“One Ignored Complaint Is Enough” – The Sixth Circuit’s Dual Ruling on Excessive-Force Handcuffing and Michigan Gross-Negligence Immunity

Introduction

Sherrell King v. City of Lincoln Park, Mich., No. 24-2017 (6th Cir. Aug. 5, 2025) tackles two frequently litigated questions:

When does an officer’s failure to adjust allegedly tight handcuffs violate clearly established Fourth Amendment rights and strip the officer of qualified immunity?
Can the same handcuffing conduct expose the officer to state-law liability for gross negligence under Michigan’s Governmental Tort Liability Act (“GTLA”)?

Officer Nick Kosmalski stopped and arrested Sherrell King for outstanding traffic warrants, used a two-cuff configuration behind her back, addressed her first discomfort complaint, but ignored her second. King sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for excessive force and under Michigan law for gross negligence. The district court denied both federal qualified immunity and state governmental immunity. The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of qualified immunity, but reversed the denial of governmental immunity, thereby laying down a pair of important, tightly focused precedents:

Federal side: Even where an officer initially checks handcuffs, a single ignored subsequent complaint, followed by injury, can defeat qualified immunity (“one ignored complaint rule”).
State side: A Michigan gross-negligence claim cannot proceed if it is “fully premised” on the same intentional handcuffing conduct that underlies the excessive-force claim.

Summary of the Judgment

The panel, per Judge Griffin, ruled:

Qualified Immunity (Fourth Amendment) – Denied.
• King’s evidence satisfied the three-part “unduly tight handcuff” test (complaint, officer disregard, injury).
• Prior published precedent (Morrison, Baynes, Rudolph, Hughey) clearly established the right; therefore, Officer Kosmalski could not claim qualified immunity at summary judgment.
Governmental Immunity (Michigan Gross Negligence) – Granted.
• King’s gross-negligence count was “fully premised” on the same intentional handcuffing act; under VanVorous and multiple Sixth Circuit cases, such claims are non-cognizable. The panel thus reversed the district court and ordered dismissal of the state-law claim.
Disposition – Case remanded for trial solely on the § 1983 excessive-force claim.

Judge Mathis would have allowed the gross-negligence claim to go to the jury; Judge Larsen would have granted qualified immunity as well. The splintered opinions underscore the importance—and narrowness—of the principal holding.

Analysis

Precedents Cited and Their Influence

Morrison v. Bd. of Trustees, 583 F.3d 394 (6th Cir. 2009) – Established the three-part test for unduly tight handcuff claims.
Baynes v. Cleland, 799 F.3d 600 (6th Cir. 2015) – Clarified that a “dismissive response” = ignoring complaint; reiterated that the right has been clearly established since at least 1993 (Walton).
Rudolph v. Babinec, 939 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2019) – Rejected any fixed “time bar”; focus is on conduct, not minutes handcuffed.
Hughey v. Easlick, 3 F.4th 283 (6th Cir. 2021) – Recent reaffirmation that ignored complaint + injury defeats qualified immunity.
VanVorous v. Burmeister, 687 N.W.2d 132 (Mich. Ct. App. 2004) – Key Michigan case barring gross-negligence claims duplicating intentional tort theories.
Counter-authorities (unpublished or distinguished): Fettes, Lee, Henry, O’Malley; the panel explained why these do not control.

Legal Reasoning

Violation of the Fourth Amendment
• The evidence, viewed favorably to King, showed (1) explicit complaints, (2) explicit disregard the second time, and (3) documented swelling, numbness, surgeries.
• The panel emphasised that “even less responsive conduct” than in Morrison/Baynes suffices—thus formalising the “one ignored complaint” standard.
Clearly Established Prong
• A long, unbroken line of published Sixth Circuit cases put officers on notice that ignoring complaints is unconstitutional. No fact-identical case is required post-Hope v. Pelzer (U.S. 2002).
• Attempts to rely on unpublished “outliers” were rejected because they cannot overcome binding precedent.
Michigan Gross Negligence
• Under the GTLA, immunity vanishes only for “gross negligence,” not intentional torts.
• The panel treated tight-handcuffing as intentional use of force; because King’s complaint alleged the same act as both excessive force and gross negligence, it was “fully premised” on intentional conduct and barred by VanVorous.
• The court distinguished Michigan cases (Oliver, Jackson) where an officer’s omission or failure to follow procedures—not the force itself—supported negligence.

Impact of the Decision

Clarifies Officer Obligations – Officers cannot rely on an initial handcuff check; a fresh complaint—no matter how soon—requires prompt reassessment.
Streamlines Michigan Pleading – Plaintiffs must plead separate negligent acts (policy failures, omissions, duty-of-care breaches) to escape VanVorous; mere relabeling won’t work.
Training & Policy Revisions – Agencies in the Sixth Circuit should update arrest protocols: “If the detainee complains, stop, inspect, adjust, document.”
Inter-Circuit Dialogue – Other circuits (e.g., 7th, 8th, 11th) have similar but not identical handcuff caselaw; this ruling may influence harmonisation.
Future Litigation – Expect more motions challenging Michigan gross-negligence counts at the pleadings stage, and more § 1983 handcuff claims surviving summary judgment where even one complaint is ignored.

Complex Concepts Simplified

Qualified Immunity: A legal shield protecting officials from money damages unless they violate a constitutional rule that was “clearly established” at the time.
Clearly Established: Enough precedent exists that any reasonable officer would know the conduct is unlawful; not identical facts, but “fair warning.”
Double-Locking Handcuffs: A mechanism that prevents handcuffs from ratcheting tighter inadvertently—but does not stop them from being too tight in the first place.
Gross Negligence (Michigan): Reckless conduct showing a “substantial lack of concern” for injury. Distinguished from (a) ordinary negligence—mere carelessness—and (b) intentional torts—conduct meant to cause harm.
“Fully Premised” Doctrine (VanVorous): If a state tort claim rests on the same intentional act as a federal excessive-force claim, Michigan courts treat it as duplicative and bar it under governmental immunity.

Conclusion

Sherrell King’s appeal has generated two concise but powerful rules for practitioners within the Sixth Circuit:

1. One ignored complaint of painful handcuffs—coupled with injury—defeats qualified immunity.
2. Michigan plaintiffs cannot recast that same handcuffing as “gross negligence” to avoid the GTLA.

The decision reinforces detainee protections during the most routine of police encounters while simultaneously tightening the pleading standards for state-law negligence claims. Going forward, officers must treat every complaint of handcuff pain seriously and contemporaneously, and plaintiffs must separate negligence theories from intentional-force allegations if they hope to sustain dual avenues of relief. The Sixth Circuit has thus sharpened both the sword and the shield in excessive-force jurisprudence, and agencies as well as litigators would be wise to take note.