

1. What Is “Entrapment” in Simple Terms?

Entrapment is a legal defense that says: “The government talked me into committing this crime; I’m not the kind of person who would have done it otherwise.” It has two parts:

Inducement – Did the government push or pressure the defendant into committing the crime (beyond just giving him the chance)?
No predisposition – Was the defendant not already willing to commit that kind of crime before the government got involved?

If the defendant can show some evidence of both, the jury is supposed to get an instruction explaining this defense and decide whether it applies.

2. Inducement vs. Opportunity

The key distinction:

Opportunity: The government sets up a situation where a crime could be committed (e.g., posting an ad, leaving a bag unattended, having an undercover officer say “I can sell you drugs if you want”). This, by itself, is legally permissible.
Inducement: The government pushes further—applying “excessive pressure,” making threats, harassing, appealing heavily to sympathy, offering unusual rewards, or exploiting vulnerabilities—to persuade someone who otherwise wouldn’t have committed the crime. This is what can trigger an entrapment defense.

3. The “Plus Factor”

Courts often say “opportunity plus something else” is needed for inducement. That “something else” is the “plus factor”—for example:

repeated, high‑pressure urging;
threats of harm if the defendant does not participate;
playing aggressively on a defendant’s extreme financial desperation;
or—relevant in other child‑sex sting cases—being the first to suggest sex with a minor to someone who wasn’t seeking that.

In Medina‑Ortiz, the court holds that simply encouraging a suspect to say what else would be “fun,” in the context of a conversation already sexualized by the suspect, is not a “plus factor.”

4. Predisposition

Predisposition asks, essentially: “Was this person ready and willing to commit this type of crime before the government showed up?” Courts look at:

how quickly the defendant agreed to commit the crime;
who first suggested the criminal idea;
whether the defendant had engaged in similar acts before;
his comments showing attitude toward the crime (e.g., boasting, lack of hesitation); and
whether any reluctance was overcome by government pressure or by his own reconsideration.

Although the panel declines to discuss predisposition in detail, their factual discussion strongly suggests they viewed Medina as predisposed: he eagerly accepted the opportunity and pushed it forward.

5. “Viewed in the Light Most Favorable to the Defendant”

This is a procedural standard. When deciding whether to give an entrapment instruction, the judge must:

assume that any disputed facts are resolved in the defendant’s favor; and
give the defendant the advantage of any reasonable inferences that could be drawn from the evidence.

Even with that generous lens, the First Circuit concludes that no reasonable jury could find government inducement here based on the record.

6. “De Novo Review”

“De novo” review means the appellate court does not defer to the trial court’s legal conclusions. The First Circuit:

re‑reads the record itself;
applies the entrapment‑instruction standard anew; and
decides independently whether the evidence warranted an instruction.

This contrasts with more deferential standards like “abuse of discretion,” where the appeals court would uphold the trial judge unless there was a clear error of judgment.

F. Impact and Future Implications

1. For Online Sex‑Sting Operations

Medina‑Ortiz provides clear guidance to law enforcement on how to structure online stings involving purported minors:

Posting generic, non‑explicit ads is permissible. Using platforms like Craigslist’s “casual encounters” section and referencing boredom and a desire for “fun” does not, without more, risk an entrapment finding.
Early and clear age disclosures are important. Here, “Rolianas” disclosed “she” was 14 very early in the interaction. Medina’s choice to persist after that point is powerful evidence against inducement and in favor of predisposition.
Let the suspect introduce illegality. If agents wait for the suspect to propose sexual acts, hotel meetups, or travel arrangements, and limit themselves to clarifying questions or logistical planning, courts are likely to see this as providing opportunity, not inducement.
Open‑ended questions are generally safe. Asking “what would we do?” or “what else?” in context, especially when the suspect has already turned the discussion sexual, will rarely amount to the sort of pressure that creates entrapment issues.

The opinion also implicitly endorses the policy logic behind stings: they are legitimate tools to “catch” people whose preexisting criminality might otherwise be hard to detect, not mechanisms to generate crime that would not have occurred.

2. For Defense Strategies in Entrapment Cases

From the defense perspective, Medina‑Ortiz sends several cautionary signals:

Sequence and initiative matter enormously. If the defendant is the first to introduce minor‑sex themes or explicit sexual content, and agents respond passively or neutrally, the “inducement” argument will be weak.
Generalized complaints are not enough. Simply asserting that agents “played” with the defendant or “played on sympathies” without concrete record citations is not sufficient; such theories will be deemed waived.
Reliance on entrapment‑favoring precedents must be fact‑specific. Cases like Gamache help only where the government is the primary source of the criminal idea (particularly sex with minors), not where the defendant drives that content.
Entrapment instructions are not automatic in sting cases. Even in undercover operations explicitly targeting sex crimes with minors, defendants must still meet a substantive threshold. The setting alone does not trigger a right to an entrapment charge.

3. Interplay with the Split Verdict

Although the jury acquitted Medina of attempted enticement under § 2422(b) and convicted under § 2423(a) (attempted transportation with intent to engage in criminal sexual activity), the First Circuit does not dwell on this split verdict. Doctrinally:

The sufficiency of the evidence for each offense is distinct from the availability of an entrapment defense.
The entrapment‑instruction question is global to the case; it does not turn on the jury’s later compromise or differentiation among counts.

Practically, however, the split underscores that juries are capable of parsing complex sex‑sting cases and may acquit on some charges while convicting on others. That reality undercuts any argument that denying an entrapment instruction necessarily makes convictions inevitable; here, the jury demonstrated discriminating judgment without the entrapment charge.

4. Doctrinal Consolidation: The “Ordinary Opportunity” Standard

By expressly adopting the “ordinary opportunity” language from the Seventh Circuit, the First Circuit aligns its entrapment analysis with a broader federal trend. Key consequences:

Clearer benchmark for courts. Judges now have a concise formulation: if the government affords a suspect only the ordinary chance to commit the crime and the suspect “eagerly” seizes it, entrapment instructions are unwarranted.
Increased predictability for investigations. Investigators can design operations to remain on the “ordinary opportunity” side of the line, generally avoiding high‑pressure tactics, persistent badgering, or first‑suggesting illegal acts.
Limited space for “manufactured crime” arguments. Defendants claiming that stings “manufacture” crime must now show more than open‑ended flirtation or casual talk; they must point to concrete forms of undue pressure or manipulation.

IV. Conclusion

United States v. Medina‑Ortiz is a focused but significant addition to First Circuit entrapment jurisprudence. The court:

reaffirms that a defendant seeking an entrapment instruction must produce evidence of both government inducement and lack of predisposition;
clarifies that inducement demands more than a sting operation plus open‑ended questions—there must be a “plus factor” such as excessive pressure or exploitation; and
embraces the “ordinary opportunity” framework, emphasizing the distinction between catching a willing offender and creating an unwilling one.

On the specific facts—Medina’s pursuit of a self‑identified 14‑year‑old, his rapid escalation to sexual imagery and explicit planning, his expressions of awareness and determination, and the absence of any heavy‑handed tactics by agents—the panel had little difficulty concluding that the government merely caught an already willing offender. The FBI did not turn him “from a righteous path to an iniquitous one”; it simply revealed the iniquity that was already there.

For future cases, especially those involving online sex stings, Medina‑Ortiz offers a roadmap: entrapment defenses will falter where defendants themselves initiate and drive the criminal content after knowing they are dealing with a minor, and where the government’s role is confined to creating an opportunity and asking clarifying questions. Only when law enforcement goes further—pressuring the reluctant or inventing the criminal idea—will the entrapment instructions described in this opinion come into play.